Beijing on Friday officially submitted its draft plan for the creation a “Polar Silk Road” to China’s National People’s Congress, China’s parliament. The plan appears as part of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for national economic and social development, and is noted in the “Long-range objectives to the year 2035” framework.

It outlines how China in the Arctic will “participate in pragmatic cooperation”, while in the Antarctic Beijing seeks to “raise its ability to participate in the protection and utilization of the South Pole”. For the former this tangibly creates a framework to flesh out Beijing’s 2018 dubbing of itself as a “Near-Arctic State” and proposal calling for a Polar Silk Road. For the latter it lays out Beijing’s vision for the region clearly for the first time in a way that gives itself scope for both integration into, and revision of, the regions geopolitical framework and Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).

China in the Arctic:

The specific benefits Beijing expects from the initiative vary. For the Arctic, the Polar Silk Road is a primarily shipping and transport-based project. It aims to construct several new commercial arteries, made viable by the expectation of an ice-free Arctic by the 2030s. These arteries are a transpolar shipping lane across the Arctic, a Northwest route utilizing Canada’s northern archipelago, and a significant upgrade of the infrastructure along the Russian dominated Northern Sea Route. China is one of, if not the only, states to have led official expeditions to explore all three of these Arctic routes.

President Xi Jinping expects that these passages could shorten transit times by up to 40 per cent, an ambition he justifies by pointing to increases in EU duties and goods taxes that means China will need to make savings on transport to offset any diminishment in returns and retain its market share. 

China in the Antarctic:

In the Antarctic, the nature of China’s development is still fairly vague, though it’s important to note that the word ‘utilization’ carries several broad implications in regard to an Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) which severely restricts economic exploitation and heavily regulates other activity.

China has the fastest growing Antarctic presence of any nation and its aims have long been disputed. Western narratives tend to portray it as a revisionist power, seeking to nudge, cajole and perhaps overturn the Antarctic Treaty to a regime more to Beijing’s liking. There is some evidence for this. On the other hand, China has publicly committed to upholding the “purposes and gist” of the Antarctic Treaty, though not perhaps all its specific elements.

A not unfair stance considering the nature of the Antarctic Treaty System is disputed between being a successful treaty fostering international cooperation or as a tool reinforcing the geopolitical aims of particular states over others. The latter being particularly poignant as there is a strong case that certain states use their scientific presences on the continent to shore up, or lay the groundwork for currently frozen or potential future claims.

China would also not be the first power to seek to shift the ATS’ specifics. The 1970-90s debates over Antarctic mining highlight this succinctly. Beijing’s plans for development and utilization of the region sit conventionally among the current geopolitical context of Antarctica, particularly as 2048 sees the ATS open for renegotiation. China’s activity currently, like that of other Antarctic powers is to both uphold the treaty as far as possible for now, while also potentially paving the way for exploitation of the continent, in terms of minerals, which it was caught attempting to exploit previously, or bio-resources, like Krill which is set to boom in China as demand soars. Likewise, China’s increasing presence here gives it a greater degree of influence under the ATS as the level of scientific activity is directly equated with political influence, as well as laying the foundation for future claims. It is unlikely now that the ATS 2048 renegotiation will go forward smoothly and without issue.

A geopolitical challenge:

China’s Polar Silk Road and Polar developments face significant challenges though, coming as they do at a time of increasing tension between it and other western powers. In the Arctic, it has recently been rebuffed from investing and influencing strategically vital regions such as Greenland or Finland, either by US pressure, or due to a lack of trust with the domestic government, and its partnership with Russia is growing, but still tenuous. In the Antarctic, the ATS’ members fears of China as a revisionist power, a perspective not helped by Beijing’s own lack of transparency, mean that further aggressive development may spark an international backlash, particularly as 2048 draws closer.   

Beijing’s developmental commitment to a Polar Silk Road then is risky, expansive and will significantly alter the geopolitical order of the polar regions. It will however do nothing to alleviate growing tensions in both polar regions, despite assurances from Beijing that it is an economic partner, rather than an actor seeking geopolitical dominance.