Since the war in Ukraine began last February, Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian President and subsequent Prime Minister, has undergone a fascinating transformation in the Russian (and international) public eye. In 2008, Medvedev came into the presidency with Vladimir Putin’s approval, after Putin had passed two consecutive terms as president (the maximum allowed under the Russian constitution). During his four years as president, Medvedev sought to make clear his relatively liberal leanings, embrace of digital technology, and openness to the U.S. and EU when compared to past Russian leaders. While many in the international sphere and within Russia saw him as a figurehead under Putin’s control, Medvedev was nonetheless often regarded as a positive hope for reform in Russia and was well-liked in the West. After his one term as president, he forwent the option to run for a second term, making way for Putin’s return, and has, since then, held a variety of positions under Putin’s eye, ranging from Prime Minister to his current post as Deputy Chairman of the Security Council. Once a "mild-mannered" reform-minded politician, his viewpoints and rhetoric today paint an opposite picture to the Medvedev of ten years ago. 

In the months following the invasion, Medvedev increasingly became known for his impassioned public support of the war and is a veritable contender for possibly the most “vitriolic '' warm hawk amongst the Russian oligarchy. In addition to rehashing standard pro-Kremlin talking points denying the existence of Ukraine, he has written online that Ukrainian officials are “cockroaches” and “rabid pseudo-Ukrainian lapdogs choking on their own toxic drool”. He often employs vivid apocalyptic and religious imagery, using figures like angels in battle, the “horsemen of the apocalypse”, and Satan (who he’s described as the “supreme ruler of hell”) to contextualise Russia’s war in Ukraine as a “sacred” battle against evil. After Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe following its invasion of Ukraine, Medvedev stated that this expulsion marked an opportunity for the Russian government to reinstate the death penalty, and later that Russian “traitors'' who support Ukraine should be regarded as “public enemies”, even in the absence of formal charges, and barred from re-entering Russia.

His tweets and telegram posts also often target the West. In numerous tweets, telegram posts, and interviews, he has suggested that NATO countries can be considered to be “legitimate military targets” or “aggressive” if they provide military assistance to Ukraine. He has repeatedly claimed that Russia will be justified in the use of nuclear force against Ukraine, in the event that Ukraine wins the war, or against Western countries who may get involved, such as the United States. In the first week of 2023, he tweeted a threat of nuclear force against Washington, D.C., calling the United States “sons of bitches'' and “freaks”. He has stated that anything less than a Russian victory in Ukraine would result in an apocalyptic world war. At the end of 2022, he tweeted his ten predictions for the new year, including the collapse of the EU; the rise of the Fourth Reich and a resulting war in France; a civil war in the United States; the crash of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and the election of Elon Musk as President of the U.S. 

Given this drastic change and particularly charged rhetoric, there is speculation as to what exactly spurred this transformation. Medvedev himself has only stated that his rigour and severity come from “[hating] them” so much, as “bastards and scum”, with “them” possibly referencing the “Nazi” Ukrainian officials he often discusses (although it is ultimately unclear and there is room for wider interpretations). One theory is that Medvedev’s new characterization fulfils a role in Putin’s pro-war appeal to the Russian people by making Putin look like a moderate, more sensible choice in comparison - akin to playing “bad cop" to Putin’s “good cop”. Medvedev’s frightening contextualization of an already horrific war sets the stage for Russia (and Putin) to play hero in its capture of Ukraine, without involving Putin directly in the most alarming forms of phrasing it. In one analysis,  Medvedev is referred to as the “voice of fury” to Putin’s “voice of reason”. They write that, whereby Medvedev uses fiery imagery and an often angry tone, Putin speaks in a more academic and measured form when discussing what could otherwise easily be viewed as reactionary subject material. On the opposite end, while some may feel Putin offers a safer leadership option compared to Medvedev, others may be persuaded by Medvedev’s language and highly emotional appeal to the Russian people. Regardless of whether this is a deliberate arrangement between Putin and Medvedev, it appears that Medvedev’s character turn currently has the approval of President Putin.

As a complementary viewpoint to this first theory, there is also the widespread opinion that Medvedev is attempting to prove his continued loyalty to Putin, and on a greater level, his relevance to the rest of Putin’s inner circle who may likely fight over the top spots once Putin’s position of power becomes vacant. There is some discussion that Medvedev is possibly trying to position himself as Putin’s successor once his presidential term limit is up in 2024 or in the event his health deteriorates before then. In 2012, Medvedev went on record to state that such a possibility could happen in the future, as it would be allowable by Russian law. However, if he is truly looking towards the top spot, Medvedev faces unique challenges in reaching this goal.

Russian political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya has categorised Medvedev as one of the most “vulnerable figures in the Russian political elite” as the West has grown to distrust him due to his relationship with Putin and as the Russian elite has grown suspicious of him due to his relationship with the West. Over the years, he has lost allies to exile and/or prison, leaving few by his side. To add to this, Medvedev was humiliated in 2017 after opposition activist Alex Navalny revealed his vast fortune, and Medvedev found himself in the midst of corruption and embezzlement charges that lead to widespread protests in Russia and a resulting very low approval rate for him amongst the Russian people. There are even reports that Medvedev lacks allies in the elite security services.  Within this context, Medvedev’s trajectory from liberal reformer to passionate war hawk begins to make sense, as 2020 pre-war reports similarly attest to his need to display “political virility” in order to remain relevant. With the beginning of the war, Russia's political centre has become more nationalistic and more geared towards war hawkishness. With reports of Kremlin in-fighting, rumours of Putin’s health problems, and the still uncertain outcome of the invasion, Medvedev’s station is at risk and his newfound war hawk character allows him to fight for his position in future Russian politics, while maintaining Putin’s protection for as long as possible.