Syria’s regional reintegration has been a work in progress for quite some time, though it gained momentum following the Türkiye-Syria earthquakes in February. Discussions surrounding disaster relief aid turned into talks about rapprochement. Arguably, the most significant development indicating the rekindling of diplomatic relations with President Assad was on May 8 when Arab League delegates agreed to reinstate Syria’s membership after more than a decade. The Syrian conflict is a core tenet of this historic breakthrough, manifested in calls for an “Arab-led political path”. Is such a political resolution to the crisis realistic amid the Syria-Arab détente?

The Tehran-Damascus strategic alliance, a fundamental source of regional strife, is one of the factors that can condition conflict resolution. Iran has been a major foreign actor directly involved in the Syrian conflict by providing the Damascus government with military and advisory backing. External support by Iran and Russia ensured that Assad remained in power by bringing territorial gains against anti-government groups, particularly the Islamic State (IS), Jabhat al-Nusra, and other anti-Shi‘a actors active across Syria. Iran’s involvement in Syria is underpinned, inter alia, by sectarian considerations. Assad belongs to the Alawites, an offshoot of Shi‘a Islam in control of the government and bureaucracy for decades.

Syria’s renewed membership in the Arab League may allow Arab officials to convince Assad to limit Iran’s military presence. That is relevant for Saudi Arabia, whose resistance to the Tehran-Damascus alliance was an obstacle to Syria’s normalisation. Riyadh and Tehran have been confronting each other by backing opposite sides in proxy conflicts from Syria to Yemen. The Saudis sponsored various rebels in Syria to battle Iranian forces, notably the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)  as well as Assad-affiliated Hezbollah militants. Yet, not only have the rivals recently agreed to restore ties, but Syria and Saudi Arabia have also started similar procedures. The Saudi Foreign Minister visited Damascus on April 18, having previously remarked that isolating Syria was no longer working.

It remains unclear whether the aforementioned can affect Iran’s involvement in the Syrian conflict. That could depend on the Saudi’s bargaining position on that. Assad might negotiate to reduce Iran’s role considering the expected utility of the Syria-Arab normalisation. Still, the Syrian regime would not wish to jeopardise its dependence on Iran and, as a consequence, its hold over the country. Without Iran’s bolstering, warring factions could start balancing their power against the army and pro-government forces, who now control roughly 70% of Syria, and even gradually capture back territory. 

Saudi Arabia, considering their recent rapprochment with Iran and Syria, could tap into an important motivator for Iran’s military intervention in the Syrian conflict: the survival of the Assad regime. Essentially, the Saudis could persuade Iran that there is no need to continue investing as many resources, whatever shape or form, for bolstering Assad as they used to because his leadership is no longer threatened from a regional diplomacy aspect. Furthermore, Iran’s influence across the Middle East does not need to be solely based on Damascus anymore, given the restored ties with such an influential regional power as Saudi Arabia.

On another front, resisting Israel is a common geopolitical interest between Damascus and Tehran. Hence, the Syria-Arab normalisation can also affect the proxy conflict between Israel and Iran in and through Syria. The presence of Iranian agents in Syria has been a deterrent to direct Israeli confrontation with Iran. Syria is the transit point for Iranian weapons and ammunition to Hezbollah in Lebanon, having posed a direct threat to Israel’s security. Moreover, since the start of the year, Syrian officials have attributed 10 airstrikes on Syrian territory on Israel, reportedly against Iranian positions. 

Limiting Iran’s influence poses an incompatibility. Iran would not want to lose strategic assets in Syria and Lebanon against Israel. If it did lose these assets, Israel’s incentives for assaulting Syrian soil would decrease. However, without Iran, the Assad leadership would become vulnerable to internal challengers participating in state-based and non-state violence in Syria, from Islamist factions to rebel groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Al-Fateh al-Mubin, and IS militants. The Arab League could find a middle ground that allows Iran to maintain a conditional military presence in Syria and the wider region. A scenario where Iran maintains a presence, even a less prominent one, could be a valuable bargaining chip to convince Assad to compromise.

Assad's priority has been to ensure his regime's survival and hold over most of the country's territory. However, if Assad deems any territorial division indivisible, a real political solution to this conflict will be impossible. A division of power should be allowed to occur, with rebel-held areas granted limited territorial autonomy (since political autonomy is unrealistic). The Arab League could persuade Assad that accommodating opposition actors in control of geographical locations, including in the northwest, will not threaten his rule. 

Therefore, the Arab League must impact Syria’s future by expecting Assad to make concessions in return. Advocating reforms is necessary because unconditionally legitimising the Syrian leadership allows instability, repression, and violence to continue.

Assad has already agreed to counter drug trafficking. But other pressing issues need to be dealt with, not least the humanitarian crisis, rebuilding local infrastructure, and improving the judicial and security systems. Additionally, regional policies should address the refugee flows risking interstate disputes, especially as host country economies struggle. According to the UN Refugee Agency, more than 14 million Syrians have fled since 2014. 70% of the population requires humanitarian assistance while over 90% live below the poverty line. Approximately 5.5 million Syrians live in neighbouring Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, increasingly unable to meet basic needs like food, medicine, and paying rent. Regardless, Syrians should not be forced to return to their country, on par with refugee law. 

The Arab League should ensure that protecting civilians and tackling one-sided violence in Syria are on top of the agenda in their coordination with Assad. By cooperating with their partners at the United Nations, deploying peacekeepers to contain ‘hot spots’ subnationally can reduce conflict outbreaks and the usual small- to medium-scale skirmishes in Syria. Also, Syria has the most annual casualties from cluster munitions worldwide, with landmines and other unexploded shells frequently causing civilian deaths. Thus, government forces should neutralise mines, at least in regime-held areas. 

A political solution to this protracted internationalised civil conflict will necessarily be multifaceted. It will involve aspects beyond the scope of this article, such as the proxy conflict between Türkiye and Kurdish groups like the US-backed SDF in northeast Syria and Russia’s direct military intervention. Nonetheless, Syria’s readmission to the Arab League amid the de-escalated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia can lead to increased coordination and a more peaceful post-war Syria as long as Assad delivers on urgent issues related to his war-torn country.