The European Union’s enlargement policy “aims to unite European countries in a common political and economic project”. According to the European Parliament, enlargement “has proved to be one of the most successful tools in promoting political, economic, and social reforms”. Indeed, this is largely true: EU citizens are able to move freely for business, education, and leisure within the bloc; the EU has a robust uniform trade strategy, and above all, the EU has largely consolidated peace in Europe since its inception.

However, according to Emil Boc, the EU’s free movement policy suffers from a serious macroeconomic limitation: brain drain. The former Romanian prime minister – now mayor of Cluj-Napoca – has been actively raising awareness of this issue. Emil Boc recognises the issue is at the intersection of regional integration and national-level macroeconomic conditions. Simply put, the fundamental right to freedom of movement within the EU and adverse macroeconomic conditions in various Member States lead to talent from those Member States leaving to wealthier Member States or indeed leaving the EU altogether. A 2018 report by the European Committee of the Regions shows that the vast majority of ‘sending regions’ can be found in Southern Europe and in Eastern Europe, whereas ‘receiving regions’ were largely concentrated in Northern Europe and most of Italy. This iterates the systemic nature of the problem within the EU. Although there is yet no formal policy dedicated to addressing brain drain within the EU, the issue has gained salience over the last few years. Emil Boc was the Rapporteur for an official opinion published by the European Committee of the Regions, calling for a local government approach to tackle the issue. Similarly, over the last year, the European Commission has formally recognised the issue.

An intra-European brain drain may not seem at prima facie as a policy issue that ought to be addressed at the European level, it must definitely is. The reasoning is two-fold: firstly, brain drain means that periphery countries and ‘sending’ regions do not grow at the same pace as wealthier countries or regions which can drive euroscepticism. Secondly, for prospective countries looking to join the EU, the prospect of having talented members of the workforce emigrate might hamper enlargement.

Perhaps the second risk is more hypothetical than the first, the link between poor macroeconomic conditions (i.e. push factors for talented workers) and anti-EU sentiment and poor integration is well-documented in ‘sending’ regions and countries. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that Hungarians, Italians, Poles, and Slovaks have all elected outspoken Euroskeptics as head of government – for a long time those countries faced stagnating economic conditions and brain drain – now their governments are willing to challenge Brussels on core elements of foreign and internal policies.