Is China’s new naval facility in Cambodia a cause for concern?
In August 2017, China formally opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti to resupply naval ships taking part in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia. However, many states, including the US, have viewed this move as President Xi Jinping undertaking an ambitious military modernization program to expand their naval capabilities abroad. Djibouti’s strategic geopolitical position, on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean, has stirred concerns around the “string of pearls” military alliances that China is attempting to form across South Asia and the Horn of Africa.
As recent as June 2022, Western officials have accused China of secretly building a naval facility in Cambodia. The Indo-Pacific is an increasingly important region for China’s naval ambitions given its proximity, the ongoing South China Sea disputes, and the growing importance of the region’s maritime trade. Chinese and Cambodian officials cite that this agreement is predicated on improving the base’s port facility, and both sides continue to deny that this deal includes any concession for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to use the facility, which many U.S. policymakers are challenging.
In the wake of intensifying Sino-American relations, US officials have expressed their concerns about China’s expanding naval footprint. A 2021 Pentagon report stated that Beijing was pursuing military facilities globally to support “naval, air, ground, cyber, and space power projection.” This is especially threatening as it could “interfere with U.S. military operations and support offensive operations against the [U.S.].” Analysts have also projected that China’s navy will strengthen considerably through to 2050.
As well as a rising naval power, Chinese officials have signed more draft security agreements this year, such as a deal with the Solomon Islands, which has alarmed the neighbouring countries of Australia and New Zealand over the possibility of a Chinese base in the Solomons. Given China’s military expansionism in recent years, it is unsurprising that many states have voiced their concerns about China’s long-term goals and motivations. Maritime concerns have come to the forefront in light of an increasingly charged political climate, stemming from rising tensions in the South China Sea dispute, uncertainty over the future of Taiwan, and concerns over potential naval choke points such as the Strait of Malacca.
Despite this alarmism, and although Sino-Cambodian ties are strong, a provision in the Cambodian constitution prohibits foreign military bases on its territory meaning it is unlikely that Chinese military forces will end up utilizing the Ream Naval Base. If a Chinese base is developed, it would have compounding effects on the security of Southeast Asia as a whole, and therefore it is doubtful that Cambodia would risk its relations with fellow ASEAN members. The current Cambodian government has maintained good relations with its neighbouring countries, especially Vietnam and Thailand. Despite some border disputes and skirmishes between 2008-11, relations have since been largely marked by cooperation rather than confrontation. Against this backdrop, allowing Chinese military presence in Cambodia could fray existing relations with both Thailand, a strong U.S. ally, and Vietnam, which has ongoing disputes with China over the South China Sea issue. This could lead to serious confrontations between the ASEAN states and China, which is against the interests of all actors involved. More fundamentally, allowing a Chinese military base in Cambodia would jeopardise Cambodia’s efforts to stay neutral in the Sino-American strategic rivalry.
Even if US accusations are true, China’s new naval facility in Cambodia is unlikely to be a cause for major concern. Chinese military expert at Defense Priorities, Lyle Goldstein, noted that China does not appear to be expanding its network to the same degree as the US has in the past. In fact, Beijing has been cautious in its use of force thus far, and its naval aspirations have been largely restrained. Additionally, the portion of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base identified by the Washington Post as being partitioned off for China’s use is too small to sustain naval vessels. Coupled with the fact that Cambodia is one of the weaker maritime states in Southeast Asia, it is unlikely to have appreciable effects on the US’s continued presence in the Indo-Pacific for the time being. Blake Herzinger, writing for Foreign Policy, has even gone so far as to say that the US has overreacted to this event. This criticism comes in part from the fact that although China currently has the world’s largest navy, its fleet relies disproportionately on smaller classes of ships, and that U.S. naval capabilities are greatly strengthened by its vast network of allies’ navies.