Welcome to the Africa Desk SST, where we aim to provide bi-weekly, granular insights for companies, organisations, or individuals operating or travelling in the central-western Sahel and/or Gulf of Guinea using intelligence techniques. If you are interested in more tailored insights, contact us at externalrelations@londonpolitica.com.

Overview

Over the last several years various coups have rocked Sahelian Africa - the central-western Sahel in particular. Coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, in Burkina Faso in January 2022 and September 2022, and in Niger in 2023 have had and will continue to have security implications for governments, international ogranisations, NGOs, and businesses. Since the respective coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, it is undeniable that the security situation in both countries has continued to worsen. 

In Mali, the government and Russian private military contractor Wagner are battling Tuareg separatist groups in the north, as well as terror groups Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Central Mali and The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the east. London Politica research indicates that the government is unlikely to be able to recapture and hold large portions of land in the country’s north, centre, or east in the short to medium term.

In Burkina Faso, terror groups JNIM and ISGS have continued to ramp up attacks and now have a significant presence in all regions apart from Centre-Ouest, Centre-Sud, Centre (Ouagadougou, the capital), and Plateau-Central. While there has not been a large-scale terror attack in the capital since 2018, we assess that - in the absence of significant foreign security assistance and/or a holistic counter-terrorism strategy - it is likely that JNIM will carry out an attack in Ouagadougou in the next year. 

In Niger, in the two months since the coup ISGS activity has significantly increased. Terrorist activity is largely concentrated in the country’s southwest, and attacks have grown bolder, more frequent, and have occurred closer to the capital, Niamey, since the coup. 

JNIM’s tentacles have also extended into Benin, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Ghana within the last year, where terrorists have committed attacks and others have been identified and arrested by local authorities. We will cover these countries in future editions of the SST.

Mali

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Mali has seen a 38% increase in political violence from last year, almost all of which can be attributed to terror groups (principally JNIM but also ISGS), the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa), and the Wagner group. JNIM has carried out attacks and, alongside the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP), a loose consortium of Tuareg separatist groups, taken territory throughout the centre and north of the country, including several army bases. JNIM is currently maintaining a blockade around Timbuktu, the most populous city in the country’s north, and is not letting any goods in and out of the city. 

In September JNIM and FAMa had a large battle in the Timbuktu region, leaving roughly 60 dead. JNIM holds a significant amount of territory in Central Mali and has recently committed repeated attacks in and around Mopti and Segou - the latter is roughly 230km from Bamako.

JNIM and ISGS have also been wreaking havoc as of late in the country’s east, in and around Gao, from which the ISGS has fanned out into Southwestern Niger. Given there is very little evidence of clashes between JNIM, ISGS, and the CSP, it is feasible to assume that the groups are - at the very least - working in cooperation with one another. Dragonfly Intelligence anticipates that over the coming months it is highly likely that the Malian Government will “lose control of large parts of their territory.”

Further, London Politica has spotted a Tunisian Air Force plane that has been making recurring trips from Bamako to and from an unknown destination in the country’s north over the last week. This may indicate that Tunisia is offering, or planning to offer some sort of military assistance.

Recent Developments

27 September - JNIM announces via their Al-Zallaqa media channel that they attacked FAMa in Acharane, a village 35km west of Timbuktu, showing off a wealth of military gear and trucks commandeered from FAMa. FAMa announced that they repelled the attack successfully and a local news source posted a video of the encounter that we have not been able to verify.

28 September - FAMa announces that ‘terrorists’ attacked an army camp in Dioura, in Central Mali. They reported to have repelled the attack, killing roughly 50 militants. A spokesperson for CSP told Africanews that it had captured the camp.

1 October - FAMa reports that there was intense fighting between them and ‘terrorists’ in Bamba, just under 200km east of Timbuktu. A video (WARNING - SENSITIVE CONTENT) published by an independent journalist purports to show CSP fighters celebrating the capturing of the camp.

2 October - A FAMa convoy departed Gao to head north towards Tessalit, Aguelhok, and Kidal, which are CSP strongholds. A Tuareg news agency reported that the convoy split into three smaller convoys, one heading to the north, another to the east, and one towards Enviv, in the far north.

3 & 4 October - FAMa reports that there was an attack on their convoys in Almoustrat, Northern Mali and Nampala, Central Mali on 3 October, and an attack on a dam in Taoussa, Northern Mali on 4 October. Further, a CSP spokesperson told Reuters that they seized the FAMa army camp in Taoussa, roughly 250km east of Timbuktu, on 4 October.

5 October - FAMa claims in a communique that ‘terrorists’ failed to stop their advance to the north, 10km south of Anefis, Northern Mali.

6 October - CSP militants post a video claiming the army has made no progress towards Enviv. On the same day FAMa announced they repelled an attack in Nyiminyama, Central Mali.

7 October - CSP claims it is being bombarded by FAMa strikes as they were attempting to encircle Enviv, Northern Mali.

7 & 9 October - a CSP commander (WARNING - SENSITIVE CONTENT) and local journalist claim that FAMa and Wagner have committed persistent atrocities over the last week in their offensive towards the country’s North. Although we cannot verify the video, these atrocities are in line with previous acts committed recently by FAMa and Wagner in other parts of Mali.

Operational Forecast

• Given FAMa and Wagner’s apparent inability to hold territory in the country’s centre - even as they undertake offensives to the north - as well as the persistent increase in terror attacks in the area, we assess that it is likely that terror groups will continue to carry out persistent attacks in Central Mali mostly unabated, and also that these groups are likely to continue to slowly expand southwest towards Bamako.

• It is likely that terror groups will remain prominent in Mali in the long term - a crumbling economy that offers scarce opportunities, as well as the need for protection brought on by atrocities at the hands of all parties will very likely drive more people into armed groups. 

• It is very unlikely that flights to and from Timbuktu will resume in the next 3 months, and unlikely that we will see an increase in flights to and from Gao in the next 3 months. Gao Airport is currently hosting roughly 2-4 flights to and from Bamako weekly.

• Gold mines in Mali’s southwest are very unlikely to be affected by conflict in the next 6 months, but the further expansion of armed groups may complicate supply chains and increase costs for mining companies.

• Bamako is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, but there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM may attempt to carry out a large-scale attack there in the near future. In the next 6 months to a year, there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM will attempt to take Bamako.

Niger

According to ACLED, there has been a 42% increase in political violence in Niger (only part of which is made up by terrorist violence) in the month since the July coup, accompanied by a 300% increase in ISGS activity. Despite the recent uptick, Niger still experiences low levels of terrorism related violence compared to Mali and Burkina Faso. Most terrorist violence in Niger occurs in the country’s southwest, being most heavily concentrated in the region of Tillabéri, in relatively close proximity to the capital, Niamey. Because of the region’s close proximity to areas of Mali and Burkina Faso that are overrun by terrorists, it is prone to spillovers. This complicates matters for Niger as the attacks that do occur have largely been undertaken nearer to densely populated areas than in Mali.

After the coup, a news channel friendly to ISGS said that it would “create favourable conditions for militants,” which is an indication that groups may be emboldened by the coup and subsequent departure of French troops. However some analysts, including Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, the Sahel Project Manager at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), conclude that the Forces Armées Nigeriennes (FAN) are better prepared to react to insurgencies than Mali or Burkina Faso. Previous to the coup, Niger was renowned for its successful strategy in abating terror, which coupled security efforts with socioeconomic policy. 

FAN are also contending with lower level Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa (ISWS) insurgencies in the country’s desolate southeast. Levels of violence in the southeast have sharply declined over the last month.

Recent Developments

28 September - A local news source reports that terrorists (very likely ISGS) killed at least 10 FAN soldiers in Kandadji, Tillabéri (190km northwest of Niamey). Other sources claim up to 22 dead.

1 October - Local news sources claim ISGS ambushed FAN 4km north of Malian border, killing 33. 

3 October  - The Nigerien Ministry of Defence announces that over 100 ISGS militants attacked FAN near the border with Mali, northwest of Tabatol, killing 29. 

5 October - FAN General Mohamed Toumba states in a press conference that "Terrorists are more armed than our soldiers, they have weapons that our states don't have plus they have cash."

8 October - FAN announces that terrorists raided Bégorou tondo, Tera department (roughly 190km northwest of Niamey) on 7 October, killing 7 civilians.

8 October - Nigerian news source announces that terrorists attacked the Banibangou police station on the night of 7 October, roughly 250km north of Niamey.

8 October - Nigerian news source announces an attack on Bibiyergou, roughly 115km northwest of Niamey, leaving 3 civilians dead.

Operational Forecast

• It is likely that ISGS will continue to carry out persistent attacks and consolidate more territory in southwest Niger, in Tillabéry and Tera departments in particular. Intelligence gaps created by the recent departure of the French and an under-resourced FAN will make it challenging to address the growing terror threat.

• Barring the implementation of mitigating factors, such as a holistic plan to address terror or security/intelligence agreements with foreign partners (the latter looks unlikely since the coup), ISGS is likely to pose a threat to Niamey within the next 6 months. 

• FAN is likely to remain in control of Niamey over the next 6 months, but it is likely that ISGS will attempt an attack in Niamey in the same time period.

• Flights to and from Niamey are unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence in the next 3 months.

• It is very unlikely that terror groups in Niger’s southeast will pose a significant threat to the Nigerien government, or to large population centres over the next 6 months. 

• Uranium mines in the north of Niger, near the city of Arlit, that are majority owned by the Orano group, a French company, are very unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence over the next 6 months, however supply chain complications resulting from an increase in violence in the south may increase costs for companies.

• The Orano Group may also face local reputational challenges and resulting security threats stemming from its ties to the French Government.

• Gold mining projects in the country’s southwest, including the Samira Hill Gold Mine in Tera, are likely to be directly impacted by terrorist violence in the next 6 months. Terror groups may directly target the mines to add to their illicit mining operations.

Burkina Faso 

Over the last year, levels of violence in Burkina Faso have been drastically higher than in both Mali and Niger. According to Omar Alieu Touray, the president of ECOWAS, Burkina Faso experienced 2,725 attacks in the first half of 2023, as opposed to 844 in Mali and 77 in Niger. The Burkinabe government now controls less than 40% of the country’s territory; the other 60% remains ungoverned or overrun by JNIM. Dragonfly Intelligence believes that - similar to the situation in Mali - the Forces Armées du Burkina Faso (FABF) are likely to continue to lose territory to JNIM. Dragonfly also highlights the apparent disorganisation of the FABF and JNIM’s desire to take the capital, Ouagadougou.

Since Touray’s statement in July, ACLED data confirms that attacks have continued at a rapid pace across most of the country. JNIM now carries out frequent attacks in all regions, apart from four regions that encircle the capital, Ouagadougou. Attacks were previously more frequent in the north and east, but have also become frequent in the country’s southwest near the border with Ivory Coast, where there was a sharp increase in attacks in August. According to the ISS, terrorists use illicit markets in Northern Ivory Coast to fund their efforts in Burkina Faso and elsewhere. 

Based on reporting from Burkinabe news source RTB news, FABF conducts daily airstrikes against JNIM. In their campaign to rid Burkina Faso of JNIM, human rights groups have accused FABF of extensive, persistent human rights abuses. Abuses are likely to continue to drive more people into extremist groups. As Ibrahim Traoré, the president of Burkina Faso, is facing an uphill battle against jihadists, he appears likely to appeal for outside help; however, given his country’s international isolation, his only option may be the Wagner group. 

Recent Developments

15 September - JNIM announces via their Al-Zallaqa media channel that they attacked FABF in Bassum, Kaya state (roughly 100km northeast of Ouagadougou), killing 10, and that they carried out an attack in Benin, killing 3.

15 September - JNIM announces that they ambushed FABF in Yimberella and Korqirla, Houet province, Western Burkina Faso, killing at least 5.

24 September - JNIM announces that they assaulted FABF in Boungou, Gourma, Eastern Burkina Faso.

27 September - JNIM announces that they killed 2 soldiers in Titu.

28 September - JNIM announces that they assaulted FABF in Diaradougou, Houet province.

8 October - Burkinabe news agency RTB news announces that FABF struck terrorists that had attacked civilians in Biba and To, Nayala province, Northwestern Burkina Faso.

Operational Forecast

• It is unlikely that - even in the event of Wagner assistance - FABF will be able to effectively abate JNIM attacks across the majority of Burkinabe territory over the next 6 months, and it is unlikely that FABF will take significant territory back from JNIM in the same time period.

• It is likely that JNIM will carry out attacks in increasingly close proximity to Ouagadougou, within the regions of Centre-Ouest and Plateau Central, and it is likely they will attempt to carry out an attack in Ouagadougou over the next 6 months.

• Although Ouagadougou is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM will capture Ouagadougou within the next year.

• Flights to and from Ouagadougou are unlikely to be significantly impacted by conflict over the next 3 months.

• As is the case in Mali, human rights abuses, a lack of economic opportunities, and a need for protection are very likely to continue to drive people to join armed groups over the next year.

• Nordgold, a Russian mining company, is very likely to continue to face protracted challenges to its mining operations at its mines in Bissa, Bouly, Taparko, and Yimiougou, as well as severe supply chain related challenges.