Overview and key takeaways

The presidential elections in Russia, which took place from Friday, 15th March to Sunday, 17th March, determine Russia’s leadership until 2030. Although the presidential election is unlikely to bring any change to the Kremlin, with President Putin almost certain to secure a fifth term in office, it remains a key moment for Russia’s political landscape and thus for the countries of Central Asian.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has remained a key player in Central Asia's political stability, economic development, and security, underlining the region's dependency through strategic alliances like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Despite limited investment of resources in these relationships, Central Asia holds substantial strategic value for Moscow, since it is seen as part of Russia’s "blizhnee zarubezhe" (near abroad), a term Moscow uses to assert its desire to expand influence, consolidate its presence, and deter Western involvement in the region. While the relationship between Russia and each Central Asian country has its unique nuances, the strong Russian influence means that changes in its domestic politics have significant implications across the region.

The re-election of President Vladimir Putin, anticipated after a campaign emphasising economic stability, national security, and global power, is likely to extend Moscow's assertive stance in foreign policy and strategic interests in Central Asia. Russia is expected to intensify its involvement in Central Asia, seeking to solidify its status as the region's primary political and cultural influence, to reinforce its geopolitical position and align Central Asian nations with Putin’s ideological perspective.

The 2024 Russian presidential election

With Putin’s tight control over Russia’s political landscape, the suppression of independent media, and opposition candidates either sidelined, incarcerated or abroad, none of the three other candidates is expected to pose a challenge to Putin’s incumbency. Nevertheless, the upcoming election is more than a formal procedure. It offers Putin a critical opportunity to further solidify his leadership and governance amid external criticism and the intensifying information war with the West. Putin needs a landslide victory to give legitimacy to his perpetual rule and unending war, and to reinforce  Russia’s stance in the face of EU and US sanctions.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides Putin with a powerful nationalist narrative to unite the Russian electorate against external threats. Putin’s pre-election rhetoric has mostly focused on hisvision of Russia as a formidable, invincible power and a stronghold of traditional values. He positioned himself as the protector of Russian sovereignty against the West’s malicious intent to strategically defeat it and as a geopolitical ideologist, suggesting his intention to disseminate “Putinism” worldwide. This narrative, coupled with the Russian military’s successful repelling of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive and renewed offensive stance, has resonated with the Russian electorate. The public support for the “special military operation” in Ukraine has further increased, and Putin’s popularity and image as a strong leader was strengthened, despite the economic repercussions of the conflict and Western sanctions. Recent polls indicate a staggering approval rating of around 86% for Putin (February 2024). These numbers most likely do not reflect genuine public opinion given the autocratic climate, fear of reprisal, and the stringent laws criminalising criticism of the military and the government's war in Ukraine, but they are noteworthy nevertheless.

Central Asia’s geopolitical balancing act

Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have gradually reduced their dependency on Russia, by diversifying their economies and adopting a ‘multi-vector’ approach to foreign relations. Despite the unique nature of each country's relationship with Russia, the region's general economic and security dependencies on Russia remained strong. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the ensuing global geopolitical shifts have nuanced these relationships.

The five Central Asian Countries declared themselves neutral in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, not recognising the self-proclaimed republics in Eastern Ukraine and neither supporting nor rejecting UN Resolutions condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In some cases, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the need to stop military action and preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was emphasised at the beginning of the war. While far from an outright condemnation, this represented a noticeable shift from the typically strong alignment with Russia and the usual avoidance of any critique against Kremlin policies. Russia's aggression and its denial of Ukraine's right to independent statehood have also sparked a critical re-evaluation of Russia’s colonial legacies in Central Asia

The shift in Central Asia's stance towards Russia was driven by a dual rationale: on one side, there was a concerted effort to avoid negative repercussions from the war in Ukraine and to rebalance the geopolitical situation and secure their own interests; on the other, a broader re-evaluation of Russia’s colonial legacies in the region took place. Historically regarded as a pillar of stability, Russia's aggression and its denial of Ukraine's right to independent statehood, as well as its generally increasingly assertive actions in the former Soviet sphere—including direct criticisms of Central Asian governance and sovereignty—have prompted a resolute emphasise on national independence and sovereignty from the region’s leaders. This adjustment is highlighted by an unprecedented increase in public disapproval of Russian leadership across Central Asia, particularly among younger generations. For them, Russia's appeal is less about ideology or sentimental ties and more connected to its role as a source of employment and economic opportunities.

Economic relations and diversification

Consequently, the Central Asian republics have expanded their international collaborations, prioritising trade, and economic growth since 2022, despite foreign policy challenges from the Russia–Ukraine war. The region has economically prospered by diversifying their trade routes, aiming to lessen their reliance on Russia by developing stronger east–west links with China, Turkey, and the European Union. At the same time, Western sanctions on Russia have also provided important trade opportunities with Russia, leading all Central Asian countries to enhance their economic ties with Russia. They capitalised on the vacuum left by international firms exiting Russia and welcomed the influx of Russian businesses, capital, and people relocating to their territories. Additionally, the region has become an intermediary between Russia and the unsanctioned world to circumvent sanctions. The high demand for labour in Russia has increased labour migration to Russia and thus led to a significant increase in remittances sent back to the region. These developments have contributed to the booming of Central Asia’s economies with appreciating currencies and  a robust growth in GDP across the region, estimated at 5.9% in 2024. Thus, while trade relations have been diversified in recent years, the economic ties between the countries in Central Asia and Russia remain strong.

Political connections

These close economic ties are firmly anchored in the deep-seated trust and decades of acquaintance among its political elites across the region. In Central Asia, as in Putin's Russia, power predominantly rests with older elites who share a Soviet upbringing and cultural background, and speak the same language. In recent decades Russia has participated in multiple power transition processes that took place in Central Asian governments and have directly intervened in several crises situations, such as during the popular uprisings in Kazakhstan at the beginning of 2022. Political trends in Central Asia have also often mirrored those in Russia. Recent events, such as Uzbekistan's constitutional referendum and subsequent snap elections in 2023 allowing President Mirziyoyev potential tenure extension until 2037, and Kazakhstan's dismissal of parliament and early elections solidifying President Tokayev's party's dominance, underscore the resilience and self-renewal of authoritarian governance in the region. These leaders display a preference for the status quo and alliances with Russia, evident from Tokayev's explicit endorsement of Putin's leadership and Kazakhstan’s strong strategic partnership with Russia. Other political developments including the tightened media control, regulation of civil activities through foreign agent laws, and controversies surrounding LGBTQ+ rights, used Russian legislation as a model. In contrast, the Central Asian leaders are hesitant to embrace the European Union's efforts to foster closer cooperation. While closer relations are welcome to strengthen and diversify the region’s economic ties, the EU’s efforts to promote democratic reforms and human rights improvements meet resistance. They are not interested in following democratic processes and European values that are perceived as incompatible with core cultural and religious values, and threaten to reduce their power.

Security ties

Finally, Russia remains the dominant force in the security landscape of Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all sit under the security umbrella of the Russian-led CSTO with Russia. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also host Russian military bases and share a unified regional air defence system with Russia. Although not members of the CSTO, even Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan maintain multifaceted security linkages, and give Russia the ability to intervene politically and militarily in domestic issues. Russia continues to be regarded as the regional security provider whose assistance could be crucial in times of crisis. However, with its focus on Ukraine and the CSTO ineffectiveness to tackle regional security issues, such as the 2022 Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border clashes, Russia’s position as the dominant security actor in Central Asia is now being contested by other countries, including China and Türkiye.

Russia and Central Asia today: Strategic collaboration or drifting apart?

The war in Ukraine and the shifting geopolitical landscape have reshaped Russia’s relations with the countries in Central Asia. The increasing sanctions and political isolation of Russia has led to a much higher prioritisation of relations with Central Asia in Russia’s foreign policy, as can be evidenced by the number of visits and dialogues that political elites of Central Asian states have had with Russia. Noting Russia’s growing interest and dependence on the region, Central Asian countries have taken advantage of their new found leverage to establish more equal relations with Russia.

Two years into the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine, Central Asia is under slightly less international pressure to take sides against Russia. Moscow’s policies on the other hand have increased its efforts for a ‘Renaissance’ in the region’s close ties with Russia. Putin has taken on a much more proactive role than in the past, engaging personally and frequently with Central Asian leaders through both bilateral and regional fora. This concerted effort is an obvious attempt to draw the countries closer to Russia, signalling a shift in Moscow's approach to securing its interests in the region.

While Russia didn’t initially push Central Asian republics beyond maintaining a positively neutral stance in the war, in recent months, Putin has undertaken an effort to assure their indirect support for him, his war in Ukraine, and his world vision. A key moment illustrating these efforts was the attendance of all five Central Asian presidents at Moscow's Victory Day parade in May 2023, a strong symbolic gesture of support for both Russia and Putin. During the parade, Putin crafted a narrative of Russia as the protector of peace, freedom, and stability, directly opposing his depiction of the West as provocateurs of conflict, spreaders of Russophobia, and eroders of traditional values. His speech not only emphasised the need for solidarity and partnership, but also highlighted the shift towards a multipolar world order, marking a strategic attempt to solidify support among former Soviet republics amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Russia's interests in Central Asia can be broadly categorised into three main areas: geopolitical influence, support for Russian foreign policy, and cultural and political leadership. Firstly, Russia seeks to maintain and expand its geopolitical influence in the region, leveraging it as a domain of important Russian influence to assert its status as a global power, while simultaneously ensuring these countries do not drift towards the West or other competing powers. Secondly, Russia desires support, or at least neutrality, from Central Asian states in its foreign policy endeavours. This aspect has been particularly pronounced during the conflict in Ukraine, where Central Asian countries have largely refrained from criticising Russia's actions, thus providing Moscow with a semblance of regional backing or, at the very least, a buffer against international condemnation. Thirdly, Russia is determined to maintain its historic role as the cultural and political leader in the region. While Russia tolerates and even endorses economic cooperation with diverse international actors, fostering regional growth, it closely monitors external influences on Central Asia's national identity and political trajectories, critical of any shifts that might weaken its own historical and cultural influence.

Central Asia also holds significant importance in the Russo-Chinese relationship. While the broader geopolitical context may suggest a shift towards a more asymmetrical partnership with Russia as the junior partner, it is Russia that continues to shape the geopolitical narrative and influence in Central Asia, despite China’s increasing economic weight in the region. It is crucial for Putin to keep this regional influence and thus maintain a balanced relationship with China.

Conclusion and forecast

Central Asia is of crucial strategic importance for Russia, even more so in the context of the war in Ukraine and the deepening of the geopolitical divide. The re-election of President Putin is unlikely to bring a substantial change to Russia's domestic or foreign policy landscape and the consistency in Russian policies may provide a sense of stability and predictability. However, the election is also set to strengthen Putin’s political and ideological position in Russia, which is likely to reinforce Russia's assertive foreign policy and its strategic interests in Central Asia, especially in the economic and cultural spheres.

Russia will try to mitigate the impact of western sanctions as much as possible with trade through Central Asian economies. Simultaneously, Russia is enhancing its economic foothold in Central Asia by expanding its energy clout, notably through initiatives like the proposed Central Asian gas union. On the political stage a continuously high number of Russian high-level engagements in the region is likely to be seen. In the security sphere, Russia will try to deepen military and technical partnerships in the region and continue to increase the readiness of its regional military bases to reaffirm its security stronghold on the region.

In the cultural sphere, Putin is set to intensify the dissemination of his ideological perspectives, capitalising on Russia's significant soft power in the region to increase regional support. A cornerstone of this approach is the promotion of Russian language and culture, which underpins Russia's influence in the area. Any effort to reduce the influence of the Russian language or critically address historical Soviet influences will be perceived as threats against Russia’s cultural and ideological hegemony, and is very likely to be met with strong resistance from the Kremlin.

Russia is also likely to intensify efforts to mould public opinion, targeting especially the youth, who exhibit growing scepticism towards Russian ideology. This will be done by leveraging its extensive network of pro-Kremlin media in Central Asia to shape public opinion according to Russian ideology and propaganda, and portray Central Asia as brotherly allies, sharing Russian values and norms. These strategic efforts are not new, but will likely intensify with Putin’s re-election, to cultivate and enhance regional support for Russia among Central Asian populations and leaders, ensuring that these nations continue to view Russia as a key partner and ally.