In the last eighteen months since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, major military and political setbacks in the war have forced the Kremlin to adapt as best as it can in order to salvage some form of victory from the war. Russia’s failure to achieve a lighting victory in February and March of 2022 has led to a protracted conflict that the Russian military and political establishment was not prepared for. Since the withdrawal of Russian forces from the push on Kyiv in April 2022, Russia suffered two more major military defeats at the hands of better organised and determined Ukrainian forces, in Kharkiv in September 2022 and Kherson in November of the same year. Since then, fighting has become a grinding affair, with Russian forces using masses of artillery, mercenary contingencies like the Wagner PMC and mobilised personnel to gradually take any territory they can. Throughout the first half of 2023, Ukrainian forces organised and prepared for another counter-offensive  with the goal of recapturing further swathes of territory.n By June of 2023, it became clear that the main thrust of the Ukrainian offensive was aimed at the south of the country, with the strategic goal of cutting supply lines between Crimea/Kherson and mainland Russia.

The Ukrainian offensive has had mixed results so far. Whilst some point to it as a failure due to small gains in territory at great cost to personnel and equipment, others point out high Russian attrition rates and recent tactically significant advances in places like Robotyne. 

As the summer winds down and the rasputitsa, the fall and spring rains that turn vast areas of the country into a muddy soup, makes a return, it is likely to slow down any major advances for a few weeks, Putin and the Kremlin will be looking at ways to move forward in the next year in order to either freeze the conflict on its terms, or claw away a result that can be presented as some victory. 

Withstand the Ukrainian offensive

The first strategic priority for Russia will be on the battlefield, as the course of the war and position of Russia in the near future will largely be determined by its ability to withstand the current or any future Ukrainian offensives. The Russian military is likely to continue its largely defensive posture into the new year. This is firstly due to Ukrainian forces putting maximum pressure on Russian units in key areas such as Zaporizhzhia, southern Donetsk and Bakhmut, and therefore pinning Russian forces down in these areas; but also due to the lack of equipment and manpower necessary for Russia to mount any significant offensive in the coming months. 

Russia is likely seeking to deny Ukraine the capture of any significant strategic objective in its offensive operations, such as Tokmak and Melitopol, and continue to pound Ukrainian equipment and personnel, even if it requires retreating from certain areas to do so. The Kremlin likely feels like it can outlast and demoralise both Ukrainian society and the West if its defences continue to look too difficult to break. The wider strategy will rely heavily on Russia’s ability to keep the majority of the occupied territory it has left and not allow itself to lose territory such as in September and November of 2022, safeguarding key lines of communication and supply that will keep the occupation viable in the long term. Political pressure by Putin and others may lead the Russian MOD to attempt more offensives in the Donbass in order to capture more territory, but this is unlikely to occur before the late winter considering the degradation of Russian combat power in the last six to eight months. 

Continue economic and military pressure on Ukraine throughout the winter

It is likely that Russian strategy will continue to follow its strike campaign on Ukrainian economic and infrastructure targets. With intelligence sources claiming that Russia has economised and stockpiled cruise missile and drone munitions throughout the summer, it is likely we will see renewed waves of strikes throughout the territory of Ukraine. Whether these strikes will be a repeat of the previous winter’s campaign to knock out Ukrainian electrical grids is difficult to tell, however, the Kremlin is likely to continue heavily targeting economic lifelines of Ukraine such as grain storage infrastructure in the absence of any grain deal. It is also likely that future strikes may increasingly target logistics infrastructure of different kinds in an effort to harm the Ukrainian war effort. The summer of 2023 has already seen strikes on several warehouses in Western Ukraine, Odesa and Donetsk; train and bus stations in Dnipropetrovsk; and industrial centres in Zaporizhzhia city. In addition to degrading Ukraine’s logistics and restricting its ability to sustain its war effort without Western assistance, the Kremlin may also calculate that continued strikes, even on areas where they have had limited success in hitting their targets (like Kyiv) show resolve and determination to keep the war going, and thus have a demoralising effect. 

Combat Western sanctions and source new economic and military outlets
A key element of the Kremlin’s approach to the upcoming months will be its efforts to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions and seek new economic and military outlets. While Western sanctions have had mixed results in the short term, the Russian economy has struggled in the absence of Western cooperation and markets. Russia has been forced to redirect most of its gas and oil exports at a discount, been cut from many financial systems and has found it more difficult to procure vital western made technology such as microchips that are essential for the use of precision weapons.

Russia has increasingly found ways to circumvent certain sanctions however, and will likely increase its efforts to establish viable economic partnerships with countries in the Global South that are willing to work with it. The first 18 months since the invasion has seen Russia increase its ties with Russia, Iran and even India in order to sell its oil and assets in exchange for cash or useful technologies. This has translated into the political sphere as well, as Russia has sought to leverage its membership in BRICS and friendliness with OPEC and states in Africa in order to carve out economic and political support for itself. The outcome of the recent G20 conference illustrates this, as the conference did not conclude with a condemnation of Russia for its invasion, largely seen as a positive development for the Kremlin.

Militarily, this will be even more expedient for Russia in the coming year, as Russian supply issues have translated to battlefield struggles. Production of artillery shells, computer chips, small arms and heavy equipment all being needed to continue the war effort, Russia is currently working on expanding its cooperation with countries like North Korea, Iran, China and Central Asian states to either bypass sanctions or buy vital equipment like ammunition. The status of these links will be vital for Russia’s ability to continue the war. However, Russia will also be seeking to expand and mobilise its Defense Industrial Base further in order to be more self-sufficient. The best example of this is the planned Geran 2 (Shahed 136) drone manufacturing factory in Kazan, planned to be operational at the end of 2023, which, if completed and running as intended, will be able to significantly multiply the number of loitering munitions Russia is able to independently build and deploy to about 300 a month.

Work on degrading Western will to support Ukraine

Finally, the coming year will prove particularly important on the information warfare front for Russia. While the first year of the invasion created a difficult operating environment for Russian influence campaigns (due to the initial shock of the invasion and reputational setbacks of the Russian army and state), the current perceived stalemate and lack of progress by Ukrainian forces on the ground throughout the summer has led to increase scepticism among some Western voices in the media and political sphere. Russia has increasingly capitalised on the slow pace of military operations in its propaganda and influence operations in order to degrade Western support for Ukraine in the medium to long term. While the US has been the largest contributor to Western military and financial support to Ukraine, many Republicans in the US have shown scepticism for continued support for Ukraine, with some presidential candidates such as Donald Trump, suggesting that he would halt aid if elected, or at the very least make it conditional on Ukraine’s cooperation with his personal political goals. Putin is likely looking to major elections like next year’s US presidential elections as major targets for influence operations, as some results could ease pressure on Russia considerably and allow him the space to either continue the war or negotiate a settlement on Russia’s terms.