US-Taiwan’s meeting in the middle?

Article thumbnail of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen reviewing a Marine Corps battalion in Kaohsiung, July 2020, courtesy of Wikipedia Commons

US and Taiwan Envoys Meet in France 

The US embassy in France has recently invited Taiwan’s envoy to a meeting, normalising engagements between the US and Taiwan for a first time since 1979 when the bipartisan Taiwan Relations Act was passed in Congress. Brian Aggeler, representing the US, met with Wu Chi-chung from Taiwan, both officials are representatives in France. The engagement has been perceived as a reassurance of the long-time US-Taiwan friendship, share of common democratic values, and the importance of Taiwan as a strategic ally for security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

The meeting has been met with strong opposition from China, which upholds the ‘One China’ policy and insists Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. On 3rd May, the Chinese Embassy in France released a statement reinforcing that ‘the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only legal government representing all of China’, which is a ‘fact recognised by the international community and a fundamental norm in international relations’.

US-Taiwan Relations 

Traditionally, the US adopted a strategy of ambiguity when commenting on Cross-Strait relations, ensuring that it merely acknowledges but will not interpret the meaning of ‘One China’ under the ‘1992 Consensus’.  However, Trump’s presidency marked closer US-Taiwan relations. In 2016, a direct phone call between then president-elect Donald Trump and Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen broke conventional US policy of not forming formal relations with Taiwan. The establishment of a new compound at the American Institute in Taiwan in 2018, symbolised America’s commitment to Taiwan. Economically, as of 2019, the US is Taiwan’s second largest single source of FDI, and domestically the Taiwanese public seeks to form closer economic cooperations with the US to reduce its economic reliance on mainland China so it has less bargaining power over Taiwan.   

Closer US-Taiwan engagement has been met with opposition from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warning the US on multiple occasions not to ‘meddle with Chinese internal affairs’, insisting that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. However, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated that it is not America’s purpose to ‘contain China’, but to ‘uphold this rules-based order that China is posing a challenge to’. America is committed to peace and security in the Western Pacific, warning that any attempts to ‘change the status quo by force’ would be a ‘serious mistake’. As a result scholars expect the Seventh Fleet to show up if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacks Taiwan.

Cross-Strait Tensions 

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, an island 100 miles east of mainland China, where Japanese administrative rule had only ended in 1945. Both parties had struggled to reclaim dominance over each other, hoping to reunify ‘One China’. Under Xi Ji-ping’s rule, the CCP is more determined than ever to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. In 2020 alone, the PLA entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone for a record 91 days, totalling up to 380 incursions. 

However, China’s crackdown of political freedom and imposition of a National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 has conveyed a clear message to the Taiwanese public that ‘One Country, Two Systems’ would not work in Taiwan as it had failed in Hong Kong. Contrary to the system of one-party rule in China, Taiwan has its own constitution and democracy. A public survey in 2020 revealed that a record 67% of Taiwan’s population identify as ‘Taiwanese’ whilst merely 2.4% identify as ‘Chinese’. Evidently the Taiwanese public are resentful towards an authoritarian China that is encroaching on their territory, cultural identities and political structures.    

Security Risks for Taiwan 

The US has provided military backing for Taiwan through the sale of arms and military technology. The Pentagon has already confirmed plans to sell 40 self-propelled howitzers to Taiwan by 2025 and has exported its submarine technology to Taiwan in support of plans to develop a Taiwanese submarine fleet. However, despite America’s military support, the Taiwanese army is still not yet ‘optimally manned, trained, equipped and motivated to defend against an attack’. It is crucial that President Tsai’s military reforms are effective in not only building up Taiwan’s defence capabilities, but also well-prepared for potential offensive attacks against PLA invasions.

The newly appointed National Defence Minister of Taiwan, Chiu Kuo-cheng, has been trained in the US before and is tasked with the mission to further military reforms including non-traditional threats, asymmetrical warfare and joint operation. However, calls to change Taiwan’s conscription policy to voluntary-based in order to save costs would deter its citizens from serving in the army. Despite growing military pressures from China, Taiwan’s youth populations perceive conscription as ‘a waste of time’ since China’s economic advantages alone could crush Taiwan. The PLA’s frequent demonstrations of its military muscles are alarming for Taiwan’s national security, and solely relying on American arms would not make up for the island’s inadequate military power. 

Implications to the Balance of Power in the Western Pacific 

In a recent interview with The Economist, Henry Kissinger argued that the rising power of China is not of a direct threat to the West as it is to its neighbouring states. Key US allies in the East, Japan and South Korea, are exposed to risks of the PLA’s military aggression in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Suga’s joint leaders’ statement in April 2021 addressed Taiwan for the first time in fifty-two years, ‘underscoring the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’. South Korea has also hinted that it is interested in military cooperation with Japan despite their rivalry.

The rare reach-out from Seoul to Tokyo for military cooperation implies the imminent need to consolidate the collective security of Asian countries that are threatened by Chinese aggression. Closer US-Taiwan relations imply that the US is committed to safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy and territorial integrity. This would undoubtedly be reassuring to Japan and South Korea, who are increasingly threatened by the PLA’s aggression and North Korea’s possession of nuclear arms. For the transatlantic relations, America’s defence of Taiwan from Chinese invasion is symbolic especially in times when there is democratic backsliding in some NATO states such as Hungary and Poland.

Taiwan is strategically and symbolically important to the US and its allies in the East, yet the US has to be cautious in striking a balance between safeguarding Taiwan’s national security, its vested interests in Japan and South Korea, whilst not provoking China to wage war over Taiwan when the Taiwanese army is not well-equipped to strike back.