Chinese engagement in Africa has significantly increased in recent years as China has become an important economic and political actor on the continent. As Africa is receiving loans and infrastructure development funding, China is taking advantage of a resource-rich continent and a large market to export its manufactured goods. However, the deepening of Chinese interests in the African continent have led to increased security considerations. As Africa has recently witnessed an “epidemic of coup d’états,” with six military overthrows during the year 2021 alone, the question of the protection of Chinese interests is coming back to the forefront. 

Impact on Chinese Interests 

At first sight, African coups do not seem to affect Chinese interests significantly. The new military governments have never taken an anti-Chinese stance and most have reaffirmed their commitment to Sino-African cooperation. In some cases, China has benefitted from the coups’ instability by gaining bargaining power and new opportunities for Chinese companies. Beijing also seems to have accepted the continent’s insecurity into its foreign policy. Although Beijing has not been completely disengaged from African security, actively using propaganda and information control, the idea prevails amongst Chinese officials that instability is inevitable with Africa’s current state of development and that “in the meantime, China has to be flexible and create new opportunities for both political leaders and African societies,” commented a Chinese representative. 

However, presenting the impact of African coups as negligible would be overlooking the indirect consequences of uncertainty and instability which constrain Chinese benefits and foreign policy’s efficiency. Firstly, a change in government always questions the future of existing agreements - if there is a risk that the new administration will renege completely on the deal, it might also want to renegotiate the terms for a bigger share, more local overview, or higher taxes. This change is likely to stretch the period of delay before the deal is agreed on and implemented, which can sometimes take decades in the African case. Moreover, the insecurity flowing from a military overthrow leads to a slowdown of the economy, reducing trade for a temporary period or longer if international sanctions against the new military government are imposed. For instance, the stark sanctions implemented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Mali this January significantly impacted the country’s trade, with liquidities drying up and the government accusing the banking restrictions for its $31 billion default default in bond payments. Finally, military overthrows pose the risk of increased violence and turmoil. Whilst domestic unrest risks slowing down trade and services, it can also directly threaten the Chinese workers involved in the country. For instance, during the Malagasy uprising in 2009, numerous Chinese businesses were the target of looting and required Chinese officials to demand greater protection of the citizens. 

The risks of coups for Chinese interests have been more visible after the 2021 Guinean coup, which has sparked a more assertive response from Beijing. Guinea is an essential partner for China, as its great iron ore and bauxite resources are crucial for its industry. China imports around 50 per cent of its bauxite from Guinea, which is used for the automotive, technological, and manufacturing sectors. The two countries also cooperated on the Simandou deal, a $19 billion mining project for iron ore in the West African state. 

Col. Mamady Doumbouya’s military overthrow in September 2021 highlighted Guinea’s importance for Chinese interests and therefore Chinese vulnerability to instability in Guinea. The coup raised uncertainty around the Samandon project, threatening to cancel the deal which had been signed a year before after more than two decades of negotiation. Prospecting on the effects of the Guinean coup a week after the event, Natalie Sambhi, analyst for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, declared “it’s not clear that the coup leaders and interim administration will honour agreements signed with Chinese companies under the previous government.” 

Moreover, the prices of aluminum rose up to their highest levels since 2008 as a result of the coup; directly impacting the Chinese industrial sector. If the country had been exposed to repeated coups and a high price of aluminum or bauxite for a prolonged time, China would have been required to diversify its imports or rely more on Australia, from which it currently imports 30 per cent of its bauxite. However, this would have required an adjustment of China’s foreign policy, as Beijing was trying to gain more independence from the island which had supported an international inquiry into China’s role in the Covid outbreak. If the new Guinean government reasserted its commitment to China, keeping the impact of the coup on Chinese interests to a low, the 2021 overthrow showed that China is not completely unconcerned by the security situation in Africa, as its interests can be quickly threatened in case of prolonged instability. Therefore, if the African coups’ direct impact on Chinese interests is not evident, they do seem to have diffuse effects which require adaptability from China. 

Chinese Response to the Coups 

Chinese foreign policy rests on the principle of non-interference; it considers that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure security in its own internal affairs. Whilst the European Union (EU) and ECOWAS are vocal in their condemnation of the coups, often imposing stark sanctions against the military governments deemed anti-democratic, China does not usually make an official condemnation or support sanctions against African military governments. China expressed no criticism of the five African coups between 2003 and 2010. In response to the 2017 coup in Zimbabwe, China declared, “We hope that Zimbabwe could properly handle its internal affairs,” whilst stating that Sudan is “capable of managing its own internal affairs and ensuring its national peace and stability” after the 2019 coup. Chinese condemnations are rare but increasingly more common and are usually voiced when Chinese stakes are higher in the concerned countries. Representatives have officially condemned the 2012 coup in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the 2013 coup in the Central African Republic, and most recently the military overthrow of Guinea’s former president Alpha Condé. However, they have never supported or implemented sanctions against the new military governments.

Although the Chinese response may appear neutral or nonpartisan, China’s non-interference doctrine has many political implications. For one, this policy represents indirect - if not direct - support for the new governments. Increasing its aid to Madagascar in return for more security for its citizens and infrastructures after 2009, Chinese support was represented in local media as an achievement of the new Madagascar government and important international recognition, helping to root the new government’s legitimacy. 

Being associated as an ally and supporter of military governments can turn detrimental to Chinese interests, notably for its image in African civil society. When the military overthrows are criticized by the population, the Chinese reputation, already low due to perceptions of economic aggressiveness, risks to decrease even more. As Chris Alden and Christopher R. Hughes, experts on Chinese foreign policy argued, “the Chinese presence then becomes a potential target for dissent from any segment of society that is discontented with the prevailing circumstances under the government of the day, whether trade unions concerned about safety standards or businesses that are unable to compete against Chinese imports, superior access to supply chains or low-cost bidding.” They use the example of Chinese cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was decried in Parliament by Jean-Lucien Mbusa, an important member of the opposition party, to rally civil society. 

Secondly, its policy of “non-interference” leads China to actively oppose sanctions in international institutions. Refusing to vote for UN-backed sanctions against the coups, China positions itself closer to Russia, which is more actively engaged in its support of the military regimes. As Richard Gowan explains, UN director for the International Crisis Group, “Russia has backed the coup-plotters in Sudan and Mali even more strongly than China. Beijing and Moscow tend to coordinate their positions over these crises.” This position has tended to deteriorate China’s relations with African members of the UN Security Council, as their historical Chinese ally in the UN went against their decision to sanction the coups. This policy also goes against ECOWAS’ position, which has become more assertive in its condemnations of the African military overthrows. ECOWAS’ policy used to be based on the principle of non-interference, but in recent years the regional organization has taken a more intervening stance, therefore breaking away from its accordance with China. David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and professor at George Washington University summarized: “Military coups in Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso complicate both China’s economic interests and foreign policy in the region, especially when Beijing’s policy is contrary to the prevailing African view.” 

The recent wave of coup d’états in Africa, therefore, impacts Chinese foreign policy, by forcing Beijing to position itself and protect its interests whilst not worrying local opinion. As China is expanding its investment on the continent, its security engagement will become increasingly significant. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that China will shift from its non-interference approach as it represents the backbone of its foreign policy. China will be more inclined to increase its presence through the outsourcing of its security to private companies or through UN peacekeeping missions, as it has started to do in recent years. For instance, following the Darfur crisis, the Chinese government pressured Sudanese authorities to accept UN peacekeeping forces in order to protect its interests in the region. Besides, it is likely that Beijing will develop its diplomatic presence in unstable countries. In recent years, there has been an important augmentation of Chinese staff, both in political and economic cabinets, whilst the first special envoy in charge of the eastern region of Africa, Xue Bing, was appointed this February. Finally, experts have noted that China should improve its reputation in African civil society as it has started to do in recent years through its “charm offensive.” 

Coups d’état in Africa are therefore not as negligible on Chinese interests as it may appear prima facie. The recent wave of military overthrows, exemplified by Guinea, has highlighted the vulnerability of Chinese engagements in the continent. Whilst China is unlikely to undertake a drastic shift in its approach to African security, it will have to adapt its policy to protect its interests in the future. Beijing’s choices in Africa will be determinant for the security of the continent and for Chinese foreign policy globally.