Nearly four years ago the UK committed to publishing a dedicated Defence Arctic Strategy (DAS) which would modernize the UK’s security policy towards its northern frontier. Despite an increasingly competitive Arctic, DAS, and its promise of a coherent UK defence strategy integrated within the UK’s wider security framework for the Arctic remains absent. The longer the UK waits to deploy a credible strategy the more costly one becomes in the long term.

In 2018 then UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson announced a new Defence Arctic Strategy which would acknowledge the fast-changing nature of the region from an area of “low-tension” to an arena of growing competition. DAS was supposed to have been completed by 2019 and was to “put the Arctic and the High North central to the security of the United Kingdom”. Rhetorically the Arctic’s importance has subsequently been confirmed during Ben Wallace’s recent visit to Sweden. Elements of its increasing importance are also found scattered throughout various UK policy papers, such as the recent Defence Command Paper and the Integrated Review. The 2018 Arctic policy framework Beyond the Ice also outlined the UK’s interest in securing and maintaining a peaceful and stable Arctic. However, the specific strategy for achieving this is absent, as are what this would mean in terms of required capability.

The strategic consequences of both the Arctic’s changing nature on the UK’s northernmost border, and the absence of a clear Defence Strategy presents a matrix of new risks to account for in terms of the UK’s domestic defence and foreign policy capability. Two key risks particularly stand out with marked impact on the pursuit of the Government’s current “Global Britain” policy framework. Firstly, the Arctic’s transition from barrier to highway presents a new strategic frontier right on the UK’s northern border for the first time since the Cold War to contend with.

Secondly, that the lack of an Arctic defence strategy to signpost deterrence and meet UK aims of securing a “stable” Arctic risks the UK unexpectedly overreaching its capacity in terms of soft and hard power deployment. Overstretch is an issue that already is a concern given the broadening of activity that the Integrated Review laid out against the backdrop of potential overreach from a defence, maritime security, political, and financial perspective. The addition of a developing Arctic strategic frontier while compounding this by default, will be all the more costly in terms of this overreach if the UK continues to treat the High North as an ad-hoc strategic frontier without signposting persistent, credible and integrated resourcing that convincingly supports partners and so deters destabilizing actors through laying out the UK’s intentions, requirements and capability in a way that credibly integrates Arctic security alongside other “Global Britain” theatres. 

Failure for DAS to appear and provide this means in the near future the Arctic would require a larger commitment than current as the region continues to become a more militarized and competitive zone. This would exacerbate UK overreach, affecting Britain’s other theatres, particularly the “Pacific tilt” which has become central to UK post-Brexit economic growth, from becoming as expansive as envisaged due to political and military resources deployed to court and support Indo-Pacific security and economic partners having to be pulled away to plug an ignored and unintegrated Arctic frontier. 

Why the Arctic now matters- A growing global arena of competition:

The British Antarctic Survey has highlighted that climate change on its current trajectory could see the Arctic completely lose its sea-ice as early as 2035. Indeed, history was made this February when an icebreaker and LNG cargo vessel travelled the Northern Sea Route (NSR) successfully in mid-winter courtesy of the absence of the once-typical multi-year ice. This transformation of the Arctic from its historical role as an inaccessible barrier limiting Atlantic-Pacific northbound connectivity, to a shipping highway whose lanes could cut up to 2-3 weeks off journey time compared to traditional routes brings with it new economic opportunities regarding mining, logistics, energy, communications and investment, but also contributes towards growing interest and tensions in the region.

These new economic opportunities are also a key driver for increased competition. Arctic seabed claims, which a few years ago were viewed predominantly through the lens of “national pride” are taking on a new strategic dimension given growing interest in Deep Sea Mining within the context of the politicalization of critical mineral supply chains and the strategic need to secure them. Norway has already laid out a proposal to mine the seabed around Svalbard; an Island which despite both the Svalbard Treaty and a series of subsequent Norway-Russia understandings regarding the limits of shared-access remains contested by Russia, particularly over access to waters and its seabed. Indeed, Svalbard was singled out by Russia’s Ministry of Defence as a future conflict flashpoint given the Arctic’s recent changes.

Furthermore, the dispute between NATO-aligned states and Russia over Moscow’s right to control the NSR are set to become increasingly urgent. Russia from a NATO perspective has already begun to politically discriminate against which ships, and nations, can utilize the route. Such moves are aimed to create a legitimizing precedent for Russia’s sovereignty through examples of compliance. In response the US, UK, and partners have begun Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the region to contest this. This is a dispute that is likely to increase in tempo, both as a melting Arctic sees an upsurge in economic activity- the NSR has seen a 54% increase in shipping activity between 2016 and 2019, but also as the melting ice undermines a significant pillar of Russia’s legal argument to control the NSR. This being Moscow’s interpretation of Article 234 of UNCLOS that allows states to regulate (though without discrimination) shipping in adjacent ice-covered waters to protect the environment. As the ice recedes, so too does the use of that clause.

Above image- denotes the Arctics two most viable shipping routes. The soverign control of which are both contested. (Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arenda)

Potentially to compensate for this, alongside the need to protect its long and now exposed Arctic coastline, Russia has ramped up its Arctic militarization. It has constructed and renovated military bases across the region, including forward bases designed to host long-range combat aircraft or equipped with missile systems like the Bastion-P and Pantsir-S1, supported by new over-the-horizon radar installations, including the long-range 29B6 Konteiner radar to provide sea and air area denial capability into the central Arctic. This alongside its Northern Fleet expansion in terms of platforms and missile capability is hoped by Moscow to achieve regional superiority over the US and partners in pursuit of a “Bastion Strategy” where defensive and offensive operations are intertwined. Allowing Moscow to potentially utilize its Arctic presence to not only deter, but also distract in support of other Russian security theatres through the application of pressure. For instance, Russian activity in Ukraine since 2014 has coincided with a major uptick in Russia’s High North submarine incursions to levels comparative to the Cold War, marking according to US Vice Admiral James Fogo III a “fourth battle of the Atlantic” being underway.

Above image- showcases many of Russia’s new or reopened Arctic misisle and air base installations. (Lima Charlie News)

The response to Russia’s military build-up from its NATO-aligned neighbours has been the re-activation or expansion of their own Arctic-capable military elements. Norway particularly in 2016 broke with precedent, and from a Russian perspective its 1949 promise to not host foreign troops on its soil, by basing US forces in its territory including B-1B Lancer bombers.

Additionally, outside interest from powers like China provides a complicating driver for increasing Arctic competition and militarization. China dubbed itself in 2018 a “near-Arctic” state in its first Arctic Policy. The document asserted that China had legitimate rights in the region which needed to be respected by Arctic states based broadly upon access, resource exploitation, and climate change. Since then, China through its “Polar Silk Road” framework (part of the Belt and Road Initiative) has become one of the region’s largest economic actors accounting for a quarter of all Arctic investment between 2005-2017. This has sparked concerns regarding the political influence these investments may embody, particularly in the context of securing strategic Arctic resources, based on controversies regarding China’s similar activity in other global regions. There are also concerns that these purchases may have a dual civilian-military use, exacerbated by China’s military visits to the region. In 2021 for instance, a significant People’s Liberation Army Navy flotilla consisting of a Type 055 Destroyer, a Type 052D Destroyer, a Type 903A supply ship and a surveillance ship entered the USA’s EEZ 46 miles off the Aleutian Islands coast in a larger-than-usual display of force and logistical reach. One of china’s state-affiliated foreign-facing newspapers claimed this was to have the US take “some of its own medicine of freedom of navigation” in reference to US-led South China Sea FONOPs. 

The transition in the Arctic to this arena of economic-security competition has essentially resulted in a classic security dilemma playing out with a cycle of growing militarization. Since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, there is also no active Russia-included forum to discuss these issues directly. This is then exacerbated by the increasing global “spill-over” from wider political and military competition among powers, which has put to bed any remaining ideas of “Arctic exceptionalism”- that meaning the Arctic is somehow distanced and unaffected by global events. The Arctic is now a growing strategic issue whose stability is directly integrated into global affairs like the South China Sea and Ukraine.  

Why does this matter to the UK?

This growing trouble-spot of a strategic frontier is right on the UK’s northern border. The UK needs a stable Arctic from both a traditional domestic security perspective, but also to ensure that it can, rightly or wrongly, continue to maintain its politically motivated post-war national interest of pursuing a global focus, and “punching above its weight” through casting its soft and hard power widely, thinly, but arguably with an impact. This is particularly true in the theatres which the Integrated Review outlined as part of the “Global Britain” framework- these being as wide-ranging as supporting “deterring” Russia (for which the Arctic is a new front) in Europe, helping to stabilize Africa, operating in the Middle East, engaging with Latin America and committing significantly to an “Indo-Pacific tilt” as a key part of the UK’s economic future. An unstable Arctic frontier risks overstretching or under-resourcing these other commitments.

The UK government clearly understands this when it noted in 2018 that it aims to secure a “stable” Arctic and will work with partners to achieve this. However, actual tangible details as the DAS might have been expected to provide in 2019 on what this actually means in terms of resources, capability, and integration with the UK’s other global theatres is missing. This causes three key problems.

Firstly, that UK diplomacy in the region isn’t as strong as it needs to be in courting partners or deterring competitors like Russia. For example, the UK has so far struggled to imitate the success of AUKUS with a more cautious Canada in the Arctic, partly as it is unclear what level of commitment the UK is publicly willing to signpost that might mitigate Canadian concerns regarding sovereignty.

Secondly, it means that the UK lacks a clear red-line deterrence in a region that has no formal all-party security forum in operation. Misunderstanding intentions and miscalculating agendas are one of the key factors that could cause Arctic competition to become conflict. The UK needs to clarify its position in detail if it is to become active in any serious hope of stabilizing the region.

Thirdly the Arctic is right on Britain’s doorstep, and while economically mostly unimportant, in security terms it is vital as activity might easily spill-over and affect the UK in its home waters, or the logistically important North Atlantic in imitation of the Cold War. However, this time with an uncertain future regarding Greenland, Scotland, and the Faroe Islands participation in curtailing Russian activity. The Scottish Nationalist Party’s Arctic strategy unlike the UK’s, emphasizes Scotland’s economic cooperation with Russia with no mention towards security. The Faroe Islands and Greenland both have independence movements with pro-Russian sympathies, the latter’s government actually having refused to comply with post-2014 sanctions on Russia, distancing itself politically from Denmark and the EU. 

Above image- HMS Sutherland, supported by RFA Tidespring, commanded a task group comprising the United States Navy’s destroyer USS Ross and the Norwegian Frigate Thor Heyerdahl on a deployment to the Barents Sea. (UK Government)

This should be a concern for the UK who is facing significant Russian submarine incursions into its waters to the point of being “overwhelming” according to UK government sources, an experience consummate with that of the US. Likewise, over the longer term as a melting Arctic fundamentally alters traditional conceptions of geopolitics as laid-down by Alfred Thayer Mahan by unifying Eurasia’s maritime areas, pushing former land-powers like Russia towards competing at sea. This also means that as the Pacific and Atlantic become linked through a shorter northern route China with its increasing navy and blue water ambition through its “Far Seas Protection” strategy will, as Britain’s current Chief of Defence Staff warned, be able to conduct incursions near the UK’s home waters. Particularly in response to UK South China Sea FONOPs, just as it has done to the US near the Aleutians. The UK’s South China Sea activities and wider Indo-Pacific presence are integral to its “Pacific tilt” by showing potential partners, particularly those like India, and members of the CPTPP its value as the “European partner with the broadest and most integrate presence in the Indo-Pacific” to foster new and improved economic opportunities post-Brexit. This has been historically difficult for the UK, and the increasing Pacific competition from China, as well as economically in the region from other European powers like France and Germany will see the UK need to marshal significant political and military resources if it’s to make good on this identified aim competitively.  

DAS- half an answer?

An Arctic with increasing Russian activity, and potentially in the near future with China able to reciprocate sabre rattling in UK home waters will see the UK increasingly overstretched. It may have to pull back soft and hard power resources fundamental to making an impact on the scale hoped-for in economically valuable theatres such as the Indo-Pacific, to concentrate on home defence and the economically unimportant Arctic. The release of a Defence Arctic Strategy provides the first step to helping alleviate this dilemma. The Arctic regardless is going to increasingly demand the UK’s security attention if it is to meet its aim of supporting partners and securing a stable region. But DAS will ideally facilitate this to be clearly integrated into the UK’s wider security framework, so that resources are not theoretically simply being pulled around ad-hoc. It also in itself has a signposting impact for partners and competitors in the Arctic to show the UK’s intensions, detail it’s red-lines, and commitment. This both avoids miscalculations escalating competition in an already unstable theatre, but also provides a deterrence in its own right by offering the parameters of competition for powers like Russia. It alone though is not the full answer by any means to the UK’s Arctic security conundrum and issues surrounding the under resourcing of the UK’s global interests. It is, however, a cheaper conversation to start with.