The Shift Towards Private Sector-led Growth in Rwanda

Home to some of the fastest economic expansion in the world over the last 20 years, Rwanda has achieved an annual average GDP growth rate of 7% over the last two decades. Paul Kagame, who has served as the country’s president since 2000, is broadly considered by analysts and observers both domestically and internationally as the engineer of Rwanda’s notable economic transformation following the end of the genocide in 1994. 

On the demand side, economic growth over the last two decades has been the result of a large public expenditure. Notwithstanding the positive economic transformation this has engendered, it has resulted in several structural challenges for the government. Rwanda’s public-sector-led development model has led to considerable fiscal deficits primarily financed through external borrowing. Debt has risen from 15.6% of GDP in 2012 to 48.9% in 2022. Whilst the national poverty rate declined from 75.2% to 53.5% from 2000 to 2013, this trend has stagnated since, with  56.5% of the population living on less than $1.90 a day.

Capitalising on the opportunities presented by Rwanda’s relatively undeveloped private sector would help to remedy the country’s current economic challenges, and create opportunities for overseas investors and companies. 

Advocacy for private sector-led growth from policy makers

Key policy documents published over the past years and months illustrate the importance the Rwandan government attaches to private sector development to create future economic growth. Engaging the private sector and diversifying sources of finances features as one of the four strategic objectives of the country’s ‘National Investment Policy’ (NIP) published in December 2020 by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The private sector-led economy envisaged by the NIP is one underpinned by increasing mixed funding through mechanisms such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) and joint ventures (JVs), as well as facilitating export-led growth to improve the country’s balance of payments position and increase foreign exchange earnings. The NIP outlines that whilst PPPs have traditionally been a rare form of financing they are “a suitable step to attract further domestic and foreign investors by efficiently sharing inherent project risks and thereby making investing in the provision of public goods and services more attractive for private partners”.

Equally, Kagame’s flagship national development strategy Rwanda Vision 2050, which was launched by Kagame in 2020, highlights the importance of continuing “the journey towards self-reliance through a private sector-led growth”. As is outlined in the Vision 2050 blueprint, leveraging the country’s demographic dividend, increasing the value of human capital by strengthening the country’s education system, and creating “new growth poles” through urbanisation will serve to increase competitiveness and facilitate the operations of private companies. More recently, Rwanda’s proposed budget for the fiscal year 2024-25, serves as an indicator that the government will opt for a state-driven and proactive approach to encouraging foreign investment during Kagame’s fourth term. As outlined in the proposed budget, the government intends to increase public spending by 11.2% during the fiscal year, with RWF 2,037.4 billion (approximately USD 15.5 billion) to be allocated for both foreign and domestically financed projects.

Structural challenges undermining private sector development 

Despite increasing awareness amongst policymakers of the importance of driving private sector growth, they face several structural barriers to achieving this goal.

Rwanda is confronted with a deficit of skilled workers upon which the government’s vision of private sector growth spurred by innovation and a prospering services sector is contingent upon. The country’s labour market remains characterised by low-skilled, low wage and informal work, with 85% of workers being informally employed as of 2021. Whilst Rwanda’s agriculture sector only makes up 27% of the country’s GDP, it employs 72.2% of the population, primarily in low-skilled and informal positions. Professions such as accountants, lawyers and engineers, on the other hand, are in particular shortfall. Rwanda’s educational framework is in part accountable for the current state of the workforce, with enrolment in tertiary education at 8% for men and 7% for women in 2023. Without access to higher education and specialised training opportunities, workers will be unable to fill the technical and managerial positions that private investment, especially in areas such as services, is dependent on. Investment into the service sector is of particular importance. As Rwanda lacks the natural resources of some of its neighbours, the tertiary sector will underpin future economic growth.

Access to financing solutions and affordable credit constitutes a further obstacle to private sector development. Lending rates are amongst the highest in the region not dipping below 14.16% in the last two decades and banks primarily offer short-term loans with collateral requirements regularly higher than 100% of the loan value. Viable equity financing solutions remain limited for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs). The Rwanda Stock Exchange remains nascent and only constitutes an equity solution for a handful of large companies. Whilst foreign private investors and companies can overcome these issues by leveraging external sources of financing, domestic companies are not presented with the same options, with local SMMEs often lacking the low-cost financing solutions to unlock growth at the early stages of a company’s development. 

Advancing towards a private sector-led economy

There are grounds to believe that Rwanda will be successful in its transition towards a private sector-led economy. Firstly, the transition is already underway. Under Vision 2020, which ran from 2000-2020, a host of reforms were implemented to unlock private investment such as privatisation of state-owned companies and introduction of tax incentives. Between 1996 and 2017, 56 formerly state-owned companies were privatised. Large companies that the Government of Rwanda has sold its stake in through the Rwanda Stock Exchange include: MTN Rwanda - the country’s largest telecommunications company, which was first listed on the RSE in May 2021 - and the Bank of Kigali, which the government sold its 20% stake in through the company’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) in September 2011. Moreover, in February 2021, Rwanda’s Investment Code, which seeks to promote and facilitate investment in Rwanda, was enacted into law. The legislation introduced a wide array of investment incentives, including a preferential corporate tax income rate of 0% offered to any international company that establishes its headquarters and regional offices in Rwanda; invests the equivalent of USD $10 million in the company in tangible and intangible assets; and provides employment and training to Rwandans, amongst other conditions. 

Secondly, Rwanda offers foreign and local companies a favourable regulatory environment and a relatively low and declining levels of corruption and crime. In 2020, Rwanda ranked second highest in Africa on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index, jumping 100 places in two decades. The index ranks countries on how conducive their regulatory environments are for establishing and operating a firm in country. Countries are ranked on several topics including starting a business, registering a property and enforcing contracts. Corruption and crime are also in decline in Rwanda, with the country receiving the lowest score in East Africa on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2023 and being the second safest country on the continent according to the ENACT Organised Crime Index 2023.

The top-down policy and decision-making structures established by the government have also traditionally shown themselves to facilitate the implementation of economic reforms. International commentators have noted that Western countries provide Rwanda with more aid than other African countries because they deem the country to use it more effectively. These frameworks will likely remain broadly unchanged with Kagame set for at least another five years in office. And we assess that future policies to boost private sector growth will likely be implemented with a similar efficacy. Kagame has committed to improving the economic security of Rwandans and has pledged to transform Rwanda into an upper-middle country before the end of his next term. With 37% of the country’s population under the age 15, Rwanda’s youth will become a powerful voice in the years to come. They represent a valuable driver of growth, however, in the absence of private sector development and integration, they are not likely to be better off than the generations that preceded them.

Despite Rwanda’s traditional reliance on public funds for stimulating economic growth, Kagame has remained persistent in his desire to attract private investment. In recent years, his administration has sought to implement policies, which breaking with the past, are likely to  unlock private sector growth. Coupled with high and sustained levels of growth and other progress made under Vision 2020, such as infrastructure developments, a more central role for the private sector within Rwanda’s growth strategy will likely present untapped opportunities for overseas investors and businesses in the years to come, particularly in Rwanda’s fastest growing tertiary sectors such as financial services, IT and hospitality.

Hunger Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Overview

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is currently experiencing one of the world’s worst hunger crises, with 42.5 million people, of the country’s total population of 105.9 million, experiencing insufficient food consumption. Of these, approximately 23.4 million people are acutely food insecure, including an estimated 4.5 million children who are acutely malnourished. The resurgence of armed conflict in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu since 2022 has further exacerbated the situation, with 7.3 million people currently displaced across the country. Women and children are bearing the brunt of the crisis, with access to food and other critical resources severely limited and incidences of sexual harassment, exploitation, and abuse surging in the affected areas.

Drivers and Causes

The hunger crisis in the DRC is fuelled by a myriad of factors, including environmental disasters, conflict, economic instability, and poor governance. Although the country possesses significant natural resources such as copper, cobalt, diamonds, and tin, the Congolese population does not benefit from the country’s natural wealth. The DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a score of 0.481 on the 2022 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), placing it 180th out of 193 countries. Poverty is widespread, with an estimated 74.6 per cent of the population living on less than $2.15 a day in 2023, and much of the population struggles to access basic necessities such as electricity and safe and reliable drinking water.

One of the key factors driving hunger in the DRC is the occurrence of frequent natural disasters such as floods, drought, volcanic activity, and epidemics. In 2021, the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo forced at least 232,000 people to flee their homes in Goma and the surrounding areas as lava flows destroyed more than 3,500 houses and toxic volcanic gases threatened both people’s lives and the environment. Similarly, the flooding of the Congo River in January 2024 affected more than 1,8 million people, destroying thousands of houses, farmland, and critical infrastructure, such as health care, water, and sanitation facilities. While the DRC’s geographical location in the Congo Basin makes it prone to climate hazards, climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of extreme weather events in the country, with floods, droughts, and heat waves all expected to increase over the coming decades.

Alongside disasters, violent conflict is another significant cause of hunger in the DRC. Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC has experienced persistent conflict with political tensions and rivalries over natural resources fuelling violence between different national and ethnic groups. In 1996, Rwandan forces invaded the DRC (then known as Zaire) to root out Hutu rebel groups that had taken cover in the eastern parts of the country, leading to a regional war that pitted Rwanda and its allies along with foreign and domestic rebel groups against the Congolese government of Joseph Mobutu. In 1997, Mobutu was overthrown and replaced by the rebels’ political leader Laurent Kabila. Yet, tensions between Kabila and his allies, Rwanda and Uganda, soon began to mount, resulting in the Second Congo War of 1998. While the war officially ended in 2003, ethnic tensions persisted and continue to be a significant obstacle to long-term peace and development to this day. In 2022, violence escalated between the DRC’s armed forces (FARDC) and the Rwanda-backed M23 Tutsi-led rebels in the eastern DRC, resulting in the killing of several thousand civilians and the forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands more across the region. While exact data on the number of victims is difficult to ascertain, the United Nations estimates that, since 1996, approximately 6 million people have died as a result of war in the eastern DRC, making the conflict the deadliest event since World War II.

Impact

Almost thirty years of conflict, environmental disasters, and poor governance have created a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions in the DRC. The 2024 Global Hunger Index ranks the DRC 123rd out of 127 countries based on indicators of undernutrition, child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality and rates the country’s food security situation as ‘serious’. Hunger is pervasive all across the country and the prevalence of insufficient food consumption is generally high or very high, with 22 of the DRC’s 26 provinces currently experiencing food insecurity levels at or above 30 per cent. This includes the provinces of North Kivu (4,2 million), South Kivu (3,7 million), Ituri (3,2 million), Kasaï-Central (2,9 million), Kinshasa (2,8 million), Kasaï (2,5 million), and Kasaï-Oriental (2,3 million), which together hold more than half of the DRC’s food-insecure population.

While food insecurity affects all segments of Congolese society, women and children have been particularly hard hit by the crisis and face a range of protection issues. In 2023, an estimated 2.8 million children under 5 years old and an estimated 2.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were acutely malnourished, with women and children in the conflict-torn provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu the most affected. Malnutrition-related effects include weakened immunity to disease and infections, increased risk of pregnancy and childbirth complications, and stunted growth and developmental delays in children. In the DRC, child stunting is especially common, with 36 per cent of children under five estimated to be affected in 2024. The child wasting rate, while comparatively lower at an estimated 6.6 per cent, is also high, as is the child mortality rate, which at an estimated 7.6 per cent is almost three times the world’s average of 2.6 per cent.

Besides the immediate risk to health and wellbeing, food insecurity makes women and children susceptible to a number of secondary threats, including sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation, and abuse. With food in short supply, many Congolese women and girls are forced to exchange sex for food and water for themselves and their families, while others have to enter forced or arranged marriages to survive. Attacks on water and food-seeking women and girls are also frequent, with those uprooted by violence and conflict the most at risk. In the conflict-affected areas of the eastern DRC, incidences of physical and sexual violence against women and children are particularly high. With no safe shelter available, women and children in the displacement camps in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu are exposed to heightened risks of rape and abduction, while child recruitment by armed groups is also common. Although no exact data on the number of sexual offence and child recruitment victims exists, in 2022 over 80,000 cases of gender-based violence were reported in the DRC while at least 1,545 children were recruited and used by armed groups. The true number of victims, however, is likely to be far higher.

Recommendations and Implications

Relief efforts so far have focused on providing emergency food assistance, health care, and livelihood support to vulnerable populations and communities within the DRC and surrounding areas. In 2023, 6.9 million people out of a target of 10 million people were reached, but a lack of funding limits humanitarian actors’ response capacity. In 2023, the humanitarian funding gap for the DRC reached a record $1,311,860, or 58 per cent of the total budget required, with the figure for 2024 currently standing at 55 per cent. Additional help is especially needed in the eastern DRC, where a new clade of mpox is rapidly spreading and threatening the already precarious existence of people living in refugee camps. However, to carry out their work effectively and reach a greater number of people, humanitarian actors require greater financial assistance, both from donor governments and private contributions.

For those operating on the ground, personal safety has become a growing concern in recent years. In 2023, more than 217 security incidents involving humanitarian workers were recorded in the DRC, including almost 30 abductions, around 20 injuries, and at least 3 deaths. Since the beginning of 2024, this number has further increased, with more than 170 attacks on humanitarian workers reported in the first six months of the year alone. Most attacks are taking place in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where fighting between government and armed opposition forces continues to rage despite the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement on July 30, 2024. 

In North Kivu, the security situation is particularly challenging. Since the beginning of the year, M23 forces have significantly expanded the territory under their control, most recently, in early August 2024, capturing the towns of Ishasha, Katwiguru, Kisharo, Nyamilima, and Nyakakoma and taking control of the southern and eastern shores of Lake Edouard and areas along the Ugandan border. Fighting between the M23, FARDC, and pro-government Wazalendo militias has also been reported in the Lubero and Rutshuru territories in recent weeks, killing at least 16 people. In Ituri, armed groups including the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) remain active, launching recurrent attacks against civilians in the territories of Djugo, Irumu, and Mambasa. In South Kivu, the withdrawal of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in June 2024 has raised concerns about a potential security vacuum, especially given the M23’s recent advance into the region. In light of the rapidly changing security landscape, it is therefore vital that humanitarian organisations liaise with local stakeholders and secure timely insights on armed group activities and movements. If your organisation is interested in tailored, PRO BONO insights from London Politica’s Africa Desk, please contact us at externalrelations@londonpolitica.com.

Burkina Faso Geopolitical Risk Assessment

Introduction

Burkina Faso (BF) is currently ruled by a military junta under the leadership of Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who came to power through a coup in September 2022. Since the takeover, the junta has adopted an increasingly militaristic and authoritarian approach, while steering BF away from alliances with Western powers, in favour of states such as Russia, who have promised the government heavy military support. Next to strengthening the junta's position, combating powerful non-state armed groups (NSAGs) is the main political driver in BF. 

NSAGs mostly include Islamist terror organisations, including home-grown extremist groups and jihadist fighters from neighbouring countries. Many NSAGs operating in the country are linked to larger organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). Due to their ability to move across BF’s neighbours' porous borders and their desire to attack civilians, NGOs, security forces and infrastructure, they pose a serious domestic as well as regional risk, and are likely to continue to do so over the short to medium term. The lacklustre performance of previous governments and allies in their efforts to improve the security situation in BF has precipitated two coups in as many years, the expulsion of French and other Western forces, the ejection of UN personnel, and an open invitation to the Kremlin.

Executive Summary:

• The ongoing conflict between security forces, terror groups, local militias, and external forces will very likely pose a very high risk to civilians and foreigners across the country over at least the next year, apart from central regions in immediate proximity to Ougadougu (as per Figure 1).

• Harassment and violence against foreign nationals (particularly French citizens) is likely due to strong anti-Western sentiment fuelled by disinformation campaigns. NGOs and aid workers face significant risks from both NSAGs and government-linked security forces, leading to a challenging operational environment. 

• We assess with moderate confidence that while GDP growth will remain stable over the next 8-12 months, it will fall short of the previous years' expectations and lag behind regional partners like the Ivory Coast. Political instability, security issues, macro tail risk, and climate factors present significant challenges for individual foreign investors.

Political Risk

TLDR:

• The number of Burkinabé civilians and soldiers killed by extremists has risen sharply over the past five years and continues to increase under Traoré’s leadership;

• Despite this, public support remains high amid disinformation campaigns which label the French, UN, and ECOWAS, as corrupt entities; 

• Levels of corruption within government and industry are pervasive;

• Russia acts as a key strategic partner to the military junta, rivalled by Turkey; and,

• A formalised Confederation of Sahelian States strengthens Traoré’s government, but would very likely impact regional economics and thus global businesses and organisations, through liquidity, trade, security, and movement difficulties.

BF has experienced recurring military coups attempts over the last ten years (2014, 2015, 2022). The present government, under Captain Ibrahim Traoré, came into power in 2022 on an anti-colonial platform, as well as on the premise that the previous governments were incapable of handling the jihadist threat. On foreign policy, Traoré has taken a similar approach to BF's neighbours Mali and Niger; distancing themselves from Western states and institutions such as the UN, as well as severing ties with former colonial power France. The overall region’s influence on anti-France and pro-Russian narratives was apparent in the lead-up to BF’s 2022 coup and has created space that Russia continues to exploit via soft and hard power. In April this year, Burkinabé authorities expelled several French diplomats, after having previously ejected the ambassador and defence attaché. French nationals, businesspeople, and aid workers have also occasionally been detained, in some cases charged with espionage and subsequently deported. 

Russia continues to play a strong domestic role; utilising propaganda, deploying fake social media accounts, fake news sites, and state controlled mass-media centres to conduct disinformation campaigns that have led to democratic backsliding. Russia also employs military aid to fill holes left by France and the UN in BF’s fight against jihadism. Indeed, the Kremlin has made itself an indispensable partner of the Traoré government and plays a significant role in the buttressing of broad domestic support for the junta. 

Turkey also works to maintain economic, religious, educational, industrial, and military ties with BF, making President Erdoğan a key regional player with significant soft power. The two nations hold several joint commissions and agency corporations, which facilitate the transfer of Turkish development aid, student exchanges, and the sale of significant military equipment – such as the Turkish TB2, a medium altitude, long endurance, ISR and attack drone that has been linked to several human rights violations in BF.

The ‘transitional’ government under Captain Traoré has so far signalled little interest in shifting the country towards democratic rule. In September 2023, the junta cancelled elections scheduled for July 2024, and postponed them indefinitely, labelling them “not a priority”. Governing power remains bundled centrally in the putschist executive, after elected and other transitional bodies were dissolved post-coup.

We assess that public support for Traoré's government remains high, at least in the capital and surrounding regions, with no signs of major unrest/dissidence over the last six months. However, political indicators, such as message control and quickly deployed counter-factual narratives, suggest that the government's popularity can, to a significant extent, be attributed to Russian disinformation campaigns. Traoré’s stability is also maintained through a propagandist civil-political organisation known as the Wayiyans. Acting largely as a watchdog, the organisation is active in a range of activities, from political rallies to vigilante ‘stability’ patrols around the capital. Traoré has effectively dulled any major internal political opposition.

Reporting around a lone gunman attack at the presidential palace in Ouagadougou further demonstrates the depth and sophistication of information-operations within Burkina Faso. The incident in question does not have any obvious political connection, however, local news and social media quickly framed it as a failed coup attempt, spinning a narrative of demonstrated regime strength.

Anti-government demonstrations, which have declined significantly since Traoré’s coup, were frequently centred around anti-French sentiment. Since the recent departure of French troops, they have largely died down. Even though the population appears pro-government, increased reporting around human rights violations perpetrated by local militias, the expulsion of certain news outlets, and a decrease in civil liberties might increasingly fuel disenchantment among the population. 

Regional observers have reported on isolated incidents of internal dissent, such as the formation of the political group FDR (The Front for the Defence of the Republic) in early April 2024. The organisation's spokesperson, Inoussa Ouédraogo, called for the “immediate release of all those forcibly conscripted, kidnapped or sequestered by the militias under the orders of Ibrahim Traoré.” However, as of today, the lack of civil unrest and protests suggests that opposition movements have not managed to gain significant momentum. This could change ​if the junta is not able to produce results against NSAGs over the next 12-24 months, as failure to address the jihadist threat has been a driving factor in past transitions of power. 

Since Traoré’s coup, the junta has also been pursuing closer cooperation with the military governments of Niger and Mali. During a recent summit in the beginning of July, the neighbours announced the formalisation of a Confederation of Sahel States (AES). The alliance strengthens the position of Traoré and his colleagues, while further isolating them from the regional Economic Communities of Western African States (ECOWAS) block. The AES’s main goal is increased security cooperation but it also seeks to improve economic ties. For instance, the three leaders have set their sights on a common currency, in an attempt to move away from the French-backed CFA Franc used by many states in West Africa. This development would strongly disrupt trade stability between BF and its key trading partners, such as Cote d'Ivoire.

BF has historically struggled with corruption at the federal and municipal level. Anti-corruption protests are a recurring pattern - the most recent broke out just last year. Local authorities are commonly engaged in bribery, extortion, and rent-seeking. The commodities sector is particularly affected. Mining firms often cooperate with corrupt local authorities to attain commercial licensing or exploitation rights, leading to extensive compliance and reputational risks. Captain Traoré has paid lip-service to an increased fight against corruption with high profile arrests, but the efforts have not been far-reaching and do not reflect tangible changes. While corruption remains common, it has not increased dramatically since 2016. 

Pervasive corruption causes various negative externalities for foreign investors and international firms. For instance, involvement of local branches in bribery schemes exposes multinationals to reputational and even legal risks, while refusal to participate may result in additional commercial challenges, such as difficulties in getting permits etc. Overall, corruption is a major obstacle to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and stunts domestic economic development.

Assessment:

London Politica assesses the overall political risk level in Burkina Faso as high due to Burkina Faso’s vulnerability to government collapse, or state violence, given the country’s long history of forceful transfers of power. High levels of political risk associated with political instability and regime change pose a significant risk to entities that rely on policy continuity, including foreign companies that hold public contracts with the current government.

We assess as likely that the competition between Russia and Turkey will increase over the next 6-12 months, manifesting in a range of sectors, including industry, security, defence, and information. Global tensions between NATO and Russia may play a larger role in the region as a result. Firms from either block may face additional pressures when geopolitical frictions spill over into the investment sphere. Indeed, actors on both sides seek to use government access to consolidate their economic influence. The same could be true for NGOs, who may be perceived as foreign government entities and therefore are at risk of mistrust and discrimination by local authorities. 

Further, we assess that over the next 6-12 months foreign nationals, particularly French citizens, are at a high risk of harassment or violence by local populations or extortion by government representatives. This endangers business continuity in the country and negatively affects the investment outlook for lenders as well as capital allocators, leading to a more complex and challenging commercial environment for foreign actors. 

Security Risk

TLDR:

• Terrorism is at an all-time high in Burkina Faso, with over 2,000 fatalities and 1,312 civilian casualties in 2023; 

• Civilian casualties often occur in any area where NSAG (Non-State Actor Groups), government forces, or the Volunteers For the Defence of the Homeland militia (VDP) are operating;

• Ongoing information operations have a significant effect on the disposition of government forces, especially the VDP militias who are a poorly trained and unprofessional force;

• NGOs and foreign nationals have experienced discrimination and violence by both NSAGs and government security forces.

BF’s security situation has deteriorated since 2023, as security forces, including local militias, are ramping up their presence and operations in NSAG controlled territory. The Figure below provides an overview of the conflict, highlighting areas of reported militia and NSAG activity that has resulted in casualties or collateral damage. London Politica’s research supports an assessment by ECOWAS, which highlights that Burkina Faso’s government controls less than 60% of the country.

NSAGs and Terrorism

BF currently experiences the highest frequency of terror attacks globally. In 2023 alone, around 2,000 people were killed in terror related incidents. In fact, over a quarter of the world’s terror related deaths occurred in the country in that same period. Notable incidents in 2023 included the killing of 71 soldiers in the province of l’Oudalan by an IS Sahel faction and the murder of 61 civilians in Partiaga, a village in the Tapoa province, by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). [see London Politica Sahelian Security Assessment for JNIM profile] JNIM remains the dominant terror organisation in the country. More recent examples include an attack in February 2024, in which terrorists targeted a Catholic church in the north-east, killing 15 worshippers. On the same day, militants massacred several dozen civilians in a mosque in the south-eastern city of Natiaboani. These incidences were reported over X by local journalists.

Insurgent guerrilla strategy - including ambushes and hit-and-run tactics - are prevalent in BF. JNIM, for instance, conducts both sophisticated and simple IED attacks to create disruption and tunnel targets into favourable attack positions. Both JNIM and other NSAGs engage in kidnappings to extract ransom payments and organised intimidation tactics to levy taxes on local businesses and NGOs in their territories. Human and arms trafficking is also pervasive in militant controlled regions. NSAGs are also leveraging access to the illegal gold trade and sale of looted government or NGO supplies, to finance their operations. JNIM, for instance, has been aggressively trying to expand their grip on lucrative mining regions, where they mine and smuggle gold, but also provide paid security for locals engaged in artisanal mining.

Terror attacks continue to occur across the country, with a particularly high frequency near the Malian border and the tri-border region between Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, where militants take advantage of weak border security. The centre of the country, particularly in close proximity to the capital, has been comparatively safe.

Government Security Forces & Vigilante Militias

International observers have also accused government security forces of violence against civilians. Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently published a report accusing the army of killing 223 villagers in February, near the northern border to Mali. HRW has highlighted numerous civilian casualties resulting from TB2 drone strikes, in both 2023 and 2024. Militias have also been accused of atrocities. Reports indicate that the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP), a national militia created by the Burkinabe government, massacred 156 people in the northern village Karma in April 2024. Their attacks, which have also included forced disappearances and summary executions, often target ethnic Fulanis, who are perceived as extremists by factions of the militia. 

The VDP has a strong presence on the front-line against NSAGs, often suffering heavy casualties. The militia relies on quick recruitment and poor training to ensure rapid deployment. While VDP personnel have benefitted from a recent 30% pay rise, the group has also been implicated in criminality, including extortion and kidnappings. As the VDP recruitment numbers have grown, so has NSAG retaliation against communities linked to the militia. IDP camps, perceived as VDP loyal, have suffered reprisal from groups, including from al Qaida-affiliated organisations. 

Sporadic social media reporting also suggests a decrease in the recapture of territory, with an increase in permanent army checkpoints on key roads, enacted curfews and declared states of emergency in the most affected northern provinces. 

NGO staff, in particular those operating in contested regions, also face increasing harassment and violence from both NSAGs and security forces, including the VDP. Amnesty International reports high-levels of mistrust against NGO members amongst locals and the military alike, who sometimes suspect aid workers of supporting jihadist organisations. These attitudes are boosted by the spread of disinformation. Attacks on NGO staff have ranged from discrimination and wrongful detention to beatings and murder. NSAGs also frequently loot aid convoys. We assess that these risks will not abate over the next 12-months and NGOs operating in conflict zones, particularly around internally displaced persons in the north and northeastern provinces, will have to continuously monitor their security exposure to both government troops and NSAGs. 

External Forces

Reporting on the specific activities of the Kremlin-backed Africa Korps remains sparse. The unit, which was established after the disbandment of the Wagner Group, employs mercenaries (including former Wagner members) as well as volunteers, and operates under the umbrella of the Russian defence ministry. While the Russian paramilitaries were originally brought in under the guise of filling the French anti-terror gap, regional sources indicate that their main mandate is to protect the military government, enabling the junta’s political aspirations while carrying out targeted missions and training Burkinabé forces. The organisation continues to recruit heavily across the Russian-speaking world, but has also signalled the desire to expand their ranks locally, in BF. The group has been linked to civilian deaths in neighbouring countries, but continues to enjoy a strong backing by BF’s central government.

Assessement:

London Politica assesses that continued, widespread violence between NSAGs and security forces are highly likely over the next 12 months. It is unlikely that the security situation in the non-capital regions will improve, as government forces have not been able to effectively combat NSAGs in contested regions causing violent spillovers affecting civilians. 

We assess that the targeting and harassment of NGOs and foreign nationals by security forces will remain highly likely over the next 12 months. Travellers are advised to avoid known areas of conflict, including the northern border regions of Soum, Oudalan, and Seno. Additionally, travellers should limit travel to main service routes around the capital-south regions around Ganzourgou, Boulgou, Naouri and Bazega. Professionals and aid workers are also advised to hire armed escorts ahead of travel and have emergency backup routes prepared. Staff deployed to conflict regions are exposed to the risk of violent attacks, looting of supplies, and kidnappings by terror organisations. They are also at risk of harassment, detention, torture, and murder from government troops, particularly in regions in which the VDP operates - such as Seno, Kossi, Tapoa, Bam, and Yatenga. 

Economic Risk

TLDR:

• Burkina Faso's economy is projected to grow by 5.5% in 2024, driven by gold, manganese, cotton, and agricultural production. However, political instability and security issues, particularly attacks on industrial centres, pose significant risks to economic development.

• Inflation has slowed due to stable commodity prices and monetary policy, but the macro environment remains volatile.

• Turkey's FDI ambitions faced setbacks with revoked mining licences, while disputes among foreign investors highlight the challenging business environment.

Burkina Faso’s economy is driven by the production of gold, manganese, cotton and agricultural goods. The IMF has projected that the country’s economy will grow by 5.5%, slightly lower than the average of 6% from 2017-2019. The lagging economic performance is largely attributed to the precarious security situation and political instability. 

Inflation, previously a grave concern to policy makers, has slowed down, mainly due to stabilising commodity prices and a monetary tightening of the Central Bank of West African States. The macro environment remains challenging, however, and resurging inflationary headwinds cannot be discounted over the next 12-months. 

Overall, the country’s economic outlook hinges largely on the political and security situation. Indeed, many of the major industrial centres are located within contested regions and are prone to attacks by NSAGs. Extractives businesses are at particularly high risk. Additional headwinds will likely include climate events, such as reduced rainfall or drought, damaging agricultural yields. Presently, growth appears largely stable, positioning BF’s economy on solid footing, compared to regional standards. 

A notable development in terms of FDI is the increasing influence of Turkey. Besides the sale of military equipment, Turkish firms are expanding into other business areas. The mining venture Afro Türk, for instance, purchased licences for the Tambao manganese mine and the Inata gold mine for $50 million in April 2023. However, in late March 2024 the operating licences were revoked again, due to failure to deliver full payment. The licences have since been handed over to new undisclosed investors. This set-back was a blow to Turkey’s ambitions and their relationship with the government. The now-defunct contract between the junta and the Turkish miner contained a noteworthy clause, which required the company to build security infrastructure for military forces fighting the NSAG threat in the vicinity of the mines, which is demonstrative of the pervasive threat these groups pose in the north of the country. This is also an indication of a broader, unspoken, trend; investors need to demonstrate alignment with the central government in order to win business, at least in major state-backed industries. Hence, this adds to the considerations of foreign business ventures, who might be wary of cozying up to an authoritarian government.

A recent dispute between Lilium Mining, the largest gold-producer in West Africa, and Endeavour Mining, a Canadian conglomerate, further demonstrates the challenging business environment in BF’s conflict zones. During the summer of 2023, Endeavour finalised a deal to sell their Boungou and Wahgnion mines to Lilium, due to the constant threat of attacks by terror organisations. The $300 million deal has since turned sour, as Endeavour brought forth a lawsuit, accusing its counterparty of failing to pay the agreed sum in full. Lilium in turn has launched legal proceedings against Endeavour, claiming they were misled regarding the operational capacities of the mines. Hence, the precarious security landscape poses serious challenges for foreign investors, especially regarding business continuity, but also when it comes to appraising investment opportunities, including the pricing of counterparty-risk.

Assessment:

BF’s economic landscape presents a high-risk environment for foreign firms considering launching or expanding business operations. The interplay of political instability, the presence of armed groups, geopolitical tensions, and other macro drivers creates significant challenges for investors. A high risk appetite is required. 

We assess that the country’s economy is heavily reliant on commodity prices (cotton, gold). This dependency makes the macroeconomic environment highly volatile. Foreign firms must be prepared (hedges etc.) for significant fluctuations in revenue linked to global commodity markets. 

It is highly likely that climate change exacerbates the frequency and severity of adverse weather events, presenting ongoing risks to economic stability and individual business operations. While extreme tail risk events such as the insect infestations that decimated cotton production in 2022 are unlikely, they remain a present risk that can have significant localised and macroeconomic impacts.

Political instability remains highly likely over the next year and a change in sentiment or government may bring about nationalisation of foreign-owned assets. International firms must navigate the political landscape cautiously, nurture good relationships with local and federal government, and develop contingency plans to mitigate the risk of abrupt policy changes.

The country hosts a high number of IDPs, resulting in a weakened workforce, leading to difficulties for foreign businesses seeking reliable labour. Companies must consider strategies to address potential labour shortages and invest in workforce development.

Infrastructure Risk

TLDR:

• Infrastructure remains unreliable both due to underdevelopment and damage as a result of ongoing conflict; 

• Access to water and medical supplies are limited outside the capital, and competition over basic resources may lead to conflict 

• NGOs and commercial enterprises are likely to face difficulties traversing outside of the national capital region as a result of poor telecommunications and road infrastructure.

The conflict has heavily damaged infrastructure across BF. Attacks on water points are common, and according to UNICEF, results in increased water scarcity, with some regions losing regular water access for up to 223,000 persons.

With BF’s paved and maintained road systems reaching just over 1,000 km in 2021, transportation can be a challenge, particularly in the hinterlands. Road systems’ traversability is likely to be worsening in the north to north-west regions as a result of intense heat and ongoing conflict. Major bridging and paved roads have also become targets for IED attacks and convoy ambushes, in systematic attempts to limit vehicle movement and the flow of supplies to besieged areas. 

Access to medical supplies and treatment has also been heavily affected by the ongoing conflict. In embattled regions medical facilities are frequently forced to cease operations, due to a lack of resources and looting by NSAGs. Indeed, in provinces such as Soum, as much as 65% of health infrastructure is non-functional. NGOs seeking to deliver medical care will be particularly challenged by the lack of pre-existing facilities and the threat of looting. In affected areas, NGOs would be well advised to hire  a security detail to protect their staff and property.

The country’s telecom sector has made significant inroads over the past four years, reaching a fibre-capable backbone that links over 145 central communities and implementing terrestrial cables to neighbouring countries. Despite this, much of the country's cellular capabilities remain largely underdeveloped, as much of the country still relies on regional 3G. 

In their late 2023 Burkina Faso country brief, Janes reported that while attacks on critical infrastructure are recorded and common, the largest threat to infrastructure remains weather-linked risks, such as heavy rainfall and floods. The World Bank has additionally highlighted that drought-like conditions are another major risk variable regarding food and water insecurity.

Assessment:

We assess that major infrastructure and industrial sites within the; Boucle du Mouhoun, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Sahel regions are under moderate short-term risk - due to historic assaults by NSAGs who have demonstrated a willingness and capability to carry out targeted attacks. These circumstances are highly unlikely to change in the next 12-24 months, as the threat to infrastructure is particularly high in conflict zones, towards the northern borders with Mali and Niger due to an increase in NSAG blacktracked trafficking and smuggling routes which have proven effective against Government Forces. As a result, NGOs and businesses operating in these regions must be prepared for delays in supplies delivery - due to ambushes and IED attacks - and should therefore keep a well-secured inventory of basic items and materials needed for operational continuity. Travelling across the Nord to Sahel regions should also be limited to self-established safe-routes, alternating in frequency and changing routes frequently.

The junta has increasingly focused on protecting infrastructure. The adoption of technology solutions, such as drone surveillance, as well as the presence of the Africa Corps has reduced the number of attacks over the last 12 months. The reduction in violent incidents, however, is not a perfect indicator of the government’s success against terror groups, as defending fixed infrastructure is easier than uprooting highly mobile terror groups.

Individuals and organisations should also prepare for civilian telecommunications coverage dead zones and blackouts, as well as bring health and water supplies. Doing so will ensure preparedness for lack of availability, but it is better to do so moderately as to not draw unwanted attention. 

Societal and Legal Risks

TLDR:

• Inter-community​ violence in Burkina Faso has increased, especially against the Fulani minority and the country hosts around two million IDPs and 40,000 refugees. 

• Russian disinformation campaigns influence public sentiment, and the government restricts media freedom, suspending various international news outlets and digital platforms.

• Homosexuality is illegal in Burkina Faso as of 10 July 2024 and discrimination is pervasive.

BF is a multi-ethnic state, in which the Mossi people make up the majority of the population (54%). Reports of inter-community violence have intensified over the last five years, with claims ranging from harassment to skirmishes between ethnic militias. Due to their perceived ties to terror organisations, the Fulani group (7%) has been among the most persecuted minorities in BF. They face regular abuse and violence from factions of the Burkinabé security forces. The Collective Against Impunity and Stigmatization of Communities, a local civil society organisation, has reported 250 extrajudicial killings of Fulani community members in the last three months of 2023 alone. We assess, however, that despite these incidents, ethnic violence will not significantly impact levels of political stability.

BF is also home to approximately two million IDPs and hosts refugees from war-torn neighbours such as Mali. The number of refugees remains comparatively small (approx. 40,000) and their arrival has not led to observable patterns of (ethnic/community/economic) violence or unrest in affected border regions. 

Homosexuality is now criminalised in BF, as of 10 July 2024. Even prior to that development, there had been no explicit protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Social surveys show that only 8% of the population is tolerant of same-sex relations, well below regional standards. Foreigners that are perceived as members of the LGBTQ+ community may be subject to raids, screenings, harassment, and even violence.

International observers and think tanks have continually reported on the presence of Russian disinformation campaigns within Burkina Faso. Further, evidence of groups both internal and external to the Burkinabe Government are believed to be operating pro-junta and anti-French information campaigns; with up to 11 simultaneous campaign streams sighted in just 2024. Reports have also linked the public’s positive perception of Africa Korps mercenaries to Russian misinformation campaigns. Specifically, fake social media accounts and news sites spreading anti-democracy and pro-Kremlin propaganda across channels such as YouTube. Journalists and bloggers have also been accused of being on Russia’s payroll to push authoritarian objectives.

According to Freedom House, BF has demonstrated the largest decrease in civil and political freedoms of any country in the region over the last 8 years, down 26 points since 2022. In the regional ranking, BF is etching closer to the bottom of the list. The country currently occupies the second to last spot, ahead of its neighbour Mali. 

While media freedom is technically a constitutional right in BF, the junta government has frequently ordered the suspension of broadcasting and access to media outlets promoting dissent. In 2023, Burkinabé authorities suspended French news outlets LCI and France24, while removing publication and access rights to Radio France Internationale and the magazine Jeune Afrique. In April 2024, in the wake of reported human right violations and the massacre of 223 civilians by the VDP, the Burkinabé government announced the suspension of BBC broadcasting rights, and Voice of America (VOA) radio networks from broadcasting for two weeks. Websites and digital platforms including Facebook are also routinely cut off without notice.

Assessment:

London Politica assesses that the situation around civil liberties is is likely to continue to worsen over the short to medium term. As Traoré’s junta moves past the cancelled July 2024 election period, and seeks extended power, we are highly confident that the state will further utilise the means at its disposal to control the dissemination of information. Moves to retain order through the control of information may lead to information blackouts and possible targeting of region specific 4/5G L-band communication networks to halt communications all together. 

Specifically in the wake of failed military operations and increased violence, a worsening of the information environment would pose a severe risk to any commercial or civil operations on the ground, severely limiting both freedom of movement and critically disrupting any operations that require telecommunication based coordination. Further, disinformation poses a direct threat to any operations which rely on local-civil cooperation due to the volatility in narrative flow. Companies and NGOs with static locations are advised to invest in telecommunications equipment not-dependent on local infrastructure or geo-regional web data.

Intelligence Brief: South African Elections

Tomorrow, 29 May 2024, At 0700 SAST (0500 GMT) South Africans go to the polls. South Africa will engage its proportional voting system to fill 400 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly. The governing African National Congress (ANC) will look to retain a majority, albeit likely a declining one. Below the forecast are factors likely to influence the vote.

Short Term Situational Forecasting

• London Political assesses with high confidence that the ANC will lose its majority due to perceived governance failures; the ANC will likely retain at least 44% of seats in the legislature, which will likely enable them to enter into a coalition with smaller parties, and without the EFF.

  • This would represent a continuation of the status quo as it relates to operational, security, and reputationl risks.

• Due to political instability caused by a reduced ANC position, it is likely that we will see unrest, and possibly clashes between party supporters during the elections. Previous clashes involving MK supporters suggest this may result in violent altercations, protests, and destruction of property.

• We assess this risk for Pietermaritzburg as high, with Johannesburg and Cape Town assessed as moderate risk locations. We are also likely to see severe congestion and petty crime in Pietermaritzburg. 

• Although political unrest is possible in Johannesburg and Cape Town, large-scale rioting and looting are unlikely. 

• Hate crimes spurred on by xenophobia are likely in all three cities; foreign nationals - particularly those from other African countries - should prepare contingency plans that take into account possible unrest and heavy congestion in cities.

 Immediate Election-Associated Risks

·       In the event of unrest, we are likely to see damage to property, arson, barricading of roads, looting, hijacking of trucks, and political violence;

·      Campaigning around illegal immigration and foreign investment in relation to unemployment can act as a trigger for episodes of targeted violence, and human right organisations have reported a heightened watch for xenophobic activity; 

·       Increased foot traffic, and possible unrest and vehicle protests may lead to movement difficulties in urban centres surrounding the elections; and,

·       Large crowds, particularly in Cape town and Johannesburg, may act as easy concealment for petty theft and gang activity.

Turnout

Turnout is expected to rise compared to recent years, according to the Chief Electoral Officer Sy Mambolo, with an increase of 1.2 million registered voters, which would be a rebound from record low voter turnouts of just below 66% in 2019. While this could be the result of important issues acutely affecting voters, or electoral inclusion campaigns, the South African median age of 27.6 is the highest it has been in the last decade, which highlights that aging young voters may simply be more likely to vote than when they were younger.

While inequality is a major issue, especially as it relates to the youth vote, other capstone issues such as the ongoing energy crisis, ageing physical infrastructure, and a volatile dependence on foreign capital have become key issues in recent years. The invigoration of young voters, and an increased age of voter-mobilisation, will likely play a large role in how key issues are assessed at the polls; South Africans appear generally more likely to prioritise social issues over economic ones. 

The Economy

South Africa’s economy is in a joblessness crisis, both leading to and being caused by sluggish growth. With unemployment reaching 32.4% in 2023, young people account for just over 40% that number. According to Reuters, falling tax revenue has been detrimental to government debt, causing debt-servicing to consume a greater share of the national budget than social spending. Further, a reliance on volatile foreign capital has reduced trust in public spending, leading to sentiments of abandonment in some regional electorates.

Infrastructure

Healthcare and Energy are at the forefront of this election. The nation’s state-owned utility company, Eskom, has resorted to major load shedding, causing crippling blackouts in recent years due to structural faults in power stations and inequity across delivery infrastructure. Much of this is the result of endemic corruption, and is perceived as a major failure of the ANC.

Healthcare inequality has sharply risen, with the rise of drug prices and poverty. While the ANC has already tabled the National Health Insurance plan, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), criticises its lack of foundation for funding, registration & administration, or hospital buy-in. As a result, the bill has sat for some time and all parties are looking to propose better solutions.

Key Players:

African National Congress

The African National Congress (ANC) is the country’s political powerhouse, with incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa looking to secure his second and final term. Often cited as ‘Mandela’s Party’, the ANC enters the race with a 57.5% (230/400) seat majority from 2019.

Reporting from eNCA indicates that despite its status, the ANC is sitting at about 40% in the opinion polls, with major news outlets such as the BBC and Al Jazeera predicting a slim loss of the party’s majority. A perceived lack of success in stopping rolling power outages, curbing corruption, and improving both provincial and national infrastructure has been seen as a major party failure by the population and is reflected in opinion polls.

We assess that it is likely that the ANC acquires 44% - 50% of the vote, forcing it to seek alliances with several smaller parties in an effort to keep its legislative power. If the ANC gets less than 45% of the vote, it is likely that the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters) and ANC form a coalition. The Democratic Alliance (DA) has already entered an alliance agreement isolating the EFF. 

Any event in which the ANC maintains a majority, either through an outright win or coalition, sustains risks to businesses around corruption and crime, particularly if the party joins into a coalition with the EFF. Businesses would be very likely to face continued and increasing levels of financial and reputational risks around corruption, operational risks associated with degrading infrastructure, as well as physical risks associated with crime.

An EFF/ANC coalition could have damaging effects for the ANC’s reputation and South Africa as a whole, as the EFF is economically radical and aggressively nationalist. Markets would likely react negatively to such a coalition due to concerns around populist policies, asset nationalisation, corruption, and institutional overreach.

Democratic Alliance

The Democratic Alliance (DA) is currently the largest opposition party, seeking to grow their representation in legislature from 20.77% to at least 25%, an increase of at least 19-20 seats. Led by John Steenhuisen, a career politician, the DA has capitalised on regional wins over the ANC since 2019, and has based its platform around enabling more regional governance, and curbing crime, corruption, and healthcare inequity.  

The DA is much smaller than the ANC, both in historical clout and assembly power, polling at just 18.6%., However, successful regional election wins in the Western Cape have provided a significant party stronghold.

The DA has also struck a pre-election coalition deal with the IFP, FF Plus, ASA, and ACDP, to form the Multi-Party Charter for South Africa (MPCSA). A coalition that currently maintains 112 seats and is expected to grow exponentially.

With the DA and IFP both being substantial players, it is likely that the MPCSA will grow to at least 140 seats; enough to force the ANC into a coalition of its own, but not enough to achieve a majority.

uMkhonto weSizwe Party

The uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party is the wildcard in the race. Formed in December 2023 by Jacob Zuma, a former South African president who left the ANC amid several legal controversies and convictions. Despite being barred from standing in parliament due to his previous convictions related to charges on corruption, racketeering, money laundering and fraud, the former president is splitting votes, achieving up to 14% in opinion polls.

Hailed as an “anti-apartheid veteran and Zulu traditionalist”, MK’s targeting of the ANC plays a significant role in our assessment that the ANC is likely to lose its majority. MK may win up to 8% of the vote (32-33 seats) based on Ipsos polls. It is very likely that the majority of these seats would come from the ANC.

Economic Freedom Fighters

The EFF, led by Julius Malema, is currently polling at around 11-12%, and was founded after Malema was expelled from the ANC in 2013 for sowing divisive radical-leftist views. Known for public stunts and inflammatory remarks against minorities, the EFF is trying to capture the youth vote with promises of free WiFi and electricity – amongst other things. 

The EFF’s platform proposes land to be stripped from the wealthy and nationalised, assets to be pulled from mining companies to be redistributed towards education, and the establishment of accessible 24-hour medical clinics. While these are not the typical eye-catching pillars for moderate South African Voters, the EFF seems to be resonating with the growing lower class, promoting their manifesto at a time when the ANC is accused of failing to look after the poor and black majority. A coalition involving the EFF would likely cause capital flight, although nationalist economic policy would likely be dampened by the ANC’s overwhelming majority within the coalition.

It is likely that the EFF will see marginal gains in 2024. With polling at 11.5%, an increase from 2019’s 10.8%. Having been left out of the MPCSA, it is likely that they will be open to coalition deals.

Implications for Political Risk 

While no party is currently bringing forward a plan that will directly impact foreign investment or South Africa’s economy, international onlookers should watch for signals from the ANC tomorrow that they will prioritise continued economic stability, as well as its possible plans to join in a coalition with the EFF. During the election there is an increased risk of violence, looting, and civil unrest that may incidentally affect businesses.

The sturdiness of South African politics also has larger regional implications, as the country acts as a stabilising regional entity that wields a significant amount of soft and hard power. Less stable states within the African Union (AU) continuously rely on South Africa's steady hand to promote regional development and integration. The AU and UN also rely on their conflict resolution prowess to address conflicts in states such as the DRC or Burundi. Thus, internal unrest and/or power grappling may affect the government’s peacekeeping efforts on the continent, possibly impacting international organisations and NGOs.

Recent reports highlight ongoing disinformation around voter fraud, gerrymandering, and deceptive tactics at polling stations. The exact nature of these issues—whether they are electoral suppression or information operations—remains unclear. Unconfirmed breaches of ballot storage sites have been reported in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape. The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) is investigating these claims, emphasising that they currently lack substantiation.

Despite IEC warnings against electoral disruptions, there are heightened concerns around violence and unrest following the election. This unrest would likely be largely fueled by former President Zuma’s inability to stand for office and a growing sense of disenfranchisement among impoverished populations, exacerbated by the EFF and MK. These tensions echo the 2021 riots in KwaZulu-Natal after Zuma’s imprisonment, which caused over R50 billion in economic damage.

Post-election, South Africa faces several significant risks, including heightened unrest, crime, and continued high-level corruption. The increased security measures by the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) suggest that physical risks around unrest and crime are being taken seriously. Additionally, the previously suspended trucking protests from early May could resurface, gaining traction during the election period on highways that already report heavy amounts of crime.

Nigeria’s Bandit Conflict

Nigeria’s Transforming Oil Industry

The Exit of Foreign Oil Companies 

Despite having oil reserves of over 37 trillion barrels, Nigeria has undergone $21.12 billion of divestment since 2006, with over $1.1 billion of divestment occurring in 2020 alone. Since 2023, foreign companies have dramatically accelerated divestment from Nigeria’s oil industry, citing widespread theft and vandalism. The resulting takeovers of foreign subsidiaries by local companies has strong potential to worsen the Niger Delta’s already dire environmental situation due to the inability or unwillingness of local companies to follow sustainability practices. While other multinational companies such as Unilever, GSK, and P&G have also left the country, the oil industry is a particularly extreme example, one which is also likely to have significant environmental impacts. 

Equinor ASA, a Norwegian company with a three decade long presence in Nigeria, recently resold its local entity Equinor Nigeria Energy Company to an obscure local corporation, Chappal Energy.  During Equinor’s time in Nigeria, it pumped over 1 billion barrels of oil from Agbami field, where it maintained a 20.21% stake. The Agbami field, which holds an estimated 900 million barrels of recoverable oil, is operated by Chevron, which holds a 67.3% interest, and was the largest oil discovery in the world at the time of its opening in 1998. In 2022 Addax, a division of the Chinese oil company Sinopec, sold four oil mining blocs to Nigeria’s state oil company National Nigeria Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Likewise, Eni, an Italian oil company, announced it would sell its local subsidiary to Oando PLC, a Nigerian company, although Oando’s acquisition has been challenged by the NNPC for failure to obtain prior authorization.  

ExxonMobil plans to sell four onshore oil fields for $1.3 billion to Seplat, a company dual-listed in Lagos and London. Seplat is now mostly controlled by UK investors, following prolonged boardroom disputes. ExxonMobil also plans to sell Seplat its equity interest in Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, which held over 90 shallow water and onshore platforms and 300 producing oil wells. The deal was initially approved by then President Muhammadu Buhari, who had appointed himself as the country’s oil minister. However, Buhari reversed course days later, and the deal has yet to be approved. NNPC has also objected to the sale, leading to criticism from ExxonMobil, which states that this is creating uncertainty among contractors and communities dependent on the oil industry. Despite major onshore divestments, ExxonMobil will continue its offshore presence in Nigeria through Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria (Deepwater) Limited and Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited, which include the Bonga, Usan, and Erha developments.

Shell also hopes to divest from its onshore oil fields, potentially resulting in sales of up to $3 billion, but its plan has been delayed by a series of court cases. Shell’s divestment from Nigeria stretches back to at least 2010. Between 2010 and 2014, the company sold off eight oil mining leases, and in its 2022 report it revealed that it had sold over half its Nigerian assets. Currently, Shell is offering to sell its onshore assets to Renaissance, a consortium of local companies, for $2.4 billion, ending its 88 year long presence in Nigeria’s onshore oil fields. Renaissance, which includes the Nigerian companies ND Western, Aradel Energy, First E&P and Waltersmith as well as the Swiss based Petrolin, will purchase Shell’s local subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria (SPDC).  SPDC operates the NNPC/SPDC/NAOC joint venture, consisting of the NNPC Limited (55% holding), SPDC (30%), Total Energies (10%), and Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (5%).  However, the sale is being resisted by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria, which has complained of maltreatment of workers by one of the companies involved.  

Shell has denied speculation that it will leave Nigeria entirely, and despite divestment from oil it remains highly involved in the natural gas industry. Shell Nigeria Gas currently distributes 60-70 million scuffs (standard cubic feet) of gas daily, and is diversifying into offshore activities. Active in Otta, Aba and Port Harcourt, it also has an increasing presence in Bayelsa state and its currently collaborating with the state government of Oyo.  

It is likely that this divestment will severely increase environmental degradation, particularly in the Niger Delta. NGOs focusing on the environment and sustainability should closely watch ongoing developments in the Delta region. 

Factors Driving the Exit

Theft and vandalism are the immediate cause of flight by IOCs (international oil companies), with environmental concerns playing a more long term role. Theft and vandalism have significantly increased in the oil rich Niger Delta over the last 5 years. Two years ago, the Nigerian economist Tony Elumelu ignited a firestorm on social media by claiming that oil companies were losing up to 95% of their profits to thieves. While the claim was exaggerated, it illustrates a very real and pervasive problem. Between March 2022 and March 2023, IOCs lost the opportunity to produce and sell approximately 65.7 million barrels of oil due to vandalism and theft. From January to September 2013, 189 crude theft points - holes drilled in pipelines to syphon off oil - were repaired by Shell. In December 2023, NNPC recorded 112 instances of theft within a single week, and has appealed to Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for assistance in stemming theft. NNPC Chief Executive Mele Kiyari has stated that 6,409 illegal refineries have been deactivated in the Niger Delta, and 4,846 illegal pipelines have been disconnected out of a total of 5,543 illegal connection points.  Oil theft became a major issue in the 2023 presidential election, with then candidate (now president) Bola Tinubu promising to utilise technology to reduce thefts, though this promise has largely been unfulfilled.  

Foreign businesses and NGOs are advised to pay close attention to rates of oil theft, regional trends around theft, as well as to any potential efforts by the Nigerian government to seriously reduce theft and vandalism.  

The Nigerian Government’s Response

While many investors were initially hopeful that President Tinubu would speed up approval for the sale of foreign oil subsidiaries, this has proved not to be the case. Eni, Equinor, and ExxonMobil are all still waiting for their divestment plans to be approved. Many deals are currently held up in court cases surrounding oil spills, and even unexecuted court judgments.  While this may cause short term delays, such punitive measures are unlikely to slow the exodus of foreign investors in the long term.  

The current exodus of oil companies is ironic in light of Nigeria’s 2021 Petroleum Industry Act, which allowed for greater foreign investment in oil. More recently, Nigeria has tried a number of measures to boost its onshore and shallow water oil and gas industries. In March 2024, President Tinubu signed measures streamlining contracts and providing tax credits to companies in this area. These include a 25% gas utilisation investment allowance in new and current projects in the midstream sector, as well as a measure to increase investment in deepwater. The approval threshold for joint ventures and production sharing will be raised to $10 million. Such measures aim to improve on the 2021 Petroleum law. However, given Nigeria’s failure to improve the security situation in the Nile Delta, it seems likely that these actions will stem the flow of foreign companies overseas.  

The Environmental Implications of Foreign Oil Divestment

It is highly likely that the exit of foreign oil companies will significantly worsen the environmental situation of the Niger Delta, already one of the world’s most polluted areas and the site of almost daily oil spills. Approximately 40 million liters of oil are spilled in the Delta each year. While environmental groups state that over $100 billion will be required to clean up the Delta, less than $1 billion has been committed by Nigeria’s government for a clean energy program which began eight years ago (and has since stalled). Environmental damage has had a severe effect on residents' quality of life in the Niger Delta. A study conducted at the University of St Gallen shows that infants are twice as likely to die in the first month of their life if their mothers live near an oil spill, and the region suffers around 11,000 premature deaths per year.  Additionally, there is vast damage to local farmlands.  

Local companies taking over former foreign subsidiaries often have less willingness or capacity to commit to sustainability. For example, in Bayelsa State’s Nembe Region, a region covered in dense mangrove swamps, severe oil leakage continued for over a month before it was stopped.  As a result, local fishermen only catch a small percentage of their previous hauls. These issues have continued since Shell’s local licence was sold to the Aiteo Group, a Nigerian company, in 2015.  Aiteo and Nigerian regulators blame the spillage on sabotage, but environmental groups and locals have blamed faulty infrastructure. Moreover, Nigerian companies are responsible for 35% more oil spills than international companies, raising concerns about their takeover of oil fields in the Niger Delta from IOCs.  

Gas flaring is a particularly severe example of this concern. Gas flaring is caused by surplus natural gas combusting during production, leading to greenhouse gas emissions. Since the recent acquisition of foreign assets by Nigerian oil companies, gas flaring has significantly increased according to reports by Stakeholder Democracy Network and the Environmental Defense Fund. A Stakeholder Democracy Network report indicates that domestic Nigerian companies flare 10 times more gas per barrel of oil produced than IOCs. Heirs Holdings, a Nigerian company which purchased a licence from Shell, increased its flaring by eight times following the purchase. If the two companies with the highest level of flares are excluded, local companies still flare 5 times more.  

Decommissioning infrastructure left behind by departing IOCs presents another challenge.  There is no fund to pay for decommissioning the infrastructure left behind by Shell and other companies, and no law required oil companies to maintain a fund of this nature until the Petroleum Industry Act of 2021. Since Shell’s divestments do not fall under this law, new companies will have to pay for decommissioning the infrastructure, but they lack the money to do so. 

Local civic organisations have agreed on a series of principles for divestment known as the “National Principles for Responsible Petroleum Industry Divestment”, which were put forth in Port Harcourt on December 6, 2023. The document, which calls for strong government intervention to prevent IOCs from leaving local communities with the decommissioning bill, was put forth together with a report by petroleum industry expert Professor Richard Steiner, based on a fact finding trip involving input with government agencies, local communities, and experts on the industry.  

The Role of International NGOs

Environmental and humanitarian NGOs operating in Nigeria are advised to pay greater attention to the Niger Delta in the wake of the IOCs’ exit. Organisations focused on public health should pay particular attention to families facing food insecurity as a result of damage to crops, and related issues such as child malnutrition and infant mortality. NGOs focused on environmental issues should work with local communities to promote the Port Harcourt Principles to Nigeria’s government, while also seeking to partner with local oil companies to implement sustainability measures. 

U.S. Economic Engagement in Africa

The AGOA

Since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has formed the foundations of US-African economic relations. The act provides duty-free access for African-made goods to enter the United States to advance Africa’s development. 

Since its inception, the US has imported over half a trillion dollars worth of goods from eligible states. Initiatives from the US public and private sectors have a far-reaching impact on various industries, spanning energy, information technology, and manufacturing. Among these sectors, FDI input into African renewable energy dominates other industries as global demand increases. The United States allocates funding for projects in collaboration with its international partners, extending beyond the AGOA and other US-sponsored initiatives. This underscores Washington’s dedication to fostering a shift towards a renewable energy-oriented African continent. The Green Hydrogen Portfolio project, overseen by Niger, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, and South Africa, is sponsored by the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the United States, enabling the production of green hydrogen. International project partnerships aim to incentivise African nations to join US-led initiatives, such as the AGOA, by aligning with US policies, as participants are also more likely to receive further FDI support from US partners. 

Participation in the AGOA requires African states to meet “rigorous” eligibility criteria. These include the “continual progress toward establishing a market-based economy, the rule of law, political pluralism and the right to due process.” There is additionally the expectation that African states refrain from “activities that undermine US national security or foreign policy interests” and “enact policies to reduce poverty, combat corruption, and protect human rights.” 

On the economic front, the AGOA’s eligibility criteria intend to encourage African competitiveness in international markets while producing an economic climate supporting free enterprise domestically. On the political front, the AGOA is a vessel for the US to lead African development and set an agenda for the continent. For this reason, the eligible states in the AGOA are titled “partners” to the US, whereby investing in Africa’s development may also support US foreign policy interests. According to the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, the most rational strategy for the US concerning global development is the reinforcement of “American values”, including peace, justice, and prosperity.

The AGOA’s Political Complications

The AGOA’s eligibility criteria highlight the economic and political interests the US holds in African development. The AGOA’s success connects to broader US foreign policy ambitions of increasing cooperation with African nations, increasingly viewed as the next “swing states” in international politics. 

In 2023, South Africa’s continued participation in the AGOA was questioned due to its close political cooperation with Russia. Amid accusations that South Africa had covertly supplied weapons to Russia and Pretoria’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine publicly, South Africa’s “non-aligned” position has interfered with US attempts to build a global consensus against Russia. US Senator James Risch said he was “disappointed” to learn of South Africa’s renewed eligibility in the AGOA given “South Africa’s continued actions that subvert US national security and foreign policy interests.”

Risch’s statement signals a concern in Washington DC that the White House does not robustly enforce the conditions of the AGOA, weakening US leadership amid a political climate that presents international issues through a binary East-West dynamic. The Biden administration has maintained the attitude of great power competition from the Trump administration, which held that Beijing’s “predatory” practices in Africa should be countered by increased US economic engagement. 

AGOA is up for renewal in 2025. There is some bipartisan support for the AGOA’s re-authorisation as US congressional members have identified firms looking to “diversify their supply chains and reduce dependence on China.” Failing to renew the Act would limit the opportunity for American enterprises to find alternative sources of rare earth elements, which are critical for manufacturing high-technology equipment. It presents the opportunity for “friend-shoring”, a strategy aimed at building new strategic partnerships to access raw materials and reduce dependence on malign powers. With at least 20 African countries whose mineral sectors account for 25 per cent of exports respectively, the AGOA’s re-authorisation may enable the United States to maintain duty-free access to markets with growing mining and refining capacity, reducing reliance on China. 

Despite South Africa’s souring relationship with the US, they remain an active beneficiary of the AGOA. US Census Bureau data compiled by Brookings underline South Africa’s importance to US mineral supply chains, as the US sources 98 per cent of its chromium ore and 37 per cent of its platinum from South Africa. Chromium is used to produce alloys, whereas platinum is used to develop fibre optics and hydrogen fuel cells. Both elements are essential for improving fuel efficiency, which President Biden has identified as critical to meeting his administration’s goal of reaching 80 per cent clean energy usage by 2030. Compared with the Central African Republic (CAR), which was removed from the AGOA in January 2024 for its security cooperation with the Wagner Group, CAR’s total exports to the US were valued at less than $1 million. CAR’s minimal involvement in the AGOA allowed the US to remove its beneficiary status without exposing the US to supply chain risks. South Africa’s continued place in the AGOA suggests that the conditions for removal from beneficiary status may depend on a nation’s importance to US strategic interests. While South Africa has pursued a foreign policy that has hindered the US's objectives of challenging Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s growing presence in Africa, its mineral abundance provides the US with a robust route to supply chain diversification. 

South Africa’s claim to neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the increasing polarisation in world politics, where many African nations resist attaching themselves to one sphere of influence. Former Governor of Kaduna state in Nigeria, Nasir El Rufai, claimed that “African coun­tries should be very, very care­ful about tak­ing a side” on ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. Of the 35 nations which abstained from the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia’s attack on Ukraine in March 2022, 17 were African. US Senator John Kennedy announced his support for renewing the AGOA, arguing that it “will play a pivotal role in helping Americans deter China’s growing influence” in Africa. While financial aid and political support are not the exclusive drivers prompting nations to endorse a US-led global agenda, they may contribute to gradually forming a positive perception of the US as a cooperative and valuable international partner. However, the US would continue facing the headwinds of African nations, which view the AGOA’s intended political reforms as burdensome to political support domestically and a strain to relations with US adversaries internationally.

The US and its African partners have experienced positive socio-economic advantages directly attributable to the legislation. In 2021, the top three countries in export revenue were South Africa ($15.7 billion), Nigeria ($3.5 billion), and Ghana ($1.7 billion). Ethiopia grew its clothing and leather exports by $273 million from 2000 to 2021, which also created almost 120,000 jobs in the US.

Ghana 

The symbiotic relationship between the US and the African continent, indicated by mutual socio-economic benefits, is demonstrated further by increased US foreign direct investment in strategic African nations. In 2022, the US-Ghana commodities exchange reached $3.7 billion, elevating Ghana’s trade surplus by $1.8 billion. To further bolster trade, the US increased its FDI in the country to $150 million for agriculture, economic development, human rights, governance, security, and education. These include $32 million in agricultural aid and $25 million in support for micro to medium-sized agrarian firms. Furthermore, the US unveiled a $300 million investment strategy to foster digital economic transformation. Ghana’s main exports to the US are transportation equipment ($95 million), chemicals and related products ($79 million), and agriculture products ($56 million). US investments are meant to advance the nation's most successful industries and cultivate emerging sectors. Around 25,000 businesses in Ghana have been supported through USAID and Feed the Future, a US-financed food and security initiative, with $192.9 million in financial assistance, generating over $98 million in agricultural sales. Additionally, with the aid provided by US programmes, 798,000 producers could utilise new technologies in agricultural production. US public investment also spurred private initiatives in the region, as 3Farmate Robotics (an innovative agritech company in Ghana) received an angel investment from a Silicon Valley investor to develop their AI-driven technology further. 

The high economic performance of AGOA-driven exports also supports funding for lagging industries, which have the potential to diversify national production further. The recent partnership worth $300 million between African Data Centers and the US International Development Finance Corporation will support the construction of a new data centre capable of sustaining up to 30MW of IT load. The project aims to bolster Ghana’s digital transformation and allow its data to remain within its borders. In doing so, Ghana will further its proliferation of digital services, including government services, fintech and mobile money, and digital agriculture. FinTech and mobile money are particularly significant for the country as 59.7 per cent of the population has a digital money account. Increasing national data security will stimulate digital economies by incentivising e-commerce, innovation hubs, and technological entrepreneurship. As such, Ghana has the potential to become a leading nation in digital transformation in the region and increase further investment opportunities, which could directly influence economic growth. Whilst these investments can not be credited solely to Ghana’s membership in the AGOA, their direct correlation with economic growth strengthens ties between the two nations, influencing private and public investment in the region. 

Nigeria

Nigeria is also a significant trading partner with the US due to its AGOA membership. Its three most profitable goods are transportation equipment ($510 million), energy-related products ($222 million), and agricultural products ($376 million). Similarly to Ghana, Nigeria receives a lot of FDI in its key performing industries, which also coincides with current government policy, which aims to diversify the economy away from oil and gas. To achieve this, Nigeria aims to advance its manufacturing industry, the agricultural sector, and technological development. The United States adopted a Nigeria strategy similar to their strategy in Ghana, supporting key industries and those perceived as undeveloped but with significant potential. The DFC perceives Nigeria as one of the key countries in the region, which is why it holds a portfolio of $780 million predominantly concentrated in the energy and financial sectors within the country. In 2022, cumulative FDI from the United States amounted to $5.6 billion, focusing on sectors such as mining, information services, and professional, scientific, and technical services.

Numerous US-based firms facilitate projects to support Nigerian development. Most notably, a US-based company, Sun Africa, has pledged to invest in an energy infrastructure project worth $2.2 billion. The construction of a 961MWp solar photovoltaic coupled with a 455MWh battery storage facility would significantly aid the nation as it only has a total installed power generation capacity of 16,384MW, which is significantly below total demand.

The US also seeks to develop other sectors of the Nigerian economy, which could lead to mutual economic interests between the two nations. One of the most significant industries is mining, due to a recent discovery of high-grade lithium deposits. The lithium reserves could propel the country’s mineral production and exports, substantially influencing its economy and international trade. Membership in the AGOA could play a significant role in the lithium trade and could benefit Nigeria as the prices of raw materials continue to increase. For this reason, in 2023, Nigeria initiated funding discussions with the US for mining-related projects.

Social Benefits 

Increased engagement with the US economy instigated the creation of the US President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa (PAC-DBIA), which aims to strengthen the administration’s commercial partnerships in Africa. The organisation recommends policies and programs in trade and investment engagement in various sectors, notably energy, finance, tech, food-water security, and health. Among the most recent recommendations is to increase funding for Prosper Africa, which is responsible for resource management and energy sustainability projects. 

It is also important to note that membership in the AGOA is not the only factor that acts as a determinant for aid. A good example is Cameroon, which lost its status on 1 January 2020 due to its humanitarian record. Although Cameroon has yet to regain its status, US-led social initiatives in the country are still ongoing. A notable example is a US Trade and Development Agency-funded energy study in Cameroon that helped to connect 100,000 households in rural areas to the power grid; the Renewable Energy Innovators Cameroon (REIc) partnered with a California-based energy company, SimpliPhi Power, to deliver the project. Cameroon’s rural electrification is only 35 per cent.

In contrast, 96 per cent of urban areas have access to power. Enhancing energy accessibility in the region has the potential to drive economic growth and foster social equality and environmental responsibility. According to the African Development Fund, extending electricity to rural areas would enhance the quality of education and healthcare. This initiative would positively impact individual households by increasing the adaptation of domestic appliances, thereby reducing the time spent on daily chores. Consequently, more time can be allocated to income-generating activities, encouraging the development of artisanal workshops that stand to benefit from electrical tools like small sawmills and workshops. Moreover, electrification aims to decrease water-borne diseases by encouraging modernising water supply systems.

With rising electricity access in Africa, digitalisation has become necessary in the content industry as the demand for digital services continues to rise. Trends, such as population increase and urbanisation, accelerated internet and cell phone coverage as more people require access to e-commerce and government services. Covid-19 also played a significant role, forcing many to use the internet to access information and purchase goods. Consequently, many countries in Africa have focused on improving their internet penetration. Since 2010, Cameroon has experienced an increase in internet penetration by 123 per cent, and Kenya witnessed a rise of 114 per cent. Much of this is attributed to AGOA membership, which provides access to external mobile service providers that see economic value in the digitalisation of the continent. Services and mobile technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa added $155 billion of economic value in 2019 alone. The US has a significant role in this process as it invests in various projects on the continent. The Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP) aims to expand internet access to emerging markets, promote secure digital infrastructure, adopt cybersecurity practices, and export US Information and Communications Technology (ICT).

As Africa’s swiftly growing network supports economic activities and government services, it has become increasingly susceptible to cyber risks. AGOA initiatives work towards advancing digital security for citizens, promoting digital literacy, and encouraging the establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks. These measures are geared towards safeguarding privacy and upholding freedom of expression in the digital realm. The combination of digital infrastructure and funding initiatives from the US government, exemplified by the allocation of $100 million to the network operator Africell by the US International Development Finance Corporation, aims to support continental projects in expediting internet access, affordability, and security. Africell aims to enhance mobile network infrastructure across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. 

The US also seeks partnerships with private US companies to promote further digitalisation efforts in Africa. The new Africa Tech for Trade Alliance created by the US Government’s Prosper Africa initiative invited US and African companies to promote e-commerce and address significant global digitalisation challenges. The alliance seeks to find solutions for existing regulatory bottlenecks and share existing technologies among the key companies to support critical sectors on the African continent, such as supply chains, digital payments, e-commerce, and digital skills and training.

The Politics Behind AGOA

In January 2024, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Niger and Uganda were officially removed from the AGOA after failing to uphold their AGOA conditions of protecting political pluralism and upholding human rights. Eligibility in the AGOA is reviewed annually, and Uganda’s removal follows the passing of the 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, which received international condemnation for including the death penalty for individuals found performing certain homosexual acts. Following its enactment in May 2023, President Biden described the law as a “tragic violation of universal human rights”, stating that his administration will “incorporate the impacts of the law into our review of Uganda’s eligibility for AGOA.” 

Uganda’s subsequent removal from the AGOA indicates that advancing human rights remains an inflexible objective to US economic engagement in Africa. Uganda’s Special Presidential Advisor Odrek Rwabwogo remarked that Uganda’s removal from the AGOA was “a stick to beat the populace of African countries who vote in a way that offends the social sensibilities of the developed West.” 

Rwabwogo’s statement reflects a widespread discontent among African nations for economic engagement conditional on political reforms. Survey data from Afrobarometer concludes that 45 per cent of Africans believe that economic engagement (including loans and developmental assistance) should be connected to promoting democracy and human rights. In comparison, 50 per cent thought that the domestic government should determine political reforms on democracy and human rights, free from international influence. Afrobarometer data suggests that the AGOA’s strict conditions surrounding political reforms are likely to be resisted by African nations, which oppose international interference in domestic politics, limiting its impact as a diplomatic device to drive political change in the region. 

The AGOA’s success as a tool of political reform is likely to be a factor in the conversations US congressional members will have as they decide whether to renew the AGOA next year. A 2024 US Congressional Research Service Report highlights how the “rhetorical and policy emphasis” on political reform risks “complicating” certain US objectives abroad, challenges China and Russia are less likely to encounter. 

The AGOA’s commitment to political reforms may limit its potential as a counterweight to growing Sino-Russian influence in Africa, which may weaken rather than strengthen US-African relations. Following Uganda’s removal from the AGOA, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has maintained a defiant tone against the US, asserting that Uganda can “stand independently from Western influence.” Pro-Kremlin broadcaster Tsargrad has used Museveni’s anti-gay stance to present Russia and Uganda as nations united against the “legalisation of sodomy,” binding both nations to cooperation borne from their mutual resentment of US policy. Uganda’s removal from the AGOA effectively functions as a sanction, similar to the World Bank’s freezing of loans to Uganda in August 2023 following the passage of the Anit-Homosexuality Act. Uganda’s bilateral trade with Russia more than doubled from $30 million in 2009 to $74 million in 2018, indicating that Uganda can meet its target of increasing commercialisation and international market integration with nations other than the United States. The AGOA’s commitment to political reform may push African nations to forge closer economic and later political partnerships with China and Russia, as neither nation includes human rights reforms as a condition of increased cooperation.

Value Chains

Failure to renew the AGOA would negatively impact the value chains that lead to increased production and exportation. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa argued that extending the AGOA may “encourage the further development of value chains” and “enhance the diversification of African economies.” In 2017, Intra-continental trade in Africa stood at under 20 per cent of total exports, compared to approximately 68 per cent in Europe and 59 per cent in Asia. Sustainable economic growth in Africa requires product diversification; 50 per cent of the continent’s exports to the rest of the world are mineral goods, leaving firms exposed to external shocks.

By renewing the AGOA beyond 2025, the US would provide certainty for prospective investors who intend to capitalise on Africa’s increasing industrialisation, supporting a more comprehensive range of industries that can better insulate Africa from external shocks. Reducing dependence on a limited basket of goods requires a long-term focus, which includes national governments undertaking major public works projects to improve access to regional markets. Expanding transport networks is essential to reducing the logistical inefficiency that dissuades investment in new industries.

South African Healthcare: Opportunities & Challenges

South Africa’s healthcare system is gradually emerging from the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. In the fight against the virus, the healthcare system exhibited a number of successes, however there remain deep flaws that are yet to be addressed. The shortcomings in the government’s response to the pandemic were products of the persistent challenges that the country’s healthcare system has faced for decades. With the new ‘National Health Insurance’ scheme in the pipeline – a medical aid fund aiming to introduce universal health coverage across the country – the South African government must take into account the needs and concerns of its people, the lessons drawn from Covid-19, as well as the broader historical-structural issues that continue to plague the country’s healthcare system.

South Africa’s Healthcare Landscape

South Africa’s constitution grants every citizen the right to healthcare through the private or public sector. Public healthcare is available to all citizens for free, without the need for health insurance. It is largely funded by the National Revenue Fund, which collects payments made to local, provincial, and federal governments. The funds are then distributed from federal to sub-national authorities, who enjoy substantial independence over the allocation of resources, depending on local priorities and necessities. 

However, the constitution’s provisions are often not reflected in practice, particularly due to the gap between the public and private sectors. The public sector provides healthcare to 80-85 per cent of the population and accounts for approximately 48 per cent of total healthcare expenditure, while the private sector provides healthcare to the remaining 15-20 per cent of the population and attracts approximately 50 per cent of total government healthcare spending. The remaining 2 per cent is covered by NGOs. Just under 80 per cent of doctors work privately, where they earn higher salaries, leaving only 20 per cent of doctors in the public sector to serve the vast majority of the South African population. This presents a clear disjuncture between the public and private health sector, with major differences emerging in terms of funding, resources, and support.

The public/private healthcare divide often tracks racial lines, raising questions around the legacy of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa’s healthcare system. In the 1986-1987 financial year, just before health services were desegregated in 1988, South Africa’s spending in the former white provinces amounted to $9.30 per capita, compared with $3 per capita in former majority-black areas. Today, access to quality healthcare remains unequal and often contingent on individuals’ ability to pay for private care or live in urban centres. Public healthcare is not allocated based on need, but rather determined by each province’s relative share of the population, thus ignoring factors such as geographic expanse, as well as demographic and implementation specificities.

This legacy of racial-economic inequality is all the more alarming because diseases, such as Covid-19 and HIV/AIDS, often disproportionately affect lower-income populations. South Africa hosts the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world; around 8 million South Africans are currently affected, accounting for 17-20 per cent of global cases. At first, the government’s denial of the virus’s existence resulted in a slow response; however, between 1999 and 2005, spending on HIV/AIDS increased at an average rate of 48.2 per cent annually. Since 1990, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS has continued to increase, but the mortality rate from the virus has been gradually declining since the mid-2000s, thanks to the development and diffusion of antiretroviral treatment.

Source: Our World in Data (2019)

Additionally, South Africa still suffers from a relatively high infant mortality rate, concentrated in remote and poorer areas. In 2018 alone, an estimated 43,000 children under five years of age died in South Africa. In contrast with its African counterparts, South Africa exhibits a relatively high healthcare expenditure, amounting to just over 9 per cent of GDP in 2019, a level of spending surpassed only by Lesotho.

Higher spending on healthcare, however, has not yielded proportional results. South Africa suffers from similar levels of inadequate infrastructure, social inequalities and disease burden as other countries in southern Africa. Yet healthcare systems in Rwanda and Kenya have often performed better and at lower costs. Contrary to South Africa, almost half of Kenya’s poor utilise private healthcare. Both Kenya and Uganda have used mobile health more extensively than South Africa to provide healthcare to low-income communities. In the South African market, there is thus a great amount of space for digital health-focused NGOs and startups to step in and make an impact. South Africa could also benefit from the adaptation and incorporation of policies that have proven successful in other African countries.

Source: Our World in Data (2022)

In 2012, the South African government presented plans to implement a national health insurance scheme over the following 14 years. This health financing scheme, or more precisely fund, is designed to cover the costs of healthcare services for all South Africans, thus aiming to move the country towards universal health coverage (UHC) and to improve the quality of, and access to care. In June 2023, lawmakers approved the NHI and in December, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) voted in favour of its implementation, with opposition voiced only from the Western Cape province. It must now be signed into law by President Ramaphosa. The NHI broadly aims to address social imbalances in the world’s most unequal society. It envisages the creation of a fund that pools public and private resources, ensuring equal healthcare access and outcomes for all South Africans, regardless of socioeconomic status. The NHI will be funded through public contributions, likely in the form of income-proportional taxes. The policy could deliver various benefits: not only could it lower healthcare costs for South Africans, but also ‘standardise’ salaries and expectations of all healthcare providers. The NHI could also help eliminate health-related barriers to education, drive economic growth by building a healthier workforce, and improve social security, as access to healthcare and education may reduce crime and welfare dependency. Additionally, the NHI could open up opportunities for public-private healthcare collaboration.

Despite widespread support for the NHI and the potential advantages of universal healthcare, as seen in other middle-income countries like Brazil and Thailand, some have raised significant concerns, particularly with regards to the NHI’s implementation. First, the NHI’s funding remains a key point of contention, as its estimated cost runs over $27 billion annually. Critics point to South Africa’s weak tax base, due to the high number of people working in the informal sector, as well as slow economic growth, as evidence for impending financial challenges and increased tax burden for citizens. These worries are heightened by recurring allegations of governmental corruption and poor administrative oversight. Second, private healthcare providers have expressed concerns about the uncertainty regarding their role in this new system, highlighting the danger of job losses should the private sector not be effectively integrated. Medical practitioners may also choose to leave South Africa in search of better paid jobs, contributing to a resource shortage in the public sector. Third, critics fear that the NHI may result in lower quality healthcare, as the government does not have enough resources to meet the needs of all South Africans. Fourth, the proposed NHI framework is unclear on several issues, including the range of treatments to be covered and the rate of reimbursement. The South African government will therefore need to address the lack of trust in the NHI’s potential by outlining a concrete roadmap, evidencing the scheme’s ability to offer reliable as well as inclusive access to healthcare, and dispelling views of the proposal as a mere idealistic utopia.

Successes in South African Healthcare

In recent years, and particularly in response to Covid-19, South Africa’s healthcare system has had notable success.

1. Since the mid-1990s, the country has reduced maternal and under-5 mortality rates, as well as death rates from infectious diseases. It has also expanded immunisation programs, which were, however, paused during the Covid-19 pandemic to comply with national lockdowns.

2. Many healthcare organisations have created innovation teams and digital strategies to follow developments in AI, telemedicine, and digitisation. Both the public and private sector have also improved data analytics capabilities to track shifts in healthcare needs and resource availability in order to identify key risks and opportunities. These measures have, for instance, contributed to promising advances in the use of nanotechnology for cancer treatment. The Covid-19 pandemic further encouraged South Africa’s healthcare sector to gradually, but comprehensively embrace digital technologies, not just for data analytics, but also to support the accelerated adoption of virtual healthcare, which has helped reduce pressures on facilities and minimise inequalities.

3. Macro- and micro-level healthcare initiatives have jointly widened access to care. At the national level, the ‘Transnet Phelophepa Health Trains’ have helped treat 200,000 patients annually by taking mobile clinics into rural areas through South Africa’s railway system. At the local level, in 2013, a Cape Town resident founded the ‘Iyeza Express’ bicycle courier service, which employs local youth to collect medication from public health facilities and deliver them to people’s homes, particularly in the city’s poorer districts. In the same year, to reduce time spent queuing at health facilities, a Johannesburg local created ‘Pelebox Smart Lockers’, which sends a PIN to patients’ mobile phones to open lockers containing prescribed medications. These initiatives have boosted the efficiency of South Africa’s healthcare system.

Challenges in South African Healthcare

Despite noteworthy successes, the South African healthcare system has encountered a number of challenges that have impacted its performance. These challenges have fed many of the criticisms that are now directed against the proposed NHI.

1. Most importantly, South Africa’s healthcare system has suffered from a lack of resources and personnel, particularly when considering the country’s large population and ‘quadruple disease burden’ (HIV/AIDS, communicable diseases, non-communicable diseases like diabetes, and violence and injuries). The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted that the needs of South Africans exceed the country’s healthcare system’s human, material, and financial capacities. Throughout the pandemic, underfunded and understaffed hospitals handled insufficient and outdated equipment, while following constantly changing protocols. Long work hours, extended waiting times, and overcrowded health facilities became the norm, particularly in rural areas. South Africa’s weak primary healthcare system, the lack of political will, and the government’s underestimation of Covid-19’s severity meant that the virus was not thwarted in its early stages. The mismanagement of the pandemic also led to the stigmatisation of communities with high Covid-19 cases, increased episodes of gender-based violence, and social discrimination in the distribution of food aid.

2. In part resulting from the country’s limited resources and staff, economic, racial, and geographic inequalities remain a keystone of South Africa’s healthcare system. The private and public sectors, as well as urban and rural localities, display massive healthcare imbalances, in terms of quality and access. In regards to the former, South Africa’s private clinics charge fees that are commensurate with those of significantly wealthier nations, due to the lack of pricing regulations. This practice has made private healthcare inaccessible for the majority of South Africans. During the pandemic, access to testing and vaccines was clearly determined by individuals’ ability to pay, with lower-income groups left behind. This outcome was, at least partially, a result of the government’s insufficient spending on public healthcare. This policy does not follow from an established norm of obtaining healthcare from the private sector, as in the United States; rather, it represents an extension of South Africa’s apartheid-era policies that cater to a small, rich section of the population. 

   With regards to the rural-urban gap, residents of major urban centres have a significantly higher chance of receiving treatment than people living in rural areas, due to the disproportionate concentration of health facilities in large cities. Apartheid-era urban planning has meant that health clinics remain inaccessible to the majority of South Africans, for financial and practical reasons. Additionally, the marked disparity in skill between urban and rural regions contributes to persistent inequalities in terms of the quality and outcomes of healthcare. This inequality has nurtured a low ‘acceptance’ of the national public healthcare system among many South Africans, with patients being not only unable, but unwilling to seek treatment due to, for instance, perceptions of (in)efficiency, language barriers, and ethnic and religious under-representation.

   However, micro-level initiatives have helped redress skill shortages in rural areas. The ‘Umthombo Youth Development Foundation’, for example, provides medical scholarships to students from remote areas. The aim is that these students later return to their home communities to offer healthcare that is perceived as more trustworthy, credible, and thus more effective. Here, healthcare startups and community or national-level NGOs can thus play a key role: they can first focus on assisting the expansion of existing programs, including the ‘Iyeza Express’ and the initiative developed by the ‘Umthombo Youth Development Foundation’, both locally and nationally. Second, given the South African government’s limited resources, these organisations can prioritise providing financial and logistical support for the development of new initiatives, particularly those geared towards improving remote areas’ access to quality healthcare and those encouraging community-based health education and university-level medical education, in an attempt to raise health awareness and redress the country’s shortage of health personnel.

3. Rampant corruption, and the lack of enforcement and accountability mechanisms to counter it, pose a major barrier to progress in South Africa’s healthcare system. Private healthcare providers, for example, reportedly submit inflated or forged claims of treatment to private health insurance schemes to maximise their revenue. The difficult response to Covid-19 was exacerbated by widespread corruption, abuse of funds, and the syphoning of scarce resources away from rural clinics.

Looking Ahead

In light of these challenges, South Africa’s healthcare sector faces a set of key risks in years to come. First, persistent resource shortages and the country’s dependence on imports from countries such as India and China will continue to dictate the trajectory of its healthcare system. Without substantial investment in the domestic manufacturing industry, progress in healthcare provision will be constrained by a resource bottleneck and may also become affected by foreign interests. Nevertheless, like many other countries in Africa, South Africa is well-positioned for the development of innovative healthcare practices and technologies that address constraints such as resource scarcity. Second, in view of the NHI’s implementation, talent retention will remain a key challenge, as skilled healthcare workers, particularly from the private sector, may choose to leave South Africa in search of more profitable opportunities. Third, while technology will be central to the expansion of care in South Africa, it will also increase the country’s vulnerability to cyberattacks, which it is not yet equipped to counter. There is thus a need for increased private-public cooperation to develop stronger national cybersecurity infrastructure.

Despite such risks, South Africa is now at a critical juncture, navigating the aftermath of a devastating pandemic, nearing the deadline for the NHI’s implementation as well as the 2024 general elections, and situated amidst a global technological revolution. The country faces a pivotal opportunity to reform its healthcare system in line with the lessons learnt from past failures:

1. In the first place, as highlighted by the country’s experiences with HIV/AIDS and Covid-19, South Africa should invest in preventive measures, including R&D and risk outlook units, to better monitor and predict outbreaks of infectious diseases.

2. Second, the incoming South African government must strengthen its leadership before implementing the NHI, for example by facilitating meaningful public-private partnerships and by fostering communication between key players. At present, different parts of the public system are managed by different government units, while private doctors operate in isolation from one another. South African leadership should instead promote linkages, or even integrate, the private and public sectors, as the former generally has more resources than necessary to treat its patients and as such, can help fill major gaps in the public sector. 

   To enhance its credibility and legitimacy, the incoming government must also cultivate public trust in the healthcare system and the NHI, if it decides to persevere with its implementation. It must clarify the NHI’s provisions, encourage transparency, and promote accountability to address corruption. It can do so by making performance data publicly available to encourage improvements on the provider side, while keeping clients informed on relevant developments. It can also establish city-wide integrated management teams to replace the current fragmented system and to redirect financial oversight from the national to the city level to reduce the risk of corruption, a model that proved successful in the Chinese province of Sanming. 

   The government could also develop education initiatives to raise awareness about the current medical system and the potential benefits of universal healthcare, to enhance support for the NHI. Additionally, framing better healthcare outcomes as beneficial for South Africa’s long-term economic growth can encourage wider domestic support as well as foreign direct investment.

3. Third, and more broadly, the government will have to ensure that the transition towards universal healthcare involves all relevant stakeholders in the public and private sector, at the local and national level, in and beyond South Africa. It must carefully balance actors’ competing interests and concerns before the NHI is implemented. In particular, South Africa should capitalise on the opportunities offered by new and existing international partnerships to unlock the healthcare sector’s full potential. Although South Africa is one of the least aid-dependent states in Africa, international donors and financiers can provide critical funding and resources, support capacity-building, share best practices, and catalyse the wider delivery of healthcare services. At the same time, South African leadership should support micro-level initiatives like the Iyeza Express, which will prove valuable to reach the most vulnerable and better respond to the needs of remote communities.

4. Fourth, South Africa can benefit from adapting and adopting successful policies from fellow African countries and other middle-income counterparts worldwide. For example, Malawi’s toll-free health hotline represents one of the many strategies that South Africa could implement to provide communities with reliable access to virtual care and remove the need to travel long distances to the nearest facilities. South Africa can also learn from Mexico’s and India’s experiences with universal healthcare, which have respectively highlighted the benefits of effective regional governance to complement national leadership, and the importance of human and physical infrastructure to drive meaningful change. 

   Perhaps most importantly, Rwanda’s successful universal healthcare policies can provide a useful model for South Africa, as the two countries lack extensive public resources and must overcome a legacy of conflict and inequality. Rwanda’s healthcare system fundamentally rests on a community-based health insurance scheme, known as ‘Mutuelles de Santé’, whereby residents of particular areas contribute to a local health fund, supported by the state and international agencies, and which they draw from when necessary. The poorest do not pay anything, while richer individuals may be responsible for co-payments. To sustain this system, the Rwandan government has supported the deployment of community health workers to the country’s 15,000 rural villages, as well as the establishment of health posts in remote areas to cut patients’ average walking time to care facilities in half, from 47 minutes in 2020 to 24 minutes in 2024. These initiatives have helped close gaps in access to healthcare and have built a workforce that is more receptive to its population’s healthcare needs.

Source: KPMG (2017)

The incoming South African government must ultimately focus on balancing the goal of achieving universal healthcare with the quality of care itself, as well as with economic and political realities. It should harness contemporary digital advances, utilise lessons learnt thus far from its experiences with HIV/AIDS and Covid-19, take on board popular concerns with the proposed NHI, and approach healthcare as a human right.

Sudan: Overlooked Risks Report

To access the report, click here.

Sahelian Security Tracker - Chad

Executive Summary

• Intercommunal tensions in the east exacerbated by refugee flows from Sudan are unlikely to result in large-scale conflict in the short term, although isolated incidents of ethnic/intercommunal violence remain possible.

• Although there may be a small terrorist presence in Southwestern Chad, it is unlikely that terror groups will gain any territory in the country in the short to medium term. Attacks on N’Djamena or major population centres remain unlikely, while there is a reasonable possibility that terrorists may conduct attacks in the Lac region. 

• The threat posed by criminal groups in the south/southwest is also unlikely to be abated over the short to medium term. 

• Chad is likely to remain generally politically stable over the next 6 months; large-scale protests are unlikely and rebel groups are unlikely to effectively challenge the government.

*The yellow icons indicate locations that are more likely to see protests in the event of domestic unrest, and we did not include communal violence as it is an omnipresent risk in nearly every region of Chad.

Introduction

Chad currently faces many security challenges, exacerbated by the war in Sudan and the proliferation of terrorism across the Sahel. Although conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region has not yet extended into Eastern Chad, continued migrant flows risk increasing communal tensions between farmers and herders over natural resources, a risk that is worsened by weapons smuggling and the presence of armed groups that have previously engaged in ethnic conflict. In Chad’s southwest, military campaigns and tensions between jihadist groups over the last year have largely mitigated the threat of direct terrorist action in Chad, but the threat posed by terror groups persists. In the south/southwest, criminal groups continue to carry out kidnappings for ransom with near impunity.

Further, the first half of 2023 saw a 150% increase in inter and intra-communal violence in Chad compared to the first half of 2022, the vast majority of which was concentrated in the south, near the border with the Central African Republic. This occurs amidst a backdrop of political instability - protests over the last several years have left hundreds dead and rebel groups in the far north have officially renewed their campaigns against the government. Even so, in December Chad’s transitional government, led by Mahamat Déby, reached an agreement with the largest opposition party, likely quelling the immediate threat of large-scale instability. Elections are scheduled for November 2024. 

Refugee Crisis in the East

Security-related developments in Eastern Chad are largely dependent on events in neighbouring Sudan. So far, the war in Sudan has driven at least 500,000 civilians into the eastern Chadian provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi-Est. According to the UN, this is adding to pre-existing socioeconomic pressures in the region. Temporary camps remain erected on lands previously used for farming and herding, which has exacerbated the shortage of basic resources that has previously driven violence between ethnic groups. 

Largely because of the conflict in Sudan, in which Arab armed groups - principally the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - with ties to the Darfur genocide have committed ethnic violence against Black African communities, mistrust remains prevalent between Black African and Arab ethnic groups in Eastern Chad. Although some analysts hold that the RSF may follow Black Africans into Chad and commit atrocities, we assess that this is very unlikely to be carried out systematically in the short term as the focus of the group’s leadership remains on taking control of Sudan and garnering global legitimacy. 

According to the International Crisis Group, Arab refugees in Eastern Chad feel unfairly associated with the actions of the RSF as NGOs have given first priority to Black African refugees, and as Arabs are suspected of sending their sons to fight with the RSF. In this context, it remains unlikely but possible that NGOs may face direct attacks by disconcerted Arabs or armed groups. In our review of local media sources and social media, we have not identified any episodes of ethnic or communal violence in Eastern Chad since the start of the war in Sudan. We have however identified incidents of purported abuses at the hands of the Chadian security forces as they crack down on weapons smuggling to abate communal conflict. 

The presence of weapons indicates that groups or individuals would have the capability to commit mass violence but so far lack the intent to do so. This may change as the war in Sudan continues, more refugees pour into Chad, and resource scarcity becomes more acute. Regardless, we maintain that large-scale violence remains unlikely in the short term as the Chadian government is heavily incentivised to remain largely uninvolved in the conflict in Sudan; Déby’s transitional government is dependent on support from Black African and Arab elements, neither of which support the RSF (a group that several news outfits suggest Déby is allowing the UAE to aid via Chad). Additionally, large Chadian troop deployments in the east are likely to mitigate the risk of large-scale communal violence. Given past precedent, incidences of ethnic violence are most likely to occur in Ouaddaï. 

General Political Stability

Over the last few years, there have been a number of large-scale protests and violent responses from security forces, particularly in N’Djamena. These protests were driven by a perceived power grab by current President Mahamat Déby after the death of his father, President Idriss Déby, in clashes with Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT) in the north. Although some opposition parties boycotted the recent agreement between the ruling Mouvement Patriotique du Salut and the opposition Les Transformateurs, the agreement has largely mitigated the threat of instability in the short term by bringing a number of stakeholders into the fold. The government has also pardoned the vast majority of protesters who had previously been arrested.

Despite this, according to an expert we spoke to for this assessment, much of the Chadian public remains disillusioned with the government, few of which turned up to vote in the constitutional referendum in December. This expert believes the official voter turnout number was falsely inflated and that unrest after or in the run-up to the November elections is likely. We maintain that, in the event of unrest, future demonstrations are most likely to occur in large population centres in the south/southwest of the country, and would likely pose incidental risk to foreign companies and NGOs, and may pose a direct risk to those that have easily identifiable ties to the west. Previously, the largest protests took place in Chad’s two most populous cities, N'Djamena and Moundou. Other southern cities such as Doba, Bébédjia, and Koumra have also seen a number of demonstrations. 

In the past week, Mahamat Déby travelled to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, signalling closer security cooperation between the two governments. Putin praised Déby for holding the December referendum and pledged the Kremlin’s support for further stabilising the country. The private aircraft on which Déby travelled to Moscow belongs to the same Emirati company that has shuttled RSF leader Hemedti to meetings with neighbouring leaders. We hold that closer security cooperation between the Kremlin and N'Djamena and the departure of French troops make large-scale demonstrations less likely in the short to medium term.

Chad remains in recurring conflict with rebels in the gold-rich northern Tibesti province; various factions based in southern-Libya continue to engage in skirmishes with Chadian security forces. In June 2023, the army halted an incursion of the Front national pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad and Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République rebel groups in the Kouri Bougoudi region, home to Chad’s largest goldfield. Some rebel groups are also active in Sudan, fighting alongside the RSF. This may allow the rebels to gain a stronger footing in Sudan, making it more difficult to uproot them, especially given Mahamat Déby’s public neutrality in the conflict. Even though it is unlikely that the Chadian government will succeed in fully defeating various rebel groups, they will unlikely pose a serious threat to the stability of the country in the short to medium term. However, as the November elections approach, rebel groups may see more popular support within the country, emboldening them further.

Insecurity in the South / Southwest

The largest source of insecurity in Southern Chad is the proliferation of violent crime, in particular kidnappings for ransom. Local media sources report that criminals are responsible for a string of kidnappings, especially in the Mayo-Kebbi Est and Mayo-Kebbi Ouest border regions with Cameroon. Kidnappings are also increasing in N’Djamena. Victims include farmers and students, and recent evidence suggests that criminals are operating across borders. Criminal or armed groups have not yet targeted NGO workers and foreign business people, but high rates of persistent criminality and impunity suggest they face increased levels of incidental risk. They may be directly targeted in the near future given the perceived resources at their disposal. Even though the government is ramping up its response to criminal groups, we foresee a continued heightened kidnapping risk over the short to medium term. There is also a risk that criminal organisations have or will collaborate with terror groups in Chad, as they have in Nigeria, which would likely increase their capabilities. 

The Lake Chad region, covering parts of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad is a hotbed of terrorist activity, and is a stronghold for Boko Haram and the Islamic State – West Africa (ISWAP); however, conflict between the two and factional infighting has weakened them. The continued security response by the Chadian army - buttressed by material support from the UAE - and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), have diminished the jihadists' capability to carry out attacks. 

There have been reports of terror attacks in very close proximity to the Cameroon/Chad border. The jihadists’ ability to move in small groups to attack villages and civilian targets, especially in the border region, is unlikely to be subdued by the government’s security response in the short to medium term. Past precedent around attacks in Chad indicate that terror groups are more likely to target Chadian soldiers than civilians, and present the largest threat in the Lac region, where a large number of humanitarian organisations operate. These groups present an existing threat in the rest of the border regions with Cameroon and Nigeria, including in N’Djamena.

The south of the country has also recently seen a sharp uptick in communal tensions resulting in violence. In May, a herder-farmer dispute in the Mandoul province led to the deaths of 9 people, including a child. Earlier that month armed “bandits” slaughtered 11 farmers in a neighbouring region. The UN OCHA reported 30 incidents of communal violence in the south during the first half of 2023 alone. Conflict over scarce resources is likely to drive further inter-communal violence. NGOs and IGOs have so far been unaffected by the local tensions and outbreaks of violence, but there is a large presence of humanitarian organisations in the south that may face incidental risk and may be targeted if they are perceived as providing assistance along communal lines.

Insight Afrique - January 2024

As 2023 concluded, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) witnessed a heated election, resulting in a landslide victory for the incumbent, Felix Tshisekedi. This edition of Insight Afrique explores the aftermath of the election, offering insights into the current state of the resource-rich country and analysing the potential implications of Tshisekedi's win. Insight Afrique aims to deliver monthly bilingual coverage and intelligence on the region, focusing on the intersection of security, politics, and business to provide a comprehensive understanding of unfolding events.

DRC Elections

In the DRC, the incumbent Felix Tshisekedi maintained his presidency, winning 73% of the vote in a hotly contested election. The runner-up, Moise Katumbi, an influential businessman and president of the football club TP Mazembe, came second with 18% of the vote. Katumbi’s campaign said in a December 23rd statement that “massive fraud” occurred, while another candidate, Martin Fayulu, claimed the election was a “farce”. By December 24,  the day after the election - which went on for an extra two days to account for logistical difficulties - 9 opposing candidates rejected the election’s results. There have been reports of election officials mishandling sensitive documents and “conducting election operations outside official centres,” incomplete voting registries, and election kits going undelivered. Over 60% of the country’s 75,000 polling stations had momentarily ceased operating at some point, which prompted the prolonged voting period. 

Although Tshisekedi, president since 2019, was projected to win the election, suspicions were pre-emptively rife in Africa’s largest francophone country. According to reports, Tshisekedi would garner 55% of the votes, largely thanks to his crowded and unorganised opposition. Much of his popularity comes from his ambitious 2019 campaign promises, such as making elementary schools free, reducing corruption, and ending the war in the East, all of which are unfulfilled. Nonetheless, Tshisekedi’s ascendancy was DRC’s first peaceful transfer of power after his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, rose due to President Laurent Desire Kabila’s 2001 assassination. Despite mild clashes with police in Kinshasa on December 27, calls for a re-run have been shut down, and Tshisekedi will begin his second term in late January. 

Fighting in the East: Tensions between DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi

The protracted conflict in the country’s east kept as many as 1.5 million out of the 41 million registered voters from voting. The conflict, fought between various groups and national armies, is most heated in the provinces of North and South Kivu, on the borders with Rwanda and Uganda. It has led to an estimated 6 million deaths since 1996. The most notorious rebel militia in the conflict has been M23, made up mostly of ethnic Tutsis, which was involved in a resurgence of attacks in late 2023 after months of relative calm. 

According to UN reports, M23 received weapons and logistical support from Rwanda, whose president, Paul Kagame, is also Tutsi. This strains the relationship between DRC and its neighbour; Tshisekedi compared Kagame to Hitler in December. Tensions have been exacerbated by Burundi closing its borders with Rwanda on January 12, accusing Kigali of hosting and backing the rebel group RED-Tabara (which also operates in east DRC), which carried out attacks in Burundi in December that left 20 dead, half of which were civilians. Kigali denies its support of RED-Tabara and has commented that the border closure “violates the principles of regional cooperation and integration of the East African Community.” With escalating cross-border tensions and the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force MONUSCO from DRC by the end of 2024 (criticised for their ineffectiveness in stopping armed groups), the security situation in eastern DRC is poised to remain precarious.

Tshisakedi and Kagame should strive to improve diplomatic ties between the DRC and Rwanda to settle tensions. Despite concerns about electoral inconsistencies and fraud in the DRC, the country has managed consecutive electoral processes with relative stability. Meanwhile, Rwanda has sustained economic growth above 5% for almost two decades and maintained a secure environment. The potential for a larger conflict in the region poses a significant threat to the progress achieved by both nations. While Tshisakedi relies on the Southern African Development Community's troops to address the M23 situation, a more comprehensive approach is necessary to eliminate the risk of regional conflict. As US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visits West Africa this month,  a diplomatic push from Washington to settle tensions could help reestablish its influence in the region and prevent the emergence of a security vacuum that would allow undesirable forces to gain a foothold.

China: A Contentious Relationship

To carry out the fight against M23, the DRC bought nine Chinese drones in March of 2023. Chinese equipment is increasingly standard in recent African conflicts, mainly due to Beijing’s indifferent approach to weapons sales and the US’s continued reluctance to get involved in African conflicts.  

China's significant involvement in the DRC has deep-rooted economic implications, especially in the mining sector. The DRC, which has 70% of the world's cobalt - a crucial component in lithium-ion batteries and various alloys - has long attracted the attention and capital of Chinese firms, which produce most of the world’s EVs and batteries. The country is home to eight of the world's ten biggest cobalt mines, making it the most significant target in the cobalt market. China dominates the DRC's mining industry, controlling approximately 70% of its mining portfolio and 80% of its cobalt output. This position results from a minerals-for-infrastructure deal signed between China and DRC in 2008. The agreement allowed Chinese companies to access DRC's vast mineral resources in exchange for constructing critical infrastructure projects, such as roads, hospitals, and schools. President Tshisekedi travelled to Beijing in May 2023 to renegotiate contracts with Sicomines, the joint venture between both countries, after claiming it provides inadequate returns for the Congolese people. Indeed, the DRC estimates Chinese firms have put forth less than $1 billion for Congolese infrastructure against the $3 billion pledged in 2009. 

Despite a recent slump in cobalt prices, Chinese firms have continued consolidating their position. In 2023, CMOC, a Hong Kong-listed company, surpassed the Swiss giant Glencore as the world's largest cobalt producer. Both companies, however, have faced widespread corruption issues, exemplifying the troublesome nature of commodity extraction in the Global South. Between 2007 and 2018, Glencore paid approximately $100 million in bribes globally and $27.5 million in DRC alone, primarily through inflated consulting fees, for "improper business advantages." Meanwhile, CMOC faces a $2 billion settlement with Gecamines, the Congolese state-controlled mining corporation, over allegations of lying about reserves in the Tenke Fungurume Mine, the country’s 2nd biggest source of cobalt. Despite President Tshisekedi's criticism of the minerals-for-infrastructure pact, it remains uncertain whether he will succeed in getting increased contributions from Chinese investors. China's vested interest in the green transition, being the leading producer of lithium batteries and electric vehicles, underscores the critical importance of its Congolese holdings to its environmental objectives. 

Still, African governments, including DRC, are increasingly sceptical of Chinese resource-backed loans. However, the demand for rare earth chemicals will triple by 2040. This situation positions Tshisakedi's administration advantageously in negotiations. Despite its thriving EV industry, the Chinese economy is grappling with substantial post-Covid challenges. Recognizing China’s reliance on minerals, Tshisakedi could leverage his reelection to secure tangible infrastructure commitments from China. Additionally, he should seek renewed pledges that address unmet investment targets or consider the possibility of revoking Sicomines' tax exemptions as a bargaining tool.

Another of the DRC’s issues is the persistence of artisanal mining, which is widespread on the African continent. The US Department of Labour estimates that 25,000 children work in the sector throughout the country. When the risk of violence and illegal labour backed by rebel groups escalates, foreign companies face the dilemma of withdrawing or increasing efforts to provide capital for securitisation as supply chains become strained. In September, two Chinese nationals were among the four individuals killed in an attack on a convoy carrying gold in the South Kivu province, underscoring the risk involved in the region's mining activities. Although foreign firms attempt to reduce their reliance on small and medium-sized mining companies to avoid the risk of employing child labour, they may also be pushing people who rely on artisanal mining towards extremist groups, further threatening security in the mining sector and commodity supply chains. 

Algier Disaccord: Kidal’s Capture Causes Algerian Conundrum

In late November, Mali's retaking of Kidal raised concerns within Algerian leadership, fearing potential strain on the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement. This agreement, overseen by Algerian leadership, aimed to resolve the conflict in northern Mali and was endorsed by the Malian state and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), comprising Touareg and Arab rebel groups in the region. Despite Algerian support, the implementation of the agreement encountered obstacles in carrying out key provisions. The establishment of power-sharing structures in northern provinces and carrying out disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes for rebels was never accomplished, leaving an uneasy status quo in the region. Challenges, such as deficiencies in training and human and financial capital, hindered all types of progress, resulting in minimal changes on the ground. 

Mali’s leader, colonel Assimi Goita’s assertive stance on state consolidation, following the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali's (MINUSMA) exit in October 2023, paved the way for Malian forces to retake Kidal, a northern province on the border with Algeria. Algiers, concerned about potential hostility and the displacement of rebel groups into its territory, fears escalating conflict and has called on Mali to respect the agreement. Though the Kidal operation showcased a level of cooperation between Touaregs and Malian forces, there are concerns that conflict may provide opportunities for ISIS-affiliated groups to gain prominence in the region. Moreover, the recent visit of Niger's leadership to Moscow on January 16 for discussions on defence, agriculture, and energy could lead to a growing partnership with Russian Wagner forces in the Sahel region at the UN’s expense. The situation remains complex, raising uncertainties about the future stability of northern Mali and its implications for the Sahel region.

For more detailed analysis and extensive coverage of security and geopolitics, visit londonpolitica.com.

Insight Afrique en francais

En 2023, à la fin de l'année, la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a été le témoin d'une élection très disputée, se soldant par une victoire écrasante du président sortant, Félix Tshisekedi. Cette édition d'Insight Afrique explore les conséquences de l'élection, offrant des perspectives sur l'état actuel de ce pays riche en ressources et analysant les implications potentielles de la victoire de Tshisekedi. Insight Afrique vise à fournir un reportage mensuel et bilingue des développements sur cette région, en se concentrant sur la sécurité, de la politique et des affaires, afin de présenter une compréhension profonde des événements en cours.

Élections en RDC

En RDC, le président sortant Félix Tshisekedi a conservé sa présidence, remportant 73% des voix lors d'une élection très disputée. Le deuxième, Moïse Katumbi, homme d'affaires influent et président du club de football TP Mazembe, a obtenu la deuxième place avec 18% des voix. La campagne de Katumbi a déclaré dans un communiqué du 23 décembre qu'une “fraude” avait eu lieu, tandis qu'un autre candidat, Martin Fayulu, a qualifié l'élection de "farce". Le 24 décembre, lendemain du jour de l'élection, prolongée de deux jours en raison de difficultés logistiques, neuf candidats opposants ont rejeté les résultats de l'élection. Des rapports ont fait état de manipulations de documents sensibles par des responsables électoraux, de déroulement  d'opérations électorales en dehors des centres officiels, de registres de vote incomplets et de kits électoraux non livrés. Plus de 60% des 75 000 bureaux de vote du pays ont momentanément cessé leurs opérations à un moment donné, ce qui a entraîné une prolongation de la période de vote.

Bien que Tshisekedi, président depuis 2019, était projeté pour remporter l'élection, des soupçons étaient préventivement répandus dans le plus grand pays francophone d'Afrique. Selon les rapports, Tshisekedi obtiendrait 55% des votes, en grande partie grâce à son opposition nombreuse et désorganisée. Sa popularité découle en grande partie de ses promesses ambitieuses de campagne en 2019, telles que la gratuité des écoles élémentaires, la réduction de la corruption et la fin de la guerre à l'est. À ce jour, aucune promesse n’est réalisée. Néanmoins, l'ascension de Tshisekedi a marqué le premier transfert pacifique du pouvoir en RDC depuis que son prédécesseur, Joseph Kabila, a accédé à la présidence à la suite de l'assassinat du président Laurent-Désiré Kabila en 2001. Malgré de légers affrontements avec la police à Kinshasa le 27 décembre, les appels à un nouveau scrutin ont été rejetés, et Tshisekedi entamera son second mandat fin janvier.

Combats dans l'est : Tensions entre la RDC, le Rwanda et le Burundi

Le conflit prolongé dans l'est du pays a privé jusqu'à 1,5 million des 41 millions d'électeurs inscrits de la possibilité de voter. La guerre dans l'est du Congo, qui a commencé dans les années 1990, est principalement une conséquence du génocide rwandais, les Hutus et les Tutsis ayant traversé la frontière pour former des milices en RDC. Le conflit, mené entre divers groupes et armées nationales, est particulièrement intense dans les provinces du Nord et du Sud-Kivu, aux frontières du Rwanda et de l'Ouganda, et a entraîné environ 6 millions de décès depuis 1996. La milice rebelle la plus notoire dans le conflit a été le M23, composé principalement de Tutsis, qui a été impliqué dans une recrudescence d'attaques fin 2023 après des mois de calme relatif.

Selon des rapports des Nations Unies, le M23 a reçu des armes et un soutien logistique du Rwanda, dont le président, Paul Kagame, est également Tutsi. Cela tend les relations entre la RDC et son voisin, Tshisekedi ayant comparé Kagame à Hitler en décembre. Les tensions ont été exacerbées par la fermeture des frontières du Burundi avec le Rwanda le 12 janvier, accusant Kigali d'accueillir et de soutenir le groupe rebelle RED-Tabara (qui opère également dans l'est de la RDC), responsable d'attaques au Burundi en décembre ayant fait 20 morts, dont la moitié étaient des civils. Kigali nie son soutien à RED-Tabara et a commenté que la fermeture de la frontière "viole les principes de coopération régionale et d'intégration de la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est." Avec l'escalade des tensions transfrontalières et le retrait de la force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies MONUSCO de la RDC d'ici la fin de 2024 (critiquée pour son inefficacité à stopper les groupes armés), la situation sécuritaire dans l'est de la RDC risque de rester précaire.

Tshisakedi et Kagame devraient s'efforcer d'améliorer les liens diplomatiques entre la RDC et le Rwanda pour apaiser les tensions. Malgré les préoccupations concernant les incohérences électorales et la fraude en RDC, le pays a réussi des processus électoraux consécutifs dans un climat de relative sécurité. Pendant ce temps, le Rwanda a maintenu une croissance économique supérieure à 5% pendant près de deux décennies et a préservé un environnement sûr. La possibilité d'un conflit plus vaste dans la région représente une menace importante pour les progrès réalisés par les deux nations. Alors que Tshisakedi compte sur les troupes de la Communauté de développement de l'Afrique australe pour faire face à la situation du M23, une approche plus globale est nécessaire pour éliminer le risque d'un conflit régional. Alors que le secrétaire d'État américain, Anthony Blinken, visite l'Afrique de l'Ouest ce mois-ci, une initiative diplomatique de Washington pour apaiser les tensions pourrait contribuer à rétablir son influence dans la région et à éviter l'émergence d'un vide sécuritaire permettant à des forces indésirables de s'implanter.

Chine : une relation controversée

Pour lutter contre le M23, la RDC a acheté neuf drones chinois en mars 2023. L'équipement chinois devient de plus en plus courant dans les dernières guerres africaines, principalement en raison de l'approche indifférente de Beijing en matière de vente d'armes et de la réticence continue des États-Unis à s'impliquer dans les conflits africains.

La participation significative de la Chine en RDC a des implications économiques profondes, en particulier dans le secteur minier. La RDC, qui détient 70% du cobalt mondial - un composant crucial des batteries lithium-ion et de divers alliages - attire depuis longtemps l'attention et les capitaux des entreprises chinoises, qui produisent la plupart des VE et des batteries du monde. Le pays abrite huit des dix plus grandes mines de cobalt au monde, en faisant la cible la plus importante sur le marché du cobalt. La Chine domine l'industrie minière de la RDC, contrôlant environ 70% de son portefeuille minier et 80% de sa production de cobalt. Cette situation découle d'un accord minerais-contre-infrastructures signé entre la Chine et la RDC en 2008. L'accord permettait aux entreprises chinoises d'accéder aux vastes ressources minérales de la RDC en échange de la construction de projets d'infrastructures critiques tels que des routes, des hôpitaux et des écoles. Le président Tshisekedi s'est rendu à Pékin en mai 2023 pour renégocier les contrats avec Sicomines, la coentreprise entre les deux pays, après avoir déclaré qu'elle offrait des rendements insuffisants pour le peuple congolais. En effet, la RDC estime que les entreprises chinoises ont contribué de moins d'un milliard de dollars aux infrastructures congolaises contre les trois milliards promis en 2009.

Malgré une récente baisse des prix du cobalt, les entreprises chinoises ont continué à renforcer leur position. En 2023, CMOC, une entreprise cotée à Hong Kong, a surpassé le géant suisse Glencore en tant que premier producteur mondial de cobalt. Cependant, les deux entreprises ont été confrontées à des problèmes de corruption généralisés, illustrant la nature problématique de l'extraction de matières premières dans le Sud global. Entre 2007 et 2018, Glencore a versé environ 100 millions de dollars de pots-de-vin dans le monde et 27,5 millions de dollars en RDC seule, principalement par le biais de frais de consultation gonflés, pour “avantages commerciaux” incorrects. Pendant ce temps, CMOC fait face à un règlement de 2 milliards de dollars avec la Gécamines, la société minière congolaise contrôlée par l'État, pour des allégations de mensonges sur les réserves dans la mine Tenke Fungurume, la deuxième plus grande source de cobalt du pays. Malgré la critique du président Tshisekedi contre le pacte minerais-contre-infrastructures, il reste incertain s'il réussirait à obtenir des contributions accrues des investisseurs chinois. L'intérêt de la Chine pour la transition verte, en tant que premier producteur de batteries au lithium et de véhicules électriques, souligne l'importance cruciale de ses participations congolaises pour ses objectifs environnementaux.

Pourtant, les gouvernements africains, y compris la RDC, se montrent de plus en plus sceptiques à l'égard des prêts chinois adossés aux ressources. Cependant, la demande de produits chimiques de terres rares devrait tripler d'ici 2040. Cette situation place l'administration Tshisakedi dans une position avantageuse lors des négociations. Malgré son industrie des VE prospère, l'économie chinoise est confrontée à d'importants vents contraires post-Covid. Reconnaissant la dépendance de la Chine à l'égard des minéraux, Tshisakedi pourrait utiliser sa réélection pour obtenir des engagements concrets en matière d'infrastructures de la part de la Chine. De plus, il devrait chercher des engagements renouvelés qui tiennent compte des objectifs d'investissement non atteints, ou menacer de révoquer le statut actuel d'exemption fiscale de Sicomines.

Une autre des préoccupations de la RDC concerne la persistance de l'exploitation minière artisanale, répandue sur le continent africain. Le Département du Travail des États-Unis estime que 25 000 enfants travaillent dans ce secteur à travers le pays. Lorsque le risque de violence et de travail illégal soutenu par des groupes rebelles s'intensifie, les entreprises étrangères doivent choisir entre se retirer ou accroître les efforts pour fournir du capital à des fins de sécurisation, alors que les chaînes d'approvisionnement sont mises à l’épreuve. En septembre, deux ressortissants chinois figuraient parmi les quatre personnes tuées lors d'une attaque contre un convoi transportant de l'or dans la province du Sud-Kivu, soulignant le risque impliqué dans les activités minières de la région. Les entreprises étrangères tentent de réduire leur dépendance à l'égard des petites et moyennes entreprises minières pour éviter le risque d'emploi de travail des enfants. Par contre, ceci pourrait également pousser les personnes dépendant de l'exploitation minière artisanale vers des groupes extrémistes, menaçant davantage la sécurité dans le secteur minier et les chaînes d'approvisionnement en matières premières.

Désaccord  d’Alger : Capture de Kidal, dilemme pour l'Algérie

À la fin de novembre, la reprise de Kidal par le Mali a suscité des inquiétudes au sein de la direction algérienne, craignant une tension potentielle sur l'Accord de paix d'Alger de 2015. Cet accord, supervisé par la direction algérienne, visait à résoudre le conflit dans le nord du Mali et était soutenu par l'État malien et la Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA), regroupant des groupes rebelles touaregs et arabes de la région. Malgré le soutien algérien, la mise en œuvre de l'accord a rencontré des obstacles pour la réalisation de dispositions clés. La création de structures de partage du pouvoir dans les provinces du nord et la mise en œuvre des processus de désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration pour les rebelles n'ont jamais été réalisées, laissant une situation précaire dans la région. Des défis tels que des lacunes dans la formation et des capitaux humains et financiers ont entravé tout type de progrès, entraînant des changements minimes sur le terrain.

En tant que leader du Mali, la position assertive du colonel Assimi Goita en matière de consolidation de l'État, après le retrait de la Mission de stabilisation des Nations unies au Mali (MINUSMA) en octobre 2023, a ouvert la voie aux forces maliennes pour reprendre Kidal, une province du nord à la frontière avec l'Algérie. Alger, préoccupée par une hostilité potentielle et le déplacement de groupes rebelles sur son territoire, craint une escalade du conflit et a appelé le Mali à respecter l'accord. Bien que l'opération à Kidal ait montré un niveau de coopération entre les Touaregs et les forces maliennes, des craintes subsistent quant à la possibilité pour des groupes terroristes de prendre de l'importance dans la région. De plus, la récente visite du leader du Niger à Moscou le 16 janvier pour des discussions sur la défense, l'agriculture et l'énergie pourrait conduire à un partenariat croissant avec les forces russes de Wagner dans la région du Sahel aux dépens de l'ONU. La situation reste complexe, suscitant des incertitudes quant à la stabilité future du nord du Mali et à ses implications pour la région du Sahel.

Pour une analyse approfondie et une couverture étendue de la sécurité et de la géopolitique, rendez-vous sur londonpolitica.com.

Consequences of Deforestation in the Congo Basin

International Impact of Deforestation

The Congo Basin is the largest rainforest in Africa and the second largest in the world, behind the Amazon. Despite having a smaller surface area, it absorbs more carbon dioxide than the Amazon, making it the Earth’s largest carbon sink. It lies across six nations: Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo, with 60% of the basin in the DRC. 

Large-scale deforestation in the Congo Basin is a complex problem. The environmental consequences of its destruction significantly impact the carbon-reducing capabilities of our planet. Absorbing 1.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, which equates to approximately 4% of global annual emissions, the basin is one of the few places in the world that absorbs more carbon than it emits. As a result, protecting the Basin has been on the agenda of global conservation efforts, including the recent COP27. 

Unfortunately, the basin’s resource richness has driven vast land mismanagement and exploitation since the colonial period. In 2019, the DRC became the country with the second highest levels of deforestation - only behind Brazil. In 2021 alone, deforestation in the Congo Basin increased by almost 5%, affecting over 630,000 hectares of land. Estimates show that between 2013 and 2014, levels of deforestation in the DRC meant that emissions equivalent to what would be released by 50 coal power plants in one year were not captured.

Additionally, the sheer size of the basin plays a crucial role in regulating rainfall patterns across Africa, which, when disturbed, could have a devastating effect on the availability of potable water and food supplies. This is especially relevant in countries like Ethiopia and Somalia, where drought has already put significant strain on resources - continued droughts could have catastrophic consequences, likely leading to famine. Furthermore, the reduced frequency of rainfall is a direct cause of soil degradation, as soil is then unable to absorb water at the necessary pace when rain does occur, consequently enhancing the risk of flooding.

Deforestation in the Congo Basin additionally generates a significant risk of spreading deadly infections. This happens because the number of species that could be carrying infectious viruses are moving closer to human settlements as their natural forest habitat recedes. Ebola endemics have followed this exact mechanism, with the very first cases recorded in the 1970s being caused by large-scale deforestation. The 2018-2020 Ebola endemic in the DRC showcases the constant risk, which is particularly elevated by the country’s high biodiversity. The spread of the diseases was partially contained by the naturally healthy ecosystem but still managed to claim 2,000 lives in a relatively short period of time. 

Stake Weakness, Corruption, and a Lack of Political Will

The mechanisms facilitating this alarming pace of deforestation in the Congo Basin can be directly associated with the weakness of the Congolese state. As 60% of the basin is located within the territory of the DRC, the DRC is also the country where the majority of deforestation activities are taking place. 

The DRC is in the 10th percentile of the human capital index, making it one of the least developed countries in the world. With few opportunities for people to support themselves - in an impoverished region marked by instability and conflict - deforestation has become a staple of the local economy. Almost two-thirds of the DRC’s population lives on less than $1.90 a day. Large populations turn to activities like hunting and poaching, and work in the logging industry. Further, increased migration by forcibly displaced populations from South Sudan and the Central African Republic has put even more pressure on the land, pushing people to settle on previously untouched natural habitats. China, the US, and Europe - where commodities extracted from the basin, like wood, palm oil, and rubber are often falsely advertised as eco-friendly - mainly fuel the growing global demand. As seen on the map below, small-scale agriculture is the principal driver of deforestation in the Basin. 

Image Source: Science Advances

The DRC government is ineffective in exercising complete control over its territories, let alone its forests, creating a security vacuum in which militant groups exploit available resources. Although the government has been receiving significant funds from international actors to restore degraded lands and has granted specific areas with protected status, it cannot fully implement protective conversation mechanisms due to the substantial presence and influence of dispersed armed groups.  

The weakness of the Congolese state leaves limited capacity to enforce legal mechanisms across the basin’s territory. As mining and logging companies are able to influence the government and surpass checks and balances, their activities often go unmonitored. With enough power generated, they can exploit resources without limits and without control. Reports from the Environmental Investigation Agency show that consortiums of timber companies have bribed ministers to receive concessions. 

Corrupt political structures facilitate the extraction of resources in the basin through the breach of labour laws, evasion of taxation schemes, and violation of protected zones with little to no resistance to their activities. Networks of criminals operating in the DRC are often involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, fraud, and tax evasion. Local activists or communities that have attempted to interfere have faced backlash, including brutality from the police. Without punitive mechanisms in place, large-scale deforestation thrives as companies avoid control and oversight.

For years, the Forest Code of 2002 was the binding legal framework protecting the rights of local communities in the DRC to concessions; however, the code lacked specific legal tools to ensure accountability and the management of concessions. This resulted in shaky legality around property rights, which was easily abused for commercial purposes. The government regularly issues logging concessions to companies that bypass existing laws, disregarding conservation policies. In 2022, the DRC opened tenders for 30 permits to extract oil and gas, covering areas with particular carbon sequestering capabilities. 

Gabon - the Conservation Champion

The Congo Basin covers six countries, but only Gabon and the Republic of Congo have experienced a decrease in deforestation rates. Although the Congo Basin covers only 5-10% of Gabon’s total area, it has received international attention for its exemplary conservation efforts. 

In 2021, while deforestation levels rose in the DRC, in Gabon they decreased by 28%. This can be mainly attributed to rigorous standards for the management of forests, which are widely and strictly enforced. Extractive business operations in the Gabonese part of the Congo Basin require specific approvals, and the Gabonese government obliges all businesses present in the basin to offset their emissions. Enforcement is facilitated by a robust network of organisations that collaborate with the government in monitoring carbon credits. 88% of Gabon’s surface is still covered in forest, and the country has generated certified carbon credits stemming from 200 million tons of carbon absorption.

Continuity is one specific element that sets Gabon apart from other nations that span the Congo Basin. Until the 2023 coup, the Bongo family had governed Gabon for 55 years. Although their tenure was autocratic and oversaw widespread poverty, the government has displayed solid political will in promoting environmental conservation over several decades. In collaboration with numerous data collection agencies, governmental bodies have utilised large-scale data collection, including satellite and drone imaging. Satellite imagery helps to identify illegal logging, which on-the-ground workers and researchers relay on to the authorities. 

Gabon has also opened special economic zones to balance profitability and sustainability, where companies receive tax breaks and other advantages. This policy offers favourable economic conditions to businesses while ensuring that all logging activities are certified and monitored. Sophisticated QR code tracking systems exemplify robust due diligence mechanisms with clear assessment metrics. 

Gabon has been working very closely with the UN to strengthen its environmental capacity, and it is apparent that this collaboration has been fruitful. Gabon’s success has created a cycle through which visible achievements yield even more investment into protection and conservation. The challenge has been to ensure that communities benefit from the protection efforts, while simultaneously generating new opportunities for industries that communities can become involved in. Gabon’s example has shown that by creating clear protection laws and promoting sustainable producers, it is possible to promote both economic profits and environmental conservation, which has the potential to be replicated in other environments.

However, it has to be pointed out that the situation in Gabon is not directly translatable to other countries in the region. Evidence shows that mineral and oil exports are often linked with a reduction in deforestation as the wealth generated by those industries facilitates the import of food in larger quantities, reducing the size of the national agricultural sector, which is evident in the case of Gabon. It remains unclear how the new political landscape after the collapse of the Bongo family’s grip on power will affect environmental policies.

Lucrative earnings from deforestation in the Congo Basin drive companies to pursue environmentally unsustainable practices. There have been multiple successful sustainability campaigns which have informed consumers of malpractice in product supply chains resulting in the promotion of fair trade products. Putting pressure on companies involved in deforestation in the area - by increasing awareness of unsustainable practices - could have the potential to revert some of the documented consequences of deforestation in the Congo Basin.

The destruction of the Basin reduces the Earth’s ability to naturally absorb CO2, promotes the spread of diseases, and disrupts rainfall patterns affecting fresh water supplies and food access in other parts of Africa. Although funds from international donors are being invested into the Basin, high levels of corruption, especially prevalent in the DRC, have reduced their impact on its preservation. As a result, there is potential for NGOs, development agencies, and transparency focused organisations to expand activities by tracking how these funds are used on the ground and measuring how they directly contribute to the specific objectives they were designed for.

Insight Afrique - December 2023

(French version below)

In recent years, a series of coups have occurred in Mali, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon, with Sudan being the only non-French-speaking state among them. Notably, France is withdrawing its troops from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (an ongoing process). This period has witnessed the rise of prominent military juntas and the ambiguous involvement of the Wagner Group in the resource-rich region. Insight Afrique aims to deliver monthly bilingual coverage and intelligence on this region, focusing on the intersection of security, politics, and business to provide a comprehensive understanding of unfolding events. Further, we are aware of the recent geopolitical developments in the DRC and will be doing an extensive section in the next newsletter on these developments and their implications.

Cameroon: Flares of the ‘Anglophone Crisis’

On 5 and 6 November, Mamfe, a community in southwestern Cameroon, witnessed violent events as it prepared to commemorate President Paul Biya's 41 years in power, the world's longest-standing leader. The occasion was overshadowed by a string of attacks carried out by regional rebels, resulting in the loss of over two dozen lives and widespread arson. These incidents highlight the escalating tensions within the 'Anglophone Crisis,' a protracted conflict involving anglophone rebels of Ambazonia seeking statehood in northwestern and southwestern Cameroon and Paul Biya’s national army. On X, the Ambazonian leadership has attributed the attacks to both ISIS-West Africa and President Biya, who they claim are colluding, on top of being US-backed.

The conflict’s roots stem from a 1961 British and UN-backed referendum that united the Southern British Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroon, which gained independence from France the previous year. Biya’s 1982 accession to the presidency provoked the formerly British region to push for secession in the name of an Ambazonian republic named after the region’s southwestern Ambas Bay. Secessionists took up arms in 2017 after national forces violently repressed uprisings protesting the francisation of education and bureaucracy, creating the Anglophone Crisis. The conflict has externally displaced around 500,000 people, primarily to neighbouring Chad.

The conflict in Cameroon, although relatively isolated, has the potential to reduce stability in the country and could impact the 2025 national elections. President Biya, who is 90 years old, is expected to run for the election to sustain his leadership. There is speculation that his son, Franck Biya, who joined the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement party in November, might also be eyeing the presidency. However, he has denied having any intention to run and only claims to be showing solidarity with his father.

Also at potential risk is the World Health Organisation’s new malaria vaccine rollout. 300,000 doses arrived in Yaoundé, the capital, the week of 19 November to combat stalling malaria rates in West Africa, particularly among young infants. Health insecurities and sexual violence often plague civil wars, which heavily obstruct vaccine rollouts. But there are cases of vaccine campaigns helping to instil momentary pauses in conflicts.  

Failed Prison Escape of Former Guinean Putschist

Guinea’s former president, Moussa Dadis Camara, was momentarily freed by rebellious military personnel on the morning of 6 November, only to be recaptured by the end of the day. Camara came into power in 2008 by exploiting the power vacuum left by the death of Lansana Conté, who had ruled since 1984. His 2022 imprisonment is a result of his junta’s violent suppression of the 2009 stadium protests in Conakry, the Guinean capital, which left over 150 dead and forced Camara into exile from 2010 to 2021. 

Alpha Condé, Guinea’s democratically elected president, elected during Camara’s exile, was overthrown by the military in 2021 when he announced his candidature for a third election, abolishing presidential term limits. The coup made Guinea another West African country to fall under military rule.

The current president, Mamadi Doumbouya, has not shied away from international attention. In September, he defended his position and other Sahelian military rulers in front of the UN General Assembly in New York, stating that the democratic models imposed by foreign powers are “detrimental” to many African nations plagued by corruption and violence. This position aligns well with autocracies such as Russia, whose heavily sanctioned Wagner Group reportedly met with Doumbouya soon after his ascension to power.

Importantly, Guinea has the world’s largest bauxite reserves, the primary ore used to make aluminium. Although the Guinean government owns the country’s largest bauxite mine, its third-largest mine, the Boffa Mine, is owned outright by Aluminium of China, the world’s largest aluminium producer. Although different governments contest bauxite’s critical mineral status due to its relative abundance, global demand for aluminium could grow by up to 40% by 2030. Instability in Guinea could thus affect aluminium supply chains, much like the Ukrainian war impacted Rusal’s - a Russian aluminium giant - bauxite exports from West Africa. China and Russia are the world’s biggest aluminium producers, facilitating its economic ties with Conakry.

Malian Forces Recapture Kidal

As of 26 November, Mali has regained control of its northern Saharan state, Kidal, from Touareg rebel groups. The military government has appointed El Hadj Ag Gamou, himself a Touareg who fought alongside the national forces, as the state’s governor. Gamou's military-allied militia remained active in the north after his defeat in Kidal by rebel and ISIS forces in 2014. The move will likely consolidate Malian Touareg's support for the national government.

The Kidal offensive came a mere two weeks after MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) closed its outpost in the region following its July 2023 commitment to retreat by the end of the year. Wagner Group forces reportedly played an important role in the military success in Kidal, underscoring once more the growing alliance between Russia and African junta-led countries.

Kidal shares a border with Algeria and Niger, making it crucial to stop the flow of ISIS-backed rebels coming in from other Saharan regions. 

Clashes on Mali-Burkina Faso Border

In Burkina Faso, over 400 ISIS-linked rebels were killed, along with over 40 civilians, in an attempt to take the town of Djibo. The JNIM (Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin) militant jihadist organisation has many outposts in the country. Burkina Faso’s president and the world’s youngest head of state, Ibrahim Traoré, is under scrutiny for failing to swiftly defeat the insurgents, which he vowed to do away with in his first three months in power. According to the UN, approximately 20 businesses were burned or destroyed in the town with a significant population of internally displaced people. Wagner forces using Turkish equipment were allegedly involved in the clash.

Despite the security challenges faced by Burkina, Traoré's leadership remains unthreatened. On 23 November, finance ministers from Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali convened to discuss economic cooperation within the Sahel Cooperation Organisation. The departure of French troops from these nations over the past two years, with Emmanuel Macron confirming France's exit from Niger in October, coupled with Sahelian leaders engaging in discussions with Russian officials in St. Petersburg in July, may indicate the emergence of a new security alliance.

Alongside these partnerships, Traore has ambitious plans for resource-rich but landlocked Burkina Faso. According to Agence France Presse, the country began constructing its first gold refinery in late November, as Traore announced earlier this year. Burkina Faso is Africa's fourth largest gold producer; it exported nearly 100 tonnes of gold in 2022, compared to 67 tonnes in 2021.  However, illegal mining and smuggling of precious metals have long been a cause of civil unrest and a significant source of funding for rebel groups, which impact the nation’s wealth and stability. Small-scale and artisanal mining, which is especially environmentally detrimental, dangerous, and often illegal, is rife. Russia’s state media outlet RT announced that Moscow had signed a deal with Mali to help build a gold refinery in the capital of Bamako, which could help curb artisanal mining.

Burkina’s refinery will process around 400 kg of gold daily and will be co-managed by the Malian company Marena Gold, while the Bamako refinery will produce 500 kg of gold daily. Not only does this fall in line with other African countries’ attempts at further capitalising on their mineral resources to combat import dependence, but the extensive infrastructure and accompanying economic plan also entrench the Sahelian military leader’s credibility outside of the Economic Community of West African States, which bans military governments. Western companies operating in Burkina Faso, especially in the mining sector, might be subjected to heightened taxes and tariffs as resource nationalism gains momentum. (In 2018, the Democratic Republic of Congo imposed higher government royalties on all its minerals.) Nonetheless, the country’s securitising is sure to strengthen investor confidence by reducing the frequency of attacks on mining convoys, which threaten the region’s gold rush.

Traoré also met with Putin in October to discuss his country’s energy needs, which marks a clear line of support from Moscow, which announced a Russian company would be building a solar panel plant in Mali by 2025. The tight relationship will likely enable further Russian involvement in Burkina Faso, such as the Bissa-Bouly gold mines, jointly owned by the government and the Moscow-based company Nordgold. Earlier this year, the Burkinabe mining minister denied allegations that Russian companies were given priority on mining contracts.

For more detailed analysis and extensive coverage of security and geopolitics, visit londonpolitica.com.

Insight Afrique en Francais

Au cours des dernières années, une série de coups d'État ont eu lieu au Mali, au Tchad, en Guinée, au Soudan, au Burkina Faso, au Niger et au Gabon, le Soudan étant le seul État non francophone parmi eux. Notamment, la France a retiré ses troupes du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger (retraite en cours). Cette période a été marquée par la montée en puissance de juntes militaires et par l'implication du groupe Wagner dans cette région riche en ressources. Insight Afrique vise à fournir un reportage mensuel et bilingue des développements sur cette région, en se concentrant sur la sécurité, de la politique et des affaires, afin de présenter une compréhension profonde des événements en cours.

Cameroun : Incidents de la "crise anglophone”

Les 5 et 6 novembre, Mamfe, une communauté du sud-ouest du Cameroun, a été le théâtre d'événements violents alors qu'elle se préparait à commémorer les 41 ans de pouvoir du président Paul Biya, le plus ancien dirigeant du monde. L'événement a été assombri par une série d'attaques menées par des rebelles régionaux, qui ont fait plus de deux douzaines de victimes et provoqué de nombreux incendies criminels. Ces incidents mettent en évidence l'escalade des tensions dans le cadre de la "crise anglophone", un conflit prolongé impliquant les rebelles anglophones de l'Ambazonie, qui cherchent à obtenir le statut d'État dans le nord-ouest et le sud-ouest du Cameroun, et l'armée nationale. Les dirigeants de l'Ambazonie ont attribué les attaques à la fois à ISIS-Afrique de l'Ouest et au président Biya, qu'ils accusent d'être de connivence, en plus d'être soutenus par les États-Unis.

Le conflit trouve son origine dans le référendum de 1961, soutenu par la Grande-Bretagne et les Nations unies, qui a réuni le Southern British Cameroons à la République du Cameroun, qui avait obtenu son indépendance de la France l'année précédente. L'accession de Biya à la présidence en 1982 a poussé la région anciennement britannique à faire sécession au nom d'une république ambazonienne, nommée d'après la baie d'Ambas, au sud-ouest de la région. Les sécessionnistes ont pris les armes en 2017, après que les forces nationales aient violemment réprimé les révoltes contre la francisation de l'éducation et de la bureaucratie, créant ainsi la crise anglophone. Le conflit a entraîné le déplacement d'environ 500 000 personnes, principalement vers le Tchad.

Le conflit au Cameroun, bien que relativement isolé, risque de réduire la stabilité du pays et d'avoir un impact sur les élections nationales de 2025. Le président Biya, âgé de 90 ans, compte se présenter aux élections afin de maintenir sa présidence. Son fils, Franck Biya, qui a rejoint le parti du Mouvement démocratique du peuple camerounais en novembre, envisage potentiellement la présidence. Cependant, il nie avoir l'intention de se présenter et prétend seulement faire preuve de solidarité avec son père.

Le déploiement du nouveau vaccin contre le paludisme de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé est également menacé. 300 000 doses sont arrivées à Yaoundé la semaine du 19 novembre, afin de lutter contre les taux de paludisme en Afrique de l'Ouest, en particulier chez les jeunes enfants. Les guerres civiles sont souvent marquées par l'insécurité sanitaire et la violence sexuelle, ce qui entrave considérablement la distribution des vaccins. Toutefois, il existe des cas où les campagnes de vaccination ont permis d'interrompre momentanément les conflits.

Evasion échouée d'un ancien putschiste guinéen

L'ancien président de la Guinée, Moussa Dadis Camara, a été momentanément libéré par des militaires rebelles dans la matinée du 6 novembre, avant d'être recapturé en fin de journée. Moussa Dadis Camara est arrivé au pouvoir en 2008 après la mort de Lansana Conté, qui gouvernait depuis 1984. Son emprisonnement de 2022 est le résultat de la violente répression par sa junte des manifestations de 2009 dans les stades de Conakry, la capitale guinéenne, qui ont fait plus de 150 morts et ont contraint Camara à l'exil de 2010 à 2021.

Alpha Condé, le président démocratiquement élu de la Guinée pendant l'exil de Camara, a été renversé par des membres de l’armée en 2021 lorsqu'il a annoncé sa candidature à une troisième élection, abolissant la limitation des mandats présidentiels. Ce coup d'État a fait de la Guinée un autre pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest à tomber sous le joug d'un régime militaire.

Le président actuel, Mamadi Doumbouya, n'a pas hésité à attirer l'attention de la communauté internationale. En septembre, il a défendu sa position et celle d'autres dirigeants militaires sahéliens devant l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies à New York, déclarant que les modèles démocratiques imposés par des puissances étrangères sont nuisibles à de nombreuses nations africaines en proie à la corruption et à la violence. Cette position s'aligne sur celle d'autocraties telles que la Russie, dont le groupe Wagner, fortement sanctionné, aurait rencontré Doumbouya quelques jours après son accession au pouvoir.

Il est important de noter que la Guinée possède les plus grandes réserves de bauxite au monde, le minerai primaire utilisé pour fabriquer l'aluminium. Bien que le gouvernement guinéen soit propriétaire de la plus grande mine de bauxite du pays, la troisième mine, celle de Boffa, appartient complètement à Aluminium of China, le plus grand producteur d'aluminium au monde. Bien que différents gouvernements contestent le statut de "minéral critique" de la bauxite en raison de son abondance, la demande mondiale d'aluminium pourrait augmenter de 40 % d'ici 2030. L'instabilité en Guinée pourrait donc affecter les chaînes d'approvisionnement en aluminium, tout comme la guerre en Ukraine a eu un impact sur les exportations de bauxite de Rusal, un géant russe de l'aluminium, en provenance d'Afrique de l'Ouest. La Chine et la Russie sont les plus grands producteurs d'aluminium au monde, ce qui facilite les liens économiques avec Conakry.

Les forces maliennes reprennent Kidal

Depuis le 26 novembre, le Mali a repris le contrôle de l'État saharien du nord, Kidal, aux groupes rebelles Touaregs. Le gouvernement militaire a nommé El Hadj Ag Gamou, lui-même un Touareg, qui a combattu aux côtés des forces nationales, au poste de gouverneur de l'État. La milice de Gamou est restée active dans le nord après sa défaite à Kidal face aux forces rebelles et à Daesh en 2014. Cette décision aidera à consolider le soutien des Touaregs maliens au gouvernement national.

L'offensive de Kidal a eu lieu que deux semaines après que la MINUSMA (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali) a fermé son avant-poste dans la région, suite à son engagement de juillet 2023 de se retirer avant la fin de l'année. Les forces du groupe Wagner auraient joué un rôle crucial dans le succès militaire à Kidal, soulignant une fois de plus l'alliance croissante entre la Russie et les pays africains dirigés par des juntes. Kidal partage une frontière avec l'Algérie et le Niger, ce qui la rend cruciale pour arrêter le flux de rebelles soutenus par ISIS venant d'autres régions sahariennes.

Affrontements à la frontière entre le Mali et le Burkina Faso

Au Burkina Faso, plus de 400 rebelles liés au Daesh ont été tués, ainsi que plus de 40 civils, lors d'une tentative de prise de la ville de Djibo. L'organisation djihadiste militante JNIM (Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin) possède de nombreux avant-postes dans le pays. Le président du Burkina Faso et plus jeune chef d'État du monde, Ibrahim Traoré, est critiqué pour son incapacité à vaincre rapidement les insurgés, qu'il avait promis d'éliminer au cours de ses trois premiers mois au pouvoir. Selon l'ONU, une vingtaine d'entreprises ont été incendiées ou détruites dans la ville, qui compte un nombre important de personnes déplacées. Des forces Wagner utilisant du matériel turc auraient été impliquées dans l'affrontement.

Malgré les problèmes de sécurité auxquels le Burkina Faso est confronté, le leadership de M. Traoré reste ferme. Le 23 novembre, les ministres des finances du Burkina Faso, du Niger et du Mali se sont réunis pour discuter de la coopération économique au sein de l'Organisation de coopération sahélienne. Le départ des troupes françaises de ces pays au cours des deux dernières années, la France ayant confirmé son retrait du Niger en octobre, et les dirigeants sahéliens ayant entamé des discussions avec des dirigeant russes à Saint-Pétersbourg en juillet, pourraient indiquer l'émergence d'une nouvelle alliance de sécurité.

Parallèlement à ces associations, M. Traoré a d’ambitieux projets pour le Burkina Faso, pays riche en ressources mais enclavé. Selon l'Agence France Presse, le pays a entamé la construction de sa première raffinerie d'or à la fin du mois de novembre, comme M. Traoré l'avait annoncé au début de l'année. Le Burkina Faso est le quatrième producteur d'or d'Afrique et ce métal est son principal produit d'exportation. Cependant, l'exploitation minière illégale et la contrebande de métaux précieux sont depuis longtemps à l'origine de troubles civils et constituent une source importante de financement pour les groupes rebelles, ce qui a une incidence sur la richesse et la stabilité du pays. De plus, le média d’état russe RT a annoncé que Moscou avait signé un accord avec le Mali pour l'aider à construire une raffinerie d'or dans la capitale Bamako.

Cette raffinerie traitera environ 400 kg d'or par jour et sera cogérée par la société malienne Marena Gold, tandis que la raffinerie de Bamako produira 500 kg d'or par jour. Ces mesures s'inscrivent dans le droit fil des tentatives d'autres pays africains de capitaliser davantage sur leurs ressources minérales pour lutter contre la dépendance à l'égard des importations. En plus, les vastes infrastructures et le plan économique qui les accompagne renforcent la crédibilité du chef militaire sahélien en dehors de la CEDEAO (la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, qui interdit les gouvernements militaires). Les entreprises occidentales opérant au Burkina Faso, en particulier dans le secteur minier, pourraient être soumises à des taxes accrues à mesure que le nationalisme des ressources s’installe. (La République Démocratique du Congo a imposée des redevances gouvernementales sur tous ses minéraux en 2018.) Néanmoins, la sécurisation du pays ne manquera pas de renforcer la confiance des investisseurs en réduisant la fréquence des attaques contre les convois miniers.

M. Traoré a également rencontré Vladimir Poutine en octobre pour discuter des besoins énergétiques de son pays, ce qui marque un soutien clair de la part de Moscou, qui a annoncé qu'une entreprise russe construirait une usine de panneaux solaires au Mali d'ici à 2025. Ces relations serrées permettront probablement à la Russie de s'impliquer davantage au Burkina Faso, notamment dans les mines d'or de Bissa-Bouly, détenues conjointement par le gouvernement et la société moscovite Nordgold. Au début de l'année, le ministre burkinabé des mines a déni les allégations affirmant que les entreprises russes étaient prioritaires pour les contrats miniers.

Pour une analyse plus approfondie et une couverture étendue de la sécurité et de la géopolitique, rendez-vous sur londonpolitica.com.

South Africa's Struggle with Corruption, Violence, and Mistrust: A Path to Reform

Overview

Over the past three decades, following the end of apartheid, South Africa has been marked by persistently high levels of violence. This violence comes in the form of confrontations between citizens and law enforcement during protests, political and economic disputes, and alarmingly high rates of violent crime. The internationally acclaimed rainbow nation, recognized for its multi-generational quest for racial equality, stands as a striking example of economic disparity, where profound poverty coexists with immense affluence. The South African state is founded upon arguably the world's most progressive and contemporary constitution, yet it grapples with deeply rooted corruption, ineffective governance, and tribal divisions.

A robust rule of law facilitates trust and confidence between citizens and their government. South African citizens exhibit a deep-seated distrust toward both the African National Congress (ANC) and the police force. At all levels of administration, there is a significant presence of organised crime and corruption which exists alongside a culture of impunity, which has contributed to lawlessness and the erosion of state institutions. As crime rates have surged, the ineptitude of law enforcement has sparked a wave of vigilantism across the country.

State Capture and Corruption

Jacob Zuma's presidency (2009-2018) was characterised by widespread corruption, substantially damaging political and institutional domains. Even before he was elected South Africa's fourth President, Zuma faced corruption and fraud charges, foreshadowing the corruption scandals that would define his time in office. Although corruption reached its zenith during the state capture period under Zuma's presidency, its corrosive influence remains pervasive and far-reaching. Rampant corruption undermines the criminal justice system, obstructs economic opportunities, disrupts social cohesion, impedes public services, and damages political integrity; thereby driving down living standards, weakening democracy, fostering organised crime, dissuading foreign investment, and exacerbating brain drain.

During Zuma's presidency, state capture was made possible by his administration and party’s meddling with the criminal justice system. He strategically disposed of leaders of key criminal justice institutions, such as the South African Police Service, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate, and the National Prosecuting Authority, appointing leaders more likely to be pliable. Concurrently, he removed those who might initiate investigations or prosecutions against him or his associates. Notably, Zuma was keen to protect and hide his corrupt dealings with the Gupta family, a prominent Indian business group. This manoeuvre systematically hollowed out state institutions and fostered an environment in which corruption flourished. The enduring consequences of Zuma's manipulation of the criminal justice system are palpable today as organised crime continues to surge throughout the country.

Corruption has inflicted a profound economic toll on South Africa. A predatory business environment has discouraged local startups and diminished the country's appeal to foreign investors. This decline in foreign investment became evident during Jacob Zuma's tenure; in 2017 Zuma removed highly respected Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, and instilled Malusi Gigaba, a loyalist, in his place. This move played a pivotal role in S&P Global's decision to downgrade South Africa's credit rating to junk status, with the agency explicitly stating that the removal of Gordhan - alongside other executive changes - undermined the country's fiscal health and growth prospects. In 2017, KPMG sacked its South African leadership due to its involvement with the Gupta family, who influenced mining, media, and technology assets. This led to KPMG losing twenty audit clients in that year, exemplifying the extensive repercussions of corruption and fraudulent activities, and highlighting the compliance and reputational risks of working with South African companies.

Various investigations, including the Zondo Commission, exposed irregular business dealings between the Gupta family and the South African government during Zuma's tenure. These dealings raised concerns about undue influence and corruption in allocating government contracts. One such case included the ten-year contract awarded to the Gupta family-owned company, Tegeta, to supply coal to the Majuba power station. Although such contracts were not inherently irregular, it came to light that Eskom paid more than double the rate to Tegeta than it paid to other coal suppliers, which has greatly contributed to loadshedding and subsequent power outages across the country. The investigation revealed that only the awardee benefitted from this arrangement. Interference in Eskom's operations was part of a broader pattern of state capture in state-owned enterprises under Zuma.

Loadshedding

One of the most pressing legacies of Zuma's presidency is loadshedding, resulting from years of mismanagement and state capture, which subjected South African citizens to a staggering 5,894 hours of power outages in 2023 alone. This crisis has taken a massive toll on the South African economy, costing as much as $46 million daily. Former Eskom CEO Andre De Ruyter has explained the challenges he encountered when endeavouring to reform Eskom, implying that high-ranking politicians were involved in pervasive corruption within the company, although he refrained from disclosing their identities. Furthermore, a correlation exists between load shedding and crime, with crime rates, especially in residential areas, surging during power outages. Loadshedding has also exacerbated inequality, leading to heightened tensions and increased social divisions.

State capture has led to a significant decrease in the ability of South African power stations to deliver sufficient electricity to the population. As money was syphoned out of Eskom’s coffers by corrupt officials, their lack of investment in maintenance and alternative energy sources rendered them unable to meet service obligations. Further, Eskom's power stations have been subjected to acts of sabotage and theft. Crime syndicates strategically target Eskom, where procurement teams pay excessive amounts for unnecessary contracts; syndicats orchestrate these acts to ensure their companies secure lucrative maintenance and supply contracts. The absence of substantial support from key bodies, such as the Ministry of Minerals and Energy, the South African Police, and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), has further hindered reform efforts as internal investigations remain unactioned.

Vigilantism

South African citizens have increasingly taken the law into their own hands; vigilante groups have filled the void left by a severe shortage of police officers in the country. This trend was exemplified in 2021 when South Africans took to the streets to protest against the 15-month imprisonment of Zuma. Responding to criminal activities, looting, arson, and damage to public property, residents in affected areas assumed law enforcement roles. These protests resulted in an estimated economic loss of over 50 billion rand. Vigilantism has become a prevailing trend in townships, evolving from local vigilante groups meting out their form of justice against criminals within their communities to a widespread practice of mob justice and extrajudicial killings across South African townships. 

The erosion of public trust in the police force, undermined by corruption and mismanagement, has created a detrimental cycle in which inhabitants of the most security-deprived townships are compelled to fend for themselves. Despite the shortage of police officers throughout South Africa, a disproportionate number of officers are stationed in affluent, predominantly white neighbourhoods. Grassroots initiatives, exemplified by organisations like Operation Wanya Tsotsi, have emerged to address this void. Despite the government's firm stance against vigilantism, overburdened law enforcement officers and local government officials often disregard vigilante actions, tacitly endorsing their activities.

Extortion Rackets 

Extortion rackets present a significant threat to investment in South Africa, as they aim to coerce companies into surrendering a portion of their profits (typically around 30 percent). The previous CEO of Eskom has alleged South African Police (SAP) involvement in extortion rackets, leveraging their assistance for compensation. Uncertainty exacerbated by extortion discourages investment and impedes development in South Africa.

It's estimated that extortion rackets have disrupted 183 infrastructure and construction projects, resulting in financial losses of up to 63 billion rand. The increased risks associated with contracting operations are likely to continue to discourage companies from conducting business in South Africa. In turn, lower levels of foreign and domestic investment contribute to elevated unemployment rates, worsening inequality, and slow growth.

As highlighted in Cyril Ramaphosa's 2022 State of the Nation address, the unreliability of electricity supply, inefficiencies in railways and ports, limitations in broadband spectrum, and declining water quality collectively deter companies from investing, hindering the economy.

Implications for 2024 Elections 

Leading up to the watershed 2024 elections, it appears increasingly improbable that the ANC will retain its power in its current form. Voter apathy and a diminishing majority in the latest local government elections have encouraged further factionalism within the ANC. Internally, contenders are engaged in fierce battles for political positions spanning various municipalities. The 2021 local government elections in South Africa bore witness to a landscape marred by political violence, assassinations, and chronic instability. Opposition political parties are leveraging such political violence to portray South Africa as a lawless mafia state that has been facilitated and promoted by the ANC government. As the 2024 elections draw nearer, opposition groups are likely to continue to push this narrative and in-fighting within the ANC is anticipated to persist. Although a solid performance by the opposition might signal an increase in the ease of doing business in South Africa, risks around political uncertainty are sustained in the short to medium term. 

There is increasing dissatisfaction with the governing ANC; state involvement in criminality remains the most pervasive force in driving organised crime. Many South African political parties have a  transactional or sectarian nature, appealing to identity politics that serve to divide- the lack of viable political alternatives has increased voter apathy since 1994. 

The ANC will likely win a significant portion of the vote in the 2024 elections, even though their support dipped below 50% in local government elections for the first time. As they are unlikely to obtain a majority, they will probably be forced to enter into a coalition government with one of the two major opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) or the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), although neither of these two parties are benefiting the most from the decline in ANC support. Instead, smaller parties such as ActionSA, Good, and the Patriotic Alliance have received increased support. Power struggles between municipal administrations and the national ANC government likely contributed to the lack of support for the larger and more established parties. The lack of a cohesive relationship between local and federal police structures has been attributed to power struggles between the DA, which rules Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and the ANC. As a result, the allocation of national police resources has remained skewed towards ANC strongholds. 

Implications for Stakeholders

Energy Sector -  The energy sector - particularly renewable energy - has the potential to attract significant foreign investment. The government has been actively pursuing renewable energy projects, but issues like corruption, mismanagement in state-owned enterprises, and power supply challenges have caused investor concerns. The lack of a stable energy supply particularly affects various industries and undermines South Africa's investment appeal, although moving towards wind and solar energy would likely make the electricity supply more reliable. Despite the obvious positive impacts of a transition to renewable energy, the vested interests of high-level politicians in the coal industry have impeded efforts to build new infrastructure to further this aim, sustaining levels of uncertainty for renewables companies interested in operating or expanding operations in South Africa. 

The move towards renewable energy would be better for the economy. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is designed to place a carbon price on imported goods based on their carbon content. It aims to prevent the relocation of high-emission industries to regions with weaker environmental regulations while incentivising global partners to implement greener practices. CBAM threatens South Africa’s exports and market share in several sectors. Reducing dependence on fossil fuels would help mitigate the adverse effects of CBAM, making South African exports more competitive in European markets. Increased costs from CBAM could deter manufacturing companies from initiating or expanding operations in South Africa.

Mining Sector -  South Africa is rich in mineral resources and has historically attracted substantial foreign investment in the mining sector, which significantly contributes to South Africa’s GDP and employs approximately 1.5 million people.  However, uncertainty in mining regulations, disputes over ownership, and labour unrest have deterred investors. A debate over the country’s Mining Charter requirements has created uncertainty for mining companies and hindered investment. Criminality is pervasive within the mining sector. Tens of thousands of illegal miners work for criminal outfits, costing the sector up to seven billion rand a year. De Ruyter has highlighted the dangers associated with coal mining towns in which violent cartels rule the surrounding areas and extort citizens as well as mining companies. In this climate of fear, mining companies are often obliged to hire private security to protect their assets and employees, highlighting the security risks associated with mining operations in South Africa which are exacerbated by inadequate policing. 

Conclusion/Recommendations

The government must champion transparency, accountability, and citizen participation, fostering nationwide resilience against corruption and organised crime. Rebuilding public trust and combating rampant corruption is a non-linear process. However, the government can demonstrate its commitment to reform by promoting transparency, instituting oversight mechanisms, and ensuring accountability. Crime rates are likely to decline as trust is gradually restored in state institutions. Institutions such as the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) should be reinforced to ensure that the judicial system functions autonomously and is devoid of power abuses. Organised crime syndicates would find it progressively less attractive to operate within the country, and the legal system would be empowered to investigate and apprehend their members, even if influential figures within the government are implicated in the process. By highlighting their dedication to the rule of law and minimising state interference, the government would instil a greater sense of security among South Africans and incentivize investment.

Sahelian Security Tracker - Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger

Welcome to the Africa Desk SST, where we aim to provide granular insights for companies, organisations, or individuals operating or travelling in the central-western Sahel and/or Gulf of Guinea using intelligence techniques. If you are interested in more tailored insights, contact us at externalrelations@londonpolitica.com.

Burkina Faso

If you would like to see a more comprehensive overview of events in Burkina Faso, see the first edition of our SST here.

Based on the information we have collected since the last edition of the SST, terrorist violence in Burkina Faso continues to proliferate across the country, with the northern regions (Centre-nord in particular) bearing the brunt of terrorist activity. Attacks against civilians and combatants are continuing at a rapid pace, occurring frequently in the country’s north, west, east, and southeast. Attacks are also becoming more common in Centre-ouest, a region in close proximity to the capital, Ouagadougou. 

The country also finds itself in the midst of an intense battle with a dengue fever outbreak that is currently most pronounced in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso, Hauts-Bassins region. So far, over 73,000 cases have been registered in the country, although the true number is likely far higher. International organisations including UNICEF and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) are working to train doctors to handle dengue in Hauts-Bassins, deliver clean water, improve sanitation, and provide healthcare services. Several regions in the north have been entirely cut off from aid due to terrorist activity.

Recent Developments

9 October - JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) claims via their Al-Zallaqa media channel that they set off an explosive device against elements of FABF in Séguénéga, Northern Burkina Faso, killing several.

11 October - JNIM attacked the Volantaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP) - a volunteer defence unit that works alongside FABF (Forces Armées du Burkina Faso) and the national police - and the national police at their camp in Yamba, Eastern Burkina Faso, killing at least 20.

11-12 October - FABF claims to have acquired intelligence pertaining to a JNIM attack in Sitgo, Séguénéga. They claim to have launched subsequent airstrikes against JNIM in the staging area which were aided by ground forces.

12 October - JNIM claims to have attacked FABF in Banwali, Hauts-Bassins. They claim to have acquired heavy weaponry in the assault.

16 October - According to FABF, JNIM attacked FABF and VDP positions near Tikaré, Bam, Centre-nord. FABF says they launched air strikes against the militants as they fled north after the attack.

18 October - The government of the Centre-nord state extended a ban on certain models of motorbikes that are commonly utilised by JNIM militants.

18 October - According to FABF, they carried out airstrikes against JNIM militants in Zoura, Centre-nord, who had attacked a VDP position in Sian, Centre-nord. They also claim to have killed militants in airstrikes in Silgadji, Soum, Sahel region. 

19 October - According to local media sources, JNIM carried out an attack on a primary school in Zawara, Sanguié. This represents a rare attack in the Centre-ouest region and was the first attack in Zawara. 

Operational Forecast

• We maintain that it is unlikely that FABF will be able to effectively abate JNIM attacks across the majority of Burkinabe territory over the next 6 months and it is unlikely that FABF will take significant territory back from JNIM in the same time period.

• We maintain that it is likely that JNIM will continue to carry out attacks in increasingly close proximity to Ouagadougou, within the regions of Centre-ouest and Plateau Central, and it is likely they will attempt to carry out an attack in Ouagadougou over the next 6 months.

• Since our forecast last week, JNIM attacked a primary school in Centre-ouest.

• Although Ouagadougou is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM will attempt to capture Ouagadougou within the next year in the absence of adequate international assistance.

• Flights to and from Ouagadougou are unlikely to be significantly impacted by conflict over the next 3 months.

• It is likely that the efforts of NGOs and IGOs to address the dengue outbreak, particularly in the Hauts-Bassins region, will be directly impacted by the proliferation of terror groups. 

• These groups, including the IRC, are almost certain to continue to face supply chain difficulties across the country, particularly in Djibo, the hub of IRC operations in Burkina Faso. 

• NGOs and IGOs are increasingly likely to become direct targets for property theft or violent attacks by terror groups as the groups proliferate.

Niger

If you would like to see a more comprehensive overview of events in Niger, see the first edition of our SST here.

Niger continues to see terrorist-related violence across the country’s southwest, in Tillabéri department in particular. Levels of violence remain slightly elevated from pre-coup levels but significantly lower than in Mali or Burkina Faso. However, the attacks that do occur are occurring in closer proximity to the capital, Niamey, sustaining risks to global businesses and large population centres. NGOs that operate across Tillabéri, including the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), are at a uniquely heightened risk of being affected by terrorist violence. Supply chain issues with the transfer of humanitarian supplies are likely to be exacerbated and increasing displacement as a result of the conflict is likely to further strain NGO resources.

Recent Developments

9 October - The French military begins formal withdrawal from Niger.

15 October - Burkinabe journalist reports that JNIM is enforcing a blockade on the village of Tamou, Tillabéri department, (100km south of Niamey) and is asking populations of nearby villages to leave. We have not been able to independently verify this claim.

15 October - A local journalist reports that terrorists ambushed FAN between Teguéy and Téra, Tillabéri, killing at least 2. We have not been able to independently verify this claim.

15 & 16 October - FAN (Forces Armées Nigeriennes) clashed with militants over a two day period in Lendou, Tillabéri. FAN claims that 31 terrorists were killed alongside 6 Nigerien soldiers.

17 October - Social media accounts claim that ISGS (The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) invaded the villages of Toukounous and Garin Guiye, northeast of Niamey. We have not been able to independently verify this claim.

19 October - The Nigerien government reports that deposed ex-president Mohamed Bazoun attempted to escape military custody and leave the country. The government says it foiled the attempt.

22 October - The French military completed its withdrawal from its camp in Ouallam, Tillabéri (roughly 100km north of Niamey), handing it over to FAN. 475 French soldiers have departed the country since 20 October. 

Operational Forecast

• We maintain that it is likely that ISGS and JNIM will continue to carry out attacks and consolidate more territory in southwest Niger, in Tillabéri and Téra departments in particular. Intelligence gaps created by the ongoing withdrawal of the French and an under-resourced FAN will make it challenging to address the growing terror threat.

• Barring the implementation of mitigating factors, such as a holistic plan to address terror or security/intelligence agreements with foreign partners (the latter looks unlikely since the coup), there is a reasonable possibility that terror groups may pose a threat to Niamey within the next 6 months. 

• FAN is likely to remain in control of Niamey over the next 6 months, but there is a reasonable possibility that ISGS will attempt an attack in Niamey in the same time period.

• Flights to and from Niamey are unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence in the next 3 months.

• We maintain that it is very unlikely that terror groups in Niger’s southeast will pose a significant threat to the Nigerien state, or to large businesses and organisations, over the next 6 months. 

• We maintain that uranium mines in the north, near the city of Arlit, that are majority owned by the Orana group, are very unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence over the next 6 months, however supply chain complications resulting from an increase in violence in the south may increase costs for companies.

• The Orana Group may also face local reputational challenges and resulting security threats stemming from its ties to the French Government.

• We maintain that gold mining projects in the country’s southwest, including the Samira Hill Gold Mine in Téra, are likely to be directly impacted by terrorist violence in the next 6 months. Terror groups may directly target the mines to add to their illicit mining operations.

• NGOs are very likely to continue to face heightened operational challenges across the country’s southwest as a result of terror proliferation. 

• The DRC’s operations in Tillabéri are almost certain to be continuously affected, and NGOs in the region may be targeted in attacks. 

• Although the DRC’s operations in Dosso (roughly 140km southeast of Niamey) are unlikely to be significantly impacted in the next 3 months, there is an increasing likelihood that they may be impacted in the medium term.

Mali 

If you would like to see a more comprehensive overview of events in Mali, see the first edition of our SST here.

As the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) continues its withdrawal, the security situation across Northern and Central Mali continues to deteriorate. JNIM has continued its attacks on FAMa (Forces Armées Maliennes) elements, as well as on UN convoys, underscoring the heightened risk faced by the UN and international organisations in Northern and Central Mali. A spokesman of the CSP (Cadre Stratégique Permanent), a consortium of Tuareg rebel groups, has claimed the CSP will stop FAMa from retaking Northern Mali. According to several Tuareg-run media sources, FAMa and Wagner have committed significant human rights abuses amid offensives over the last two weeks, including the killing of civilians.

JNIM is currently attempting to enforce a complete blockade on Timbuktu and Gao, the two largest cities in the north, causing shortages of fuel, food, and medicine; a Gao resident who spoke to the BBC says fuel shortages are causing blackouts. All flights to and from Gao have been grounded. These developments sustain and heighten supply chain risks across the immediate region - this is particularly relevant to businesses in Niger, who share significant trade relationships with businesses in the Gao region of Mali.

Recent Developments

*When referring to FAMa announcements, we put the word ‘terrorists’ in parentheses because FAMa refers to both the CSP, as well as JNIM and ISGS as terrorists.

13 October - JNIM ambushes FAMa in Konna Boré, Central Mali, killing 17 and destroying and seizing vehicles.

15 October - JNIM announces via their Al-Zallaqa channel that they attacked FAMa with an IED between Gao and Anefis, Northern Mali, on 15 October. They also announced they had fired on a UN cargo plane in Tessalit, which was confirmed by FAMa. 

17 & 18 October - FAMa announces that they launched counteroffensives on ‘terrorists’ near Tessalit, and conducted airstrikes on convoys in Tessalit and Kidal.

18 October - JNIM announces that they attacked FAMa near Diangassagou, Central Mali, destroying cars and ammunition, and that they burned over 40 UN peacekeeper trucks in Kuna, Mopti, Central Mali.

19 October - According to the UN, another UN plane landing in Tessalit was fired upon. 

21 October - MINUSMA completes withdrawal from Tessalit camp, Northern Mali. According to the UN, they completed their withdrawal from Tessalit ahead of schedule due to an “extremely tense and degraded security context.”

22 October - MINUSMA completes withdrawal from Aguelhok camp, Northern Mali, and Douentza camp, Central Mali.

23 October - FAMa announces that ‘terrorists’ raided the Aguelhok camp after the UN withdrawal. FAMa also stated that the UN retreat threatens the security of the Aguelhok region and that FAMa remains in possession of the Tessalit and Anefis camps recently abandoned by the UN.. 

25 October - JNIM claims they undertook an IED attack on a FAMa and Wagner convoy between Hombori and Gossi, Northern Mali, killing all passengers. 

26 October - The UN announces that a UN logistics convoy travelling from Ansongo to Labbezanga, Gao, Northern Mali, was fired upon by 4 assailants. One driver was seriously injured.

Operational Forecast

• It is likely that the security situation across Central and Northern Mali will continue to deteriorate as more peacekeepers continue to withdraw.

• Given FAMa and Wagner’s apparent inability to hold territory in the country’s centre - even as they undertake offensives to the north - we continue to assess that it is likely that terror groups will continue to carry out persistent attacks in Central Mali mostly unabated, and also that these groups are likely to continue to slowly expand southwest towards Bamako.

• Since our last forecast, JNIM has undertaken several attacks on FAMa in Central Mali.

• We continue to assess that it is very unlikely that flights to and from Timbuktu will resume in the next 3 months, and very unlikely that we will see an increase in flights to and from Gao in the next 3 months. Flights to and from Gao airport have been suspended as JNIM attempts to blockade the city.

• We maintain that Bamako is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, but there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM may attempt to carry out a large-scale attack there in the next 6 months to a year. In the next 6 months to a year, JNIM may attempt to take Bamako.

• It is likely that UN personnel and assets will continue to come under threat in Northern Mali as a means to expedite the group’s exit from the country. There is a reasonable possibility that international organisations - principally NGOs that are active in Central Mali - may also face attacks from JNIM in the short-medium term.

Namibia’s Mineral Export Ban

On June 8 2023, the Namibian government announced an export ban on unprocessed lithium and other rare earth minerals (REMs). Namibia is the second African nation to impose an export ban on critical minerals, after Zimbabwe, highlighting the rise of resource nationalism, which aims to capitalise on rising global demand for sought-after commodities in the transition to net zero.

Namibia’s Domestic Interests

Rising demand for electric vehicles and consumer devices drove lithium prices to $75,000 per metric ton in March 2022, a 400 per cent increase compared to its previous five-year average of $15,000. The increasing profitability of rare earth minerals has prompted nations with known reserves to expand their processing capacity. China currently processes most of the world’s REMs, with 58 per cent of the world’s lithium processing taking place within its borders. Namibia’s ban on REM exports aims to improve domestic refining capacity. The International Energy Agency predicts that the country’s mineral export volume will triple in size by 2030. If it is all processed at home, Namibia will see a significant rise in the output’s added value.

Namibia’s President, Hage Geingob, views domestic mineral development as key to industrialisation. The Mines and Energy Minister, Tom Alweendo, asserted that there is “no way” Namibia could industrialise without processing its minerals. Mining and quarrying make up 9.3 per cent of Namibia’s GDP and 66 per cent of its total exports, driven mainly by uranium mining and rough diamonds. Lithium processing would allow for diversification in Namibia’s mining sector, reducing reliance on the fluctuating value of unprocessed mineral exports and forging a path toward sustainable growth. Banning the export of lithium is expected to increase the mineral supply in Namibia, enabling processing plants to purchase unrefined lithium at a discount. Minimising development costs is vital to incentivising domestic and foreign investment. Namibian wealth management firm Simonis Storm Securities projects that Namibia’s lithium refining industry could be worth nearly $1 billion annually by 2025. 

Namibia’s Chamber of Mines, an association of mining and quarrying organisations, announced their support for the government’s ban on lithium exports. Chamber executive Veston Malango described it as “necessary” to “grow the economy in line with the African Mining Vision.” This refers to the African Mining Vision (AMV), an African Union strategy meant to enhance Africa’s utilisation of natural resources and “underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socioeconomic development.” The Union’s decision to include lithium processing within the AMV strategy underlines the government’s expectations for future lithium demand in the medium to long term.

International Significance

Namibia signed a trade agreement with the European Union in October 2022, in which it highlighted plans to become a reliable mineral processor. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has shown explicit support for Namibia’s ambitions, stating that processing will “not only create greater local prosperity…we will ensure that we have more than just one supplier in the future.” Further, two months after Namibia’s announcement on the banning of lithium exports, it signed a joint REM exploration agreement with Japan. 

The shift in mineral-related focus toward Southern Africa is part of broader efforts from Indo-Pacific and Western nations to reduce reliance on China for sourcing REMs - China began investing in Southern African mining before any other major economy. Namibia is one of five African nations included in Japan’s critical mineral strategy designed to reduce dependence on China, which imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium in July.

Namibian mineral refining represents another opportunity for the United States to challenge China's position in the global mining market. Amos Hochstein, United States Security Envoy, called for more “competition” across “multiple countries,” emphasising the United States’ desire to access REMs without the risk of political friction. Rystad Energy, an energy consultancy, forecasts a significant increase in Namibian lithium output from approximately 5,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate in 2024 to 33,000 in 2030, lifting investor confidence in Namibia’s mining sector. 

Whilst the capacity of Southern African nations to produce and process REMs may ease reliance on Chinese processing, China will remain a goliath. Africa’s six largest lithium mining nations could account for approximately 12 per cent of global supply by 2031, stressing the importance of multilateral trade cooperation in transitioning to net zero. Namibia’s mineral wealth means it can become a crucial stakeholder in REM supply chains.

Structural Challenges

Scaling up domestic lithium production will require firms to adjust to Namibia’s new regulatory practices, potentially delaying the launch of new processing plants. Included in the Namibian government’s mining plan is a provision which may allow for the lifting of lithium export restrictions in select circumstances, allowing the export of limited quantities of unprocessed ore at the direction of the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The government's authority in determining export arrangements may impede metallurgical testing, a vital component in the design phase of new facilities, which would further lengthen the testing period of new processing plants and negate potential marginal gains.

The Geingob government continues to battle allegations of corruption in mining, which first emerged in October 2022. Chinese mining firm Xinfeng Investments denies accusations of forgery, acquiring mining licences through bribery, and illegally exporting raw materials to China under the pretence of mineral testing; Namibia’s Business and Intellectual Property Authority has suspended two unnamed officials suspected of facilitating the purchase of lithium mining licences which Xinfeng Investments later acquired. Further, the technical advisor of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ralph Muyamba, awarded mining licenses to Orange River Mining, owned by his cousin, worsening suspicions of corruption.

Minister Alweendo’s subsequent amendment of the ministry’s mining licence application process indicates that the Namibian government may not have in place the requisite regulatory framework to eliminate illegal activity but also shows that it is willing to take steps towards mitigating corruption risks. Following the corruption allegations aimed at Xinfeng Investments, the Anti-Corruption Commission re-evaluated the trustworthiness of prospective investors and now requires organisations to provide comprehensive plans detailing how they intend to conduct mining operations in Namibia. The procedure aims to tighten licence procurement procedures and to stop licence-holders from selling them off to third parties. Eliminating shadow markets is essential to fulfilling Namibia’s ambition of increased value-addition in mining; failing to enforce the amendment may deter investment from capable organisations amid concern that Namibia cannot optimally exploit its mineral wealth under current regulations.

Namibia is not the latest African nation to restrict the export of unprocessed minerals. On July 27, the Ghanaian government approved its ‘Minerals of the Future’ policy, an export ban which intends to encourage domestic lithium processing. The broader trend of resource nationalism aims to empower mineral-rich states by increasing their stake in mining operations. Namibia’s decision to ban lithium exports underscores the urgency for the country to strengthen its regulatory framework to capitalise on this significant economic opportunity.

Water Scarcity in Africa: A Changing Landscape of Challenges and Opportunities

The right to water, as recognized by the United Nations, entitles all individuals to access to sufficient, safe, physically accessible, and affordable water. However, this right is not reflected in practice. The African continent has suffered from a water scarcity crisis for decades. Its implications on communities’ food, health, and economic security have been critical and have not been effectively mitigated by governments or international humanitarian actors. There is an urgent need for improved infrastructure and governance, enhanced international cooperation, and greater awareness about the effects of water scarcity to tackle the crisis in Africa and ensure that all individuals are provided with enough clean water to meet at least their basic needs.

Drivers and Recent Trends

Water scarcity in Africa has developed into a complex emergency. Changing climate patterns, a rapidly growing population, inadequate infrastructure, and poor governance have contributed to a critical water crisis that threatens both the health of the African population and the stability and development of the entire region.

Of the 23 countries worldwide labelled as ‘critically water-insecure’ by the UN Institute for Water, Environment and Health, 13 are located in Africa. These countries are characterised by low levels of access to safe drinking water, sanitation services, and water resource stability. Africa has the lowest levels of safe water access of any continent; in 2020, only 15 per cent of the continent had access to safe drinking water. In Chad, nearly 50 per cent of the population consumes drinking water with very high levels of E. coli, while just 6 per cent has access to safely managed potable water.

Source: Mason, Nalamalapu & Corfee-Morlot 2019

Over the past five decades, despite advancements in access to safe water and sanitation around the world, since 2020 Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed an increase in the proportion of its population lacking access to secure potable water services. An estimated 70 per cent of people in Sub-Saharan Africa lack safe drinking water services.

Source: Naddaf 2023

Several mutually-reinforcing factors are contributing to Africa’s water scarcity crisis. First, the continent’s climate, characterised by high temperatures, variable rainfall, and harsh aridity, has contributed to both desertification and intense flooding. While Africa has the highest number of countries at high risk of droughts, there remains a severe threat of flooding, as evidenced in Somalia and Ethiopia earlier this year.

Second, Africa’s rapid population growth is increasing the demand for water resources. Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing at 2.7 per cent annually, which is more than twice as fast as South Asia (1.2 per cent) and Latin America (0.9 per cent). This is placing immense pressure on the continent’s water and food resources, especially as these are gradually being depleted by (largely human-induced) forces such as climate change.

Third, government policies have been unable to slow these trends. Distinguishing between physical and economic water scarcity is fundamental to understanding the implications of water scarcity and devising appropriate responses. Physical scarcity refers to the condition wherein available water resources fall short of fulfilling the needs and demands of the population. On the other hand, economic water scarcity arises where, despite the natural availability of water, access to water is limited due to a lack of infrastructure, high costs, and institutional constraints – in other words, due to poor policies and governance. 

Arid regions of the continent, mainly located in North Africa, are characterised by physical water scarcity, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa predominantly experiences economic water scarcity. Interestingly, water stressed countries, particularly Algeria, Libya, and Egypt in the North, and Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana in the South, make water available to a higher proportion of people than in countries with abundant water resources, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC possesses over half of Africa’s water reserves and receives frequent rain, yet lacks the infrastructure and regulations to provide millions of Congolese with access to clean water. Even within countries, economic water scarcity impacts individuals differently, as it acts upon existing socio-economic inequalities dictated by income, gender, race, level of education, or political beliefs. These statistics highlight the role of government policy in ensuring an equitable distribution and supply of safe water for citizens.

Economic water insecurity is often derived from poor regulatory mechanisms governing the use of bodies of water. The pollution and contamination of water have become critical issues, stemming at least in part from the mismanagement of agricultural, animal, and industrial waste, as well as the overexploitation of bodies of water, as in South Africa. As a result, contaminated water is often utilised in households, particularly in settings where alternative water sources are unavailable.

Fourth, private companies and organisations have attempted to profit from Africa’s limited public water access by privatising water. This has rendered water an increasingly elusive resource by making it more expensive and inaccessible. In areas worst hit by droughts, in the Horn of Africa for example, the cost of water has increased by up to 400 per cent, leaving many without enough water to meet basic needs. Water privatisation has thereby widened inequalities, while also potentially creating opportunities for corruption. In Uganda, “private contractors estimated the average bribe related to a contract award to be 10 percent (of the total cost),” meanwhile an estimated 46 per cent of urban water consumers pay extra money to connect their households to a water network. Corruption ultimately inflates water prices, thus denying poorer segments of the population access to water.

Fifth, climate change is further complicating matters. The Horn of Africa region, for example, is in its fourth consecutive year of drought and is experiencing the impacts of “one of the worst climate-induced emergencies of the past 40 years.” The region’s minimal rainfall has triggered a water scarcity crisis, with more than 8.5 million people, almost half of them children, facing dire water shortages. This represents merely one instance amid a multitude of cases across the continent.

The Implications of Water Scarcity

The water scarcity crisis in Africa has, and will continue to have, important consequences at the local, regional, and international level. Not only does it critically impact human security, but is also intensifying migration flows and exacerbating conflicts, thereby requiring regional and international bodies to step up their operations to respond to growing humanitarian emergencies.

First, water scarcity has a prejudicious effect on the continent’s human security. The lack of safe, accessible drinking water increases the likelihood of chronic dehydration, particularly in areas with arid climates. Water scarcity also compromises food security and livelihoods. A large proportion of the African population is reliant on agriculture, farming, and fishing for both personal consumption and as a source of income. The inconsistent access to and supply of water reduces crop yields and the availability of food, exposing communities to critical socio-economic and health vulnerabilities. Moreover, water scarcity contributes to environmental degradation; parts of Africa have witnessed increasing desertification and a loss of biodiversity, which compounds existing challenges to livelihoods. For example, over one-third of Burkina Faso’s farmland is degraded as a result of both prolonged periods of drought and improper land use, thus gravely impacting the population’s food and economic security.

From a macro-level perspective, water scarcity can also slow economic growth. Inconsistent agricultural yields and industrial productivity that contribute to persistent poverty and famines, make water insecurity a critical impediment to economic development. Simultaneously, limited food outputs can induce inflation and thus impact both national and global food prices.

Water scarcity also significantly increases the likelihood and spread of diseases, such as cholera and diarrhoea. An estimated 842,000 people die from diarrhoea every year as a result of unsafe drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene. Access to hand-washing facilities ranges from 25 per cent of the population in Chad, to just 9 per cent in Burkina Faso. In regions characterised by water scarcity, communities are less inclined to allocate water resources to hygiene-related activities, thereby augmenting the probability of disease proliferation and transmission.

 Source: Our World in Data 2019

Water scarcity’s impact on human, health, and economic security inherently reinforces inequalities. While communities living in rural areas, informal settlements, or low-income settings often struggle to meet their basic water needs, individuals in comparatively advantageous socio-economic positions are able to access privatised sources of water. Water scarcity disproportionately impacts the most vulnerable people, including children who are at a greater risk of developing conditions stemming from malnutrition, such as stunting and diabetes. Water insecurity may also exacerbate gender inequalities; when water is not easily accessible, the burden of travelling to collect it often falls on women and girls. This represents a “high opportunity cost to obtaining education or employment.”

Second, water scarcity is a driving factor for migration. Internal displacement in African countries has significantly increased in recent years due to persistent conflict, resource scarcity, and natural disasters. In Burkina Faso, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) grew from less than 50,000 in October 2019 to around 2 million in March 2023. Inherently, migration hinders the ability to secure stable and reliable access to water resources. Rural-urban migration, towards Nairobi and Mombasa for instance, has led to overcrowding in cities not equipped to deal with overpopulation, placing huge strains on water resources, further intensifying water scarcity. Water insecurity has also driven transborder migration, increasing the demand for, and pressure on, water resources in neighbouring countries. The almost-total disappearance of Lake Chad, a vital source of water and livelihoods for 30 million people in the Sahel, has forced the displacement of three million people and has left 11 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The combination of resource shortages, forced migration, and pre-existing tensions has served to trigger violence between fishing, farming, and herding communities.

Third, water insecurity has contributed to the provocation of conflict on the African continent, both within and across borders. Violent clashes have, in turn, exacerbated human security and triggered further migration and conflict. Beyond Lake Chad, tensions have emerged between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over access to the Nile Basin, especially after the latter began the construction of a hydroelectric dam that Egypt claims could drastically reduce water flows into the country. Moreover, the potential for, and fears of, transboundary conflict have triggered intra-state discontent. For example, the development of the ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ heightened the Egyptian public’s concerns about reliable water access and generated significant pressure on the government to respond firmly. Furthermore, human dependence on water has been intentionally exploited during conflicts; water resources, systems, and infrastructure required to deliver water have come under direct attack. In fact, children under the age of 5 living in conflict zones are 20 times more likely to die from diseases linked to unsafe water and sanitation than from direct violence.

Fourth, on a more global scale, the combination of famines, droughts, diseases, migratory flows, and armed conflicts resulting from water scarcity in Africa have generated an urgent demand for international humanitarian interventions. The international community is confronted with growing expectations regarding the coordination of increasing volumes of aid to help African governments mitigate the local impacts of water stress. Additionally, international actors must overcome barriers to the access of remote or crisis-affected settings to ensure the timely delivery of essential water resources and facilitate the development of vital infrastructure. The international community finds itself at a critical juncture as current efforts to address the unfolding water scarcity crisis hold the potential to shape long-term trajectories and trends.

Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

Evidently, the water scarcity crisis entails significant risks and challenges for African governments and the international community in years to come. Current trends indicate that water scarcity, as well as its consequences for human security (including famines, poverty, inequality, health insecurity, migration, and conflict) are likely to worsen. Both climate change and Africa’s rapid population growth will place increasing pressure on the continent’s water resources, while central governments may lack not only the capacity, but also the political will, to respond adequately. Guaranteeing equitable access to safe, clean, and sufficient water to meet individual basic needs, both personal and economic - and thus preventing the onset of large-scale humanitarian crises - will represent a critical governance challenge in coming years. Measures must be taken to improve national water management, storage, distribution, and recycling capacities, especially through infrastructure expansion. Governments will have to recentre their efforts towards preventing and managing water scarcity, instead of merely attempting to deal with its consequences. 

At the same time, the unfolding challenges linked to water scarcity in Africa present important opportunities for both governments and the international community. First, huge potential exists for states to invest in and develop durable infrastructure to ensure the reliable supply of clean water to homes. This specifically includes piped water systems, which can help provide communities with readily available drinking water, while removing the need for women and children to travel long distances and forgo education or work. This would inevitably increase children’s school attendance and free up time for women to engage in more productive activities, which would have positive implications for countries’ economic growth. 

Simultaneously, governments should invest in the development and distribution of sustainable, water-efficient, climate-resilient practices and technology, such as drip irrigation, reforestation, and the extraction and recycling of groundwater, to sustain livelihoods and mitigate physical water scarcity in the long term. Thus far, “water resources harnessed and land area developed for irrigation in Africa are still far below the (region’s) potential,” opening up an opportunity to fill this gap. The digitisation of agriculture and farming would significantly help conserve water resources and render activities more productive and efficient, thus contributing to communities’ food, health, and economic security. Some African countries have already taken important steps in this regard: Namibia has improved urban wastewater management in Windhoek, recycling sewage water into drinking water, meanwhile the Kenyan government has sought to increase the distribution of drought-tolerant maize varieties. 

Equally important is the need for improved data collection; governments must cooperate with sub-national actors to expand the available data on both physical and economic water scarcity, to ensure that implemented projects yield desired results and are endorsed by recipient communities. All the above efforts can be pursued jointly by national governments, the private sector, and the international community.

Relatedly, the water scarcity crisis presents an important opportunity to enhance cooperation on water management at the regional and international level, whether through development institutions, regional bodies, or inter-state frameworks. Currently, multilateral efforts to combat climate change and reverse water scarcity trends in Africa are insufficient. There is still no global framework for addressing water stress, like there is for climate change and the preservation of biodiversity. Water insecurity must be prioritised on international and regional agendas. State and non-state actors alike should increase their support to African governments, through capacity-building programmes, disbursements of financial assistance, exchanges of technical expertise, and infrastructure development. 

The United States’ Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), developed in 2022, represents a good starting point, as it seeks to mobilise private capital investment towards infrastructure linked to climate and energy security, digital connectivity, health security, and gender equality. Such goals could support important investments in water infrastructure. Yet this initiative does not go far enough to prioritise the issue of water scarcity and forefront the urgent need for improvements to water management policy and infrastructure in Africa.

Source: Our World in Data 2021

Meanwhile, within Africa, the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group, as part of the African Union, has been playing an important role in tackling water scarcity. Its sovereign insurance mechanism has paid out over $36 million to African countries affected by drought since 2014, preventing further famines, poverty, and health insecurity. However, this framework has mainly focused on assisting countries to respond to the effects of water scarcity, rather than encouraging the development of infrastructure and technology that can mitigate and prevent these effects in the first place. Despite providing important assistance in times of crisis, more needs to be done to ensure that all individuals across Africa obtain reliable access to safe, clean, and readily available water before having to suffer the impacts of water scarcity.

Lastly, there is a crucial opportunity to enhance education and raise awareness about water scarcity and its effects, particularly on human health. Governments must invest in initiatives aimed at encouraging behavioural changes, particularly where water scarcity is less pronounced, and promoting climate-resilient agricultural practices. Central governments must simultaneously support bottom-up, micro-level initiatives seeking to tackle both the causes and effects of water insecurity. Only through a combination of local, regional, national, and international efforts can the current water scarcity crisis be mitigated and communities across Africa be provided with long-term access to clean, safe, and affordable water.

Sahelian Security Tracker - Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger

Welcome to the Africa Desk SST, where we aim to provide bi-weekly, granular insights for companies, organisations, or individuals operating or travelling in the central-western Sahel and/or Gulf of Guinea using intelligence techniques. If you are interested in more tailored insights, contact us at externalrelations@londonpolitica.com.

Overview

Over the last several years various coups have rocked Sahelian Africa - the central-western Sahel in particular. Coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, in Burkina Faso in January 2022 and September 2022, and in Niger in 2023 have had and will continue to have security implications for governments, international ogranisations, NGOs, and businesses. Since the respective coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, it is undeniable that the security situation in both countries has continued to worsen. 

In Mali, the government and Russian private military contractor Wagner are battling Tuareg separatist groups in the north, as well as terror groups Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Central Mali and The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the east. London Politica research indicates that the government is unlikely to be able to recapture and hold large portions of land in the country’s north, centre, or east in the short to medium term.

In Burkina Faso, terror groups JNIM and ISGS have continued to ramp up attacks and now have a significant presence in all regions apart from Centre-Ouest, Centre-Sud, Centre (Ouagadougou, the capital), and Plateau-Central. While there has not been a large-scale terror attack in the capital since 2018, we assess that - in the absence of significant foreign security assistance and/or a holistic counter-terrorism strategy - it is likely that JNIM will carry out an attack in Ouagadougou in the next year. 

In Niger, in the two months since the coup ISGS activity has significantly increased. Terrorist activity is largely concentrated in the country’s southwest, and attacks have grown bolder, more frequent, and have occurred closer to the capital, Niamey, since the coup. 

JNIM’s tentacles have also extended into Benin, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Ghana within the last year, where terrorists have committed attacks and others have been identified and arrested by local authorities. We will cover these countries in future editions of the SST.

Mali

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Mali has seen a 38% increase in political violence from last year, almost all of which can be attributed to terror groups (principally JNIM but also ISGS), the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa), and the Wagner group. JNIM has carried out attacks and, alongside the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP), a loose consortium of Tuareg separatist groups, taken territory throughout the centre and north of the country, including several army bases. JNIM is currently maintaining a blockade around Timbuktu, the most populous city in the country’s north, and is not letting any goods in and out of the city. 

In September JNIM and FAMa had a large battle in the Timbuktu region, leaving roughly 60 dead. JNIM holds a significant amount of territory in Central Mali and has recently committed repeated attacks in and around Mopti and Segou - the latter is roughly 230km from Bamako.

JNIM and ISGS have also been wreaking havoc as of late in the country’s east, in and around Gao, from which the ISGS has fanned out into Southwestern Niger. Given there is very little evidence of clashes between JNIM, ISGS, and the CSP, it is feasible to assume that the groups are - at the very least - working in cooperation with one another. Dragonfly Intelligence anticipates that over the coming months it is highly likely that the Malian Government will “lose control of large parts of their territory.”

Further, London Politica has spotted a Tunisian Air Force plane that has been making recurring trips from Bamako to and from an unknown destination in the country’s north over the last week. This may indicate that Tunisia is offering, or planning to offer some sort of military assistance.

Recent Developments

*When referring to FAMa announcements, we put the word ‘terrorists’ in parentheses because FAMa refers to both the CSP, as well as JNIM and ISGS, as terrorists.

27 September - JNIM announces via their Al-Zallaqa media channel that they attacked FAMa in Acharane, a village 35km west of Timbuktu, showing off a wealth of military gear and trucks commandeered from FAMa. FAMa announced that they repelled the attack successfully and a local news source posted a video of the encounter that we have not been able to verify.

28 September - FAMa announces that ‘terrorists’ attacked an army camp in Dioura, in Central Mali. They reported to have repelled the attack, killing roughly 50 militants. A spokesperson for CSP told Africanews that it had captured the camp.

1 October - FAMa reports that there was intense fighting between them and ‘terrorists’ in Bamba, just under 200km east of Timbuktu. A video (WARNING - SENSITIVE CONTENT) published by an independent journalist purports to show CSP fighters celebrating the capturing of the camp.

2 October - A FAMa convoy departed Gao to head north towards Tessalit, Aguelhok, and Kidal, which are CSP strongholds. A Tuareg news agency reported that the convoy split into three smaller convoys, one heading to the north, another to the east, and one towards Enviv, in the far north.

3 & 4 October - FAMa reports that there was an attack on their convoys in Almoustrat, Northern Mali and Nampala, Central Mali on 3 October, and an attack on a dam in Taoussa, Northern Mali on 4 October. Further, a CSP spokesperson told Reuters that they seized the FAMa army camp in Taoussa, roughly 250km east of Timbuktu, on 4 October.

5 October - FAMa claims in a communique that ‘terrorists’ failed to stop their advance to the north, 10km south of Anefis, Northern Mali.

6 October - CSP militants post a video claiming the army has made no progress towards Enviv. On the same day FAMa announced they repelled an attack in Nyiminyama, Central Mali.

7 October - CSP claims it is being bombarded by FAMa strikes as they were attempting to encircle Enviv, Northern Mali.

7 & 9 October - a CSP commander (WARNING - SENSITIVE CONTENT) and local journalist claim that FAMa and Wagner have committed persistent atrocities over the last week in their offensive towards the country’s North. Although we cannot verify the video, these atrocities are in line with previous acts committed recently by FAMa and Wagner in other parts of Mali.

Operational Forecast

• Given FAMa and Wagner’s apparent inability to hold territory in the country’s centre - even as they undertake offensives to the north - as well as the persistent increase in terror attacks in the area, we assess that it is likely that terror groups will continue to carry out persistent attacks in Central Mali mostly unabated, and also that these groups are likely to continue to slowly expand southwest towards Bamako.

• It is likely that terror groups will remain prominent in Mali in the long term - a crumbling economy that offers scarce opportunities, as well as the need for protection brought on by atrocities at the hands of all parties will very likely drive more people into armed groups. 

• It is very unlikely that flights to and from Timbuktu will resume in the next 3 months, and unlikely that we will see an increase in flights to and from Gao in the next 3 months. Gao Airport is currently hosting roughly 2-4 flights to and from Bamako weekly.

• Gold mines in Mali’s southwest are very unlikely to be affected by conflict in the next 6 months, but the further expansion of armed groups may complicate supply chains and increase costs for mining companies.

• Bamako is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, but there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM may attempt to carry out a large-scale attack there in the near future. In the next 6 months to a year, there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM will attempt to take Bamako.

The above image depicts notable security-related events identified by London Politica in Northern Mali since 27 September, 2023.

The above image depicts all identified incidents of political violence (blue) and protests (orange) that occurred in Mali in September. Source: ACLED

Niger

According to ACLED, there has been a 42% increase in political violence in Niger (only part of which is made up by terrorist violence) in the month since the July coup, accompanied by a 300% increase in ISGS activity. Despite the recent uptick, Niger still experiences low levels of terrorism related violence compared to Mali and Burkina Faso. Most terrorist violence in Niger occurs in the country’s southwest, being most heavily concentrated in the region of Tillabéri, in relatively close proximity to the capital, Niamey. Because of the region’s close proximity to areas of Mali and Burkina Faso that are overrun by terrorists, it is prone to spillovers. This complicates matters for Niger as the attacks that do occur have largely been undertaken nearer to densely populated areas than in Mali.

After the coup, a news channel friendly to ISGS said that it would “create favourable conditions for militants,” which is an indication that groups may be emboldened by the coup and subsequent departure of French troops. However some analysts, including Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, the Sahel Project Manager at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), conclude that the Forces Armées Nigeriennes (FAN) are better prepared to react to insurgencies than Mali or Burkina Faso. Previous to the coup, Niger was renowned for its successful strategy in abating terror, which coupled security efforts with socioeconomic policy. 

FAN are also contending with lower level Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa (ISWS) insurgencies in the country’s desolate southeast. Levels of violence in the southeast have sharply declined over the last month.

Recent Developments

28 September - A local news source reports that terrorists (very likely ISGS) killed at least 10 FAN soldiers in Kandadji, Tillabéri (190km northwest of Niamey). Other sources claim up to 22 dead.

1 October - Local news sources claim ISGS ambushed FAN 4km north of Malian border, killing 33. 

3 October  - The Nigerien Ministry of Defence announces that over 100 ISGS militants attacked FAN near the border with Mali, northwest of Tabatol, killing 29. 

5 October - FAN General Mohamed Toumba states in a press conference that "Terrorists are more armed than our soldiers, they have weapons that our states don't have plus they have cash."

8 October - FAN announces that terrorists raided Bégorou tondo, Tera department (roughly 190km northwest of Niamey) on 7 October, killing 7 civilians.

8 October - Nigerian news source announces that terrorists attacked the Banibangou police station on the night of 7 October, roughly 250km north of Niamey.

8 October - Nigerian news source announces an attack on Bibiyergou, roughly 115km northwest of Niamey, leaving 3 civilians dead.

Operational Forecast

• It is likely that ISGS will continue to carry out persistent attacks and consolidate more territory in southwest Niger, in Tillabéry and Tera departments in particular. Intelligence gaps created by the recent departure of the French and an under-resourced FAN will make it challenging to address the growing terror threat.

• Barring the implementation of mitigating factors, such as a holistic plan to address terror or security/intelligence agreements with foreign partners (the latter looks unlikely since the coup), ISGS is likely to pose a threat to Niamey within the next 6 months. 

• FAN is likely to remain in control of Niamey over the next 6 months, but it is likely that ISGS will attempt an attack in Niamey in the same time period.

• Flights to and from Niamey are unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence in the next 3 months.

• It is very unlikely that terror groups in Niger’s southeast will pose a significant threat to the Nigerien government, or to large population centres over the next 6 months. 

• Uranium mines in the north of Niger, near the city of Arlit, that are majority owned by the Orano group, a French company, are very unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence over the next 6 months, however supply chain complications resulting from an increase in violence in the south may increase costs for companies.

• The Orano Group may also face local reputational challenges and resulting security threats stemming from its ties to the French Government.

• Gold mining projects in the country’s southwest, including the Samira Hill Gold Mine in Tera, are likely to be directly impacted by terrorist violence in the next 6 months. Terror groups may directly target the mines to add to their illicit mining operations.

The above image depicts all identified incidents of political violence (blue) and protests (orange) that occurred in Western Niger in September. Source: ACLED

Burkina Faso 

Over the last year, levels of violence in Burkina Faso have been drastically higher than in both Mali and Niger. According to Omar Alieu Touray, the president of ECOWAS, Burkina Faso experienced 2,725 attacks in the first half of 2023, as opposed to 844 in Mali and 77 in Niger. The Burkinabe government now controls less than 40% of the country’s territory; the other 60% remains ungoverned or overrun by JNIM. Dragonfly Intelligence believes that - similar to the situation in Mali - the Forces Armées du Burkina Faso (FABF) are likely to continue to lose territory to JNIM. Dragonfly also highlights the apparent disorganisation of the FABF and JNIM’s desire to take the capital, Ouagadougou.

Since Touray’s statement in July, ACLED data confirms that attacks have continued at a rapid pace across most of the country. JNIM now carries out frequent attacks in all regions, apart from four regions that encircle the capital, Ouagadougou. Attacks were previously more frequent in the north and east, but have also become frequent in the country’s southwest near the border with Ivory Coast, where there was a sharp increase in attacks in August. According to the ISS, terrorists use illicit markets in Northern Ivory Coast to fund their efforts in Burkina Faso and elsewhere. 

Based on reporting from Burkinabe news source RTB news, FABF conducts daily airstrikes against JNIM. In their campaign to rid Burkina Faso of JNIM, human rights groups have accused FABF of extensive, persistent human rights abuses. Abuses are likely to continue to drive more people into extremist groups. As Ibrahim Traoré, the president of Burkina Faso, is facing an uphill battle against jihadists, he appears likely to appeal for outside help; however, given his country’s international isolation, his only option may be the Wagner group. 

Recent Developments

15 September - JNIM announces via their Al-Zallaqa media channel that they attacked FABF in Bassum, Kaya state (roughly 100km northeast of Ouagadougou), killing 10, and that they carried out an attack in Benin, killing 3.

15 September - JNIM announces that they ambushed FABF in Yimberella and Korqirla, Houet province, Western Burkina Faso, killing at least 5.

24 September - JNIM announces that they assaulted FABF in Boungou, Gourma, Eastern Burkina Faso.

27 September - JNIM announces that they killed 2 soldiers in Titu.

28 September - JNIM announces that they assaulted FABF in Diaradougou, Houet province.

8 October - Burkinabe news agency RTB news announces that FABF struck terrorists that had attacked civilians in Biba and To, Nayala province, Northwestern Burkina Faso.

Operational Forecast

• It is unlikely that - even in the event of Wagner assistance - FABF will be able to effectively abate JNIM attacks across the majority of Burkinabe territory over the next 6 months, and it is unlikely that FABF will take significant territory back from JNIM in the same time period.

• It is likely that JNIM will carry out attacks in increasingly close proximity to Ouagadougou, within the regions of Centre-Ouest and Plateau Central, and it is likely they will attempt to carry out an attack in Ouagadougou over the next 6 months.

• Although Ouagadougou is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM will capture Ouagadougou within the next year.

• Flights to and from Ouagadougou are unlikely to be significantly impacted by conflict over the next 3 months.

• As is the case in Mali, human rights abuses, a lack of economic opportunities, and a need for protection are very likely to continue to drive people to join armed groups over the next year.

• Nordgold, a Russian mining company, is very likely to continue to face protracted challenges to its mining operations at its mines in Bissa, Bouly, Taparko, and Yimiougou, as well as severe supply chain related challenges.

The above image depicts all identified incidents of political violence (blue) and protests (orange) that occurred in Burkina Faso in September. Source: ACLED

Tunisia’s Migration Crisis

Climate change is a major driving force behind migration and is one of the most controversial topics in today's geopolitical debates. Migration is often a reaction to dramatically shifting climate conditions, which is especially evident in Africa where rural flight - often partially driven by climate change - is a significant contributor to increasing urban populations. According to some estimates, 216 million people could be displaced across six world regions by 2050 as a direct result of climate change. The number is highest in Africa, where it is projected that as many as 86 million people will become internal climate migrants. This issue is notably prominent in Tunisia; Tunisias constitute the predominant nationality among migrants travelling to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, comprising 18.7%.

 Between 2009 and 2014, 46,000 people migrated to Tunis, and around 119,600 people migrated to the central and southeast regions of Tunisia. Although, according to the Wilson Center, about 64% of individuals who pass through Tunisia are principally motivated by economic factors, it is important to note that climate change and economic performance are interconnected. In rural regions the economy is especially dependent on climate; thus, climate change is a significant contributor to the deteriorating economic conditions that drive migration.  

Climate change: The primary driver of the Tunisian migration crisis

Climate change trends in Tunisia highlight a consistent increase in observable average seasonal temperatures. Between 1901-1930 average annual temperatures were 10.63, 17.60, 27.17, and 20.61 celsius for winter, spring, summer, and autumn, respectively. In contrast, between 1991-2020, these averages were 11.62, 18.96, 29.12, and 22.09 for the same seasons. In the last 30 years alone, temperatures increased by 0.4 celsius per decade on average. A similar pattern is observable for precipitation, which has decreased by 3% per annum since 1901, according to the World Bank. These changes have an impact on agricultural yield in the country, which is influenced by temperature and precipitation fluctuations as well as extreme climatic events. In addition to agricultural production, these changes affect ecosystems, which play a crucial role in national food security. Moreover, the low precipitation rate combined with temperature increases directly facilitates soil degradation and the multiplication of pests and diseases. 

Although Tunisia only moderately relies on agriculture, which accounts for 12% of the country's GDP, the agricultural sector employs around 16% of the country’s population. Younger generations in rural areas that rely on agriculture are more likely to migrate to urban centres or abroad as they search for more stable livelihoods and socio-economic prospects. Although these decisions are economic, the precarious economic state many in Tunisia find themselves in is driven by climate change as it causes rural areas to become less fertile.

This exodus in part explains Tunisia’s 16.1% unemployment rate. High unemployment in Tunisia is magnified by urban migration. This is an increasing economic risk as Tunisia's slowly developing economy cannot provide sufficient employment opportunities to migrants. But Tunisia’s rural-urban migration is only a fragment of a broader issue. Over the years, Tunisia has evolved into a pivotal junction for international migrants seeking passage into Europe. Historically, Libya occupied the central role as a transit hub for migration northwards. However, from 2017 onwards, the influx of migrants reaching Italian shores from Libya declined due to increased Italian support for the Libyan coastguard. By 2020, 40% fewer migrants departed from Libya, with Tunisia emerging as the new epicentre for transit to Europe via the Mediterranean. 

This is partly due to the current political situation in Tunisia, where the government has begun to silence dissent and terrorise opposition figures. Political oppression is a key trigger for migration, including for migrants from other parts of Africa who reside in Tunisia. The government has accused African migrants of bringing violence into the country, which has instigated aggression towards the migrant population. A report from 5 July described a machete attack on a group of migrants in the city of Sfax, which left two people wounded. In this case, the economic hardships brought on by climate change can also lead to political oppression, which further influences migration. Many critics, namely the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, have stated that the anti-migration speech given by Tunisian President Kais Saied on 21 February was designed to distract Tunisians from ongoing economic problems.

Migration and Europe

Migration is currently at the top of the European political agenda as more migrants continue to attempt to travel to the EU. Between January 2023 and July 2023, the number of migrants travelling to Europe rose by 13% and reached 176,100, the highest figure since 2016. Simultaneously, migrants have started to use a sea route through the Central Mediterranean, which according to Frontex, is the most dangerous. Increasing pressure is being placed on Tunisia and Libya to curb the influx of migrants. In both countries smugglers are offering lower prices for passage to Europe, leading to higher demand for their services.

For European countries, and specifically for point of arrival countries, migration is starting to become a major financial and political struggle. Italy, which has the highest number of arrivals, spent around 1.7 billion euros on migrant reception alone in 2018. This is causing political dilemmas as Italy and other countries begin to question the role of the EU in dealing with irregular migration. In 2018, the EU contributed only 46.8 million euros, or 2.7% of total Italian spending on migration-related measures. Increasing pressure from its member states has forced the EU to rely on alternative solutions. On 16 July, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia, which includes a 700 million euro funding package for the country. 105 million euros are to be designated for migration management. 

The EU is attempting to transfer the responsibility for migration to the port of origin countries; however, sceptics question the ethics and sustainability of such an approach. In the case of Tunisia, the official purpose of the EU support package is budgetary support. But given the rising tensions in Tunisia, it is difficult to predict how much is going to be allocated to providing services to migrants in need. Further, accounting for the Tunisian government's recent rhetoric surrounding migration and its resulting violent consequences, the EU’s migration policy may lead to human rights abuses at the hands of Tunisian security forces. In Libya, where the EU provided financial assistance for migration management efforts, people face high levels of violence and abuse from the coast guard and other militias. 

Despite the decrease in the number of individuals attempting to journey to the EU from Libya, the EU has faced allegations of overlooking human rights violations in Libya, and adopting short-term measures rather than formulating a substantive, enduring solution. As the numbers of those migrating from Libya dwindled, a corresponding surge occurred in Tunisia. Implementing a similar approach in Tunisia would likely have similar results, facilitating human rights abuses and pushing migration routes into neighbouring countries. According to a Human Rights Watch report from 19 July, three days after the memorandum was signed, there had already been documented cases of abuses against migrants by Tunisia’s security forces. These included torture, arbitrary arrests, and detention. The report also states that the majority of these incidents occurred after the presidential speech on 21 July. 

Implications 

Although it is difficult to estimate the impact of the signed memorandum between Tunisia and the EU, organisations should monitor the development of efforts, especially with regard to potential human rights abuses. Tunisia should be held accountable for how it spends the money it receives from the EU. Although Tunisian efforts to address criminal groups that facilitate illegal migration into Europe have the potential to reduce the overall number of migrants travelling from Tunisia to the EU, these efforts could come at a cost. As climate change continues to worsen, many will continue to migrate north as supplies become scarcer, employment more difficult, and conflicts more frequent. As Tunisia battles internal and external migration, it has the chance to create a policy - which can act as an example for other African nations - that aims to forge long-term solutions and combat the source of the problem, not just the symptoms of it.

Kenya Plans to Send a Police Task Force to Haiti

On 29 July, Kenyan Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua announced that Kenya will commit to sending a 1,000 strong police task force to Haiti to train and assist the Haitian Police in restoring security and stability in the country. The small Caribbean island state has been struggling with a severe security crisis for years now. Violent gangs control around 80% of the nation’s capital Port au Prince and local law enforcement is not sufficiently staffed, trained, and/or equipped to effectively counter such a threat. The deployment still needs to be approved by Haitian authorities and by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but both UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken have signalled support for the initiative. The Haitian Foreign Minister, Jean Victor Geneus, expressed gratitude for Kenya’s offer and announced that the country is willing to receive its support.

In October 2022, Guterres began calling for a non-UN international mission to support the local police, and in July 2023 the UNSC passed a resolution encouraging UN member states "to provide security support to the Haitian National Police," potentially through "the deployment of a specialised force." Although most member states supported the deployment of a multinational force to support Haiti, Kenya was the first and only country to commit to sending a task force. In late August, a Kenyan delegation travelled to Haiti to evaluate the mission’s operational needs and assess the specifics of its mandate.

The call for outside support was first issued by interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry in October 2022 following an increase in murders, kidnappings, and rapes committed by criminal gangs that control much of the capital. Henry took over leadership of the country after the murder of President Jovenel Moise in July 2021 by a group of foreign mercenaries. The humanitarian crisis was exacerbated by a gang blockade of one of the capital's main fuel terminals that has caused shortages and a significant increase in the price of basic necessities. The growing humanitarian crisis has led to an increase in demonstrations against the government, further worsening social instability. The UN estimates that about five of Haiti’s nearly 12 million people suffer from hunger.

Despite calls for foreign support by Haitian officials, human rights groups warned against the intervention due to human rights abuses committed by previous international missions in the country. Before their withdrawal in 2019, UN troops were accused of sexual violence towards Haitian women and girls. Moreover, UN peacekeepers who were deployed to Haiti after a devastating earthquake in 2010 were responsible for a cholera outbreak that killed over 9,600 people. These, along with other similar incidents throughout the country's history, have made the local population particularly averse to the presence of foreign military contingents in the country.

Kenya's proposal to send its own task force is in line with the country's commitment in recent years to present itself as a stabilising actor. Kenyan police have been involved in several peacekeeping missions over the last 15 years, including in Somalia and South Sudan. However, questions remain surrounding the potential effectiveness of a deployment of Kenyan police in Haiti. The first concerns the distance between the two countries, while the other relates to accusations of violent abuse by Kenyan police in managing domestic unrest. Coordinating a task force in a country as far as Haiti cannot be compared, in terms of logistics, to previous missions in other African states, and will certainly test Kenya’s ability to match its ambitions with logistic and coordination capabilities.

Despite the fact that the United States and Canada have already demonstrated their willingness to offer financial resources in support of the Kenyan mission, what it will likely require is logistical assistance from entities with greater experience in executing missions of this nature. The crux of the challenge lies in effectively strategizing, facilitating transportation, and ensuring the sustained presence of the task force within Haiti. The Kenyan police force's relative lack of experience in conducting long-distance operations is a notable vulnerability that may particularly affect the mission during the preparatory stages. This weakness could lead to significant complications during the operational phase. While the transfer of personnel and resources could present temporary problems, the ongoing maintenance of the task force in Haiti over an extended period could expose substantial logistical deficiencies posing serious challenges to the long-term sustainability of the mission.

Haitians still vividly recall the 2010 cholera epidemic, which was traced back to a malfunction in the wastewater facility within the UN forces' compound, resulting in the contamination of a river. This underscores the critical importance of thoroughly assessing and effectively managing all the requirements associated with international missions in Haiti. Instances such as the 2010 incident significantly contribute to the deepening of the population's resentment towards external interventions, contributing to the growth of negative sentiment over time. In addition to accommodating the task force, there is also the essential task of equipping the Kenyan police adequately for their duties. The equipment provided will need to be regularly replaced and supplemented to match the rapidly evolving situation. Given the pervasive level of violence that characterises the crisis in Haiti, it is reasonable to anticipate a substantial demand for equipment replacement and turnover. This further amplifies the logistical challenge at hand.

Language presents another complicating factor. Given that Kenyan police officers are not proficient in either French or Haitian Creole, the languages predominantly spoken by the local population, the task force will encounter a significant language barrier. This barrier presents a dual challenge; it hampers effective communication between the Kenyan and Haitian forces, as well as impeding the task force's ability to engage with the population. Considering the Kenyan police's intended role of providing support and training to the local police, the potential impact of communication difficulties on the mission's objectives is readily apparent. Particularly in joint operations, the inability to communicate efficiently and effectively has the potential to undermine operations. Further, the language divide between the task force and the local populace could give rise to tensions. This is especially relevant given that the task force's policing responsibilities necessitate consistent and close interaction with civilian communities. In an environment marked by elevated levels of violence and a general distrust of external entities, this barrier could further worsen the population's discontent with international missions.

A significant area of concern raised by Haitian civil society pertains to the history of abuse and violence associated with Kenyan police. During the Covid-19 outbreak, there were accusations that the police fatally shot individuals who had violated government-imposed curfews. In a more recent incident that occurred in July 2023, approximately 30 people were killed by the police during protests sparked by increases in the cost of living. These events have led to a substantial level of apprehension regarding the Kenyan task force's deployment and the behaviour of its officers. The concern stems from the fear that the Kenyan police could introduce a highly violent and extrajudicial approach to handling the security crisis in Haiti. If the Kenyan police take a highly repressive approach, the general population may bear the brunt of the consequences, rather than the gangs that are largely responsible for the ongoing violence. Considering that the purpose of the task force is to provide training to the Haitian forces, there is a risk that similar violent tendencies might be adopted by Haitian forces, potentially exacerbating abuses and violations within the country in the long term.