Human Rights Controversies Surrounding Egypt’s Hosting of COP27

By Justin Sin

Egypt is hosting the United Nations Climate Change Conference at Sharm el-Sheikh International Convention Centre this month. The conference represents a unique chance for all stakeholders to highlight solutions to the global challenge of climate change. On the agenda are discussions of innovations, unlocking private sector finance for climate adaptation, youth leadership programs and more. However, the influential conference has also served to shine a spotlight on the host country’s human rights misdealings. In particular, the situation of British-Egyptian prisoner Alaa Abd El-Fattah has drawn the attention of several media organisations and high-level British leadership. 

Alaa was a key figure during the 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Egypt and is one of the most renowned political prisoners in the Middle East. He spent more than nine years in and out of the Egyptian prison system on trumped-up charges because of his political protests. His latest term began in September 2019 following a wave of demonstrations where authorities accused him of “spreading false information.” As a result, Abd el-Fattah, currently residing in Wadi al-Natrun prison, has committed to a hunger strike. Since April, he has been partially hunger-striking by only eating 100 calories a day and taking only water and salts to protest his detention conditions. However, he informed his family in early September that he could die soon and would escalate his strike to cease drinking water as the COP27 conference began. There is mounting pressure on the British government to act and support him as complete inaction would likely lead to Alaa’s death under the spotlight of the climate conference. 

There has been a lot of effort from various activists to support Alaa and raise awareness of the human rights concerns in the country. Days before the conference, authorities detained an Indian climate activist walking through Cairo with a sign reading “March for our planet.” Moreover, hundreds were detained across Egypt over demands on social media for citizens to protest Egypt's economic crisis. Most Nobel prize for literature laureates published an open letter calling for heads of state, climate ministers, envoy heads, and negotiators to help free the political prisoners in Egypt. Alaa’s sister, Sanaa, began staging a sit-in two weeks ago outside the Foreign Office. Sanaa did this to garner Foreign Minister Cleverly's attention and pressure him to make a public statement demanding her brother’s release. Sanaa has also said she will fly to COP27 to raise humanitarian concerns at the conference. Sanaa’s efforts were greeted by a wave of support from a coalition of 64 members of parliament who signed a letter demanding the foreign secretary take immediate action regarding Abd El-Fattah’s case. On Sunday, Amnesty International joined Alaa’s family in organising a candlelit vigil with over 200 candles marking the number of days of Alaa’s hunger strike and banners which called for his release. Sacha Deshmukh, the Chief Executive of the UK branch of Amnesty International, also wrote to Downing Street asking Rishi Sunak to help. Fortunately, Rishi has acknowledged these concerns and assured the family that he would raise Alaa’s issue at COP27. However, the Egyptian government has continued to insist that there are no political prisoners in the country. 

Qatar and the FIFA World Cup

By Apoorva Iyer

In 2010, Qatar defeated several countries to become the first Arab nation to win the bid to organise the FIFA World Cup 2022. It is an opportunity that allows Qatar to move beyond the shadow of its Gulf neighbours, mainly Saudi Arabia and UAE, as it tries to place itself in the international forum. 

As an oil-rich nation, 40 per cent of Qatar's GDP relies on oil and gas revenue. However, as all the Gulf countries are pushing for economic diversification, the FIFA world cup is a significant opportunity for the current Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani to attract the spotlight. It was a vision developed by the then Qatar's Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani who won the bid to organise the FIFA World Cup 2022 in 2010.

Qatar has spent some $200 billion on developing the stadiums and infrastructure crucial to hosting the five-week-long World Cup. Further, around $300 billion were upgraded roadways, among many others, to attract tourists and boost the tourism industry. Also, approximately 1.7 million visitors are expected to visit the country. It is expected to add $17 billion to its economy. It is a massive moment as the current tourism industry contributes 6-7 per cent to the economy and the country intends to double to 12 per cent by 2030. 

It is not just Qatar but the entire Middle East that is expected to see an increased footfall of visitors during the World Cup. For instance, 90 flights are scheduled to enter Doha each day, and 40 will leave from Dubai, allowing visitors to return to Dubai the same day. Besides that, Saudi Arabia and Oman have also organised several infrastructures to accommodate the World Cup visitors. Bahrain is expected to increase hotel occupancy in Bahrain by 9%, Kuwait by around 24%, and Jordan will be 33% busier.  

However, despite several investments and the massive amount splurged in the country, Qatar has turned heads for different reasons.

To begin with, accommodation in Qatar is causing several issues. As a small country with around 1.2 million population, there is worry about the logistical problems of dealing with the sudden influx of visitors. Also, despite no restriction on alcohol, Qatar still needs to be considered tourist friendly by people. Thus, they are inclined to live in Dubai during the World Cup and travel to Qatar for the matches.  

Apart from that, there are other concerns related to human rights for which Qatar is drawing international criticism. As per reports, around 6,500 migrant workers have died since Qatar was awarded the right to host the FIFA World Cup in 2010. Apart from human rights violations, the LGBTQ community's concerns are rising. Water has clarified that showing public affection is illegal and can lead to several criminal charges. These concerns have increased as Qatar has refused to guarantee to protect the LGBTQ community. 

To add to these issues are the concerns of corruption in the FIFA World Cup. As per a USA official, the representatives working for Russia and Qatar had bribed FIFA officials to secure hosting rights for the World Cup in men's soccer. The accusations were a part of a year-long investigation into corruption allegations that led to numerous arrests.

Apart from these allegations, another issue concerns how Qatar will live up to its commitment to a 'carbon neutral' World Cup claim when it has air-conditioned eight stadiums that will host the matches.

The final nail in the coffin is the reports that Qatar is paying fans for their accommodation and travel expenses to visit the country to attend the World Cup and remain there for a minimum of 14 days, where they are supposed to see scheduled events. This way, they expect these fans to be the country's ambassadors to the world.  

All of these allegations and criticism and possible mismanagement of the FIFA World Cup led to a statement by Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani where he claimed that the allegations were fabricated and driven by campaigns that raised eyebrows on the true intentions of organising the FIFA World Cup.

All these matters come at a time when Qatar is trying to create a reputation on the global stage. In 2017, Qatar was boycotted by Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt after allegations that Qatar was supporting Islamist groups in the region and having warm ties with Iran. That caused a significant fallout in terms of its image at the international level. For a long time, Qatar has been preparing for the FIFA World Cup 2022 and trying to revolutionise the tourism industry. This world event was supposed to attract millions of visitors to the country. Those visitors were expected to become 'ambassadors' and 'influencers' who would also attract investment in other sectors.

But now these criticisms have taken the positive aspect of the FIFA World Cup. The event will eventually continue, and there is no doubt about that. However, the event's goal was to attract tourists, create a positive image and make Qatar a prominent name for a financial hub. Until now, Dubai was synonymous with these words. It is now synonymous with the terms' violation of LGBTQ rights,' 'human rights violation', 'death of migrant workers, and 'paid money to FIFA officials to win the bid.' Now, Qatar is busy with damage control instead of attracting a positive impression.

Hence, this opportunity is viewed to improve its standing politically and economically. Controversies such as these have a significant impact. For the time being, it is believed that the effect will remain for the short term. However, all these issues will have a long-lasting impact as these factors will be scrutinised in future while making major investment decisions in Qatar by investors and individuals alike.

Will the Threat of Iran Stall Biden’s Promised Consequences for Saudi Arabia?

By Cherifa Bourchak

The aftermath of OPEC’s decision to cut oil production is bringing the cracks in the U.S. and Saudi Arabia’s decades-long relations into sharp focus. In early October, OPEC+, an intergovernmental oil supply organisation, announced its intention to cut approximately two million barrels a day, sparking significant outrage among U.S. officials and drawing a promise from President Biden of ‘consequences’. 

Although a prominent fixture in the oil marketplace, Saudi Arabia is widely considered OPEC’s defacto leader and has been under international scrutiny over the decision for two predominant reasons. From an economic standpoint, the announcement has been deemed by experts such as the International Energy Agency as the ‘tipping point’ that could drive an already struggling global economy into recession. The outcome is additionally of huge benefit to Russia, which was producing under its quota and can now produce more oil at higher price points under the new terms. This comes despite heavy European attempts to curb Russian energy revenue by decreasing overall import dependence as well as the G7’s recent decision to impose a cap on Russian oil exports. From a U.S. perspective, the decision is a significant breach with the Biden administration and its unofficial alliance with Saudi Arabia to help drive down oil and petrol prices ahead of crucial November midterm elections, sparking significant outrage among U.S. officials.

The proposed consequences by members of the Biden Administration range from banning weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and unleashing the Justice Department to filing a lawsuit against OPEC members for collusion. Similarly, Saudi has alluded to retaliatory measures of dumping U.S. debt and could further divert from Western interests by redirecting oil sales. The effect of this could be profound, causing huge ripple effects in financial markets in an already weakened economy while highlighting risks to bilateral relations between the U.S. and Saudi. Saudi Arabia has defended its decision as purely economic and unanimous while strongly rejecting that the Kingdom was politically motivated against the U.S. due to its stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the strong U.S. backlash to the cuts suggests that Biden is serious about re-evaluating the relationship with the Kingdom in order to best serve U.S. interests, which may change the dynamic of bilateral relations between the two countries. 

Despite the frosty back and forth, it is unlikely that this setback will spark a fundamental change in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia due to both countries' strong regional interests, particularly in the common threat of Iran. Recent intelligence reports released on November 1st warned of an imminent Iranian ballistic missile and drone attack on Saudi Arabia, which prompted the swift launch of U.S. warplanes stationed in the Gulf towards Iran. Since September, Iran has attacked northern Iraq with ballistic missiles and publically accused Saudi Arabia and the U.S. of fueling the daily demonstrations against Iran’s Islamic Republic. The immediate alert status of U.S. and Saudi forces is a clear illustration of the strong partnership between both countries despite calls for a revaluation and heavily conveys that both will remain united on matters of securitisation against Iran. In addition, the U.S. is unlikely to abandon weapons sales to Saudi given the high risks of Washington’s counter-terrorism efforts and the threat of Israel’s integration in the region.

However, the threat of consequential action by Biden should not be taken lightly, particularly due to the timing of the oil cuts against the magnitude of the mid-term elections, which will determine which party controls Congress. This matter will significantly shape the rest of Biden’s presidential term and may lead to a consequential shift in future Democrats' attitude towards relations with Saudi Arabia. In the short term, it is likely that the Biden administration will stall its promise of action for more urgent priorities against Iran and will continue close ties with Saudi to minimise the risk of regional conflict. However, Saudi Arabia’s economic ties to Russia remain a long-term problem for Western allies, as will any future rebuff of U.S. interests, which may place the Kingdom at risk for future international pressure to take action against Russia and address its controversial position of neutrality in relation to the ongoing Ukraine war. In the context of the OPEC decision and the U.S.’s determination to secure their interests, it brings forth future questions of whether this is the start of Saudi Arabia’s significant shift towards ‘putting Saudi first’ and securing their interests against Western opposition. 

Lebanon’s Power Vacuum and the Economic Crisis

By Hassan Kablan

On October 31 2022, the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, left the presidential palace signalling the creation of a power vacuum as the elections to determine his successor were unsuccessful. Addressing his followers outside the presidential palace in Beirut, the Maronite leader, closely allied with Hezbollah who took office in 2016, said that Lebanon is approaching a new “chapter which necessitates huge effort’’, as the country struggles to recover from its severe financial crisis that started in October 2019. The above had been foreshadowed by the parliamentary elections that occurred in May 2022, and which resulted in a divided Parliament that is struggling to agree on a path out of Lebanon’s current crisis. Indeed, the failure of the political parties to elect Aoun's successor will further deteriorate living conditions in the country as no decisive steps will be taken to solve pre-existing problems.

Since the assassination of former PM Rafic Hariri in February 2005, a power vacuum at the level of executive power has somehow become a norm in Lebanon. However, unlike the past two decades, in which the political system was able to coexist with a caretaker government more than once or without an elected, as what happened between 2014 and 2016 (the third presidential vacuum since 2007), the parliament’s inability to elect a president will likely lead to further economic and social collapse. Lebanon has been suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis for three years and is currently run by a fragile caretaker government with restricted powers and a sharply divided parliament that lacks an explicit and clear majority capable of electing a new president.

Once described as the Switzerland of the Middle East, Lebanon finds itself crippled by the burden of an economic crisis that the World Bank identified as one of the worst in modern history. Most of the population now lives in poverty, as inflation has reached triple digits, and most people are unable to afford basic necessities, such as food and energy. A recent cholera outbreak in the country's northern part and Russia's pullout from a major grain export agreement have indeed exacerbated the situation, as the UN estimated in April 2022 that some 2022 million people in the country require aid with food security and health care. To make things worse, an unending electricity shortage has made many people depend on privately owned generators that are getting more and more expensive. All along, a political deadlock has been holding up the required reforms to secure foreign assistance and provide a lifeline for the country. 

The latest presidential void will likely further aggravate the political, social, and economic crises in the Middle Eastern country, as noted by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Barbara Leaf.  Addressing an audience recently at the Washington-based Wilson Center, Leaf noted that she predicts ‘’a scenario where there is disintegration [….] where there's just an unravelling” while emphasising that “nothing we or any other foreign partner can do can take the place of what Lebanon’s own political leaders have failed to do to date: form a government and get to the urgent task of pulling Lebanon back from the brink.” Given the current crises, Lebanon's political leaders must reach a settlement to limit the damage caused by the presidential vacuum. Most importantly, the country’s political actors should reach a compromise to give the current caretaker government the freedom needed to conform to the needed economic reforms. But such a compromise, if it occurs, should not constitute an alternative to electing a new president, which is only a small, but important step in the country’s long road to recovery.

Iraq’s New Political Consensus: al-Sudani, al-Sadr, and al-Sistani

By Abid Zaidi

October 27th saw the apparent end to a year-long deadlock within the Republic of Iraq, with parliamentarians approving a new government, selecting Abdul Latif Rashid as President, who subsequently named former Minister for Human Rights Mohammad Shia al-Sudani as Prime Minister. Since parliamentary elections in late 2021, the Iraqi legislature had seemingly been unable to form a stable coalition government, owing largely to the newly elected parliamentarians under the control of radical Shi’i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his eponymously named Sadrist movement, who rejected both the prevailing corruption that has pervaded post-Saddam Iraq, as well as the growing Iranian influence pervading Shi’i political movement. With Sadr failing to form a government, he eventually withdrew from the political process, officially retiring from public politics and calling on all Sadrist movement parliamentarians to resign from the Council of Representatives.

The election of both a new Prime Minister and President will hopefully bring an end to a year of turbulence for Iraqis, which has seen attacks on the offices of various political actors, violence in Baghdad’s specially designated “Green Zone”, and the growth of several external actors, namely Iran. Haste appeared to be of the essence for al-Sudani, who only used a third of his constitutionally-allotted one month to form a new cabinet from amongst a broad-church of political parties both within his Coordination Framework (a coalition of Arab Shia parties that hold significant affiliation to Iran) and externally amongst Kurdish and Sunni groups, even inviting the Sadrists’ participation (although these advances were ultimately spurned).

In so doing, Sudani has appealed to a broader constituency than al-Sadr could have ever wished for. Experts have decried al-Sadr’s tactics of applying public pressure through foot protests, occupying the Council of Representatives for upwards of half a month this July, as infantile and ostracising rather than welcoming. Additionally, despite holding one of the most significant legislative mandates in recent Iraqi history, domestic and international actors have welcomed al-Sudani’s government formation, as stability becomes the primary motivating factor driving subsequent power-sharing dynamics. al-Sudani, whilst far less known than al-Sadr both at home and abroad, has demonstrated that charismatic leadership is not the be-all-and-end-all in this new chapter for Iraq.

Whilst the peace is currently maintained, however, there is a lot on al-Sudani’s plate, assuming he is to run out his full, constitutionally-mandated four-year term. In the first instance, the fiscal landscape for Iraq is supremely bleak. Not a month after his election, a new corruption scandal involving the owners of several high-ranking companies that had been afforded public contracts unfolded, with almost 3.7 trillion IQD (2.5 billion USD) inconspicuously withdrawn from the state accounts of the Iraqi Tax Authority. For the wider Iraqi electorate, however, the main bones of contention are whether al-Sudani will attempt to reverse the decision of the previous government to deliberately devalue the Iraqi currency on foreign exchange markets, attempting to make Iraq less reliant on US dollars, the de facto underground currency in play within the state. Additionally, al-Sudani’s fiscal plan to develop a stable supply of food imports, create more state jobs, and initiate a long-delayed plan to compensate the families of those affected by both Da’esh and the campaign against them, are all heavily dependent on Iraq’s ability to obtain a secure line of international credit – a recent deal signed between the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development and the National Bank of Iraq to the tune of 36.7 million AED (10 million USD) is a vital lifeline for al-Sudani, in not only supporting his short term plans but long-term security and economic co-operation between the UAE and the Iraqi Republic.

In the second instance, the government must consider the advanced age of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a major political player in post-Saddam Iraq, despite historically advocating for a separation between theology and politics. Turning 93 in the upcoming year, al-Sistani has played a pivotal role in determining Iraq’s political trajectory, issuing the infamous fatwa/call to arms for all able-bodied Iraqi men to fight the Da’esh onslaught, which was seen as a key turning point in the struggle against the Islamic State. Unlike his similarly politically inactive teacher Ayatollah Abul Qasim al-Khoei, al-Sistani has not yet named or even postured towards identifying his religious successor. The state of clerical politics in Iraq has been a key determinant in its political trajectory. It is the implicit respect al-Sadr has for al-Sistani that prevented the former from turning the holy Shi’i city of Najaf into a battlefield between Sadrist and US forces during the 2004 occupation, on the command of the former. It is this respect that again played a role in ceasing the violence in the “Green Zone '' earlier this year, on the orders of the Grand Ayatollah.

And it is the reverence that al-Sadr showed for his clerical authority Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri that determined the manner in which he conducted his anti-US campaigns in the early 2000s. As such, when al-Haeri announced his withdrawal from clerical life earlier this year, it appeared as though al-Sadr was in a political freefall.

As such, the potential for al-Sistani to pass away with no clear successor could pave the way for a re-emergence of instability, coupled with the potential filling of this space by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has already gained a significant foothold given the role its specialised Islamic Revolutionary Guards (and its former top general, Qassem Soleimani) played in the struggle against Da’esh. The seminaries of Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran have historically been at odds. However, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the latter has been on the rise – the ability to significantly determine who succeeds al-Sistani would anger several Iraqis and may potentially herald the reappearance of the anti-Iranian Sadrist movement in a far more potent manifestation.

In the third instance, al-Sudani must maintain the stability of not only the country but of his incredibly fragile Coordination Framework. Indeed, al-Sudani calling out corruption is a “double-edged sword”, for it may involve him engaging in incredibly stark confrontations, not least amongst some members of the Coordination Framework, some of whom, including former Prime Minister and political heavyweight Nouri al-Maliki, represent the class of politician that took over after 2003, and drove the country “into dysfunction and economic ruin”.

What can al-Sudani do to prevent another political breakdown? Al-Sudani has already laid out the vision for his premiership, including a vast and sweeping range of political and electoral reforms to improve democratic outcomes and reduce corruption, but experts say the only way this can effectively be tested is to win back the favour of the Iraqi electorate is through the calling of an early parliamentary election, allowing al-Sudani to marry his ever-increasing personal popularity with an electoral legitimacy not yet afforded to him.