In the United Kingdom, the public is largely familiar with the case of Shamima Begum, one of three British 15 year-old girls who left London in 2015 to join ISIS. In 2019, Shamima resurfaced in an ISIS displacement camp in Syria, and since then, she has repeatedly stated her desire to return to the UK. This issue has gained significant attention from the media especially since 2019, when she lost her British citizenship after it was revoked by the then Home Secretary, Sajid Javid. Some have argued that she has been illegally left stateless, as the British government’s claim that she could gain Bangladeshi citizenship through her parents was never viable. Claims that she was a victim of trafficking have also begun to emerge.

However, as of February 2023, this decision to strip Shamima of her citizenship was upheld by the British Courts. Whilst the media may overwhelmingly focus on Shamima Begum’s case, in truth, she represents the tip of an iceberg of a complex, multidimensional issue of citizenship, state responsibility and global security in the aftermath of the defeat of ISIS, perhaps the world’s first partially successful non-state terror group which managed to begin building a new political structure; the “caliphate.” This article will explore the issues of the ISIS displacement camps and their wider implications to regional and global security, alongside the tensions these displaced people create for many states around the world since the fall of ISIS in 2019. Crucially, the slow pace of repatriation of foreign-born nationals reflects how a traditionally Western, liberally-orientated state system is struggling to handle a new world of non-state terrorism and warfare that leaves behind challenging consequences that cannot be so easily solved. This article will thus explore questions like: how do ISIS displacement camps like al-Hol and al-Roj in Syria continue to affect regional, and global, peace dynamics, what does the UK government’s decision, deferring a complex problem of our era of modern terrorism to “someone else”, say about state responsibility, and what predictions can be made on how this camps might change in the future? 

The two most well-known ISIS displacement camps are al-Hol and al-Roj; the latter is where Shamima Begum currently resides. Both are located in North Eastern Syria, with the former housing more than 56,000 people, mostly Iraqis and Syrians - but there are also approximately 10,000 foreign-born nationals - compared to around 2615 people in al-Roj. Whilst al-Hol camp has existed since the 1990s from the First Gulf War, in 2018, with the fall of ISIS, it saw its population swell from around 10,000 to over 56,000. Many foreign-born nationals in both camps are (or were) ISIS wives, and along with their children, they reflect the  diversity of nationalities that ISIS managed to successfully appeal to across the world. Nationalities in the camps range from countries such as Germany, the United States, Australia and Canada to name a few. Approximately 90% of the 56,000 inhabitants of al-Hol are women and children. 

The UN has stated that over half of al-Hol camp are under the age of twelve and in this camp, physical conditions are poor, with no formal schooling and branches of radical Islamic thinking circulating widely in the camp. As such, there are humanitarian fears for the thousands of vulnerable children growing up in an atmosphere of extreme difficulty, hate and separation. In 2021, Save the Children reported that 79 children died from issues such as fire, from vehicles or drowning and crime is the primary cause of death according to the WHO’s Al Hol Camp Annual Mortality Report 2021. Additionally, in a video by Al-Arabiya News (English), a reporter showed how she tried to talk with the women and children in the camp. Whilst the women ignored her questions, the young children shouted at the reporter to, ‘go wear your Hijab first and then come here’ and that she was in ‘infidel’, ‘killing the sisters.’ Most disturbingly, these young children said, ‘We’ll kill you’ in response to her asking, ‘When you grow up, what are you going to do with me while I’m not wearing Hijab?’

As such, it is evident that these children are growing up in a deprived climate, one of hate and brainwashing of extremist Islamism from the potently active remnants of ISIS. Whilst the so-called “caliphate” might be politically destroyed at the state-level, this camp, and others like it, highlight how ISIS’ dangerously toxic rhetoric and beliefs have not disappeared, and instead are being fostered in new generations, some even born in the camp, who have never known anything different. This thus risks many new threats evolving not just to the stability of already fragile and fractured Syria and Iraq - and thus the wider Middle Eastern region - but to global security, due to the internationalised network of modern-day terrorism. New threats could come from these generations feeling neglected and left behind; detached from the rest of the world, thus potentially imbuing feelings of anger and hatred towards others. As Gaby Hinsliff of The Guardian stated: ‘To stop the next Manchester attack, MI5 must find the next young man growing up in a petri dish of hate.’ It is overwhelmingly clear that thousands of children in Syria, living in these displacement camps, are being left to those exact conditions; petri dishes of hate. The question remains why the international community is forgetting them, or delaying action with regard to helping these children, when many of their parents are citizens of other countries. 

Due to the radical extremism in the camp and pressures from holding so many people in an unstable region, there have been repeated calls by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - these forces run the camp; the North Eastern region of Syria has been under their control since this largely Kurdish force toppled ISIS with Western backing - that those of foreign nationality must be allowed back to their home nations to alleviate pressure. Moreover, the SDF argues that these ISIS families cannot stay living in camps for the rest of their lives. Issues like revoked citizenship, as seen with Shamima Begum, must be re-considered thoroughly, taking into account the long-term effects of leaving citizens in these camps, from their own human rights, and particularly those of their innocent children, to regional peace for the Middle East which will affect the wider world in our interconnected, hyper-globalised planet. Reactionary acts like removing citizenship only serve to place a considerably high burden on the SDF. Whilst SDF supporters, such as the United States and United Kingdom might continue to send economic support, this approach lacks comprehensive, long-term planning. Instead, the approach shows scant foreign policy understanding; defeating the “caliphate” was not the end of radical extremism and it will instead require more strategic action than funnelling money to resistance fighters which not all states support (notably Turkiye is still actively fighting the SDF). Whilst the SDF face ISIS on a daily basis, to the “West”,  the terror group is perhaps incorrectly seen as a past problem, detached from 2023.

Therefore, whilst removing Shamima Begum’s British citizenship may be largely popular with the British public - many argue the abhorrent crimes of ISIS, such as the genocidal attacks on the Yazidis, means that any people who were involved (ISIS fighters), or associated (wives and families), do not deserve empathy or a second-chance - actions must be reflected upon with a longer-term mindset for the current path only exposes short-termism in policy, and rampant misunderstanding of the multidimensionality and durability of extremism and modern terrorism. The latter will certainly not “go away” when people and children are left to live in such conditions as the ISIS displacement camps. Groups such as Amnesty International have expressed disappointment at the United Kingdom’s decision on Shamima Begum, arguing repatriations should occur, as seen with other countries, with a potential for criminal proceedings and prosecution in the most serious cases. Moreover, some argue Britain’s acts reflect entrenched structural racism in the British system. Tim Farron MP has asked: ‘If Shamima Begum was white and called Sharon from Manchester, it wouldn’t even occur to the government to take the passport of somebody ‘obviously’ British.’ However, Britain remains the only G20 country to strip citizenship en masse, refusing to repatriate. Since 2019, only 11 nationals have been brought back according to Rights and Security International.

On March 2nd, 2023, UN Secretary General António Guterres called again to the international community for the principles of  accountability and reintegration, and that ‘responsible repatriations are possible.’ His words highlight how action and diplomatic conversations regarding this issue are still needed. Whilst some countries, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden have repatriated some of their citizens and their children, the latter have often been separated from their mothers upon return due to pending investigations or sentencing, and this has further added to trauma of the children involved, and showcases how this issue of repatriation is extremely complex. However, Human Rights Watch states that between 2019 and 2022, over 100 children have been successfully repatriated, with many now positively showing this can work. They refer to a Swedish grandfather of several children repatriated to Sweden in 2019: “It is possible, fully possible, for reintegration and recovery of children. My grandchildren are evidence of this. They have recovered in the most incredible way. This is an example that it is possible.… All children should have the opportunity to get a new chance in life.”

Importantly, in November 2022, the SDF threatened to stop guarding the displacement camps such as al-Hol. These forces and the region which they control are under attack by Turkiye who have been fighting the SDF since the Syrian civil war, delineating the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), one of the main groups in the SDF, as a terrorist group. Therefore, the safety of the thousands of children in camps such as al-Hol is severely threatened with the continuation of the complex, strategic dynamics of this fractured region. The SDF forces have even stated that Turkiye has attacked al-Hol camp, where seven guards were killed and some detainees tried unsuccessfully to escape. As reported by the BBC, General Abdi of the SDF stated in 2022 that this complex situation between the Kurdish region of Syria and Turkiye means that: “Our forces would be busy protecting our own people and families and we wouldn't be able to guard the camps.” As well as this, The Jerusalem Post has reported that some ISIS women in the camp are using young boys as sex slaves in order to continue to grow the population of ISIS for a potential re-birth of the “caliphate.” As such, the ongoing attacks between the SDF forces and Turkiye, alongside reports of sexual child abuse occuring in 2023 both highlight the urgency for states to comprehensively address this stagnant issue. 

Therefore, as the years continue, the issue of these displaced, and now sometimes stateless ISIS families in Kurdish-controlled Syria remains a diplomatic tug-of-war that is representative of the complexity of modern day warfare and the inability of nation states to present methods for handling the aftermaths. It is clear that this issue of these ISIS displacement camps is emblematic of the chaos still facing Syria, and that this overwhelmingly does, and will continue to have, many repercussions for global security if over sixty countries continue to ignore their citizens and the issue of ISIS after the fall of the “caliphate.”