Since the dissolution of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan has been a valuable and close partner of Russia in many ways. Within Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan can be considered the most valued partners of Russia for their size, wealth and integration with the Russian economy and security structure. 

Kyrgyzstan's economy is about 40 to 50 percent reliant on trade with Russia, and it has been part of Russia’s security organisation (the CSTO since 1992). Kyrgyzstan has also hosted one of the largest Russian military bases outside of Russia since 2003. 

It is no wonder therefore that the two countries have enjoyed a close political partnership after the end of the Soviet Union, and Kyrgyzstan has usually been quite good for Russia in the region as being a reliable partner that backed Russian programs and actions. In the last decade, however, talk of competition between Russia and China for influence in Central Asia has put countries like Kyrgyzstan into play, as they have attracted significant Chinese investment. 

The war in Ukraine has led to  a significant shift in the political allegiance of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan however. Both countries have voiced their  disapproval of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and have recognized Russia’s new weakness and inability to protect them and their interests. 

For Kyrgyzstan this has been shown in different ways, firstly a significant clash of force between itself and Tajikistan occurred in September over disputed border areas that had seen some sporadic fighting in the past. Russia’s preoccupation with issues in Ukraine, however, have made it unable to address this fighting, marking an important shift in power in the region. The Kyrgyz has voiced its displeasure and boldness in  several ways in the past month: it has followed its neighbour Kazakhstan in announcing that it would not turn back Russian conscripts fleeing the draft, and has on multiple occasions made announcements publicly voicing its disagreement with the Kremlin. In a shocking scene to many regular Kremlinologists, the Kyrgyz t President Sadyr Japarov even kept President Vladimir Putin waiting for a meeting during the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement summit in Uzbekistan in September. When noting that Putin has often used this tactic of being late as a power move on his political counterparts, the images of Putin sitting patiently as he sought to drum up support among his allies in the region left a mark on many observers. Further meetings between Putin and his Central Asian counterparts since then have continued to show this growing rift in power, with a meeting held in October seeing Kyrgyz and Central Asian dignitaries making their reservations and grievances with Russian influence known to Putin himself. 

There is therefore a growing sense among the Kyrgyz government, but also other Central Asian governments, that they now have the opportunity to establish a more balanced relationship with Russia. Russia is increasingly needing them as much as they need Russia. All the while, Kyrgyzstan has been one of the major Central Asian countries that have slowly been seeking alternatives to Russian influence through strengthening their relations with China. Central Asia has been seen as the pivot point for China’s Belt and Road initiative, and Kyrgyzstan in particular, due to its geographic location and relatively large population, has seen some economic benefits from the investment so far. Ultimately, however, it is likely that countries like Kyrgyzstan are looking for more equal partnerships with their larger partners such as China and Russia, instead of merely exchanging one for the other, as Kyrgyzstan still remains culturally close to Russia in many respects,such as language, and anti-Chinese sentiment is still a barrier to Chinese investment in the region.