It is a geopolitical maxim that landlocked countries face systemic disadvantages in economic and social development. This is an observable phenomenon; an article published in Transition economics finds that landlockedness reduces economic growth by 1.5% every year. According to the United Nations, the loss of economic potential in landlocked countries is caused by low social capital, low productivity and a commodity-dependent economy.

These disadvantages to trade, social development, and the growth of society at large are not likely to disappear in the short term. However, climate change is creating an ‘opportunity’ for some landlocked countries to leverage a vital commodity – water – against more powerful countries. This is due to water scarcity as well as water stress when the ecological and infrastructural conditions within a given area are unable to guarantee a sufficient clean water supply. By 2050 it is estimated that about half of the world population will live in such conditions. The impacts of water stress will be felt globally, particularly in the Americas, East Asia, and the Mediterranean regions.

In light of these challenges, securing water supplies becomes a paramount imperative for all countries to ensure the survival and welfare of the polity and its citizens. Aside from the cultural damage resulting from climate migration from areas suffering from water scarcity and water stress, the competing interests to secure water can lead – and has led – to conflicts between political actors at the supranational, national, and subnational levels. However, as highlighted by Sandy Milne writing for BBC Future, “even where water scarcity exists, a complex mix of factors will determine whether it actually leads to conflict”. This means that competing interests are not a sufficient condition for water conflicts to break out, but rather underlying conflict or disunity play a significant role in triggering water conflicts. Therefore, access to water need not be the founding pillar for new conflicts but it can be the tipping point for already existing conflicts. In an international political realm that is increasingly unpredictable, the role water access may play in conflict escalation poses significant challenges to regional stability and a peaceful international community. This reality is made eerier by the fact that a large portion of the world’s active conflicts are taking place in regions with high levels of water stress.

It would not be incomprehensible to think of the Aral Sea crisis as an early warning sign for the future of landlocked countries amid projections of ever-worsening climate and water crises. However, the Aral Sea case study comes with two important caveats. Firstly, the draining of the Aral Sea was primarily caused by a Soviet water diversion project, and secondly, the landlocked countries that make (or rather, made) use of the Aral Sea for water supplies are themselves situated in a landlocked riparian area and basin. Simply put, the Aral Sea does not feed into the ocean or a sea connected to an ocean. Therefore, to conclude that landlocked countries would, in general, suffer from a deepening water crisis would be a reductionist claim. This is because some landlocked countries find themselves with control over the flow of river water and may be in a position to leverage water supplies downstream as a result.

In light of increasing water scarcity and water stress, the geography of such countries with control of water supplies downstream offers a ‘riparian advantage’. This makes landlocked countries’ geopolitical setting more advantageous than has been the case historically and could present opportunities for collaboration amongst states sharing common riparian areas. Equally, leveraging water for the sake of furthering national interests also comes with the heightened risk of conflict between riparian states. An example of how a ‘riparian advantage’ can lead to regional conflict is the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Ethiopian government began filling the GERD’s reservoir in 2020, and the third filling of the reservoir has commenced and is currently ongoing. Pursuant to Article 6(1)(a)(b)(c) of the convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, Ethiopia is entitled to erect a dam insofar as it does not hamper the ecological health of the River Nile, nor the “social and economic needs” and the “population dependent” on the Nile’s water supply. Categorically, the GERD fails in all of these elements according to a study published in Water. However, there are two crucial things the GERD addresses; the need for sustainable energy sources and sustaining Ethiopia’s large agriculture-based economy for its rapidly-growing population.

Ethiopia’s firm-handedness in continuing the filling of the GERD reservoir has, unsurprisingly, been condemned by Egypt and Sudan. The two Arab nations’ position is that the water from the Blue Nile, the tributary of the Nile Ethiopia has dammed, is fundamental to the Nile’s water supply and therefore the GERD poses an imminent risk to the livelihood of the 117 million people that live downstream of the GERD in Egypt and Sudan. The result of headstrong negotiations from both sides of the table has resulted in an effective breakdown of negotiations. Notwithstanding, the GERD reservoir is being filled. If the impact on water supply is significant, then the conditions for an unprecedented water conflict could well and truly manifest themselves. Whether the disagreement over the GERD will remain regional is yet to be seen. However, the evolution of the situation is certainly going to be one of the most significant developments in contemporary African politics. The GERD dispute demonstrates there is a ‘riparian advantage’ that Ethiopia is able to wield over Egypt, a country which is on paper economically and militarily stronger than Ethiopia. How the conflict between the downstream countries and Ethiopia is settled - if it ever will be ‘settled’ – will set a prerogative that will either affirm or deny a de facto ‘riparian advantage’ in geopolitics.  Therefore, the GERD and its political implications demonstrate how water might undermine existing conceptions of state sovereignty as the world delves deeper into the climate crisis, as well as the roles conflict and cooperation will play in navigating water scarcity and water stress in the future.

Whether water scarcity and water stress can truly be described as an ‘opportunity’ or if a ‘riparian advantage’ will truly manifest itself for countries with similar geopolitical benefits as Ethiopia may be considered almost immoral. However, when the proverbial horns lock, the oft-neglected landlocked countries will find themselves with great power to wield over their neighbours downstream as the climate and water crises deepen. The alternative to ‘water wars’, then, must be a re-evaluation of state sovereignty in such a way that riparian neighbours can bind together to find common solutions to differing problems. Regardless of whichever path the world follows – conflict or cooperation – landlocked countries will get their place in the sun within the wider context of international politics.