Welcome to the Africa Desk SST, where we aim to provide granular insights for companies, organisations, or individuals operating or travelling in the central-western Sahel and/or Gulf of Guinea using intelligence techniques. If you are interested in more tailored insights, contact us at externalrelations@londonpolitica.com.

Burkina Faso

If you would like to see a more comprehensive overview of events in Burkina Faso, see the first edition of our SST here.

Based on the information we have collected since the last edition of the SST, terrorist violence in Burkina Faso continues to proliferate across the country, with the northern regions (Centre-nord in particular) bearing the brunt of terrorist activity. Attacks against civilians and combatants are continuing at a rapid pace, occurring frequently in the country’s north, west, east, and southeast. Attacks are also becoming more common in Centre-ouest, a region in close proximity to the capital, Ouagadougou. 

The country also finds itself in the midst of an intense battle with a dengue fever outbreak that is currently most pronounced in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso, Hauts-Bassins region. So far, over 73,000 cases have been registered in the country, although the true number is likely far higher. International organisations including UNICEF and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) are working to train doctors to handle dengue in Hauts-Bassins, deliver clean water, improve sanitation, and provide healthcare services. Several regions in the north have been entirely cut off from aid due to terrorist activity.

Recent Developments

9 October - JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) claims via their Al-Zallaqa media channel that they set off an explosive device against elements of FABF in Séguénéga, Northern Burkina Faso, killing several.

11 October - JNIM attacked the Volantaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP) - a volunteer defence unit that works alongside FABF (Forces Armées du Burkina Faso) and the national police - and the national police at their camp in Yamba, Eastern Burkina Faso, killing at least 20.

11-12 October - FABF claims to have acquired intelligence pertaining to a JNIM attack in Sitgo, Séguénéga. They claim to have launched subsequent airstrikes against JNIM in the staging area which were aided by ground forces.

12 October - JNIM claims to have attacked FABF in Banwali, Hauts-Bassins. They claim to have acquired heavy weaponry in the assault.

16 October - According to FABF, JNIM attacked FABF and VDP positions near Tikaré, Bam, Centre-nord. FABF says they launched air strikes against the militants as they fled north after the attack.

18 October - The government of the Centre-nord state extended a ban on certain models of motorbikes that are commonly utilised by JNIM militants.

18 October - According to FABF, they carried out airstrikes against JNIM militants in Zoura, Centre-nord, who had attacked a VDP position in Sian, Centre-nord. They also claim to have killed militants in airstrikes in Silgadji, Soum, Sahel region. 

19 October - According to local media sources, JNIM carried out an attack on a primary school in Zawara, Sanguié. This represents a rare attack in the Centre-ouest region and was the first attack in Zawara. 

Operational Forecast

• We maintain that it is unlikely that FABF will be able to effectively abate JNIM attacks across the majority of Burkinabe territory over the next 6 months and it is unlikely that FABF will take significant territory back from JNIM in the same time period.

• We maintain that it is likely that JNIM will continue to carry out attacks in increasingly close proximity to Ouagadougou, within the regions of Centre-ouest and Plateau Central, and it is likely they will attempt to carry out an attack in Ouagadougou over the next 6 months.

• Since our forecast last week, JNIM attacked a primary school in Centre-ouest.

• Although Ouagadougou is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM will attempt to capture Ouagadougou within the next year in the absence of adequate international assistance.

• Flights to and from Ouagadougou are unlikely to be significantly impacted by conflict over the next 3 months.

• It is likely that the efforts of NGOs and IGOs to address the dengue outbreak, particularly in the Hauts-Bassins region, will be directly impacted by the proliferation of terror groups. 

• These groups, including the IRC, are almost certain to continue to face supply chain difficulties across the country, particularly in Djibo, the hub of IRC operations in Burkina Faso. 

• NGOs and IGOs are increasingly likely to become direct targets for property theft or violent attacks by terror groups as the groups proliferate.

Niger

If you would like to see a more comprehensive overview of events in Niger, see the first edition of our SST here.

Niger continues to see terrorist-related violence across the country’s southwest, in Tillabéri department in particular. Levels of violence remain slightly elevated from pre-coup levels but significantly lower than in Mali or Burkina Faso. However, the attacks that do occur are occurring in closer proximity to the capital, Niamey, sustaining risks to global businesses and large population centres. NGOs that operate across Tillabéri, including the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), are at a uniquely heightened risk of being affected by terrorist violence. Supply chain issues with the transfer of humanitarian supplies are likely to be exacerbated and increasing displacement as a result of the conflict is likely to further strain NGO resources.

Recent Developments

9 October - The French military begins formal withdrawal from Niger.

15 October - Burkinabe journalist reports that JNIM is enforcing a blockade on the village of Tamou, Tillabéri department, (100km south of Niamey) and is asking populations of nearby villages to leave. We have not been able to independently verify this claim.

15 October - A local journalist reports that terrorists ambushed FAN between Teguéy and Téra, Tillabéri, killing at least 2. We have not been able to independently verify this claim.

15 & 16 October - FAN (Forces Armées Nigeriennes) clashed with militants over a two day period in Lendou, Tillabéri. FAN claims that 31 terrorists were killed alongside 6 Nigerien soldiers.

17 October - Social media accounts claim that ISGS (The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) invaded the villages of Toukounous and Garin Guiye, northeast of Niamey. We have not been able to independently verify this claim.

19 October - The Nigerien government reports that deposed ex-president Mohamed Bazoun attempted to escape military custody and leave the country. The government says it foiled the attempt.

22 October - The French military completed its withdrawal from its camp in Ouallam, Tillabéri (roughly 100km north of Niamey), handing it over to FAN. 475 French soldiers have departed the country since 20 October. 

Operational Forecast

• We maintain that it is likely that ISGS and JNIM will continue to carry out attacks and consolidate more territory in southwest Niger, in Tillabéri and Téra departments in particular. Intelligence gaps created by the ongoing withdrawal of the French and an under-resourced FAN will make it challenging to address the growing terror threat.

• Barring the implementation of mitigating factors, such as a holistic plan to address terror or security/intelligence agreements with foreign partners (the latter looks unlikely since the coup), there is a reasonable possibility that terror groups may pose a threat to Niamey within the next 6 months. 

• FAN is likely to remain in control of Niamey over the next 6 months, but there is a reasonable possibility that ISGS will attempt an attack in Niamey in the same time period.

• Flights to and from Niamey are unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence in the next 3 months.

• We maintain that it is very unlikely that terror groups in Niger’s southeast will pose a significant threat to the Nigerien state, or to large businesses and organisations, over the next 6 months. 

• We maintain that uranium mines in the north, near the city of Arlit, that are majority owned by the Orana group, are very unlikely to be affected by terrorist violence over the next 6 months, however supply chain complications resulting from an increase in violence in the south may increase costs for companies.

• The Orana Group may also face local reputational challenges and resulting security threats stemming from its ties to the French Government.

• We maintain that gold mining projects in the country’s southwest, including the Samira Hill Gold Mine in Téra, are likely to be directly impacted by terrorist violence in the next 6 months. Terror groups may directly target the mines to add to their illicit mining operations.

• NGOs are very likely to continue to face heightened operational challenges across the country’s southwest as a result of terror proliferation. 

• The DRC’s operations in Tillabéri are almost certain to be continuously affected, and NGOs in the region may be targeted in attacks. 

• Although the DRC’s operations in Dosso (roughly 140km southeast of Niamey) are unlikely to be significantly impacted in the next 3 months, there is an increasing likelihood that they may be impacted in the medium term.

Mali 

If you would like to see a more comprehensive overview of events in Mali, see the first edition of our SST here.

As the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) continues its withdrawal, the security situation across Northern and Central Mali continues to deteriorate. JNIM has continued its attacks on FAMa (Forces Armées Maliennes) elements, as well as on UN convoys, underscoring the heightened risk faced by the UN and international organisations in Northern and Central Mali. A spokesman of the CSP (Cadre Stratégique Permanent), a consortium of Tuareg rebel groups, has claimed the CSP will stop FAMa from retaking Northern Mali. According to several Tuareg-run media sources, FAMa and Wagner have committed significant human rights abuses amid offensives over the last two weeks, including the killing of civilians.

JNIM is currently attempting to enforce a complete blockade on Timbuktu and Gao, the two largest cities in the north, causing shortages of fuel, food, and medicine; a Gao resident who spoke to the BBC says fuel shortages are causing blackouts. All flights to and from Gao have been grounded. These developments sustain and heighten supply chain risks across the immediate region - this is particularly relevant to businesses in Niger, who share significant trade relationships with businesses in the Gao region of Mali.

Recent Developments

*When referring to FAMa announcements, we put the word ‘terrorists’ in parentheses because FAMa refers to both the CSP, as well as JNIM and ISGS as terrorists.

13 October - JNIM ambushes FAMa in Konna Boré, Central Mali, killing 17 and destroying and seizing vehicles.

15 October - JNIM announces via their Al-Zallaqa channel that they attacked FAMa with an IED between Gao and Anefis, Northern Mali, on 15 October. They also announced they had fired on a UN cargo plane in Tessalit, which was confirmed by FAMa. 

17 & 18 October - FAMa announces that they launched counteroffensives on ‘terrorists’ near Tessalit, and conducted airstrikes on convoys in Tessalit and Kidal.

18 October - JNIM announces that they attacked FAMa near Diangassagou, Central Mali, destroying cars and ammunition, and that they burned over 40 UN peacekeeper trucks in Kuna, Mopti, Central Mali.

19 October - According to the UN, another UN plane landing in Tessalit was fired upon. 

21 October - MINUSMA completes withdrawal from Tessalit camp, Northern Mali. According to the UN, they completed their withdrawal from Tessalit ahead of schedule due to an “extremely tense and degraded security context.”

22 October - MINUSMA completes withdrawal from Aguelhok camp, Northern Mali, and Douentza camp, Central Mali.

23 October - FAMa announces that ‘terrorists’ raided the Aguelhok camp after the UN withdrawal. FAMa also stated that the UN retreat threatens the security of the Aguelhok region and that FAMa remains in possession of the Tessalit and Anefis camps recently abandoned by the UN.. 

25 October - JNIM claims they undertook an IED attack on a FAMa and Wagner convoy between Hombori and Gossi, Northern Mali, killing all passengers. 

26 October - The UN announces that a UN logistics convoy travelling from Ansongo to Labbezanga, Gao, Northern Mali, was fired upon by 4 assailants. One driver was seriously injured.

Operational Forecast

• It is likely that the security situation across Central and Northern Mali will continue to deteriorate as more peacekeepers continue to withdraw.

• Given FAMa and Wagner’s apparent inability to hold territory in the country’s centre - even as they undertake offensives to the north - we continue to assess that it is likely that terror groups will continue to carry out persistent attacks in Central Mali mostly unabated, and also that these groups are likely to continue to slowly expand southwest towards Bamako.

• Since our last forecast, JNIM has undertaken several attacks on FAMa in Central Mali.

• We continue to assess that it is very unlikely that flights to and from Timbuktu will resume in the next 3 months, and very unlikely that we will see an increase in flights to and from Gao in the next 3 months. Flights to and from Gao airport have been suspended as JNIM attempts to blockade the city.

• We maintain that Bamako is likely to remain generally stable over the next 3 months, but there is a reasonable possibility that JNIM may attempt to carry out a large-scale attack there in the next 6 months to a year. In the next 6 months to a year, JNIM may attempt to take Bamako.

• It is likely that UN personnel and assets will continue to come under threat in Northern Mali as a means to expedite the group’s exit from the country. There is a reasonable possibility that international organisations - principally NGOs that are active in Central Mali - may also face attacks from JNIM in the short-medium term.