Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely seen to have shaken up the international order. Right after Brexit, all these combine in a manner that could very well impact the ‘Global Britain’ strategy and, critically, the UK’s ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ in its foreign and security policy.

Context

In March 2021, the UK published a policy paper that set out Britain’s post-Brexit foreign strategy; ‘Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’. It targeted the global repositioning of Britain and, more importantly, focused on strengthening British action in the Indo-Pacific both bilaterally and multilaterally, which has been termed their ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. One year on this has translated into the UK joining ASEAN as a dialogue partner, new defence partnerships such as the AUKUS deal, and a commitment to a more enduring deployment of UK naval assets in the Indo-Pacific. However, these engagements fall short of the Integrated Review’s more holistic, long-term goals of enhancing regional economic and diplomatic relations. Indeed, the UK is yet solidify lasting partnerships with the ASEAN nations.

Impact

In light of these somewhat limited advancements, the Russo-Ukrainian war threatens to further modify British plans for the Indo-Pacific. As it stands, the war is projected to have destabilising effects on the region. On the one hand, Indo-Pacific countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan have imposed sanctions on Russia, following the footsteps of Western and NATO countries. On the other hand, China and India have shown signs of tilting towards Russia, in a polarising scenario unseen since 1991. Though China abstained from a UN General Assembly condemnation of Russia’s invasion, Presidents Xi and Putin’s meetings have confirmed China’s alignment with Russia. Indeed, China shares security concerns, such as threat to the ‘indivisible security’ principle that NATO is said by Russia to pose, and so participates in the discourse that Russia employs in justifying military action in Ukraine. As for India, Moscow has been its main exporter of weapons for a long time and both enjoy the dividends of their strategic partnership.

Prospects

Considering these developments, the UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy could move towards furthering the defence engagements already favoured in the last year. Britain is generally aligned with the US in security matters, and the Integrated Review already aimed to balance out China’s influence in the region. This may entail the UK continuing to put defence goals ahead of regional engagements, as these two poles will all but strengthen in the future, sketching out the new polarised international order. Despite this, without regional support, the UK will not obtain much progress in furthering its position in the region—specifically maritime and naval presence, let alone advancing the original diplomatic and commercial goals of the Integrated Review.

Opportunities

Nevertheless, as sanctions besiege Russia and its assets, the war in Ukraine can present a window of opportunity in trade and investment for the UK in the Indo-Pacific. Critically, the conflict’s international implications have already begun shaking up the system of regional alliances. India, for instance, may find itself in need of resorting to other purveyors of weapons—a market the UK is not unsuited for, being home to numerous defence giants such as BAE systems. Furthermore, it could invest in bilateral trade, economic and infrastructural ventures similar to the EU Global Gateway initiative, that will assist in bringing hydropower to India from Nepal.

More generally, the UK could take over the place of Russia in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit, whose principles could compromise Russia’s further involvement—thus gaining the influence and support much needed to fulfil the Integrated Review’s goals. By the same token, Britain could take advantage of the problems that sanctions are posing for countries partaking in them and replace Russia in trade matters. Indeed, due to the war and the Russian sanctions it has lead to, many Indo-Pacific countries are suffering from shortages in grain, energy, technology, and fertilisers. Thus, the UK could step in as an exporter of crude and refined petroleum and petroleum gas, as well as aircraft and vehicle parts, computers, and telecommunications tech; all of which are already of paramount importance for UK exports. Another such case is fertilisers wherein the Indo-Pacific could replace the EU as its major importer following Brexit.

All in all, the evidence suggests that Britain is at a crossroads when it comes to the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. While it has already favoured defence goals over diplomatic and regional connections, the war in Ukraine threatens to bring instability to a region already experiencing polarisation. This may mean going down the path of military partnerships and furthering their defensive presence in the region, yet it may also open a window of opportunity for British foreign investment and trade partnerships if they can play their diplomatic cards well, and define themselves as a strong and stable alternative.