Summary

In light of the fast-growing drone export industry in Türkiye, this article assesses the geopolitical interests and strategies behind this industrial trend. The emergence of Türkiye’s drone industry stems from its need for self-sufficiency due to the arms embargo imposed upon it since the 1970s. In recent years, the demand for domestic production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been integrated into Türkiye’s strategy of promoting its political and military presence in regional conflicts. Still, challenges arguably remain in the country’s efforts to build such techno-geopolitics.

Türkiye’s Drone Warfare

The global military drone market is estimated to grow from USD 14.4 billion in 2023 to USD 35.6 billion by 2030, fueled by an increasing global demand for military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Following the U.S., Israel, and China, Türkiye has emerged as a rising drone power. It has been one of the fastest-growing arms suppliers since 2000 and has become the largest drone exporter since 2018. The burgeoning combat drone industry can be partially attributed to Ankara’s modernisation strategy in the defence sector dating back to the 2000s, which prioritised establishing a stable domestic supply chain, reducing arms-import dependency, and strengthening the export capability. The Defence Strategic Plan 2019-2023 released by the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) further revealed the salient role of drones in reinforcing Türkiye’s military capability. 

Recognising this trend, this article provides an overview of recent technological advancements in Türkiye’s drone industry and their deployment in armed conflicts, specifically Turkish military operations in Syria, the Libyan Civil War, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the Russia-Ukraine War. In the last section, this article aims to analyse Türkiye’s geopolitical ambitions through two perspectives: Türkiye as a global drone power and its geopolitical objectives.

Türkiye’s rise as a drone power: technological advancements and the export industry

At the national level, the research and development investment in Türkiye’s defence industry has experienced a consecutive growth from USD 58 million in 2003 to USD 1237 million in 2017. Key priorities include ensuring the indigenous design and production of cutting-edge military equipment. As a result, Turkish companies can supply 80% of the Turkish Armed Forces’ military equipment in 2022, compared to only 20% in 2004. In light of this progress, Türkiye’s Defence Strategic Plan for 2019-2023 reiterates the objective of “minimising foreign dependence in the defence industry by developing domestic technologies”. 

Beyond satisfying domestic demands, Türkiye’s defence industry aspires to compete in the global market. In 2022, total exports in the defence and aerospace industry sectors reached USD 4.4 billion, targeted to increase to USD 6 billion in 2023, surpassing some European countries’ annual defence budget. As the largest export item in the defence industry, Turkish UAVs generated USD 871.5 million in exports in 2022, increasing by 80% from 2021. By 2023, over 500 Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones had been sold to 32 countries, among which GCC countries remain the top buyers. More deals with countries like Angola, Slovakia, Portugal, and Japan are expected to follow. In July 2023, Türkiye signed a contract with Saudi Arabia on the transaction of Akinci UAVs, one of the most advanced technologies capable of fully automated navigation. The agreement with Saudi Arabia further includes closer cooperation on personnel training, technical support, and even joint production and technology transfer.

The rapidly growing military drone industry in Türkiye is largely propelled by its military-industrial complex. Aselsan, Roketsan, and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) are among the top defence companies that have been cooperating closely with the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish government in promoting the research and development of innovative technologies, developing final products, and decommissioning platforms and systems. One flagship product of TAI is its Anka UAV, which has been deployed in several Turkish operations in counter-terrorism and regional conflicts. Baykar, another rising key corporation –  in which Erdogan’s son-in-law Selcuk Bayraktar serves as the Chief Technology Officer – has been aligning its vision with Türkiye’s strategic priority of achieving self-sufficiency in the defence industry and expanding military influence globally. Ukraine’s deployment of Baykar-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 drones against Russian forces has boosted the company’s reputation. In 2024, Baykar will reportedly introduce a new highly autonomous combat drone named “Kizilelma”, capable of working alongside fighter jets and taking off and landing on aircraft carriers with high situational awareness ability.

Military deployment in armed conflicts

Turkish military operations in Syria

In Syria, drones have mainly been deployed in Türkiye’s airstrikes in Operation Euphrates Shield (2016-2017), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019), and Spring Shield (2020) against the Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is composed primarily by Kurds and led militarily by the Kurdish People’s Defence Units (YPG). Beyond Syria, they were also used in operations against militant groups affiliated with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq.

Compared to traditional warfare, combat drones give an edge to Turkish armed forces to launch cross-border offensives in areas where they could not previously reach, with low cost and fewer casualties. More importantly, Türkiye has integrated the use of drone attacks into regional counter-terrorism campaigns to undermine the Kurdish dominance in northern Syria. Following an airstrike by Russian and Syrian forces against a Turkish army convoy in Balyun, Idlib Governorate – claiming the lives of over 30 Turkish soldiers in February 2020 – Türkiye launched Operation Spring Shield, during which it executed surgical airstrikes in northwestern Syria. One strategic rationale behind the Operation was to maintain the de-escalated area across the Turkish-Syrian border stipulated under the 2017 Astana agreement and the 2018 Sochi agreement, as well as to create a buffer zone between the PKK and YPG and prevent an influx of Syrian refugees into Türkiye. Drone strikes incapacitated Syria’s mobile air defence system, while conventional land-based artillery targeted Syrian deployments in the north. Although there has been no accurate estimation of Syrian losses, the drone attacks have proven effective in preventing the Syrian army’s advance into the Idlib Governorate and defending Turkish-held areas in this region from regime forces. 

Although Türkiye intends to target military objectives, drone attacks have brought collateral damage to civilians too. For example, of the 11 people killed by a Turkish drone attack on 5 October 2023 in northern Syria, five of them were civilians. Further, the effectiveness of drone attacks can be undermined by the proportion of drones damaged or lost in the total amount that Türkiye holds. Within merely two weeks before Operation Spring Shield ensued, one Anka-S and two TB2 drones were lost in Syria, while another two were lost in Libya, out of the approximately 118 airframes produced within five years as of 2020.

Libyan Civil War

During the Libyan Civil War between 2014 and 2020, both the United Nations-endorsed Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA) – led by General Khalifa Haftar – resorted to air power, deploying UAVs to offset the challenges in operating in Libya’s flat desert terrain. Türkiye has provided military aid to the GNA, particularly weapons and troops, since 2019, with force-multiplier effects on the government’s army. Before Türkiye’s involvement in Libya, the GNA was exposed to constant threats from drones used by LNA-aligned armed forces in information gathering and precise targeting and killing. That changed after the GNA was equipped with Turkish-made drones, including Bayraktar TB2s, that can not only detect and destroy the LNA’s ground targets and their communication and supply lines but also provide air cover.

Nonetheless, the war in Libya revealed the risks of deploying UAVs on the battlefield. On the one hand, the TB2 drones provided by Türkiye were found to be vulnerable to ground attacks when located at their operating bases at the Tripoli and Misratah airports, according to a report submitted to the United Nations Security Council. The launched TB2s could easily be susceptible to destruction by the Pantsir S-1 air defence systems provided by the United Arab Emirates, which supported the LNA militarily in 2019. To compensate for the losses of Bayraktar drones, three of which were confirmed in June 2019, Türkiye deployed conventional weapon systems together with air coverage provided by warships. Although there was no fatal damage to the GNA, the LNA’s attrition tactics increased the difficulty for the government armed forces to maintain their advantage. Between 2019 and 2020, the GNA reportedly lost 22 of its 24 drones fighting against the LNA. The attrition rates of these drones were highly related to the capability of the enemy’s air defence system. On the contrary, the GNA possessed inferior anti-aircraft guns and air defence systems.

Another risk pertaining to Türkiye’s deployment of unmanned combat drones concerns the possible use of AI-armed drones, namely lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). A Turkish-made STM Kargu-2 drone – which is a type of loitering munition using machine learning to operate autonomously – was reported to have tracked down and remotely attacked logistics convoys and forces affiliated with the LNA in March 2020. Even though no human casualties were recorded, this incident has drawn debates over the lawfulness of deploying LAWS in armed conflicts, especially on their potentially significant repercussions on the principles of proportionality and distinction between combatants and civilians stipulated by International Humanitarian Law. In other words, the remote control of UAVs raises concerns over the accurate distinction between combatants and noncombatants. It also brings into question accountability for the casualties inflicted by drone attacks. Meanwhile, when deployed in combination with kinetic systems against drone attacks, they could engender collateral damage to civilians, particularly in densely populated areas. 

Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

Turkish-made combat drones have received much of the credit for Azerbaijan’s military advantage in the 44-day conflict with Armenia from 27 September to 10 November 2020. Since Türkiye first recognised Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, there has been a strong relationship between the two countries. Between 2011 and 2020, 2.9% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports were from Türkiye, including rocket artillery, missiles, and combat drones. Shortly before the outbreak of the conflict in September 2020, Azerbaijan had just purchased at least five Bayraktar TB2 UAVs armed with MAM-L (lightweight Smart Micro Munition) guided bombs through Turkish financial assistance. Except for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, the TB2s were also used for target detection and marking, as well as precision-guided attacks by the Azerbaijan Armed Forces in the 2020 Karabakh War against Armenian forces. Notably, the first documented UAV-inflicted destruction on an enemy ballistic missile system occurred during this war. 

Nonetheless, the significant effects of TB2s in this conflict were not rendered solely by their competencies but partially due to the ineffectiveness of the Armenian air defence systems. Azerbaijan’s tactics resembled Türkiye’s during Operation Spring Shield in Syria. Turkish drones had force-multiplier effects in systematically destroying the enemy’s air defence systems, specifically Armenia’s Soviet-era systems, including the S-300, K11 Krug, 9K33 Osa, 2K12 Kub, and 9K35 Strela-10, which were not designed for counter-UAV missions. The TB2s could fly far beyond the highest reach the systems can detect and intercept. Within just two weeks, 60 pieces of the aforementioned Armenian systems were destroyed by the Azerbaijani armed forces. Meanwhile, due to the limitations of UAVs in certain situations – such as bad weather conditions – they were deployed in synergy with other land-based fire support to enhance the effectiveness of the strikes. Further strengthened by the Israeli-made Harop targeting at radars in the Armenian air defence system, the deployment of the advanced Turkish UAVs equipped Azerbaijan with an asymmetric air power advantage that paved the way to its final blow to Armenia’s defensive position.

Russia-Ukraine War

One prominent feature of the war between Russia and Ukraine has been the deployment of combat drones on both sides. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s were key in assisting the Ukrainian army in targeting air defence systems in Russia’s initial offensive. The earlier successes of the Ukrainian military can be attributed to Russia’s disorganised air defence and electronic warfare that could not detect drones as small as the TB2s. 

However, the force-multiplier effects of UAVs remain to be proved, and the long-term course of the war can hardly be affected by drones alone. Drones must be deployed together with conventional weaponry and well-designed tactics to ensure the effectiveness of strikes. TB2 drones have already been vulnerable to the enemy’s air defence system in Libya and other conflicts because of their larger shape and slower flying speed. Hence, Ukraine could face more challenges as Russia keeps improving its air defence systems and electronic warfare. Moreover, some analysts maintain that each weapon system is effective under certain military conditions. The TB2s are arguably more effective to Ukrainian forces when Russian supply lines deal with multiple front lines and are in a large-scale pattern. Despite the unclear picture of TB2s in the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine has been strengthening cooperation with the Turkish company Baykar in drone repair. Baykar is also about to invest USD 100 million to establish domestic manufacturing factories of combat drones for Ukraine, set to be completed around October 2024.

Drone warfare in Türkiye’s industry and geopolitical strategy

The rise of Türkiye as a global drone power

The emergence of the Turkish defence industry, especially in the design and production of combat drones, stemmed from the early 1990s when Ankara was determined to promote military modernisation and develop self-sufficient and indigenous defence technologies. The initial driver for Türkiye’s decision to self-sufficiency in the defence industry appeared in 1974 when the U.S. imposed an arms embargo following Türkiye’s invasion of Cyprus. Since then, Türkiye has had difficulties procuring military equipment from Western countries. In the 1990s, Türkiye initiated a 30-year modernisation program – worth USD 150 billion – to reduce foreign defence dependency and cultivate global leadership in defence technology and arms export. Armed drones are among the program’s modernisation projects.

Although most Turkish weapon systems have become indigenous, technological dependency on foreign companies still exists, including cutting-edge command and control systems crucial to developing AI-enabled UAVs. Western companies such as Hensoldt – the German defence electronics manufacturer – have supplied Türkiye with optical sensors – a key component of drones – since 2020. The Turkish government stresses partnerships with foreign companies to sustain a global supply chain. The A400M is a typical example of how Turkish companies are integrated into a global value chain while increasing the domestic supply chain’s competitiveness. The development of the TAI Anka drone family commenced after Türkiye procured several UAV types from the U.S. and Israel in 2020.

Additionally, Türkiye has prioritised the development of AI technology as one of the critical areas in its vision of building a “Digital Türkiye”. It also released a national AI strategy in 2021, analysing the latest global developments in AI technology and applications. As AI technology consolidates, it can become essential to Türkiye’s drone industry. Nonetheless, several challenges remain in Türkiye’s thriving drone industry and strategy, notably its lack of investment and the dependence on foreign components that require export licences. Due to the restrictions posed by Western countries resulting from the growing geopolitical tensions, Türkiye has experienced challenges importing components such as U.S.-made engines, which led to its failure to fulfil major contracts. As its relationship with GCC countries improved, Türkiye could expect a higher potential for its drone industry and more strategic manoeuvrability. However, other problems include the brain drain due to the outflow of highly skilled professionals specialised in the operations and maintenance of drones. These factors could stunt the efforts built up by Türkiye’s military-industrial complex to promote its techno-geopolitics both regionally and globally. 

Türkiye’s geopolitical objectives behind the development and export of drones

Türkiye’s increasing investment in drone technology and arms transfer is not only linked to its domestic demand for technological self-sufficiency but also to its broader foreign policy interests. As the paradigm shift brought about by the initial development of drone warfare and autonomous weapon systems is underway, investments in this area might create an opportunity for geopolitical breakthroughs for Türkiye.

Two pathways can be observed in Türkiye’s use of drones as a political tool: coercion and influence. Their use in Türkiye’s military intervention in armed conflicts aligns with its purpose to promote its revisionist agenda and undermine political threats posed by militant groups in Syria and Iraq affiliated with the PKK. The combat drone is a robust means of deterrence and can play a crucial role in achieving this purpose. Through its indirect involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Türkiye is also expanding its political presence in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, drone diplomacy has emerged as a profitable way to expand Türkiye’s political and economic influence overseas. Türkiye’s burgeoning drone industry has provided an optimal opportunity for countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) seeking to develop their domestic defence industries, bringing in huge amounts of revenue in arms trade since the GCC blockade against Qatar in 2017. Through arms transfer and export of a complete drone warfare doctrine and concept of operations (CONOPS), Türkiye could gain economic profits while increasing its strategic position and regional influence. 

Conclusion

Türkiye’s booming defence industry has helped increase its manoeuvrability in foreign policy making and geopolitical competition by expanding its military, political, and industrial influence through drone export and deployment. Nonetheless, the use of drones in regional conflicts has revealed the limited effects of these technologies in front of advanced conventional weapons, as well as risks associated with humanitarian considerations. As the global arms race on artificial intelligence ramps up, the revolutionary implications of AI-enabled drones in geopolitical competition will be significant.