On the 30th of December 2022 the parallel National Assembly led by the opposition voted for the dissolution of the interim government presided by Juan Guaidó. Hence, leaving the parallel legislative body recognised by the United States (US) without an executive body. Thus, questioning its own legitimacy against Nicolás Maduro government’s National Assembly. Regardless, this week both the government and the opposition decided to ratify their National Assemblies, taking the country back to its 2019 scenario where both assemblies are entering 2023 in a dispute for legitimacy. Nonetheless, for the international community the question still stands: which assembly should they recognise?

As the opposition declared the failure of the interim government, it begs the question of the source of its legitimacy now that its executive body has ceased to exist. This assembly, democratically elected in 2015 for a period of 5 years, is three years past its original mandate which was extended in 2019 under the constitution's article 233. In the attempt to oust Nicolás Maduro, the assembly declared him a usurper of power in order to activate article 233. The article states that any vacancy of the presidency should be filled by the president of the Assembly, Juan Guaidó at the time, who became the president of an interim government the 5th of January of 2019 with the objective to call for a new presidential election within a period of 90 days after his appointment. 

With the ending of the 90 day period on the 5th of March 2019, the assembly and the interim government, who rallied the support of over 60 countries including the United States and the European Union, declared that the interim government shall remain until Nicolás Maduro is ousted from power. However, with the dissolution of the interim government criticised by the same assembly that appointed it for its lack of transparency and corruption, the time for this parallel assembly is due. Prominent Venezuelan jurists who  are part of the Constitutional Bloc of Venezuela warned the assembly of the consequences that the end of this opposition structure would entail. Nevertheless, without any strategy, route or agenda, the assembly was ratified with Dinorah Figueroa, currently in exile in Madrid, as its president. 

The only plausible explanation for this overdue assembly to retain any legitimacy relies on the frozen Venezuelan assets overseas which amount to more than $3 billion. Consequently, with over $300 million frozen in the US, the US State Department recognised the authority of the assembly as the last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela and would probably be followed by countries such as the United Kingdom where 31 tons of Venezuelan gold are frozen in the Bank of England to avoid the government from accessing it. Nevertheless, with the failure of the interim government, the international community questions the ability and transparency of the opposition national assembly to manage these resources effectively. Thus, questioning whether supporting them is still the wise choice for their own and the venezuelan people’s interests.

Thus, the current scenario emulates what happened in 2019 with an opposition led assembly whose grasp for power crumbles by the day while Nicolas Maduro and the government assembly sits back and evaluates the bizarre situation the opposition has put itself in while waiting to rip some benefits from their mistakes. 

As we think of Venezuela’s future:

• Probability of Negotiations: the news of the dissolution of the interim government came as a surprise for both the venezuelan people and the international community. However, throughout numerous rounds of negotiations the government continuously stated that for them to concede guarantees to the opposition the interim government had to be dissolved. Hence, what seems to be a surprise may actually be a step forward in the negotiations. The question that stands is: who benefits? The economic and humanitarian situation in the country is worsening, the opposition has taken a step back while the government patiently waits for its opportunity to strike a final blow.

• Elections: 

• With presidential elections coming in 2024, the opposition’s change of strategy with the dissolution of the interim government and the ratification of the assembly, are a clear indication that unlike previous elections they want to participate. Hence, without an executive body to represent them, the opposition will need to hold primary elections to decide who they will rally behind for the presidential elections. Thus, 2023 will be another year defined by the power struggles and the search for unity within the opposition.

• The government patiently waits for the presidential elections. However, with the dissolution of the interim government the expectation is that Nicolás Maduro may concede the promised guarantees and finally hold: free and fair democratic elections. Nevertheless, the government also has the opportunity to repeat what they have already done in the past, to take advantage of the weak situation the opposition is in and move the elections to 2023.