On May 8 1945, 11 months after the Allied invasion of Normandy, Nazi Germany declared unconditional surrender and brought the European theatre of the Second World War to a close. Italy, Nazi Germany’s wartime ally, tendered her surrender in July two years prior, although the Italian Social Republic – a puppet state of the Nazi regime – continued the fight against Allied forces. Following the German surrender, the Allies sought to bring about peace in Europe building on the principles agreed upon during the Potsdam Conference of 1945. Of the highest priority was the administration of Germany and Italy, as well as the elimination of National Socialism and Fascism from both countries. This brought about the process of denazification. Although the process was geared more towards Germany, the Allies’ influence and efforts to remove extreme ideologies also permeated Italian politics; the British government largely oversaw the restructuring of the Italian Armed Forces and the U.S. government actively manipulated the 1948 general election in the favour of Italy’s Christian-Democrat party, Democrazia Cristiana. 

The effects of these efforts were largely positive, certainly in the reconstruction of democratic institutions in (West) Germany and Italy. The German constitution – the Grundgesetz – explicitly affirms its desire to “promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe” and the German Penal Code criminalises the affiliation to National Socialist ideals, as well as the downplaying and denial of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime. Similarly, Article 12 of the final provisions of Italy’s constitution explicitly prohibits the reformation of the Fascist Party “under whichever fashion” and commits to draft legislation to the same end. This commitment is consolidated in the Legge Scelba, published on June 23 1952. Scelba considers movements or groups of five or more people “pursuing undemocratic ends […], exalting, threatening, using violence” for political gain as reincarnations of the Fascist Party. Italy also has supplementary legislation criminalising ethnic, racial, and gendered discrimination – namely the Legge Mancino of 1993 and Decree 654 of 1975, which ratifies the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination.

Despite the constitutional and legislative commitments to anti-fascism in Italy, under the oversight of Giorgio Almirante – former member of the Fascist Party and propagandist for the Italian Social Republic – the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) was founded. In the first post-war general election, the MSI won 6 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 1 seat in the Senate. The MSI enjoyed sustained success since the 1948 elections and in its post-fascist, proto-conservative phase as the Alleanza Nazionale, became the third party in the Chamber of Deputies after the 2006 general election. The Alleanza Nazionale eventually dissolved in 2009, after a sustained period of political moderation. 

Throughout its existence, the MSI confined the term ‘right-wing’ in Italian politics to the extreme end of the spectrum. So much so that “no other party wished to be confused or assimilated with such a term given the stigma it had via its identification with fascism” explains Piero Ignazi, a leading scholar in comparative politics and party systems. For that reason when in December 2012 Giorgia Meloni and Ignazio La Russa founded Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), with a logo brazening the tricolour flame of the defunct MSI, it became difficult to not link FdI with neo-fascism. Now, almost 10 years later, FdI finds itself in a position where the party may obtain a governing majority in the upcoming general election. Politico’s poll of polls has FdI as the most favourable party amongst the Italian electorate with its coalition partners – Forza Italia and Lega – following in fourth and fifth place. In other words, the FdI-led coalition is expected to obtain just under half of the popular vote on September 25 2022. 

The outcome of this month’s general election remains to be seen, and what a Meloni-led FdI majority coalition would mean for Italy and Europe is cryptic, at best. Looking at the table of contents of FdI’s manifesto, it is difficult to see anything that screams right wing; the index page is primarily focused on increasing the role of the welfare state, finding green energy solutions, and a section devoted to environmentalist policies. This may appear as a catch-all approach to the elections. By drawing in traditionally ‘left-wing’ policies in its manifesto the FdI can try to distance itself from its neo-fascist links. However in local politics, the FdI still pays homage to its MSI links. For example, in its office in Carpi – a small town in the province of Modena in Emilia Romagna – there is an MSI-marked plaque commemorating Giorgio Almirante. Furthermore, the FdI’s manifesto commits to a foreign policy which defends national interests and respects Italy’s international commitments despite the fact that Meloni has gone on record, speaking at a Vox event in Andalucía, to reject the “Brussels bureaucrats'' and the ”LGBT lobbies”. Such comments seemingly undermine the European Commission’s LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, in addition to subscribing to Eurosceptic rhetoric. Meloni’s stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine has equally been inconsistent since the start of the conflict. Even before the 2022 elections were called, there have been instances of controversy, with FdI facing accusations of sympathising with fascist rhetoric and ideology. In 2017, FdI voted against a proposed decree of law which would criminalise symbolism of the Fascist Party and fascist apologism. In 2021, a local councillor of FdI was pictured performing a Roman salute in Ventimiglia, a locality within the province of Imperia in the Liguria region. The councillor later tendered his resignation from the party. 

On the other hand, one may be optimistic and point out that the FdI does not have, really, a violent militia or paramilitary which is typical of traditional fascism. However, as Ishaan Tharoor explains in his Washington Post column, physical violence is not a necessary tool for European post-fascists and, considering the insurrectionists that took to Capitol Hill on January 6 2021 were not formally linked to the Republic Party, the absence of a formal militia or paramilitary is no guarantee of political pacifism. For this reason, the contradictions and Janus nature of Meloni’s campaign casts doubt over what an FdI-led government will do in Italy and abroad nor what the repercussions might be.

The asymmetry between FdI’s campaign and its local-level support from party members do no favours to distancing the party from the connotation of fascism. This is precisely why support for FdI reflects a decline in the quality of Italian democracy, catalysed by frustrated Italian voters which are increasingly losing faith in the establishment. The ‘frustration vote’ has a persistent theme in Italian politics, from the Mani pulite investigations to the last general election in 2018, but what makes FdI’s success different is its open embracing of neo-fascist emblems and symbolism. Whether a FdI victory would mean categorical ‘failure’ of Italy’s post-war reconciliation is perhaps a bold statement to make, and one that remains to be seen. However, the prospect of a frustrated electorate being formally governed by the tricolour flame is a far cry from the Italian democracy envisioned in 1946, when Italy was proclaimed a republic.