Introduction

As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is causing the forced displacement of millions of Palestinians towards the border with Egypt, Europe is reckoning with the most fatal year for migrants in the Mediterranean in five years. The humanitarian crunch added to energy security concerns, macroeconomic instability across the Maghreb and violence in the Sahel adds pressure on the EU Southern Neighbourhood’s foreign policy. The EU’s policy is largely aimed at containing major security crises from spilling onto European shores. The EU’s Southern securitisation attitude is being challenged from every angle and may require European officials to reconsider the ‘fortress Europe’ approach for a better crisis management policy. 

Europe’s Troubling Southern Neighbourhood: Between Securitisation and Migration Control

As 2023 draws closer to a conclusion, the EU sees itself challenged with numerous security crises from all sides of its neighbourhood. In the east, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been enduring for nearly two years, Azerbaijan's offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh adds up to the region’s instability, and tensions between Serbia and Kosovo revive memories of ethnic conflict in the Western Balkans. Moreover, the major escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian war since Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel threatens to turn into a regional conflict in the Middle East, with unsettling consequences for the Maghreb. 

The Israeli-Palestinian escalation is putting pressure on a volatile aspect of the EU Southern Neighbourhood's foreign policy: migration control. While it is undeniable that the EU's concerns with Israel-Palestine extend beyond migration policy alone, the EU is certainly paying particular attention to how Egypt and other North African nations will manage the expected massive inflow of Palestinians seeking refuge from what the UN called a threat of “mass ethnic cleansing” and the WHO a “public health catastrophe.”

But if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is putting the international security spotlight back on the Middle East, the EU has been bolstering its economic and diplomatic engagement with its Southern Neighbourhood since well before Hamas's Oct. 7 attacks. A critical aspect of the EU's foreign policy in North Africa and the Sahel has involved the negotiations of energy deals (particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine) and bilateral migration agreements as part of a broader strategy to meet security objectives and establish shared interests along Europe's Southern frontier.

However, the overall declining socio-economic health of North Africa, distinguished by high inflation, climbing debt, and slow growth, as well as unfolding security crises in the Sahel, may slow down or even halt the EU's agenda. And now, with a new humanitarian disaster happening in Gaza, officials in Brussels should realistically worry about how to prevent major socio-economic disruptions and a forthcoming migration crisis from reversing on European shores.

Before Israel-Palestine: the renewed migration conundrum in Tunisia

Palestinians moving out of Gaza due to Israel's bombardment will add pressure on an already alarming migration situation in the Mediterranean. In 2023, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) recorded more missing migrants in the Mediterranean than in the last five years, making 2023 in only two quarters the most fatal year for migrants since 2017. Since 2020, the IOM has also reported an increase in irregular departures from Tunisia, with Tunisian nationals representing more than 60 per cent of the Central Mediterranean crossings in the same year. Observers and authorities argue that Tunisia has replaced Libya as the main country of embarkation towards Italy for what is the deadliest irregular migration route across the Mediterranean. 

Record arrivals of migrants from Tunisia, added to an international outcry caused by reports of delays in State-led rescue operations and obstruction to NGO Search and Rescue (SAR) vessels, rang more than a few bells in Brussels and moved migration once again at the heart of the EU foreign policy agenda in North Africa. 

In July 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen led a ‘Team Europe’ with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to Tunis. They met with Tunisia’s President Saied and shook hands over the signing of a strategic partnership between Tunisia and the EU. In a press conference following the agreement, Von der Leyen described the deal as “an investment in our shared prosperity, stability, and  future generations.” The Partnership package includes macro-financial support following an IMF-supported reform program and €105 million to support Tunisia’s border control efforts. Von der Layen left no doubts on what is the core intention of the agreement, describing it as “an anti-smuggling operation partnership” that supports Tunisia’s sea border management and SAR activities. 

The rest of North Africa and the turmoil in the Sahel 

Tunisia stands as the most recent effort launched by European officials to foster stability along its southern bordering states. Concurrently, as the War in Ukraine shifted Brussels's pure security concerns to the East, nations in North Africa and the Sahel have witnessed a resurgence of economic and diplomatic engagements from Europe.

As a result of the war in Ukraine, Algeria, a strategic energy partner with the EU since 2015, became the third most important gas exporter to the organisation. Furthermore, after an expensive deal in July 2022, the North African country became Italy's largest gas supplier. Moreover, an $8 billion agreement signed in January 2023 between Libya's National Oil Corp. and Italy's Eni reinvigorates relations with the nation partitioned by civil war, Jihadists, and tribal leaders. During the same visit, the Italian delegation renewed the MOU on illegal migration for three years, concluding a model security-oriented trip to Libya. 

In the highly fragile Sahel, the EU has been active since 2011, particularly in the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). In 2021, the EU adopted a new Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, which confirmed the region as a critical security concern for Europe due to the presence of simultaneous crises, including political unrest, Jihadist and communal armed threats, inter-ethnic violence, and worsening humanitarian conditions aggravated by climate change. With the primary objective to prevent security crises in the Sahel from spilling into North Africa and eventually across the Mediterranean - with uncontrolled migration flows at the top centre of things to avoid - the EU shifted from a primarily security and military-focused approach to a more comprehensive strategy for long term development and better governance. However, the 2021 Sahel strategy may still be insufficiently prepared to respond to the new dimensions of regional dynamics, particularly following military coups across the entire Sahel, the incursion of the Wagner Group, and geopolitical competition with China, Turkey, the Gulf states, and Russia. 

More risks on the horizon 

The myriad of security challenges that North Africa and the Sahel face are spurring large-scale intra-continental migration to the North as more people flee violence, poverty, and chronic instability. On top of this, Israel's bombardment of Gaza, which is causing the forced displacement of millions of Palestinians towards the border with Egypt, does nothing but exacerbate the humanitarian crunch in the broader region. 

After the onset of the War in Ukraine, the EU attempted to refresh relations with its southern bordering partners through energy deals, financial aid, transfer of military and surveillance equipment, and border securitisation. Yet, it is possible that a ‘Fortress Europe’ approach could weaken the EU’s long-term interests in the region and worsen relations with countries at its southern frontier.

Moreover, accommodating North African countries’ harsh measures against migrants to diminish irregular arrivals in Europe could escalate xenophobic sentiments, particularly against sub-Saharan communities, and push more people to seek alternative routes to Europe. In the short term, frontline countries like Italy may experience fewer arrivals, even more so if North African governments continue major crackdowns on irregular migrant communities such as the one in Sfax, Tunisia, where thousands have been forcibly moved to desert areas far from the coastline. However, human traffickers - who are used to operating across borders - will likely devise new, dangerous methods to launch vessels across the Mediterranean. 

The rising risks of uncontrolled irregular migration flows, which worsened in 2023, will maintain the EU’s eyes fixed on a security-oriented approach to its southern border. Yet, the current European securitisation strategy may fall short of addressing the broader challenges confronting the overall region - especially after the recent escalation in Gaza - potentially leading to major socio-political tensions in the region and heightened geopolitical rivalry in the coming future.