A violent conflict broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese regular army and a paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023. The clashes come at a time of economic and political fragility, as Sudan undergoes a democratic transformation. International and intergovernmental agencies had predicted the conflict after efforts to establish a civilian-led democratic government failed, but tensions have only increased.

Overview of the current situation 

This conflict has its roots in the regime of former dictator Omar al-Bashir. In 2003, armed movements in Darfur resisted Bashir’s regime, leading him to create the RSF. This paramilitary was led by Lt. General Mohammad Dagalo. He coordinated military operations with the Sudanese regular armed forces led by Lt General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The cooperation between the two generals was strengthened in 2019 when a civilian uprising broke out against al-Bashir. They agreed to overthrow the regime and form a military council to rule the country. After three decades of terror, al-Bashir was ousted from power and, at the same time, prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and other crimes committed in Darfur in the 2000s. To this day, the ICC is still trying to arrest al-Bashir by cooperating with other states to extradite him.

In opposition to the figures al-Bashir assigned to lead the new civilian government, Dagalo and Burhan staged a coup in 2021 to rule over Sudan. With the country facing a severe economic and security crisis and having failed to establish a democratic government, a military framework between Burhan's regular army, Dagalo's RSF and the pro-democracy group Forces for Freedom and Change was signed in December 2022. However, public disagreements and tensions over the terms of the agreement gradually emerged between the two generals, through indirect statements and sharp accusations. These tensions eventually escalated into today’s violent conflict. The military coup, the failure to establish a democratic civilian government, and the governance of the country by two heavily armed military groups made Sudan a fertile ground for the emergence of armed conflict. It is not clear who initiated the fight, but both armed forces were militarily prepared for a confrontation. 

The Generals’ fight 

Before the conflict, Sudan was politically and economically weakened. Dagalo and Burhan saw the alliance as an opportunity to rule the country, protect their interests,  strengthen their forces, and develop political ambitions. However, the military framework failed to bring about a common agreement between the two most powerful actors. The agreement provided for a transfer of power to civilians, the integration of the RSF into the regular army, the release of their lucrative control over agriculture, trade and other sectors, and the return of military forces to their headquarters. But, the framework was an obstacle to the interests and ambitions of the generals. By complying with it, both parties would have lost power and leadership over the control of the army, weapons, and resources. In addition, the generals' vision differed. On one hand, Dagalo accuses Burhan of being a “radical Islamist” and does not want him to rule the country. On the other hand, Burhan is willing to stop clashes and give back power to civilians only if a government is elected. 

The conflict in Sudan clearly illustrates how quickly political alliances change, especially in a period of democratic transition. It also demonstrates the danger of having two heavily armed groups ruling the country and the ease with which the eruption of violence began. Their attitudes prove that this conflict is about power politics. Both generals have the ambition to free Sudan from the other faction. Their personal and professional experiences have accustomed them to always being in control at the top of the hierarchy, to using deterrent and offensive approaches, and to giving orders that include the use of lethal weapons. This idiosyncratic analysis can shed light on how they make decisions and confirm that they are willing to fight, regardless of the safety of the Sudanese. 

The consequences and impacts of the conflict in Sudan

The clashes first started in Khartoum and quickly spread to other parts of Sudan, such as the Darfur region, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan, and Omdurman. The conflict will cause a humanitarian crisis if a cease-fire is not reached. Indeed, at least 427 civilian casualties have been reported since the conflict began. The hostilities are destroying public infrastructure and making it impossible to supply basic necessities. Some civilian houses have been requisitioned and transformed into military fortifications. There are also reports of armed men breaking into homes to rob, assault, rape, loot and kill. Sudanese, humanitarian aid and diplomats are targeted. Martin Griffiths, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, confirmed the reports. This raises questions about the ability of the two generals to command and control their soldiers. The inability of the commanders to handle their fighters could prolong the violence and undermine the chances of stability, even if Burhan and Dagalo were willing to reach an agreement. 

How would it affect the region? 

The conflict in Sudan could spread instability to neighbouring countries through refugee flows and intensify the future humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the wider region. As a result, Chad and Egypt have closed their borders with Sudan, believing that the fight could quickly spread to their countries. However, this does not mean that Sudan will be abandoned. In fact, Sudan is important. Located in a geopolitically important region, it is the third largest country in Africa, sharing borders with seven countries, and has an opening to the Red Sea. Sudan is rich in natural resources - gold, oil, iron, and chromium ore, among others - and has access to the Nile River. All these characteristics make Sudan a strategic country in an optimal but unstable location. Therefore, the involvement of other countries in this conflict can be envisaged, especially if it is prolonged. Dagalo and al-Burhan may seek material assistance from their allies. At present, General Mohammad Dagalo has an alliance with the United Arab Emirates and has close ties with the Wagner Group. For his part, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has an alliance with Egypt. It is important, in the coming days, to pay attention to new or re-established alliances in the region. Without the prospect of peace, other neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries may be tempted to take an interest in Sudan and participate directly or indirectly in the war efforts. 

The conflict in Sudan is still at its peak. A 72-hour ceasefire on April 21 2023 came into effect after the emergency session of the UNSC during which the evacuation of foreign citizens occurred. According to Volker Pethers -head of the UN mission in Sudan- the ceasefire was only partially respected and clashes around “strategic locations largely continued and sometimes even intensified.” General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohammad Dagalo are both convinced of their positions and show no willingness to end the clashes. The time elapsed since the 2021 putsch shows that the generals are not willing to give up their seat of power and any response to international or international interventions has been a formality to which they would respond according to their own goodwill and interests. So far, mediators from the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Western and Gulf capitals failed to bring Burhan and Dagalo to the negotiation table. An emergency session of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was held on 25 April 2023. António Guterres urged for a respected ceasefire and to end hostilities in order to launch negotiations and bring humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people. 

Possible outcomes 

As international and intergovernmental actors have failed to obtain a proper ceasefire and bring the two parties to the negotiation table, several hypotheses on the evolution of this conflict can be envisaged. 

Firstly, one of the issues would be the interference by other countries or private actors in this conflict by sending military, financial or human capabilities. Dagalo has a close relationship with Wagner, mainly for the extraction of natural resources. In order to continue to profit from Sudan's natural resources, Wagner could become directly or indirectly involved in the conflict to enable Dagalo to maintain an advantage in the conflict and gain power in the long term. Burhan and al-Sissi are partners and Sudan and Egypt share a common border. To prevent the conflict from spreading beyond his borders, President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi could decide to intervene in the conflict to both protect his territory and support an ally. 

Secondly, one of the fighting parties took control of a laboratory in Khartoum on 26 April and “kicked out all of the technicians”, which represents a biological risk. Dangerous biological samples, such as cholera and measles, are isolated in this laboratory. With power cuts in Khartoum, the WHO has expressed concern about “exposure to highly contagious pathogens.” The exposure could reinforce the upcoming humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict and worsens the economic and health conditions in Sudan. Indeed, the spread of these viruses would decimate the Sudanese population, which is already in a critical situation, and would make it even more difficult for international humanitarian aid to intervene in the long term. 

Last but not least, if one of the two generals wins, it is possible that the winner will refuse the establishment of a civilian democratic government and impose a dictatorship in his image. The stalemate of the conflict and the non-respect of international laws make them liable to international sanctions and prosecution before the ICC. Al-Bashir, prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes, is an example the generals do not want to follow. The ICC is actively requiring states like Jordan, South Africa, Kenya, and Angola, among others, to arrest the former dictator. However, there is a lack of cooperation and countries refuse to comply. Indeed, a number of countries are either signatories of the Rome Statute but have not ratified it, or are not signatories or State Parties and therefore do not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction. The generals will avoid falling under international warrants. However, the establishment of a civilian government and the opening of the country to international authorities would make them punishable and isolated. In this context, rivalries between generals are likely to persist and the establishment of democracy unlikely for the time being.