Kazakhstan's Refusal of BRICS+: Understanding the Geopolitical Balance
Executive Summary
Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS+ indicates a desire to maintain a balanced foreign policy and strategic neutrality, cooperating with diverse global powers while safeguarding its sovereignty and fostering economic opportunities. This decision aligns with its long-term strategy of neutrality, rather than a rejection of Russia itself.
For Russia, this decision is perceived as a blow to its influence in its 'near abroad’. For Kazakhstan, it reflects a broader regional trend of distancing slightly from Moscow while still maintaining bilateral relations.
Kazakhstan’s BRICS+ rejection highlights the evolving geopolitical trends in Central Asia since 2022 and the complexity of navigating relationships with major powers like Russia, China, and the EU.
Introduction
While Kazakhstan’s refusal of BRICS+ membership has been seen by many, including the Kremlin, as a snub to Russia, it is actually aligned with Kazakhstan’s long-term strategy to remain a neutral, cooperative partner to all its neighbours. Kazakhstan, through bilateral agreements and other alliances, already has access to collaborative channels with most of the BRICS members, negating the need for a full BRICS+ membership. For Russia, however, this refusal marks a dangerous deviation from its expectations for its ‘near abroad’, and signals a long-term decline of its influence in Central Asia.
From 22nd to 24th October 2024, Russia hosted the 16th BRICS summit, the organisation’s first in its new form, BRICS+, officially welcoming Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as new members alongside scores of world leaders from other hopefuls. Among them, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was invited by Russia to attend as an honoured guest. For many, this seemed an obvious precursor to the country’s membership in the alliance. However, a few days before the summit, after receiving a proposal to join the alliance, the Kazakh government politely refused, announcing they will not be pursuing BRICS+ membership now, nor in the foreseeable future. In an interview with Tengri News, Tokayev’s spokesperson Berik Uali diplomatically addressed the issue, stating that, while Kazakhstan was “watching the evolution of BRICS+ with interest”, it would not seek membership.
The advent of BRICS
The BRICS alliance was designed as an alternative to Western-dominated international systems like the UN and the G20, placing the focus instead on support among developing nations. For its five founding members, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, it also presents a mechanism to project soft power abroad and to invest in - and gain influence in - developing countries. For Russia in particular, it has become a way not only to project soft power but also to circumvent Western sanctions and increase its access to much-needed resources to continue its war in Ukraine. Hosting the 2024 summit, which was attended by scores of world leaders and, most notably and controversially, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, allows Russia to broadcast to the West its power and influence in the rest of the world. From a Russian perspective, proving that the Western sanctions provoked by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine haven’t undermined its economic and geopolitical stability as much as they might have wished is essential for both its domestic and international image.
Given the recent expansion of BRICS, its global reach and the development prospects which come with it, the refusal of the largest Central Asian economy might come as a surprise. But this is only one part of a much larger picture, one in which Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia are seeking to balance their delicate geographical position between their powerful neighbours, China, Europe and Russia. The goal is to enhance their economic and development opportunities and foster cooperation without taking sides. To stray too far under the influence of one state could present not only risks to the country’s sovereign independence but also a loss of opportunities for cooperation with other countries and alliances.
Snub or Strategy?
Kazakhstan’s refusal of BRICS+ membership, while not significantly consequential for Russia, is an embarrassing denial of the image that the Kremlin wishes to present as pure fact - that Russia maintains its former place as a paternal, guiding figure towards former-Soviet countries. In response, Russia has banned the import of certain types of produce including grain, tomatoes, peppers, and sunflower seeds from Kazakhstan under the pretext of an alert from its agricultural safety watchdog, and engaged in price dumping to undercut exports of Kazakh wheat. Though hardly likely to create a lasting issue for the country’s economy, the message of displeasure that it sends is clear.
It is no accident that the two former Soviet countries that are most keen to join BRICS+, Belarus and Azerbaijan, are those who maintain relatively strong ties with Putin’s Russia. Kazakhstan’s lack of desire to join can be seen as part of its long-term strategy to position itself outside of Russia’s sphere of influence while remaining on good terms with the country, on which Kazakhstan is still reliant to some degree. Russia considers the former Soviet countries of the region as its ‘near abroad’ and its influence looms like a shadow over many aspects of life. The economies of the countries are linked intrinsically with the success of the ruble and are heavily reliant on Russia for trade; for Kazakhstan, Russia is its second largest import and third largest export partner. What’s more, almost half of foreign businesses in Kazakhstan are Russian. However, since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many Central Asian governments, fearing perhaps for their own countries, have been making small but decisive moves away from the Kremlin in a bid for greater self-determination.
Beyond BRICS+
Additionally, Kazakhstan has no few alternatives to BRICS+. In his statement on Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS+, Uali affirmed Tokayev’s commitment to the UN as “a universal and uncontested organization.” Kazakhstan is also a member of many regional organisations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation alongside several BRICS+ members, notably Russia, China, India and Iran. Kazakhstan is also a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, and the Organization of Turkic States. Kazakhstan has strong bilateral relations with China, which has invested heavily in the country through its Belt and Road Initiative, as well as with the EU, both of whom are significant players in the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
However, Kazakhstan’s refusal of BRICS+ membership does not indicate that Russia-Kazakh relations are substantially deteriorating. Indeed, Kazakhstan recently reaffirmed that they will continue to support Russia through the sanctions linked to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Putin honoured a long-planned visit at the end of November for the summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, where he was well received. In 2022, the Kazakh government was reliant on Russia through the CSTO to help it maintain order after violent protests erupted in the country. It is clear then that Kazakhstan, by rejecting BRICS+ membership, is not rejecting Russia itself. Rather, the Kazakh government is seeking to maintain the delicate balance it has been creating with all the stakeholders who have taken an interest in the region.
Conclusion
For Kazakhstan, ultimately, this choice represents the delicate equilibrium it must pursue to balance potential allies, and be able to continue growing its economy through the investments of its neighbours and other stakeholders. The Kazakh government seems to be well aware that the future potential for diplomatic and economic growth and development hangs on how well it balances these opportunities now. For Russia, although impactful for the image it wants to project to the West, Kazakhstan’s absence at the BRICS+ table will ultimately not be hugely consequential; Kazakhstan has indicated it is still open to cooperation with BRICS+ as a non-member country and it maintains strong bilateral relations with Russia, meaning that channels for Russia to profit from its relations with the country remain open. However, such a blatant refusal to join one of Russia’s most prominent international projects may signal the beginning of the end of Russia’s presumed, domineering influence in its ‘near abroad’, as Central Asian countries start to look more closely at other opportunities for interaction and cooperation.