The combined influence of Russia and Iran is increasingly substantial, with their strategic alliance having been reasserted over the past few months. At the same time, the divide between the East and West has also become evident. Positive diplomatic relations between Russia and the West have become almost non-existent following its invasion of Ukraine. Yet as many stood against Putin’s invasion, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi endorsed Putin on 25 February 2022 by supporting Russia’s position against an expanding NATO. Since the invasion, Putin has visited the supreme leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, one which had likely involved talking points on Ukraine, Syria, and Israel as well as the general future of the Middle East.

Strategic cooperative efforts were made clear at the beginning of this year when President Raisi expressed a desire to have “permanent and strategic” relations between Moscow and Tehran. With Putin’s interests to ensure Russia’s continued influence in the Middle East and Iran being a dominant regional power, close ties are ideal. For Iran, there is a focus on increasing its influence throughout the Middle East in order to better manage its interests in Syria as well as its dealings with the presence of the US and relations with Israel. At the international level, there remains a level of dependency on Moscow’s international decision-making capabilities, however, their combined global influence is on the rise as Tehran builds relations in the East. Iran’s pivot to the East is a result of mutual sentiment against Western hegemony in the current world order, with global powers such as Russia and China making concerted efforts to challenge said status quo. Since Iran aligns with these views and suffers the consequences of US economic sanctions, its pivot to international organisations and alliances in the East is a natural progression. Yet, while influence in the East will be a positive step forward for Iran, Russia and China are likely to ensure that Iran’s influence remains limited when it comes to their regional spheres of influence. 

Russia-Iran in the Middle East

The regional influences of Russia and Iran differ greatly in terms of the relations they choose to maintain and their material capacities such as military support or energy supply. Their capabilities have in turn shaped their foreign policy agendas in addition to creating tensions throughout the Middle East. Iran’s ability to influence remains complex due to continued tension with other regional powers. The case of Iran-Israel is the primary example as both remain adversaries, presenting itself as a challenge for Moscow to keep a diplomatic balance. Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is of top concern for Israel – alongside other issues such as its involvement in Syria – which can help explain Israel’s lack of support for the JCPOA (better known as the Iran Nuclear Deal) and the consequential economic sanctions that would take place if Iran finds itself in breach of the deal. Additionally, while there are positive ties with Oman (military cooperation) and the UAE (economic relations), Iran’s influence is narrow and limited in reach. However, Iran’s support of the Assad regime in Syria and their continued military presence throughout the country remains foundational in their continued efforts of building and maintaining relations in the region. 

Looking to Russia, their involvement in the Middle East extends back to the Soviet era, with a peak period of material influence in relation to economic and military support in the 1960s, particularly in the lead-up to the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Through a series of miscalculations and failure to provide accurate information through “Soviet warnings regarding the build-up of an Israeli assault against Syria”, Russia started toward a path of slowly diminishing influence in the region. Since Putin came into power, he has made consistent efforts in improving bilateral relations across the board. Part of Putin’s foreign policy strategy in the Middle East understands the weight of using soft power in order to improve relations with specific countries, for instance, through Russian cultural centres in Lebanon and Egypt. One example of Putin playing both sides is the positive ties developed with Israel over the years, having met both former Israeli President M. Katsav and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, while simultaneously working on relations with Palestine in addition to their alliance with Iran. However, Russia has taken on a stronger position against Israel when in February of this year they called for Israel to end its airstrikes against Syria. In the same tone following the Russian invasion, Israel has sided with Ukraine, consequentially leading to strained relations between Moscow and Jerusalem. Russia’s support throughout the Middle East appears on the surface to be lacking support from the majority of countries surrounding its invasion of Ukraine as revealed through the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia and demand it withdraw from Ukraine. 

Vote to Condemn Russia (Middle East)

For

Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen, Egypt, Afghanistan

Against

Syria

Abstained

Iran, Iraq, Sudan

In this case, nations will prefer to avoid involvement in a war that primarily involves Europe and the United States, and, arguably, a vote to condemn can prove a strategic move to ensure positive relations with Western countries with whom they have critical ties. What is important to note is the position Iran has taken in the past when explaining its decision-making process regarding who it builds relations with. In March 2018, when Iranian Foreign Minister Dr Javad Zarif “invited Pakistan to participate in Chabahar port project and development of its link with Gwadar Port”, he explained how Iran’s “relations with India, just like Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, are not against Pakistan as we understand Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia are not against Iran”. In other words, the relations Iran makes with other countries are expected not to be interpreted as a form of malice against another country and vice versa. Of course, this can be considered a naivety Tehran cannot afford. In looking to Moscow, even with strained relations with Jerusalem, Tehran understands the difficulties of maintaining bilateral relations (Russian-Israel; Russia-Iran) and the effort required to avoid decisions that could spark further conflict.

Russia-Iran in Syria

In 2015, Russia re-asserted its foreign policy position on the Middle East following its military intervention in Syria that provided critical air support. Influence over Syria is highly contested amongst external actors, and while Moscow and Tehran have shown support for Damascus, all three see a different future for Syria. It is debatable as to which actor has greater influence in Syria. With Putin having gained increased levels of influence over Assad following the 2015 intervention, ensuring he remained in power, Syria fell into Russia’s debt. In March 2022, that debt came under the spotlight when Assad extended the support of the Syrian army and with Putin’s “commanders free rein to enlist them”. Furthermore, Russia recently used its influence in the UNSC to prevent humanitarian aid from going into Northern Syria through Turkey, stating that they held “concerns about cross-border aid being manipulated by terrorist groups” and to “organise the delivery of aid in coordination with the Syrian government to all parts of Syria”. Influence in the UNSC is a level of support the Assad regime would be without if not for Russia, offering the Syrian government increased capacity to fight the Kurdish forces and Syrian civilians by any means necessary. 

Moscow has typically kept itself distant due to its risk-averse nature, speaking to its pragmatic foreign policy approach. As was the case in December 2017 when the chief of the Russian General Staff, Army Gen. Valery Gerasimov, explained that Russia’s military “advisors are attached to nearly all units”. Yet Iranian and pro-Iran forces (e.g., Hezbollah) were and remain crucial actors for the Assad regime. By 2015, Iranian forces were increasing their war efforts, with Iran’s former Chairman for the Committee of Foreign Policy saying they were “ready to send troops to Syria if Mr. Assad's government requested them”. As of 2022, Iran’s military presence is predominantly in Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, Al-Quneitra, Damascus, and Homs, while their military presence since 2013 has increased substantially overall.

What should be highlighted is Iran’s long-term plans in Syria. First, Tehran’s efforts to build trade relations would help support the survival of Assad’s government. In 2018, Tehran hosted a joint business forum with Syria to discuss such plans, noting possible areas of trade in  “air and road transport, aviation, insurance, agriculture, [and] industry”. Yet, even after having spent an estimated $30 billion in Syria as of 2020, Iran holds only a small share of trade with Syria and could possibly lose out to bigger players. If Tehran is unable to secure stronger trade ties, influence from Putin could assist in such goals so long as it does not negatively impact Moscow. Second, a military presence throughout Syria will likely be maintained if Assad takes back full power.  

Relations with Other Regional Powers: Saudi Arabia and UAE

The former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (2014-2017) focused on the restoration of bilateral ties, making it a core tenet in Iran’s foreign policy agenda. At present, Tehran appears to be continuing this policy to some extent as it has welcomed the possibility of accepting a UAE ambassador in Iran. The Emirates presidential adviser Anwar Gargash aligns with this line of policy stating, “The next decade cannot be like the last... It's a decade where 'de-escalation' should be the key word.” Of course, the ability to achieve such an outcome is unclear. For instance, the threat of Iran providing support to the UAE’s enemies in Yemen (the Houthis) serves as a substantial barrier. In 2019, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, Mohammed Abdullah Al-Hadhrami, delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly where he condemned Iran and its “expansionist agenda”, leading Iran’s proxy wars through the provisions of armament to militias, specifically the Houthis and Hezbollah. While Russia stands in support of Iran’s proxy wars in Syria, the case of the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and Moscow’s lack of involvement has proven another balancing act crafted by Putin in order to maintain positive bilateral relations across the board. The ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Syria thus reveal how Russia and Iran stand at odds against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with each continuing in their attempts to curate a different future for each country. 

In terms of power, since the beginning of the 21st century Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have been provided with a multitude of beneficial opportunities to expand their regional influence. For Iran, the Iraq War offered a weakened adversary in addition to the Bush policies assisting in the creation of “a sectarian Iraq that has helped empower Iranian hardliners”. Similarly, the war in Afghanistan led to a dependency on Iran as it “provided… $500 million in development aid” in addition to some Afghans seeing Iran as “a possible protector”. In 2014, Saudi Arabia and UAE simultaneously gained immense influence over Egypt following Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi’s rise to power following a coup against the first democratically elected president in Egypt. For Russia, the war in Ukraine is forcing many to take sides, such as the UN vote to condemn Putin’s invasion. Saudi Arabia is choosing to maintain a balance with its relationship with Russia, made clear in the recent efforts of OPEC+ to increase oil production by a mere 0.1 per cent  of global demand. For the Emirates, while they abstained earlier in the year on the resolution to condemn Russia, they did however vote later on in favour of condemnation due to the need to ease tensions with the US. A takeaway point here is that the Gulf countries are not always aligned with the West and that decisions are made based on beneficial opportunities rather than loyalty alone.  

However, there remains a divide between the power players, particularly in relation to geographical influence. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have launched continuous air strikes against the Houthis in Yemen over the years, with the most recent having been in January of this year. The air strike, led by a Saudi coalition, was in apparent “retaliation for Houthi attacks” on the UAE. While it was said that the strike was directed towards a military facility, there is little or no evidence in support of this claim, according to Human Rights Watch. In April this year, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei addressed Saudi leaders, making it clear that Iran believes the Houthis have the majority of control in the war, and if peace is to occur, Saudi and UAE intervention must cease and essentially allow for a Houthis take over. This will then place Russia once in a difficult position as it has largely remained uninvolved in Yemen. Whether a position as a neutral mediator is satisfactory remains to be seen. Based on the ongoing hostile and violent attacks being made from both sides, Iran’s support of the Houthis remains a critical position if it seeks to increase its regional influence. If successful, given that Yemen borders Saudi Arabia, the gains would provide a significant increase for Iran’s sphere of influence. 

Global Influence 

Anti-Western sentiment remains at the core of Russia-Iran relations and has allowed for Iran to overcome its previous “Neither West, nor East” outlook. Since Western sanctions have had such an impactful role on Iran’s capacity to develop, it has pivoted to the East in order to build economic ties. Russia’s position in certain international organisations has proven beneficial in the past for Iran. For example, in 2020 when the United States sought to restore all UN sanctions on Iran, Russia opposed the decision and requested a meeting with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Putin’s actions therefore underline Moscow’s willingness to alleviate the influence behind Western sanctions for Iran’s benefit while ensuring regional stability in the Middle East. 

Membership in international organisations, such as ASEAN and the SCO, has been led by Moscow in order to provide Tehran with the ability to avert Western influence via sanctions. Therefore, Russia reveals its capacity and willingness to push for Iran to become a stronger influential member of the international order. Much of this is made clear when in 2016, following sanctions relief on Iran, Putin expressed Iran’s route to full membership into the SCO had “no obstacles left”. In September 2021, Iran officially gained permanent membership to the SCO which will provide access to the Central Asian markets, improving its economic ties and strengthening its economy. Once Iran’s full membership with the SCO is finalized, it will be provided with the ability to influence the decision-making process among other SCO members, in particular, Russia, China, India and Pakistan. How Iran’s decisions could be influenced within the SCO can be determined based on Russia’s relationship remaining positive as well as Iran’s critical economic ties with China and India. It is clear that Iran’s ascent into the international region is far from over and its influence will only continue to rise. 

A prominent area of Russian influence for the benefit of Iran has greatly revolved around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, which provided sanction relief as well as the lifting of the arms embargo on Iran. Once the Trump administration pulled out of the deal in 2018, “Iran began ignoring limitations on its nuclear program” and resumed its nuclear activities. The JCPOA’s ultimate goal is nuclear non-proliferation, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As a permanent member of the UNSC, Russia provides Iran access to influence the outcome so long as they remain allies. While China may provide additional support, their combined capacity to influence remains weakened due to the other four members – US, UK, France and Germany – having strong anti-Iranian sentiment based on their willingness to “maintain international security” through the JCPOA. 

At present, the Iran Nuclear Deal is currently undergoing a major revival with talks having been held recently in June 2022. Russia’s support for Iran was made clear, stating: “Iran is respecting in good faith the provisions of [resolution 2231] to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”. Due to the apparent clash between the US and Iran, and if the JCPOA talks were to fail, we could see a growth in regional pushback within the Middle East against the U.S. and its Western allies.  

Final Points

Assessing the capacity of Russian and Iranian influence is one of growing concern, and while each one’s capacity continues to develop, their strategic alliance is of no surprise. The fact that Russia is able to purchase advanced drones, as well as receive training from Iran in order to aid Putin’s war, speaks to the critical nature of their alliance. Additionally, the ongoing wars in Syria, Yemen and Ukraine – in addition to the issues surrounding a nuclear Iran and clash between the East and West – highlight the relationships and struggles for influence in the Middle East rather well. Iran serves as a strong port of entry for Russia as well as an important partner that stands against a Western presence in the Middle East. For instance, in the case of Syria, Iran’s military efforts have proven capable of preventing a possible Western puppet regime from being established, an outcome that would be unacceptable to both Russia and Iran. 

For Russia, Iran will also remain a crucial counter-balance to Turkey’s NATO membership, and given how Putin has used NATO as a justification to invade Ukraine, Iran will therefore continue to serve as an important ally due to their mutual stance against the Western organisation. Similarly, due to Iran’s lack of international influence, Russia’s international position remains highly assistive in specific situations for Iran, such as the joining of international organisations to build trade relations in the East or the decision-making power Russia holds with the UNSC. While this, in part, helps explain the simplicity behind the reasoning of a Russia-Iran strategic alliance, obstacles will certainly arise and put the alliance to the test. However, as Russia has moved closer to Iran since the invasion and, consequently, is more aggressive with Israel, Russia’s ties with Israel are thin and will no doubt generate new challenges in the future. 

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, with Raisi and Ali Khamenei backing Putin’s decision, a rift is becoming more visible between and echoes the beginnings of the Cold War. The Biden administration released a fact sheet – following the July 16 Jeddah Security and Development Summit “hosted by Saudi Arabia and attended by the GCC leaders” – the US explained it will “support and strengthen partnerships with countries that subscribe to the rules-based international order”, in addition to efforts of preventing what it perceives to be as threats to regional stability. The paper helps highlight the ideological divide taking place between the East and West within the Middle East. The resultant shift, if the West takes a more aggressive approach in the Middle East, will present more challenges for Russia and Iran. Russia will have to ensure it strikes a balance, one which serves as a neutral mediator as, for instance, could be the case in Yemen. Iran  will seek to develop and increase its power based on its expansionist tendencies, but will likely encounter limitations due to Russia’s own interests. The combined resources, therefore, of Russia and Iran presents a strong and influential relationship at both the international level and within the Middle East, and will aggressively challenge the international liberal order.