This briefing aims to provide an overview of Chinese, Western and BRICS countries’ media reactions to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held between the 16th and 20th of October 2022, and Xi Jinping’s subsequent confirmation as General Secretary and Chair of the Military Commission to serve a third term; unprecedented in the post-Mao era.

China

In Chinese media, Xi´s third term was welcomed as a necessity to strengthen China and to ensure it continues on the path of “national rejuvenation” and a “new modernisation drive” (China Daily). State media largely focused on explaining the procedural aspects of the congressional elections and Xi’s reappointment. Other media such as the South China Morning Post (SCMP) largely produced opinion pieces expressing support for the abolishment of “collective leadership” in favour of removing Xi´s term limits and for the necessity to establish loyalist party officials in key positions such as the Party Standing Committee. For example,  SCMP columnist Chong Chung-yan portrays  “collective leadership” as a system doomed to breed corruption and the antithesis to effective leadership, citing examples of corruption under Hu Jintao´s leadership. Xi’s reappointment is also seen as crucial by state media to achieve “reunification” with Taiwan. On this issue, non-state outlets emphasise the absence of a clear timeline, portraying this as a refusal of Beijing “to be rushed by Washington.”

The West

In Western media, in particular the US, UK, and Western Europe, the congress and Xi´s reappointment was primarily portrayed as consolidating Xi’s personal power, with negative implications both for West-China relations and China’s domestic political stability. Xi’s power centralisation is regarded as a regressive step “tilting China back towards one-man rule” (Guardian), with his reappointment as General Secretary, appointing loyalist officials, and enshrining his political thought as “core of the CCP and its ideology”. Analysts raise concerns that this puts the party and country at risk of developing a Maoist “personality cult”, as Willy lam, senior fellow of Jamestown foundation, a Washington think tank, writes. The congress is overall regarded as a ”rubber stamping” exercise (Bloomberg), with many outlets citing the appointment of Shanghai party boss Li Qiang as replacement for former Premier Li Keqiang, despite his “mismanagement of Shanghai´s Covid lockdowns”, as evidence that Xi values loyalty above all else. Overall, Xi´s third term is interpreted as Xi fully dismantling the guardrails against power centralisation put in place by Deng Xiaoping, and potentially securing a future lifetime appointment.

Regarding Taiwan, Western media interpreted Xi´s rhetoric about a hostile foreign policy environment as implying an acceleration of China´s “reunification” plans with Taiwan. In particular, Western media pointed to newly adopted amendments to the party constitution that alter cross strait relations from “building solidarity” to “resolutely oppose(ing)” Taiwan independence.

Finally, Putin being among the two first heads of state to congratulate Xi was highlighted as a signal that Xi is expected to continue China´s “limitless partnership” with Russia.

The BRICS

INDIAN news primarily reflected that Xi´s third term signified his greatest power centralisation yet, and China’s most rapid to date – “Xi Jinping today is the master of all that he surveys in China and all that he surveys for China” (Firstpost). This is regarded as particularly remarkable as he achieved this despite domestic headwinds stemming from Covid, domestic economic downturn and international isolation (Hindustan Times). Indian outlets focused on Xi´s promise to turn China into a “modern socialist country”, interpreting it as party control rather than economic growth becoming the central paradigm going forward. Indian outlets also sought to position themselves vis-à-vis Western news, commenting that Western news overemphasise Hu Jintao´s early exit from the conference and anti-Xi protests in Beijing. Furthermore, they disagreed with how the West portrayed Hu and other opposition officials who have been forced into retirement as “moderates” (Firstpost). Concerning the implications for Sino-Indian relations, most outlets agree that it signifies a continuation of tensions, in particular as several military officials directly involved in the 2020-2021 Galware border dispute attended the conference and received honors. However, Indian outlets interpreted the lack of direct remarks on India as a sign that their border dispute may be more negotiable than other territorial claims such as Taiwan.

SOUTH AFRICAN news reflected mixed views on Xi´s third term. On the one hand there was critique of how easily Deng Xiaoping´s rules-based collective leadership system had been dismantled making way for Xi´s unprecedented third term (Mail & Guardian). This expanded into questioning whether it had ever existed as a robust system, as Deng himself had been practically unbound by his own rules. On the other hand there was a general recognition that a strong Xi-led China could benefit African development, as it is a historically postcolonial Third World partner and “a major player with a keen understanding of foreign dominance and relentless instability”, as argued by Emmanuel Matambo, Research Director at the Centre for African China Studies, University of Johannesburg. In this vein, Xi´s emphasis on multilateralism in his opening speech was interpreted as a continuation of China challenging US influence. Especially regarding international institutions, China and Africa have historically supported each other, most notably demonstrated by African countries´ support for China attaining Taiwan´s UN seat. On the question of Taiwan, Xi´s opening speech was regarded as less escalatory than it may have been, citing that it did not lay out a concrete timeline for “reunification.”

BRAZILIAN news outlets’ coverage of the congress and Xi´s reappointment both reflected Brazil’s identity as a BRICS country, alongside shared interests with China, and implications of the recent election of Lula as president. This was the case for media across the political spectrum. The congress was largely reported as a tool for Xi to reform and centralise power in the party leadership. In advance of the congress there was even speculation of Xi attaining the title “chairman.”

Regarding Taiwan, the media primarily focused on the lessons that Xi could draw from the cost of the Ukraine war for Russia, and that he sought “moderation” in discussing the use of military force to achieve “reunification” (Folha de Sao Paolo). Instead, Xi was regarded as currently preoccupied with rebuilding the domestic economy, which is facing an “unprecedented crisis.”

Xi´s third term reappointment almost directly coincided with Lula´s re-election as Brazil´s president and was thus speculated to mark a major policy shift, with Brazilian-Chinese relations and Brazil´s BRICS engagement expected to improve. Many pointed out that compared to Bolsonaro, who adopted a more China-sceptic (protectionist) stance, Lula had initiated Brazil´s entry into BRICS in 2009 during his former presidency and established a close working partnership with Hu Jintao.