The Russian invasion of Ukraine set in motion chains of coordinated international sanctions on a scale hitherto unseen, and yet it has simultaneously made increasingly clear the geopolitical divide between the West, and 'the Rest'. There are two principal sides in this confrontation. On the one, there stand the Russian (and Belarussian) aggressors who are supported nominally by several fellow autocratic states; and on the other, a group of democratic states and organisations including NATO who have contributed politically, economically, and militarily to Ukraine's defence.

It is the first major test of this web of American, and more broadly Western, alliances in the face of an interstate war on their doorstep and the core NATO/EU states have acted in concert on recognising, condemning, and sanctioning Russia. This return to the Cold War dichotomy follows years of a revisionist and aggressive Russia asserting their dominance over smaller, ex-soviet states as well as supporting autocratic regimes across the Middle East.

This generalisation however ignores the number of states who, in a delicate political dance between the West and Russia, have decided on a more ambiguous response to the crisis, or indeed taken no stance at all. India is chief among them and stands out as one of few democratic states who did not vote to condemn the Russian invasion in the UN General Assembly earlier in the month. India has several reasons to enact and maintain this non-aligned policy, and it is certainly not a case of apathy on their part. 

With ideological roots in the Cold War, Indian neutrality or 'non-aligned' policy has remained a mainstay of their international presence ever since they, along with four other key heads of state, founded the Non-Aligned Movement within the UN in 1961. It served to act as a counterweight to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, aiming to provide a third node of power in what was a very binary world order. India had its reasons for engaging in this way then, just as they have now. Justifications now fall into two main categories: a feeling of abandonment by an increasingly isolationist USA; and a national security imperative to restrain the growth of Chinese influence in the region.

It's no secret that the USA has been prioritising their own national interest in the international sphere for a few years now. It began with Trump’s ‘America First’ policies and has been continued under Biden with COVID-19 vaccine policies as well as import tariffs on ‘key’ industries, the withdrawal of the USA from the limelight of all aspect of international diplomacy has been seen as concerning by allied nations. In India’s case, there were two notable instances where the Biden administration are felt to have failed to support them: firstly in their sudden withdrawal from Afghanistan; and secondly their U-turn on vaccine exports in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Afghanistan issue has played on minds in India recently, being cited by some in their defence of India’s position on the Ukraine issue. The sudden and largely unannounced withdrawal of US forces in their entirety across a few weeks in 2021 sparked concern amongst partner nations who scrambled to declare policies of their own or to organise the evacuation of citizens. India, a long-term partner of allied forces who specialised in providing ‘soft’ power projects such as humanitarian, education, and infrastructural development totalling over $3bn is particularly concerned that a new Taliban government could target their investments.

Indian self-interest also comes into the equation when considering their stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as recent protests over newly introduced farming regulation threaten the stability of the world’s largest democracy. With oil prices spiralling globally, the Indian government has stated that they are in talks with Moscow about increasing the volume of oil imported from Russia in the near future, aiming to capitalise on the discounted prices and reduced international demand for Russian oil. Whilst Russo-Indian trade is relatively small, only accounting for $9bn a year total, an increase to the $1bn or so that India spends importing Russian oil could amount to useful yet small reprise for Vladimir Putin as he seeks to direct Russian exports to markets unaffected by sanctions. In addition to the energy security worries, India is concerned at losing Russia as a military ally, regional partner, and potential mediator of any future conflict between themselves and their larger neighbour, China. Modhi and Putin have met in person nearly 20 times since 2014, signalling a personal relationship even if their nations are further apart on other political matters. In addition to this, Russia imports account for more than 60% of India’s military equipment despite spending on US military hardware increasing to over $20bn in little over a decade. With clashes with increasingly aggressive Chinese troops occurring frequently on the contested Himalayan border, military build-up in the nearby provinces of Tibet and Xinjian and water security issues being exacerbated by widespread Chinese dam construction, India is hoping that if the two did reach a crisis point in relations, the Russian role as mediator could help to swing the diplomatic balance and ease tensions.

The US has however reportedly offered to replace all Russian-sourced Indian military equipment with their own stock in an attempt to reduce Indian dependency on the Kremlin and thus potentially change their stance on Ukraine. This may have some impact, but the likelihood of immediate replacement as would be necessary for maintaining capability is practically zero. The addition of more modern US military technology would both remove reliance on Russian imported equipment and potentially alter the power balance vis-à-vis China. Interestingly, India has also reportedly cancelled orders for Russian made fighter jets, helicopters and anti-tank weapons as the war has dragged on into the second month, potentially showing that cracks are beginning to form. It is unclear yet how far the Indian government will go along this track as it would signal a large shift in their historic non-aligned status. Such a move puts them at greater risk of diplomatic confrontation with China as well as reducing the likelihood that they could count on Russia to mediate or act on their behalf if tensions were to rise between the two most populous nations in the world.