On the night of the 26 July and into the following morning, the Niger’s presidential guard, led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, captured and detained President Mohamed Bazoum, declaring control of the country through a coup d’etat. The military junta set up the ‘National Council for the Salvation of the Homeland’ (CNSP), simultaneously suspending the existing constitution and installing a curfew and closing country borders. Officials have presented the past government’s inability to protect citizens from the threat of terrorist violence as a justification for the coup. This seems to be at least partially true, as reports show that the government has underestimated the security threat presented by Boko Haram in the south and armed groups with links to ISIL and al-Qaeda in the west. Additionally, there have been recent internal divisions between the presidential guard and the military, which is likely to have further pushed General Tchiani towards rebellion. After the coup was announced, protesters gathered in the capital, showcasing support for Bazoum. Estimates suggest the presence of hundreds of people, however, the crowd’s advances towards the presidential palace were met with a stern reaction from the presidential guard, which dispersed the protests through warning shots. 

African leaders have been seeking a peaceful resolution. Both the African Union (AU) as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - Niger being a member of both - have been vocal in condemning the coup in an attempt to reestablish stability. Benin’s president, Patrice Talon, has personally flown to Niger in order to evaluate the situation. Now both the AU and ECOWAS have given the new military leadership strict deadlines to cede power, reinstall Bazoum as head of state, and restore constitutional order under the threat of sanctions. ECOWAS has gone a step further in not ruling out the use of force if the new authorities refuse to cooperate.

Growth of ‘Coup belt’ weakens region, strengthens paramilitary groups 

The coup in Niger bodes poorly for western influence in the region. Niger has been called the “west’s only hope” in the Sahel region as it acted as a rare ally in the region under Bazoum. Both the EU and the US have been dedicating substantial financial resources to keep Niger secure and fit to combat the activities of regional paramilitary and terrorist groups, while also managing irregular migration from the sub-Saharan region. Revolts in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Sudan have created a wave of coups in the region, where predominantly pro-western leaders have been repeatedly replaced by heavy handed military juntas.

After a military takeover in Mali, the new anti-western regime expelled all French military staff from within its borders. Consequently, French troops relocated to Niger which served as a regional hub for western resources and troops fighting armed groups in the region. With Niger’s new military junta at the helm, the ‘coup belt’ grows and further reinforces instability in the Sahel. Without a strong and legitimately recognised leadership, groups like Boko Haram and networks of al-Qaeda and ISIL could potentially grow in strength and further weaken an already weak state.

Western woes mean opportunities for Russia

Military governments that lack democratic legitimacy have a tendency to coddle up to non-democratic global powers in order to stay in power and exert control over their territories. Russia, often through the hands of the Wagner group, has been benefiting from this phenomenen in Africa in recent years. Mali has been the most recent example where exiled western troops were replaced by Russian mercenaries. In Niger, Russia has a history of launching destabilising disinformation campaigns, which could indicate that Russia may also be interested in expanding its physical presence in the country.

Niger produces approximately 7% of the world's uranium. Historically, a significant portion of its uranium production has been channelled to France, primarily for use in the nation's nuclear power stations that account for around 70% of French power generation. Notably, France relies heavily on uranium imports, with about three-quarters of its supply coming from just four countries: Kazakhstan, Australia, Niger, and Uzbekistan. However, the dynamics surrounding Niger's uranium trade have been evolving. The country has diversified its customer base, reducing its dependence on traditional buyers like France, and has started selling significant shares of its uranium to customers in Canada and China, with companies from both of these nations operating their own extraction sites within Niger.

Wagner's history of accepting payments in natural resources and particularly valuable raw minerals is no secret. The coup in Niger has raised suspicions regarding Wagner's involvement and the potential objectives of the Russian government. Although information on the scale of alignment between the Wagner group and the Russian government is sparse, Yevgeny Prigozhin's decision to attend a Russia-Africa conference suggests that Wagner is deeply interested in the region. Below are two possible motives for that interest in Niger:

• Uranium for Wagner and Russian Interests: The coup might open up opportunities for Wagner to establish operations in Niger, likely in exchange for access to uranium resources. These uranium reserves could then be transported to Russia for military or civilian purposes or be sold on international markets. This would likely have a significant impact on uranium extraction businesses currently in operation in Niger.

• Disrupting the French Energy Market: Another speculated objective is that the coup may enable Wagner to divert significant amounts of uranium away from the French energy market. This disruption could potentially jeopardise the supply of uranium to France, leading to fluctuations in energy prices. The potential consequences of this disruption include an energy-related cost of living crisis in France, similar to what some European countries have experienced when dependent on Russian gas.

Given the geopolitical implications and potential economic repercussions, it is imperative for the international community to closely monitor the situation in Niger and collaborate to ensure stability, transparency, and accountability in the region's natural resource trade. Additionally, addressing concerns regarding Wagner's activities and their potential impact on global security and energy markets should be a priority for relevant international organisations and nations.

Too early to declare coup successful

The reason behind the exact timing of the rebellion remains unclear. The most probable scenario is that General Tchiani, who was installed as commander of Niger’s presidential guard by Bazoum’s predecessor, had been dismissed from office days prior to the coup and spearheaded the rebellion in an attempt to remain in power. Tchiani has declared himself the leader, however, it remains unclear exactly how much backing he retains within the militaty and business establishment. A financially sanctioned presidential guard with limited support from the military and civil society may eventually find itself in a weak and vulnerable position.

Conclusion

Once the current fluid situation becomes more clear and the structures of power become at least partially reestablished, Niger could become another African state involved in a wider international power struggle. The west, mainly represented in Africa by France diplomatically, and by the US financially, will want to retain Niger as a security buffer against military insurgent groups in the region. However, Wagner will aim to add Niger to its growing list of allies in the West African region.

Although Bazoum had a history of restricting democratic freedoms and was ultimately unable to ensure security across the country, his rule did see an increase in per capita income, improvement in humanitarian indicators, and at least partially competent inflation management. Conversely, frequent military coups in other countries have led to visible regressions in most of these areas, and it is difficult to find reasons why Niger will become an exception. If Tchiani is successful in securing his position as the new leader, Niger’s fate could closely resemble that of Mali, which has been characterised by worsening cases of violence against civilians, constitutional impasse, increasing Wagner activities, and the rise of militant groups.