On February 20th, the French finalised their military mission in Burkina Faso during a ceremony with Burkinabe officials at the Kamboinisin base, north of the capital Ouagadougou. This follows the decision by the Burkinabe government to terminate its military cooperation agreement with France earlier this January, demanding that the 400 troops stationed in the country depart within a month. The end of the French mission demonstrates the deteriorating relations between France and Burkina Faso since President of the Transition Ibrahim Traoré ousted Paul Henri Sandaogo Damibia last September. The presence of troops had been empowered by a military cooperation agreement signed in 2018 to fight jihadist insurgency groups present in Burkina Faso, such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (IS-GS). The departure of French troops raises several questions regarding the origins and significance of the damaged relationship between Burkina Faso and France, spotlighting the transformation of French presence in West Africa. 

Developments in Relations 

Burkina Faso’s relationship with France has been defined by the latter’s economic and political influence since the independence of the country in 1960. The two have encountered a relatively stable relationship in recent decades, especially when considering trade relations. In 2020, France was Burkina Faso’s third most important trading partner in terms of imports. France was also Burkina Faso’s most important foreign aid donor, providing €91 million in 2020. 

French influence has also materialised by a military presence in Burkina Faso - unofficially since 2010, then officially since 2018, resulting from the signature of the cooperation agreement. France was perceived by the Burkinabe government as a reliable partner in the fight against jihadist insurgency groups which gained traction in the north of the country in the late 2000s. This enabled France to deploy its task force “Sabre” (created in 2009) to defend French interests in West Africa during the Blaise Compaoré presidency. The presence of these troops was formalised and strengthened during Roch Marc Christian Kaboré’s presidency (2015-2022) following the 2018 attack on the French embassy in Ouagadougou, claimed by JNIM. France presented its troops as an effective instrument to solve the escalating security crisis in the country considering the limited capacities and resources of the Burkinabe government. However, French support did not solve the security crisis as hoped, challenging French presence in the country. Declining confidence in Burkinabe-French relations was further diminished by President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who removed Kaboré in a coup in January 2022 criticising his approach to jihadist insurgency groups. This discourse was used by Damiba’s opponents to remove him from power and subsequently gained ground. 

Following a second coup in less than a year in September, the rise to power of Ibrahim Traoré has seen a clear deterioration of the relationship between Burkina Faso and France. In the aftermath of the coup, Traoré accused French troops of protecting Damiba on Burkinabe television, resulting in an attack on the French embassy by Traoré supporters in October. Two months later, the regime ordered the suspension of Radio France Internationale (RFI) in the country. All of these actions complement the regime’s discourse that argues France has acted as a meddler rather than a partner in Burkina Faso and Western Africa. 

Grievances against the former colonial power have spread across the country. In early January 2023, French deputy foreign minister Chrysoula Zacharopoulou visited Ouagadougou to try and appease tensions with the Traoré regime. She denied accusations that France was a meddler, asserting it was “imposing nothing” on Burkina Faso. However, this visit seems to have had little impact on altering the trajectory of the relationship, considering Burkinabe authorities demanded the departure of French troops two weeks later. Whilst the last Burkinabe request for French military support dated back to only July 2022, the request of departure indicates that relations with France are in a critical phase. The spokesperson of the Burkinabe government, Jean-Emmanuel Ouédrago, stated that the termination of the 2018 agreement was not the end of Burkina Faso-France relations. Considering the current authoritarian regime has designated French military intervention as the root of the worsening security crisis, it is likely that these relations will be more limited for the foreseeable future as long as Traoré stays in power. 

New Partnerships

Burkina Faso, along with Mali, has become the epicentre of the security crisis in Western Africa. Two million people are internally displaced and 40 per cent of territory is controlled by JNIM and IS-GS insurgency groups. Traoré has devised a strategy different from his predecessors to reconquer territory from jihadist insurgency groups. He has argued that the solution to the security crisis is the militarisation of Burkinabe society rather than relying on external forces, such as France. Since November 2022, 90,000 civilians have been recruited to be part of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), a paramilitary group established in 2020. Traoré has also announced he wants civil servants, such as those from the Forest and Water agency, to participate in this fight. 

This policy of the Burkinabe forces has also been reinforced by the arrival of new military equipment ordered by Damiba, such as Bayraktar drones. Traoré’s strategy has had some success as Burkinabe forces were able to take back some significant towns in northern Burkina Faso in late 2022 and early 2023. However, the frequency of attacks by jihadist insurgency groups has also increased. In recent weeks, more than 70 Burkinabe soldiers have died in Oudalan province bordering Mali, demonstrating the limits of domestic capacity building. In consequence, other external actors, such as Russia and Turkey, have stepped in to try to project their influence in the hope of filling the gap left by the departure of France. 

Anti-French sentiment has escalated due to France’s failure in successfully mitigating the security crisis, which has been fuelled by campaigns on social media. Russia has been particularly active in trying to expand its influence in Burkina Faso as part of its broader strategy in Africa. It has been credited with significantly contributing to disinformation campaigns and fuelling anti-French sentiment across the region, which has been particularly effective in Burkina. Reports of Russian flags and photos of Russian President Vladimir Putin during protests in Ouagadougou this January reflect the reality of growing Russian influence in the country under the Traoré regime. Both countries have embraced expanded cooperation as demonstrated by Burkinabe Prime Minister Kyélem de Tambèla’s visit to Moscow in December 2022 and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Ouagadougou in January. 

In December 2022, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo made allegations against Burkina Faso, stating that they made an arrangement where Wagner mercenaries would support Burkinabe forces in exchange for operating a gold mine. However, Burkinabe authorities have rejected the claim that there are Wagner troops in the country. Burkina’s ties with Russia risks relations with some neighbours sceptical of Russian influence, like Ghana. This could compromise regional security collaboration, such as the Accra initiative which coordinates counterterrorism operations since 2017. Burkina Faso’s receptiveness to Russia reflects a desire for new partnerships ensuing the rise of tensions with France. There is potential for the presence of Wagner troops in the near future in the country which would likely further the divide with France, as seen in Mali. Moreover, it is unlikely that the presence of Wagner troops would be effective in improving the security situation, as has been demonstrated in Mali. Exchanging French military presence with another presence, such as Russia, will not resolve issues of inappropriate strategy and rampant corruption within the Burkinabe army, which has hindered the response to jihadist insurgency groups. 

Consequences of Withdrawal

In the days following the termination of the agreement, French authorities announced that the 400 troops stationed in Kamboinsin would be redeployed to neighbouring Niger where there are already 2,000 troops stationed. Since then, French President Emmanuel Macron outlined a new strategy for Africa during a speech on February 27, preceding his four-nation tour in the region. During this speech, he announced a gradual decrease of French military presence in Western Africa whilst increasing cooperation and training of African military forces, which does not encompass Burkina Faso. French departure from Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali has highlighted the need to rethink operations in the region. Part of this rethink is increased cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Sénegal. However, the French have yet to detail what they will do with troops stationed in Chad and Niger. 

Presently, Chad and Niger are the strongest partners of French security operations in the region. Niamey, the capital of Niger, is already becoming the hub of French security operations in West Africa. This has been enabled by the eagerness for French presence by Nigerien President Mohammed Bazoum, despite opposition by some. French strategy will have to ensure Nigerien authorities and the public remain supportive if they wish to make Niger the hub of their counter-insurgency operations. France should also consider furthering cooperation with countries in the Gulf of Guinea, such as Benin and Togo, who are increasingly subject to attacks of jihadist insurgency groups on their territory. If France chooses to diversify cooperation, it should also take into account the regimes in place and their stability to prevent a reiteration of the situation in Burkina Faso and Mali. 

Developments in the security sphere also raise questions regarding France’s future economic and political presence in Western Africa. Anti-French sentiment is gaining ground in countries as some argue that the Burkina Faso and Mali expulsion is the “tip of the iceberg”. Negative perceptions could materialise in countries traditionally favourable towards the French, such as Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Hostility towards France is also impacting its economic and political presence in the region. Since the early 2000s, French economic presence has declined drastically through trade and technical cooperations in favour of other powers, such as China, Russia, and Turkey. In his speech, Macron challenged this decline, calling for a “new era” to develop a new partnership with African actors. It remains to be seen whether this new era will materialise as it is not the first time that Macron has promised reform. Revelations in future months and years might also show that France may have done lasting damage to its relationship with some African partners, such as Burkina Faso, particularly if the regime stays in place in Ouagadougou. 

Rebuilding Relations

France’s issues in the region are rooted in negative public perception towards the former colonial power. In Burkina Faso, civil society played a crucial role in the government’s decision to sever ties with France. Any future French strategy must take the role of civil society seriously in order to mitigate public reception. Redefining military cooperation may not be enough to challenge perceptions that it is a neo-colonialist power sustaining an asymmetric relationship. This could materialise by expanding exchanges and a more robust development policy which demonstrates France can be a beneficial and reliable partner. Thus, the French government should also pursue policies which engage with civil societies in the region to prevent the pattern of events which developed in Mali and Burkina Faso.

The success of France’s new strategy in the region remains to be seen. It is crucial to focus on a relationship driven by mutual interest, particularly in the field of security. However, the transformation of this relationship is not solely dependent on France. As asserted by Macron, France cannot fix all of the problems in Africa. Some regimes have chosen to blame France entirely for the escalation of the security crisis in order to divert attention from problems of corruption and strategy. Therefore, the relationship can only transform if these regimes choose to engage with France or if these regimes change. Therefore, the relationship can only transform if these regimes do not remain in power. In Ouagadougou, it is unlikely that the attitude towards France will evolve as Traoré’s discourse is focused on blaming France and developing a relationship with Moscow. This situation is not necessarily the same for other countries in the region where there is potential for a new era.

While Burkinabes and France wait to see how Burkina Faso’s governance will be handled, France should focus on establishing and reforming relations in West Africa. Preventing Russian influence and mitigating errors in counter-terrorism operations are key in order for France to gain favour in the region and hopefully repair its relationship with Burkina Faso in the future. French presence in Africa is in a critically fragile state and must be handled methodically. The coming months will show whether France adapts a more analytical strategy and how the new era of French-African relations materialises.