Eight months have passed since Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the world is still divided in regard to its attitude towards the war. The Economist provided a study based on a country’s government policies since the war broke out. It divided the world into three categories; Western-leaning, Russian-leaning, and neutral on the war in Ukraine. Out of all post-Soviet countries, Belarus remains a staunch supporter of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not least demonstrated by the country’s decision to host Russian troops on its own sovereign territory prior to Russia’s invasion in late February. However, Belarus was not always as closely aligned with Russia as it is today. Assessing Belarusian foreign policy from a political, socio-economic and military perspective will provide greater clarity as to its shift into Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Political perspective:

Previously it could be said Belarus practised a form of realpolitik when it came to its foreign policy. What this means is that Belarus sought to maintain some ‘state of neutrality’ which regularly shifted between Western nations and Russia depending on its needs. Realpolitik can be seen as an extremely pragmatic way of dealing with the current circumstances and it certainly benefited Belarus for a time. For example, Belarus previously maintained warmer relations with the West. After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Belarus notably acted as a mediator during the crisis and refused to recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The mood shifted after the 2020 elections where Svetlana Tikhanovskaya lost overwhelmingly in rigged elections that saw Alexander Lukashenko win more than 80 percent of the vote. The election result sparked nationwide protests and widespread repression. Some 30,000 civilians had been detained and 4,000 claimed to have been tortured. A wave of repression against journalists, media outlets and NGOs have also persisted in what Human Rights Watch called a ‘civil society purge’. The 2020 elections therefore marks a turning point in Belarusian foreign policy with Lukashenko abandoning its realpolitik approach in favour of total alignment with Putin. The true insight into Belarus’ shifting attitudes is twofold. Firstly, the West’s failure to properly stand up to the rigged 2020 elections is tied to Belarus being an accomplice in Ukraine. It took some ten months for the first serious Western-imposed sanctions to be implemented. This gap time provided Lukashenko valuable time to politically realign itself with Russia and limit the economic fallout of sanctions. Secondly, Belarus as a failed democracy means that it will be a continual threat to Ukrainian stability. Sharing a large land border with Ukraine, Belarus prior to the invasion in February provided the staging ground for Russian troops to invade. Currently, it continues to host Russian troops, supplies and missiles in its own sovereign territory. Lukashenko’s continual entente with Putin, therefore, poses a real threat to Kyiv. So long as Lukashenko’s regime persists, Ukraine's northern borders will never be secured. 

Economic and social perspective:

Prior to the war, Ukraine was Belarus’ main trading partner after Russian imports of goods to Ukraine in 2021 were estimated to be worth $5.4 billion. However, after the 2020 protests and Western-imposed sanctions, Belarus sought to become more economically dependent on Russia. Currently, 60% of Belarusian exports now end up on the Russian market. Russia has also issued new loans to Belarus worth some $1.5 billion, and even Belarus continues to buy Russian gas at a heavily discounted price of $128.5 per thousand cubic metres compared to the market price of $2,800 this summer. Paradoxically while the West can be criticised for its weakness in its approach to standing up to Belarus, its eventual sanctions which are punitive in nature served only to cement Belarus closer with Russia. Belarus’ rapprochement with Russia has therefore afforded it some economic benefits. But it cannot be denied that prior to the war and the 2020 protests, Belarus benefitted most economically from realpolitik. Furthermore, despite Lukashenko’s close affair with Putin some 80 percent of Belarusians oppose Belarus’ involvement in Ukraine. In fact, despite widespread repression by Lukashenko’s regime, the spirit of resistance endures. A wave of democratic and anti-war movements continues in Belarus whereby hackers and partisans sabotage railways to deter and stall Russian movement and supplies reaching Ukraine. The fight for Belarusian democracy and a stolen election continues alongside Ukraine’s right to sovereignty and self-determination. 

Military perspective: 

From a military perspective, Belarus has played and continues to play a significant role in aiding Russia’s expansionist policies. Prior to Russia’s invasion, Belarus and Russia performed large-scale military exercises called Zapad-2021 in September 2021 which included 200,000 soldiers. The exercises while ‘defensive’ in nature served only to provoke and heighten tensions between Russia’s neighbouring countries, especially post-Soviet countries that are Western-leaning and seek EU or NATO membership. The Zapad-2021 exercises culminated in exercises on Belarusian sovereign territory called Allied Resolve 2022 where more air and ground operations were conducted. Russia also brought over military equipment and positioned its armed forces closer than ever to the Ukrainian border. A week later, Russia would invade Ukraine from the north via Belarus, from the east in disputed territories and from the south from Crimea. As previously stated, Belarus maintains a position whereby it still poses a threat to Ukrainian stability. This is true from a military perspective where Russian Iskander missile systems capable of launching ballistic and cruise missiles have been reported to have been fired from Belarus into Ukrainian territory. Lukashenko has even affirmed he is ready to host Russian nuclear weapons if necessary. The threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and stability is real. However, Ukraine has remained vigilant and prepared. For example, its recent counter-offensive has been successful in Kherson and Kharkiv. Ukraine has also mined the roads and fields and destroyed key bridges on its northern frontier with Belarus. Should another counteroffensive be made by Russia or Belarus, Ukraine also possesses a highly modern High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided by the United States. With an effective range of 84km, HIMARS have already changed the tide of warfare and have proven to be militarily effective at wreaking havoc on Russian ammunition depots and supply lines. The stability of Ukraine remarkably is still highly contingent upon Belarus; it goes to show why the fight for Belarusian democracy should matter to the West. The reality is that the war in Ukraine is not simply a war against Russia but a geopolitical struggle that places Belarus right at the centre. Indeed militarily the means and supplies offered to Russia on Belarusian territory makes Belarus an important case study on the balance of scales when considering a conclusion to the war in Ukraine. There is no doubt that both Lukashenko and Putin’s fates are intimately tied, that if Russia were defeated in Ukraine it would likely be the end of Lukashenko’s regime as well.