By Léopold Maisonny

Summary

Since November 19, Houthi rebels operating from Yemen have conducted attacks against ships cruising in the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. Major shipping companies have suspended Red Sea crossings and rerouted their ships to the Cape of Good Hope route, increasing maritime freight costs by approximately 10%. The formation of a US-led multinational coalition is unlikely to end Houthi attacks given the Houthi drone and anti-ship missile capabilities constituted with Iran’s support. 

Current Developments

• Following the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and the subsequent Israeli response in the Gaza Strip, Houthi rebels have conducted several attacks against ships cruising off the Yemeni coasts in the Red Sea, the Bad-el Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. On November 19, General Yahya Sarea, military spokesman for Yemen’s Houthi rebels, announced on X that the Houthi armed forces would attack ships carrying the Israeli flag or operated or owned by Israeli companies. He later extended the threat to all ships heading to Israeli ports.

• The first attack took place on November 19, in the southern Red Sea, where a Houthi commando hijacked the cargo ship, Galaxy Leader, and moved it to the harbour of Hodeidah, Yemen. Ray Shipping, a Tel-Aviv-based company, is the owner of the Galaxy Leader. The Houthis later carried out attacks against ships using anti-ships missiles, as well as air and underwater drones. American, British, and French military naval assets present in the area have intercepted air drones and anti-ship missiles aimed at them or other ships and assisted attacked vessels. 

• Major shipping companies  - including Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM, MSC, and Evergreen - have suspended the transit of their naval assets through the Red Sea due to the security risks. Some of them have already started rerouting their ships to the Cape of Good Hope. The oil and gas company BP has also suspended Red Sea crossings for its tankers. 

• On December 18, the Houthis attacked the Panama-flagged container MSC Clara and the Norwegian-owned oil carrier Swan Atlantic, with underwater drones, after the crews did not respond to their calls. The attacks did not cause any casualties.

• On December 18, US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, announced the formation of a multinational coalition named Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure the freedom of navigation in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The announced participating countries were the US, the U.K., France, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Bahrain, Italy, and the Seychelles. However, France and Italy later announced that their naval assets present in the area will remain under national command, and Spain that it would only participate in EU-coordinated or NATO-led operations. On December 20, Greece, Denmark, and Australia joined the US-led initiative. The same day, EU Member States agreed to build information-sharing practices with the US-led operation through the naval assets deployed as part of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the EU counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. Despite U.S. efforts to involve a broad range of countries, Bahrain is the only non-Western member of the coalition, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, India, or China declining to join this US-led initiative.

Analysis & Forecast

• Around 40% of Asia-Europe maritime trade usually crosses the Red Sea . The current attacks are likely to impact trade including energy supplies such as oil, liquid natural gas, and food products like grain and palm oil. On December 18, oil prices already increased by 2%.

• Insurance costs and maritime freight costs will very likely increase as the major shipping companies have rerouted their ships to the Cape of Good Hope, increasing the duration of the route from Shangaï to Rotterdam from approximately 35 to 45 days. While shipping companies save the Suez Canal passage fees (amounting to up to $600.000 per ship), the longer duration involves additional fuel costs to increase the speed and compensate for the delays, leading to a 10% total cost increase.

• Through these attacks, the Houthis very likely seek to gain leverage in peace talks with Saudi Arabia. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a multinational airstrike campaign against the Houthis. In April 2022, the two parties agreed on a truce, which expired in October 2022 but has informally been maintained. Saudi Arabia seeks to end the conflict with the Houthis and build regional stability to implement its “Vision 2030” development plan aimed at diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil revenues. 

• Houthi attacks against ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are very likely to persist despite the launching of Operation Prosperity Guardian. Although the size of their arsenals is unknown, the Houthi rebels have access to significant and diverse strike capabilities thanks to Iranian assistance. They retain anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, including the Sayyad and Sejjil. In terms of air drones, the Houthis possess the Wa’id, derived from the Iranian Shahed 136, and different versions of the Samad that they also use for suicide missions. The Houthis have also exhibited in the past two versions of underwater drones (named “Nazir 1” and “Nazir 2”) that they probably employed. 

• The formation of the US-led multinational coalition is unlikely to improve the security situation in the Red Sea in the near future. There remains uncertainty at the moment about the objectives and operational outlines and modalities of Operation Prosperity Guardian. In practice, this coalition is an extension of the US Combined Task Force 153 in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, headquartered in Bahrain. Most countries have limited military naval assets that they could potentially deploy to the area, and with limited weapon capabilities to face the Houthi attacks. Some European countries’ reluctance (France and Italy) to have their naval assets placed under US command will very likely require additional inter-force coordination. The absence of key actors like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, also raises challenges for supplying ammunition by air and setting up port calls. However, the presence of US and French air and naval military facilities in Djibouti partly alleviates this issue. 

• Another uncertainty relates to the operational missions of the coalition, ranging from escorting commercial ships crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to forming an A2/AD bubble to counter Houthi drone and ballistic missile attacks. The Houthis’ resort to underwater drones will also require anti-submarine warfare capabilities.