Why has the opposition candidate been declared so late?

When the candidacy of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was announced on 6 March 2023, there was a little over 2 months left until the elections. Before the announcement, many speculated that the ambiguity surrounding the opposition candidate was a deliberate strategy to prevent President Erdoğan from having a political target by concealing the name of the candidate until the last moment. 

However, on 4 March 2023, it became evident that the main reason for the delay was the disagreement between two major parties of the alliance, CHP and İP. Meral Akşener, the leader of İP, declared that her party was leaving the alliance because CHP (and four other parties) tried to impose Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy without consensus. Akşener and İP supported CHP’s Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu or Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, who had higher ratings in the polls than other opposition figures. Akşener presented her position as supporting “Candidates That Can Win”, thus undermining Kılıçdaroğlu. On the other hand, Kılıçdaroğlu and CHP leaders opposed nominating either one of the mayors because they would have to resign from their current posts and both municipalities (and their considerable resources) would be lost to ruling AKP-MHP coalition which has a majority in both municipal councils.

Akşener publicly appealed to Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, the CHP mayors of Istanbul and Ankara respectively, to challenge their party chairman Kılıçdaroğlu and enter the presidential race. She argued that this was a historical responsibility for them. However, the mayors did not comply. They reaffirmed their allegiance to Kılıçdaroğlu and attempted to convince Akşener to reconsider her decision. Akşener’s strategy failed. Her political base exerted enormous pressure on her to remain in the opposition bloc as they regarded it as essential for defeating the ruling party in the upcoming elections. Facing this dilemma, Akşener and IYI reversed their decision and rejoined the coalition on 6 March 2023. She also negotiated the vice-presidential roles for the two CHP mayors in the new cabinet.

How did these recent developments affect Erdoğan’s strategy? 

Since the 2018 elections, Türkiye’s ruling coalition of AKP and MHP has pursued a national security oriented domestic policy strategy that serves two main purposes. First, it allows them to divert attention from critical issues such as the economic crisis and democratic erosion, while consolidating and mobilizing their core constituencies. Second, it enables them to create various cleavages within the society, such as seculars versus conservatives and nationalists versus leftists/pro-Kurdish groups. The polarization of the opposition camp, both at the voter and elite levels, reinforces President Erdoğan’s image as the sole guarantor of stability and impedes the opposition’s efforts to unite and challenge his authority.

The devastating earthquake that hit Türkiye and Syria on 6 February 2023 exposed the fragility of the ruling coalition’s strategy. The disaster claimed more than 40,000 lives in Türkiye alone, and revealed the state’s inability to cope with the aftermath of such a large-scale emergency. The sense of security that was essential for President Erdoğan’s legitimacy and governance was severely undermined by this tragic event.

The return of Meral Akşener and IYI to the Millet Alliance weakened the second pillar of the ruling coalition’s strategy. It demonstrated that despite political polarization at the elite level, the opposition camp had consolidated its support base. This consolidated pressure compelled Meral Akşener to rejoin the Millet Alliance without securing her demands for a different presidential candidate and a clear stance against HDP, which she had previously accused of having links with terrorism and opposed any cooperation with.

Although there are significant cracks in the pillars, Erdoğan’s strategy has not collapsed yet. He enjoys substantial concentration of powers in his hands, particularly in terms of state apparatus and mainstream media. For instance, “Asrın Felaketi” (The Disaster of the Century) media campaign that was launched by Communications Directorate immediately after the earthquake, was a spin move to proliferate a narrative in which “the disaster was so huge, no state could be prepared for it” According to the polls, this PR campaign had limited success. It is highly likely that Erdoğan will mostly continue to follow his playbook and adopt a more polarizing rhetoric. He will continue trying to wedge a gap between opposition components, particularly IYI and HDP. 

Despite facing challenges within his ruling coalition, President Erdoğan is reluctant to give up his position. Consolidation of the opposition block makes it harder for him to create divisions among his political opponents, thus prompting him to consider forming alliances with other political parties to broaden his coalition. Two such parties are Yeniden Refah and Huda-Par, which have their own political baggage.

Yeniden Refah, for example, opposes the 6284 Law on Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence Against Women, a law designed to safeguard women and children from domestic violence and abuse. This stance may not sit well with conservative women who support the AKP, potentially leading to challenges in forming a successful coalition. Despite this, Erdoğan is determined to expand his coalition to maintain his grip on power in the face of growing opposition.

The Huda-Par, a pro-Kurdish Islamist party founded in 2012,  presents a distinct set of challenges for the AKP due to its association with the Turkish Hizbullah, a militant group that sought to establish an Islamic state in Türkiye and engaged in violent activities such as bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings. Although Huda-Par has refuted any existing links to the Turkish Hizbullah, some of its members are former affiliates of the group, and allegations of ongoing connections remain. A prospective alliance between the AKP and Huda-Par could potentially generate tension with the MHP, which has traditionally opposed the Turkish Hizbullah and has endeavored to combat its operations.

In essence, potential collaborations between the AKP and the Yeniden Refah and Huda-Par parties carry significant disadvantages. The Yeniden Refah Party's opposition to the Law on Protection of Family and Prevention of Violence Against Women could cause friction between the AKP and its conservative female supporters, while a partnership with Huda-Par may provoke negative reactions from the AKP's key partner in the ruling coalition, the MHP. Furthermore, such an alliance with Huda-Par could hinder the AKP's ability to divide the opposition by criminalizing the HDP.