Executive Summary

• Intercommunal tensions in the east exacerbated by refugee flows from Sudan are unlikely to result in large-scale conflict in the short term, although isolated incidents of ethnic/intercommunal violence remain possible.

• Although there may be a small terrorist presence in Southwestern Chad, it is unlikely that terror groups will gain any territory in the country in the short to medium term. Attacks on N’Djamena or major population centres remain unlikely, while there is a reasonable possibility that terrorists may conduct attacks in the Lac region. 

• The threat posed by criminal groups in the south/southwest is also unlikely to be abated over the short to medium term. 

• Chad is likely to remain generally politically stable over the next 6 months; large-scale protests are unlikely and rebel groups are unlikely to effectively challenge the government.

Introduction

Chad currently faces many security challenges, exacerbated by the war in Sudan and the proliferation of terrorism across the Sahel. Although conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region has not yet extended into Eastern Chad, continued migrant flows risk increasing communal tensions between farmers and herders over natural resources, a risk that is worsened by weapons smuggling and the presence of armed groups that have previously engaged in ethnic conflict. In Chad’s southwest, military campaigns and tensions between jihadist groups over the last year have largely mitigated the threat of direct terrorist action in Chad, but the threat posed by terror groups persists. In the south/southwest, criminal groups continue to carry out kidnappings for ransom with near impunity.

Further, the first half of 2023 saw a 150% increase in inter and intra-communal violence in Chad compared to the first half of 2022, the vast majority of which was concentrated in the south, near the border with the Central African Republic. This occurs amidst a backdrop of political instability - protests over the last several years have left hundreds dead and rebel groups in the far north have officially renewed their campaigns against the government. Even so, in December Chad’s transitional government, led by Mahamat Déby, reached an agreement with the largest opposition party, likely quelling the immediate threat of large-scale instability. Elections are scheduled for November 2024. 

Refugee Crisis in the East

Security-related developments in Eastern Chad are largely dependent on events in neighbouring Sudan. So far, the war in Sudan has driven at least 500,000 civilians into the eastern Chadian provinces of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira, and Ennedi-Est. According to the UN, this is adding to pre-existing socioeconomic pressures in the region. Temporary camps remain erected on lands previously used for farming and herding, which has exacerbated the shortage of basic resources that has previously driven violence between ethnic groups. 

Largely because of the conflict in Sudan, in which Arab armed groups - principally the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - with ties to the Darfur genocide have committed ethnic violence against Black African communities, mistrust remains prevalent between Black African and Arab ethnic groups in Eastern Chad. Although some analysts hold that the RSF may follow Black Africans into Chad and commit atrocities, we assess that this is very unlikely to be carried out systematically in the short term as the focus of the group’s leadership remains on taking control of Sudan and garnering global legitimacy. 

According to the International Crisis Group, Arab refugees in Eastern Chad feel unfairly associated with the actions of the RSF as NGOs have given first priority to Black African refugees, and as Arabs are suspected of sending their sons to fight with the RSF. In this context, it remains unlikely but possible that NGOs may face direct attacks by disconcerted Arabs or armed groups. In our review of local media sources and social media, we have not identified any episodes of ethnic or communal violence in Eastern Chad since the start of the war in Sudan. We have however identified incidents of purported abuses at the hands of the Chadian security forces as they crack down on weapons smuggling to abate communal conflict. 

The presence of weapons indicates that groups or individuals would have the capability to commit mass violence but so far lack the intent to do so. This may change as the war in Sudan continues, more refugees pour into Chad, and resource scarcity becomes more acute. Regardless, we maintain that large-scale violence remains unlikely in the short term as the Chadian government is heavily incentivised to remain largely uninvolved in the conflict in Sudan; Déby’s transitional government is dependent on support from Black African and Arab elements, neither of which support the RSF (a group that several news outfits suggest Déby is allowing the UAE to aid via Chad). Additionally, large Chadian troop deployments in the east are likely to mitigate the risk of large-scale communal violence. Given past precedent, incidences of ethnic violence are most likely to occur in Ouaddaï. 

General Political Stability

Over the last few years, there have been a number of large-scale protests and violent responses from security forces, particularly in N’Djamena. These protests were driven by a perceived power grab by current President Mahamat Déby after the death of his father, President Idriss Déby, in clashes with Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT) in the north. Although some opposition parties boycotted the recent agreement between the ruling Mouvement Patriotique du Salut and the opposition Les Transformateurs, the agreement has largely mitigated the threat of instability in the short term by bringing a number of stakeholders into the fold. The government has also pardoned the vast majority of protesters who had previously been arrested.

Despite this, according to an expert we spoke to for this assessment, much of the Chadian public remains disillusioned with the government, few of which turned up to vote in the constitutional referendum in December. This expert believes the official voter turnout number was falsely inflated and that unrest after or in the run-up to the November elections is likely. We maintain that, in the event of unrest, future demonstrations are most likely to occur in large population centres in the south/southwest of the country, and would likely pose incidental risk to foreign companies and NGOs, and may pose a direct risk to those that have easily identifiable ties to the west. Previously, the largest protests took place in Chad’s two most populous cities, N'Djamena and Moundou. Other southern cities such as Doba, Bébédjia, and Koumra have also seen a number of demonstrations. 

In the past week, Mahamat Déby travelled to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, signalling closer security cooperation between the two governments. Putin praised Déby for holding the December referendum and pledged the Kremlin’s support for further stabilising the country. The private aircraft on which Déby travelled to Moscow belongs to the same Emirati company that has shuttled RSF leader Hemedti to meetings with neighbouring leaders. We hold that closer security cooperation between the Kremlin and N'Djamena and the departure of French troops make large-scale demonstrations less likely in the short to medium term.

Chad remains in recurring conflict with rebels in the gold-rich northern Tibesti province; various factions based in southern-Libya continue to engage in skirmishes with Chadian security forces. In June 2023, the army halted an incursion of the Front national pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad and Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République rebel groups in the Kouri Bougoudi region, home to Chad’s largest goldfield. Some rebel groups are also active in Sudan, fighting alongside the RSF. This may allow the rebels to gain a stronger footing in Sudan, making it more difficult to uproot them, especially given Mahamat Déby’s public neutrality in the conflict. Even though it is unlikely that the Chadian government will succeed in fully defeating various rebel groups, they will unlikely pose a serious threat to the stability of the country in the short to medium term. However, as the November elections approach, rebel groups may see more popular support within the country, emboldening them further.

Insecurity in the South / Southwest

The largest source of insecurity in Southern Chad is the proliferation of violent crime, in particular kidnappings for ransom. Local media sources report that criminals are responsible for a string of kidnappings, especially in the Mayo-Kebbi Est and Mayo-Kebbi Ouest border regions with Cameroon. Kidnappings are also increasing in N’Djamena. Victims include farmers and students, and recent evidence suggests that criminals are operating across borders. Criminal or armed groups have not yet targeted NGO workers and foreign business people, but high rates of persistent criminality and impunity suggest they face increased levels of incidental risk. They may be directly targeted in the near future given the perceived resources at their disposal. Even though the government is ramping up its response to criminal groups, we foresee a continued heightened kidnapping risk over the short to medium term. There is also a risk that criminal organisations have or will collaborate with terror groups in Chad, as they have in Nigeria, which would likely increase their capabilities. 

The Lake Chad region, covering parts of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad is a hotbed of terrorist activity, and is a stronghold for Boko Haram and the Islamic State – West Africa (ISWAP); however, conflict between the two and factional infighting has weakened them. The continued security response by the Chadian army - buttressed by material support from the UAE - and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), have diminished the jihadists' capability to carry out attacks. 

There have been reports of terror attacks in very close proximity to the Cameroon/Chad border. The jihadists’ ability to move in small groups to attack villages and civilian targets, especially in the border region, is unlikely to be subdued by the government’s security response in the short to medium term. Past precedent around attacks in Chad indicate that terror groups are more likely to target Chadian soldiers than civilians, and present the largest threat in the Lac region, where a large number of humanitarian organisations operate. These groups present an existing threat in the rest of the border regions with Cameroon and Nigeria, including in N’Djamena.

The south of the country has also recently seen a sharp uptick in communal tensions resulting in violence. In May, a herder-farmer dispute in the Mandoul province led to the deaths of 9 people, including a child. Earlier that month armed “bandits” slaughtered 11 farmers in a neighbouring region. The UN OCHA reported 30 incidents of communal violence in the south during the first half of 2023 alone. Conflict over scarce resources is likely to drive further inter-communal violence. NGOs and IGOs have so far been unaffected by the local tensions and outbreaks of violence, but there is a large presence of humanitarian organisations in the south that may face incidental risk and may be targeted if they are perceived as providing assistance along communal lines.