Since its inception, numerous nations have expressed an interest in joining BRICS, an international co-operative organisation, formed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Its constituent economies contribute over 20 percent of the world’s GDP and over 40 percent of the global population. Developed to balance Western dominance in international institutions, as of this year 20 countries, including UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and various African countries, have highlighted their interest in full membership. Several discussions of the founding members have concerned the bloc’s expansion, but decisions have yet to be made. 

Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s ambassador to BRICS, announced a meeting in early February for members to discuss BRICS expansion and the criteria that would govern the inclusion of new members. Based on these developments, there is increased speculation that the focal point of the discussion at the BRICS Summit scheduled for late August 2023 in South Africa will concern an extension of membership to 5 countries - Egypt, Argentina, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Whilst the membership of all of these countries remains on the table, the cornerstone of this meeting will focus mainly on Iran and Saudi Arabia's membership in the bloc. 

However, there exists a prevailing opinion that BRICS is still far from the achievement of its objectives of countering Western-hegemonic domination of international institutions through its so-called democratisation of the world order, despite formal applications of membership by Latin American, Middle Eastern, and other nations. 

First, due to its expansionist policy, analysts have viewed China’s presence in BRICS as far more self-serving than other founding members, with many viewing China’s policy as one which uses its alliances and partnerships for its self-interests rather than contributing to assisting other nations. Given its desire to preserve its position as a world power, Riyadh’s presence in the bloc will potentially be seen as threatening to this goal. Besides, it also has vast energy resources and regional dominance and is ambitious to gain the status of a middle power and thus contribute to the post-COVID new international system.

Second, for Riyadh to become a middle power and contribute purposefully to the energy and security of BRICS, and most importantly, not be shadowed by Beijing’s policies, the state would necessarily need to diversify its economy. Currently, the Kingdom relies on oil for over 80% of its export income and 40% of its GDP while profiting from rising global oil prices. According to the Brookings Institute, “in the medium term, revenues from oil are expected to decline in the face of reductions in global demand starting around 2040, if not sooner.” This would largely be fuelled by a Western-led reduction in dependency on fossil fuels and increase in use of renewable technologies. 

Third, with Iran and Saudi Arabia both applying for BRICS membership, approving their memberships may be difficult. The possibility of Tehran and Riyadh sharing a homogenous diplomatic and economic table may be confounding on account of their strenuous bilateral relations. Moreover, the chances of the nations setting aside their bilateral issues to facilitate BRICS’ economic growth seems far-fetched, even for a hypothetical situation. 

Nevertheless, such concern need not mean the future of BRICS expansion is a lost cause, owing to recent economic and social development that attacks these issues. Further, the case for BRICS’ continued existence is strong - numerous countries are continuing their applications for the bloc. In addition, steps have been taken to resolve these issues, though further concerted action by BRICS will be necessary to see a harmonious entry of Saudi Arabia and Iran into the bloc.

First, it was China that initiated the proposition for the bloc expansion in the first place. Whilst hesitancy between China and Saudi Arabia may exist, progress has been made towards conciliatory foreign relations between the two. President Xi Jinping met King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud in December 2022, with the visit underscoring China’s relations with the Arab world and its growing importance within China’s broader foreign policy strategies. This extends to other founding BRICS states too; Putin visited Iran in July 2022, and Iran’s Foreign Minister visited India in June 2022.

Second, Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” project, launched in 2016, deals directly with the objective of diversifying its economy, thereby dealing with its high dependence on oil exports. The omnipresent Russia-Ukraine war is only accelerating the process. The invasion put Riyadh in a tough spot in balancing pressures from Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. As of late, the Kingdom’s ability to improve its alliances with the Eastern hemisphere whilst managing healthy diplomatic relations with the West underscores its desire to be recognized as a middle power. 

Third, Saudi Arabia joining the bloc will majorly impact its international ports and patterns of trade. It owns vast energy resources and is a crucial influence within OPEC that controls the prices of oil in the global market. Thus, Riyadh has the potential to influence global energy markets. Until now, Saudi Arabia has relied on the West, especially the US, due to its oil-for-security policy. Joining the bloc would allow other member nations to initiate steps to contribute to Saudi Arabia’s security, thereby increasing business opportunities for the defence industry. The Kingdom will further benefit from diversifying its over-dependence on the West in crucial matters of security and energy. 

Finally, whilst turbulent Iran-Saudi Arabia relations may introduce elements of hostility within intra-bloc discussions, this need not paint an overly glum picture of the bloc’s future. China and India, two of BRICS’ founding members, have maintained tense relations for several decades, and have largely set aside such issues when dealing with external parties within the wider BRICS community. The bipolarity of China and India could additionally create a cushion for frosty Iran-Saudi relations. For instance, since the Russia-Ukraine war, both countries have abstained from voting on resolutions against Russia, a fellow BRICS founding member. Hence, in the case of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, countries like India will play a crucial role in ensuring that BRICS’ functioning is not hampered as it maintains warm relations with both countries. 

Hence, the membership application by two oil blocs (Iran and Saudi Arabia) will substantially boost BRICS as it will officially herald the Middle East’s move towards finding an alliance in the Eastern hemisphere. The bloc is also working on establishing a global reserve currency that will include the BRICS member nation’s local currencies. It is presumed to be a substitute for the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR). BRICS has also been keen on pushing for trade in local currencies, significantly impacting the long-lasting dominance of the dollar. Until now, the dollar has remained the currency for oil transactions. Thus, countries are forced to own bonds in US Treasury reserves. Once the transactions begin in local currencies, BRICS expansion may engender a mass withdrawal from the US Treasury. Subsequently, such developments will accelerate the progress towards de-dollarization.

Indeed, since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, there have been several developments that hinted at unease in US-Saudi relations. Subsequently, Riyadh has started looking for other alliances that have passively snubbed the US, securing new defence deals with Russia and China and finally applying to BRICS in an attempt to solidify the Middle East’s movement in alliance with the Eastern Hemisphere. These moves underscore a major geopolitical shift, accelerating the de-dollarization process, cementing the position of both Tehran and Riyadh as established middle powers, and cementing the position of BRICS as a bloc to be reckoned with.