This series will cover China's military development overseas, in relation to its foreign policy. The economic success of China in the past decades has reignited its foreign ambition, and slowly pushed the country into a geopolitical competition with the West. The series seeks to investigate how China is developing its military capabilities globally, and how its developments affect the global balance of power. 

Introduction:

At the turn of the 21st century, Chinese policymakers identified the coming 20 years as a period of ‘strategic opportunities’. Since the CCP’s rise to power in 1949, China’s influence was primarily restricted, focusing on internal unity, and economic modernisation; but since the early 2000s, it has adopted a ‘going out’ strategy–chiefly economically and diplomatically, though, in recent years, also militarily. Namely, the CCP has now long encouraged domestic Chinese businesses to engage in foreign direct investment, notably through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has seen the CCP and its associated enterprises invest in a total of 138 countries spanning four continents. Alongside economic means, the CCP’s activist foreign policy also relies on ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’–a belligerent mixture of forceful rhetoric, propaganda, and misinformation intended to coerce states to ‘get in line’. But perhaps most worryingly for the US and the west more broadly has been the pace, intensity, and scope of China’s military advancement

The rationale behind the CCP’s military ambitions abroad is multi-faceted, but strung together by the overarching principle of strategic competition against the US, and its allies. The CCP is pursuing a grand strategy of ‘displacement’ vis-à-vis the US: it seeks to, first, reduce the capacity of the US to maintain its position atop the international order and ensure it can position itself as such and, second, to develop and employ the means to coerce and induce other countries to serve its ends. The importance of hard power projection itself cannot be understated: during the Cold War, and since its end, it has been one of the primary factors that have held the U.S. and its allies together, and allowed Washington to remain atop the international system.  

It is in this context that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the PLA Navy (PLAN) have established a base in Djibouti and are constructing bases, ports, and underground facilities in Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe, respectively. The establishment of these facilities is the first step towards contending with American military dominance abroad, and thus establishing Chinese military credibility internationally. Although it is highly doubtful that China will ever holistically match American military capabilities or the number of American military bases abroad, should China establish bases in the right places, it will not need to play a ‘numbers game’ to pose a threat to American military hegemony. 

Djibouti:

In July 2017, the PLA opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti City, the capital of Djibouti. Owing to its position on the south end of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, an essentially necessary crossing point from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, Djibouti is home to the most foreign military bases in the world, hosting French, Japanese, Italian, American, and now Chinese bases. Indeed, the Strait is the world’s fourth most frequented maritime route, with some 30,000 ships passing by each year. 

Rationale for the Base:
Whereas American, French, Italian, and Japanese bases in Djibouti were in most cases established for historical reasons, the rationale behind the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) base is rooted in contemporary developments. Most notably, ostensibly in the need to safeguard the CCP’s investments in Djibouti and surrounding countries–namely, Ethiopia, whose trade accounts for 90 per cent of Djibouti’s port traffic, made for and through the BRI. In particular, Djibouti shares a border with Somalia, which is notorious for its piracy. The Gulf of Aden had significant piracy problems in the past, and China isn’t the only country that has deployed its hard power to protect its investments in the region. In 2008, the EU began a counter-piracy operation, Atalanta, in the region, whilst NATO, from 2008 to 2016, also ran such operations in the Gulf.

As depicted in the graphic above, Djibouti is a central part of the BRI in Africa, and more specifically, of the Maritime Silk Road initiative. The overarching purpose of the BRI is to create a set of interconnected land- and sea-based trade routes, primarily in underdeveloped nations, that will allow China to exert significant economic and diplomatic soft power in a bid to displace American influence and gain soft power where the U.S. is absent. Djibouti is absolutely essential to the project: as mentioned earlier, with the exception of the Cape Route, it is the commercially viable passage for maritime trade to flow from Europe to India and Southeast Asia.

Djibouti’s geostrategic significance has been mirrored in Chinese approaches towards the country since the turn of the 21st century. The majority of Djibouti’s critical infrastructure projects, valued at approximately $14.4 billion, are financed by Chinese banks, and China owns more than 70 per cent of Djibouti’s debt. Under such infrastructure projects, there are two in particular that have benefited from Chinese financing and logistical assistance, and whose presence has been instrumental in establishing and justifying China’s first overseas military base.

First is the Port of Doraleh, or the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT), an extension to the Port of Djibouti, the nation’s largest and principal port, and consequently a crucial intercontinental trading hub. The Terminal can handle 8.2 million tonnes of cargo annually, is able to support oil and liquified natural gas tankers, has 40,000 vehicle slots, and has multiple silos for agricultural needs. Importantly, all of the Port’s terminals link to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway–itself a Chinese-financed project–thereby allowing landlocked Ethiopia to access maritime trade routes. Construction of the Terminal began in 2004 under a 30-year contract at the behest of Dubai-based DP World through a joint venture with Port Autonome International de Djibouti (PAID), a government-owned entity, who took ownership of 67  per cent of the Terminal, with the remaining 33  per cent owned by DP World. In 2013, the government of Djibouti sold 23.5  per cent of PAID to the state-owned China Merchants Group (CMG), and in February 2018 the government unilaterally terminated the agreement with DP World, asserting that it was necessary to safeguard ‘the country’s sovereignty and economic independence’. The termination sparked a string of arbitrations and litigations initiated by DP World, which is seeking significant damages. In total, there have been eight decisions in favour of DP World, which is owed some $685 million by the government of Djibouti. 

The second is the Doraleh Multipurpose Port (DMP). The DMP was primarily financed by the Chinese Export-Import Bank, which provided $405 million, and constructed by CMG, alongside additional contractors such as China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) and China Construction Harbour and Channel Engineering Bureau Group Company Limited–both subsidiaries of state-owned entities. Distinctly from the DCT, the DMP serves the partial purpose of linking the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ)–which is planned to be Africa’s largest free trade zone, costing $3.5 billion and spanning 4,800 hectares–to the Red Sea. By virtue of the DIFTZ, the DMP is crucial to China’s ambitions for Djibouti: to transform the country into a major international trading hub, and perhaps the ‘Singapore of Africa’. 

Given the nature of both the DCT and the DMP, and the extent of Chinese investment and stakes in both projects, the CCP has explained the establishment of its military base in terms of ‘mainly provid[ing] rest and rehabilitation for the Chinese troops taking part in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, UN peacekeeping and humanitarian rescue’. It has therefore opted to refer to the base as a ‘logistical support facility’ rather than a ‘military base’. In reality, one of the base’s primary purposes is to safeguard the Maritime Silk Road from pirates and terrorists, mainly from Yemen and Somalia. Such is evident in the base’s extensive capabilities, which will be discussed below. 
However, the rationale for establishing military bases in Djibouti is deeper than merely protecting its investments from pirates. Rather, the CCP has prioritised establishing a foothold in Djibouti’s most valued geostrategic asset–the sea. Whilst indeed that the PLAN does indeed need logistical support–its soldiers and seamen do need rest and recuperation, and its ships maintenance capabilities–it is also true, and certainly more important, that China’s grand strategic ambitions require the nation to play a proactive and eventually extensive role in international security, especially in areas where the U.S. is uncharacteristically absent, such as Africa.

Analysis of the Base and Missions Conducted to Date:

The PLAN Military Base is located on the Doraleh Litoral, 12 kilometres west of Djibouti City. As can be seen in the graphic above, it is directly adjacent to the DMP, and is only approximately 11 kilometres from U.S. military base Camp Lemonier. Although estimates vary, the base is said to house over 2,000 PLAN personnel, in comparison to Camp Lemonnier’s 4,000. The base’s construction was quick–it took only a year and a half to complete–and, although construction information is not public, it is likely that both military contractors and the China State Construction Engineering Company (CSCEC) were involved. 

For the West, more worryingly than its impressive construction time is the base’s verified and purported capabilities. It features a pier that is approximately 450 m long, able to dock and accommodate frigates and certain cargo and container ships, and a causeway that is approximately 430 metres long. Additionally, the pier is allegedly long enough to dock one of China’s three aircraft carriers, though none have yet ventured into the Indian Ocean, let alone the Red Sea. In March 2022, a Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu, used to conduct anti-piracy missions but occasionally also to monitor western ships in the Gulf of Aden, was seen docking at the base’s pier.

Furthermore, the base is equipped with two heliports and a runway that is approximately 395 metres. As a result, only small fighters–tentatively, the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, which is used on Chinese aircraft carriers–and helicopters could make use of the base’s facilities, though it is not alleged that China has deployed or will deploy either in the near future. As can be seen in the graphic above, the PLAN is working on expanding the base, though it is not known what the addition will be. 

The base’s perimeter is highly fortified, to say the least. It features three layers of defence: though the outer layers seem to be regular perimeter fences, the inner layer consists of an eight-metre thick wall, presumably made of cement. Around the edges of the perimeter are watchtowers and a control tower; there are also drone control facilities and a fuel storage facility. The addition of a drone control facility is particularly striking, given that the U.S. has previously launched drones from Camp Lemonnier to targets in Yemen and Somalia. More speculatively, the base is said to have a considerable underground portion, approximating 23,000m2. It is said that the underground facilities are used to conduct cyber-related operations, perhaps cyber- and electronic-warfare, though it is also alleged to be used for secured transmissions. 

The base’s official missions consist of anti-piracy and logistical support operations, and the base also acts as a ‘transit point’ for Chinese peacekeeping missions working in conjunction with the UN. Indeed, an important general purpose of the base is to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Unofficial missions, unacknowledged by the CCP, include securing the Maritime Silk Road, which goes ‘far beyond anti-piracy operations’ to encompass, for instance, submarine patrols in the Indian Ocean. As such, the base serves as a sort of ‘springboard’ from which the PLAN can gradually expand its military reach in the Indian Ocean, and Africa generally. Such is a critical first step towards the CCP’s bold ambition to establish itself as a military contender to the U.S. abroad. 

Ream Naval Base (Natasha)

Since July 2019, China has been furthering its military network by establishing a presence at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. Many suspect that this would expand China’s global power and increase tensions throughout Southeast Asia. Cambodia continues to reject suspicions and maintains that the rehabilitation and expansion of the base will not involve exclusive rights for Chinese military use. An anonymous Chinese official who spoke to the Washington Post reported that scientists and the military will use the base to establish a station for the “Chinese Beidou navigation satellite system.” 

While much of Beidou’s system applications are focused on assisting communication services for those in rural areas or health monitoring of soldiers, the navigation satellite system has implications that cause concern. According to Asia Times, an article by a Chinese publication called NetEase reported that BeiDou could be used to guide glide bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the LeiShi-6 and the Dongfeng-41, “although their ultra-high speed might lower the navigation system’s accuracy.” The chief designer of Beidou’s satellites, Chen Zhonggui, stated that its systems are accurate “to within three to five meters globally and within one to three meters in the Asia-Pacific region.”

In the fall of 2020, two US-funded Tactical Headquarters of the National Committee for Maritime Security buildings were demolished despite US offerings to renovate, raising speculations about Cambodia’s intentions with China. International actors fear that such a base in Cambodia would further tensions in the contested South China Sea. China has long been developing artificial islands in order to establish a strong foothold in the South China Sea and institute the ability to expand its power over further distances.

This is cause for great concern in other Asian countries, such as Vietnam and Japan. According to Professor Alexander Vuving at the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, “It puts Vietnam into a two-front or even three-front situation where it has to face Chinese military presence not just along its northern border and in the South China Sea but also on its southwestern border.” Vietnam and Cambodia continue to have unsolved land border demarcation   problems and the involvement of the Chinese will certainly put China-wary Vietnam on edge. 

Director-General of the Cambodian Defence Ministry’s material and technical-services department, Chau Phirun, stated: “Over two years, Chinese firms and technical experts from China’s military will build and renovate a number of structures, including a maintenance workshop, slipway and dry dock for repairing vessels, warehouse, two new piers, and electrical, water, and sewage infrastructure.” 

In comparing satellite imagery taken from February 2022 to those in late November, significant grubbing has taken place at the site with a pier being erected in September and two buildings sometime after. To the east of these new structures, cement foundation has been laid but the purpose is yet to be known. Should the area be developed as a full-functioning naval base, the coastal area would need to be significantly dredged as it is currently too shallow to hold warship vessels. Dredgers have been seen at the Ream base in recent months, suggesting that larger vessels may soon be able to access the area. 

Sihanoukville is a tourist town in which the Ream naval base is located and has been facing turmoil since Chinese investors fled due to the COVID pandemic. The town is now rampant with partially built or vacated buildings where criminals have taken residence. Since those in Sihanoukville are desperate for investors to come back, it is interesting that the Chinese government has not taken advantage of Sihanoukville’s economic hardships to expand development on the alleged base. Perhaps China has not reinstated investments or shown a move to establish an expansion into town in order to keep quiet. With international scrutiny focused on Chinese military expansion in Cambodia, China may be calculating their next moves carefully as they continue developing the base. In the meantime, local landowners who are no longer receiving rent revenue will continue to bear the negative economic impacts. 

While analysts are split over the level of concern of such a small base at .3 square kilometres, the real matter is focused on surveillance ability. With the use of the Beidou system, China would be able to monitor naval bases belonging to Vietnam and Thailand which are also used by Western nations. With China sending strong messages through actions like the firing of missiles near Taiwan earlier this year, it’s no wonder that Vuving believes that the Chinese involvement in the Ream Naval Base has caused further damage to Cambodia-Vietnam-China relations and has marked a “point of no return.” While Cambodia has taken chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and maintains its stance on neutrality regarding US-China relations, concerns of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expansion remain with Washginton continuing to press for transparency.

Port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea (Natasha)
Over the last several months, China has been constructing a naval base off the west coast of Africa at the Port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea. According to a publication by the Wall Street Journal in December of last year, US intelligence declared this action as a“great concern”and believes this port will be used for replenishing naval combat units and repairing warships. Commander of US Africa Command Gen. Stephen Townsendstated last year that China’s establishment could be used to inhibit western trade should tensions lead to a trade rivalry. A permanent Chinese military base on the Atlantic would allow China to compete with western commercial activities, which could escalate into a cold war situation.

Dr Freedom Onuoha, a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria–Nsukka, told Nigerian media that “A Chinese base in the Atlantic Ocean can play a decisive role in cutting off US access to strategic resources from many African states if conflict breaks out in the future. In a situation of intense hostility or great power confrontation in the future, it makes it a lot easier for China’s naval forces to stroll up and down Africa’s Atlantic coastline”. Beijing has remained silent on the Port of Bata and no further developments have been reported since May.

Zimbabwe Underground Marange Base (Natasha)

According to a 2018 report by Spotlight Zimbabwe, China installed next-generation surface-to-air missiles (SAM) in Zimbabwe, reproducing their military set up on Woody Island in the South China Sea. The following year the same source stated that the base was a permanent military presence and that China would be developing a secret underground military base for special forces. The base is set to protect Chinese-owned diamond and gold mines located in Marange and is rumoured to be equipped with advanced radar systems and aviation facilities. 

The installation of HQ-9 missiles has raised concerns in the US regarding China’s growing influence throughout Africa. China has invested billions of dollars in Zimbabwe in telecommunications, mining, and agriculture. In 2014, China was set to assist the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) until then-President Robert Mugabe called off the deal at the last minute, referencing Chinese diamond plundering and corruption. Mugabe had suspicions regarding his vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, and his relationship with the Chinese regime. As tensions built over the years regarding Mnangagwa’s involvement with the Chinese, Mugabe’s suspicions were proven accurate when Mnangagwa and the ZNA committed a coup d'état in 2017. Mnangagwa has since invited China back to the diamond mines and approved a base in the country. “Now there is every reason to believe that Mugabe's November 2017 ouster could have been a result of China viewing his stay in power as a threat to their economic investments, especially after having stripped them of diamond mining rights." 

At the time of this publication, no HQ-9s could be located at or near the Marange field. While no similarities can yet be seen between Marange and established Chinese bases, Marange does host a significant landing strip at approximately 1,480 metres in length and geography that can easily host an underground base, perhaps using existing mine shafts that are visibly seen throughout the area. 

The rising concerns in western nations of China’s military expansion is not without cause. The implications of the Chinese possibly impacting trade, instigating tensions in SouthEast Asia, and the commonality of human rights abuses committed by Chinese and African regimes is a significant ongoing and potential problem. The continuance of secretive expansion, whether rumoured or legitimate, understandably causes tensions in international relations and furthers distrust. Multiple nations have either been considered or are expected to hold Chinese military bases. While suspicions should be cautiously addressed, there is no doubt that China is becoming successful in its aim of global influence and power.