This series will cover China's military development overseas, in relation to its foreign policy. The economic success of China in the past decades has reignited its foreign ambition, and slowly pushed the country into a geopolitical competition with the West. The series seeks to investigate how China is developing its military capabilities globally, and how its developments affect the global balance of power. 

Background:

Alongside establishing military bases, facilities, and ports abroad, the CCP has recently begun to project force on foreign soil through the operation of wholly and majority state-owned private military contractors (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs). The advent of PMCs and PSCs globally is, in essence, a novel phenomenon. Although definitions vary, it is important to appreciate the distinction between the two: PMCs are contracted to ‘offer battlefield services’ and generally ‘take as their customers… sovereign military authorities’, whereas PSCs offer general security services, often protecting personnel and/or assets.

There is a further distinction, enshrined in international law, between PMCs and PSCs and mercenaries. Under Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, mercenaries are recruited especially to ‘fight in an armed conflict’, whereas PMCs and PSCs are often contracted outside of conflict zones, and, within conflict zones, may carry out activities such as training combatants. Even where PMCs are recruited for the purpose specified above, the definition of a ‘mercenary’ in the 1949 Geneva Conventions is quite restrictive and practically ‘unworkable’ in practice. Thus, the line between what constitutes a mercenary and a PMC may be blurry at times. 

An Overview of Chinese PMCs and PSCs:

PMCs and PSCs have been employed by sovereign entities–most notably, the U.S. and Russia–since the mid-1990s. There are several significant benefits to employing PMCs and PSCs in order to achieve a stated strategic objective as opposed to relying on uniformed soldiers. These contractors provide, firstly, deniability to domestic audiences, which allows states to undermine the extent of their pursuit of said strategic objective–or even fully deny their involvement. Indeed, the precursor unit of Wagner Group–Russia’s largest and most notorious PMC–played a critical role in the annexation of Crimea in 2014, thereby formally absolving Russia of any coercive involvement in the episode domestically. Secondly, deniability for geopolitical purposes is also highly desirable: states may project hard power without being formally held to account for doing so. Lastly, and relatedly, PMCs allow states to circumvent international law mechanisms that restrict the use of force against other states, but also domestic legal prohibitions against direct involvement in war zones.

In China, PSCs in particular began proliferating after September 2009, when they were legalised by the CCP. Four years after their legalisation, in 2013, there were estimated to be some 4,000 registered PSCs in China, with 4.3 million workers in the industry. And by 2017, there were an additional 1,000 PSCs; however, PMCs remain strictly forbidden. PSCs are now a prominent part of China’s domestic infrastructure market, helping secure investments throughout the country. Internationally, Chinese PMCs are situated along BRI investments. China’s emboldened and active role in international affairs, especially in underdeveloped nations, has given rise to anti-Chinese sentiment, and put Chinese nationals and investments at risk of terrorist activities, civil unrest, and sabotage. The rationale behind employing Chinese PSCs is thus to minimise the aforementioned risks in relation to BRI investments. By 2016, Chinese state media reported that 20 Chinese PSCs operated on the international market across 40 countries–all of which are linked to the BRI. Other sources, however, have found that there are between 30 to 40 Chinese PSCs operating abroad. The scarce availability of information relating to PSC activity abroad is a testament to the effectiveness PSCs offer where perception management is concerned.

However, Chinese PSCs do not, distinctly from Russian or American PMCs, offer direct assistance to combatants in war zones or conflict zones. Rather, their primary role is to strictly offer non-combat missions, including site and personnel security. As alluded to earlier, this forms an important aspect of the BRI. As of 2020, there are more than 600,000 Chinese workers abroad that offer labour services on contracted projects. Indeed, in numerous BRI countries, Chinese labour comprises the majority of BRI projects’ workforce, making the need for personnel protection especially pertinent. In this context, companies working on the BRI–themselves often state-owned or state-sponsored–have opted to hire Chinese PSCs to overcome cultural, linguistic, and operational differences when working with foreign PSCs. There is the further aspect of cost: a report in the Financial Times found that 12 Chinese guards cost $700-$1,000 a day, equivalent to a single American or British guard. 

Recent attacks against Chinese nationals along the BRI underscore the need for the CCP to protect its workers, citizens, and investments abroad. In 2017, for instance, the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, was bombed by terrorists with ties to the al-Nusra Front. That same year in Pakistan, two Chinese teachers were kidnapped and killed by ISIS. It is hoped that PSCs will therefore have a deterrent effect: by virtue of their employment, the risks of such attacks may significantly decrease. Where this does not succeed, it is the CCP’s hope that PSCs will prove effective in exercising force against hostile elements. 

In a 2016 study, the Chinese think-tank Phoenix International Think Tank found that the two largest Chinese PSCs were presumably Chinese branches of British firms G4S and Control Risks. At this juncture, it is important to note that, according to Chinese law, PSCs operating domestically must be either wholly state-owned or derive a minimum of 51  per cent of all registered capital from the state. Significant PSCs that meet such requirements include China Security and Protection Group, HuaXin ZhongAn (华信中安集团), Beijing DeWe Security Services, and Frontier Services Group. The China Security and Protection Group is especially prominent: it employs approximately 30,000 workers and has a global focus, though it tends to operate on the BRI. The most curious case is perhaps Frontier Services Group, which was founded by former Blackwater CEO Erik Prince. The firm has a focus on the BRI, but has worked within China as recently as 2019, when it was contracted to construct a ‘training base’ in Xinjiang.

Evaluating Chinese PSCs:

Despite their proliferation in recent years, many commentators regard Chinese PSCs as underdeveloped, especially in comparison to American, British, and Russian firms. Alex Maslov, head of the School of Asian Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow, asserted that Chinese PSCs are ‘not very effective and quite unprofessional’. Furthermore, Tian Buchou, who is a veteran of Chinese special forces and has over 17 years of experience with private security in Africa, remarked that ‘more than 80 per cent of Chinese security personnel have just a basic education’. This is in stark contrast to firms such as Academi (formerly Blackwater), Wagner Group, FDG Corp., and many others, who provide a ‘comprehensive operational system covering logistics, weapons, high-technology and even medical support’ to ensure soldiers are well-trained. Chinese PSCs’ lack of operational and technical ability stems in large part from the fact that there is a ‘revolving door’ between the PLA and contractors. The same phenomenon exists with American, Russian, and other PSCs, but those armies are well-trained and have extensive and recent combat experience abroad. The PLA, on the other hand, last sent troops abroad to fight in an active conflict in the Sino-Vietnam War, which ended in 1979. A further contributor is the fact that Chinese PSCs are effectively entirely under state control. As highlighted by Alessandro Arduino, who is co-director of Security & Crisis Management at the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, the CCP’s conception of ‘unreliable’ PSCs does not turn on return on investment. Yet the above does not mean that the CCP will extend ‘indefinite support’ to ‘underperforming projects’. PSCs’ low costs, the extent of capital committed to the BRI, and the ‘revolving door’ between the PLA and Chinese PSCs does guarantee the CCP’s commitment to certain PSCs for some time.

A second significant challenge is China’s uncertain regulatory framework surrounding PSCs’ capacity to operate internationally. As per the ‘Law of the PRC on Control of Guns’ (中华人民共和国枪支管理法), only the police, the PLA, and the militia may possess weapons abroad. As a result, PSCs do not have effective means of self-defence nor of defending personnel or assets de jure, though such legal requirements are often circumvented de facto. More broadly, the law that originally legalised PSCs–the ‘Regulation on the Administration of Security and Guarding Services’ (保安服务管理条例)–failed to establish a coherent regulatory framework for PSCs operating internationally. Even though the law stipulates that PSCs operating domestically must essentially be state-controlled or -owned, PSCs operating abroad can, in theory, remain wholly private. PSCs operating abroad are therefore forced to operate in a ‘grey area’ of legal uncertainty, which gives the CCP ample opportunity to claim deniability when it comes to the involvement of its PSCs in the BRI. However, it also restricts the extent to which PSCs may operate abroad: without clear rules to guide actions, PSCs may be afraid of ‘overstepping’. 

Conclusion:

Chinese PSCs’ presence abroad and domestically has multiplied since 2009. However, since then, they are limited in their capacity to provide adequate security services, and do so only when hired by firms associated with China’s BRI. The extent of PSCs’ reliance on the BRI for business abroad is therefore significant, and where BRI projects falter, so will PSCs. In comparison to American, Russian, and British PMCs and PSCs, Chinese PSCs are unable to compete: they do not have adequate training and resources, nor do they have the same financial incentives. Therefore, the influence Chinese PSCs exert on the global stage remains limited.