On 23 April 2022, three military bases in Mali’s Sevare, Niono, and Bapho were attacked simultaneously, leaving six soldiers dead and 20 wounded. It was the latest act of violence and militancy to rock the West African country, which has been battling an Islamist insurgency in its north since 2013. In late March 2022, Malian soldiers and fighters from the Wagner Group, a Private Military Company (PMC) with shadowy ties to the Kremlin, executed over 300 civilians during a military operation in the town of Moura in central Mali. The United Nations (UN) called for an independent investigation, but its investigators were blocked from visiting the site of the killings.

Mali witnessed two coups recently, one in August 2020 and another in May 2021. As opposed to Sudan, where citizens have been engaged in violent protests against the Sudanese coup since October 2021, the Malian public’s reception to the military takeover was relatively warmer. Along with this warmth came the steady outpouring of public anger against continuing French presence in the country. France has about 5000 troops across the Sahel, and the majority of them are based in Mali. France’s Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane, intended to fight the Malian insurgents and jihadists across the Sahel respectively, have slowed down in momentum and failed to garner local support or achieve the intended aims. French-Malian relations floundered after the army’s takeover, and Bamako asked France in February 2022 to withdraw all its troops “without delay”.

Mali’s rejection of France was followed by its open welcome of the Russian PMC, the Wagner Group. According to some reports, Wagner troops arrived in Mali in December 2021. Mali officially denies the presence of the Wagner Group and maintains that the army works alongside “Russian military instructors”. However, the massacre in Moura confirms fears of the Wagner Group’s active operations, which have an infamous reputation for including torture, rape and extrajudicial killings, also in other African countries like Libya and the Central African Republic. In return for its services, the group reportedly gets access to oil fields, valuable minerals, and gold and diamonds. The Wagner Group is seen as a Russian tool to further Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in areas like Ukraine and Africa, but without being able to be directly traced back to the Kremlin and thus affording the Russian government deniability of links to the group.

Photo from Ukraine’s Security Service showing allegedWagner Group mercenaries at an unidentified location (ssu.gov.ua)

But it may be wrong to assume, as some claim, that the Malian junta and the Wagner Group’s mercenaries have helped grow the popular discontent with France and Europe. Rather, they have capitalised upon the already existing public anger against the insurgency in the north and the ruling class’ inability to provide security and rule of law to the people of Mali. This explains, at least partially, the larger than expected support that Colonel Assimi Goita received after the coup in August 2020.

The Malian situation should not be looked at as just another case of “democracy versus autocracy” gaining hold in Africa. This lens, also used to perceive the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is too simplistic and lacks nuances, and perhaps also helps explain the lukewarm African condemnation of Russia for its war in Ukraine. One of Africa’s prime concerns is security, hence its turn toward a side that claims to guarantee it. This, combined with painful memories of Western hypocrisy in African history, certainly makes it easier for Mali and other African countries to turn their trajectory eastward. The reduced European role in such countries and increasing Russian presence means further deterioration of the human rights situation and lesser regard for rule of law and democracy. But the broader African tilt toward countries like Russia and China, over the US or European countries, cannot be expected to cease or slow down in the immediate future. Mali’s and other African countries’ turn to the Kremlin will have its own costs, which may be clearer with time.