Reflections on China’s Spy Balloon: Another Sputnik moment?
Overview of the Incident
US-China relations have deteriorated rapidly over the past decade and any miscalculations could have dire consequences for global stability. While great powers are capable of mitigating the negative impacts of incidents such as the Cuban Missile Crisis through military and political communications, other events led to great power competition (the launch of Sputnik I) or even war. Indeed, many factors contributed to the outcomes of these events, including political leaders’ decision-making process, external and internal pressures, and the geopolitical dynamics in different regions. This article is going to put the spy balloon incident in the wider context of the tense relationship between China and the US, and try to provide a reasonable prediction of its outcome by taking different factors into consideration.
US-China relations were confronted by an unexpected event in February when a spy balloon was spotted over Montana, where one of the US’ three nuclear missile silo fields is located. While the Pentagon Spokesman claimed that these balloons ‘have been observed previously over the past several years’, President Joe Biden decided to shoot down the balloon in the fear that its surveillance equipment could send sensitive information back to China. To minimise the risk to civilians, President Biden authorised the Department of Defense to send an F-22 fighter jet to shoot down the balloon when it flew above the Atlantic Ocean on 4 February. During his State of the Union Address, while he didn’t directly refer to the incident, President Biden warned that “if China threatens our sovereignty, we will act to protect our country.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken also postponed his trip to Beijing and called the incident an “irresponsible act and a clear violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law that undermined the purpose of the trip” during his phone meeting with Wang Yi.
China and the United States’ Reactions
China emphasised that the so-called spy balloon was actually a weather balloon that veered off its designated course, whereas the U.S. government insisted that the debris of the balloon contained high-level equipment that was able to collect signals and sensitive information. The Biden administration’s decision to let the balloon fly across American territory triggered a backlash within Congress. During a subcommittee hearing, Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) blamed the Pentagon for allowing the spy balloon to fly over the United States “when we could've taken it down over the Aleutian Islands”, other Republican senators such as Mike Gallagher (R-WI) said that “the Chinese Communist Party should not have on-demand access to American airspace.” In addition to domestic tensions, the spy balloon incident also revealed the lack of trust between the high-ranking officials of both sides. During the Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi regarded the United States’ reactions to the balloons as “unimaginable”, “hysterical”, and an act that violated international norms. Wang claimed that “There are so many balloons all over the world, so is the United States going to shoot all of them down?” During a closed-door meeting with Wang, Antony Blinken claimed that the Chinese Foreign Minister refused to apologise for the spy balloons incident.
When a United States Navy EP-3 intelligence aircraft collided with a PLANAF J-8 interceptor jet above the South China Sea in 2001, the United States and China set up a series of hotlines to foster communications between both countries. The spy balloon incident, however, has revealed the lack of trust and communication between high-ranking officials, with China refusing the Pentagon’s request for a call between Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Wei Fenghe, China’s Minister of National Defense.
America’s “Sputnik Moment”?
When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I into orbit in 1957, the United States was shocked by the USSR’s progress in space exploration and US public opinion saw the event as a part of the Cold War competition. The Eisenhower administration responded by founding NASA in 1958 and fostering research and investments within the space industry. While some critics argued that the spy balloon incident provided a ‘Sputnik Moment’ for the Biden administration, both sides have little incentive to escalate the dispute. Firstly, the Russo-Ukraine War entered a stalemate with both sides struggling to occupy new territories. Although President Biden, who was eager to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine, promised half-billion dollars in US assistance during his surprise visit to Kyiv on February 20th, the CSIS reported that the U.S. Army could be confronted by ‘years of ammunition shortages’ due to the supplies provided to Ukraine. The United States allies in NATO also expressed their concerns about the shortage of ammunition as a result of the war. Indeed, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has put a significant burden on the United States' weapon supplies. With its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, the United States is unwilling to enter a ‘two-front clash’ with both Russia and China. Evidence has shown that the Biden administration was aware of the presence of the spy balloon on January 28th, but decided not to inform the public for fear that the incident may force Blinken to cancel his trip to Beijing. Indeed, announcing the news of a spy balloon over the United States before Blinken’s trip to Beijing could provoke China and further deteriorate the tense relationship between China and the United States.
Grey zoning and shifting focuses from the Indo-Pacific
Secondly, China sees the Russo-Ukrainian War as an ideal opportunity to use its grey zone tactics and distract the United States from the Indo-Pacific. After Wang Yi’s announcement at the Munich Security Conference that China will devote itself to the “political settlement of the Ukraine crisis” and continue to stay firm on the side of peace and dialogue, he visited Moscow in late February, less than a week before the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He met several high-ranking government officials such as Sergey Lavrov and Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s Security Council. During his visit to Russia, Wang Yi expressed China’s interest in helping Russia to “coordinate high-level exchanges, restart dialogue and cooperation mechanisms, and push for greater development of bilateral relations.” According to a readout from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi and Nikolai Patrushev also opposed “the Cold War mentality, bloc confrontation, and ideological opposition”, an implicit criticism of the United States.
On the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Xi Jinping released his 12-point proposal, in which China asked for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and asked for the end of sanctions on Russia. Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the ideas of the proposal but he also believed that “the question is what follows the words…the question is in the steps and where they will lead to.” While Ukraine was cautiously optimistic about the proposal, Both Russia and the United States refused to endorse Xi’s initiative. Blinken claimed that China was trying to "have it both ways" and Russia stated that this was not an appropriate time to discuss a peace proposal. Nevertheless, by minimising its involvement in the war and positioning itself as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, China has been able to leverage its close relationship with Russia and distract the United States’ attention away from Asia.
How consequential is this for Sino-American competition in Asia?
Although the Russo-Ukrainian War poses significant challenges to the United States and its allies, it remains unlikely that the cross-strait situation will witness any dramatic events at the moment. While the United States is unwilling to enter a new Cold War with China, it still shows strong support for Taiwan to prevent China from making strategic miscalculations. Indeed, the United States, in response to China’s grey zone tactics, demonstrated its commitment to deter China’s geopolitical ambitions by committing itself to the security of Taiwan. The White House held a 7-hour secret meeting with Taiwan’s foreign minister Joseph Wu and the national security adviser Wellington Koo at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)’s Washington Headquarters on 21 February, which marked the first visit to Washington by Taiwan’s foreign minister since 1979. Other participants include Wendy Sherman, the Deputy Secretary of State, and Kurt Campbell, the National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific.
While little details were given regarding the outcome of the meeting, the confidentiality of the meeting implied that both Taiwan and the United States wanted to tone down the significance of the meeting in fear of provoking China. Besides political communications, to provide better training for Taiwan’s armed forces, the Pentagon announced that it is going to expand its military presence in Taiwan by deploying around 100-200 troops to Taiwan in the following months. Taiwan also announced its training program, which is going to send a battalion of soldiers to the United States for military exchanges. On March 2, Washington announced a US$619 million arms sale package to Taiwan, including the latest AIM-120C-8 Missiles and AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). Indeed, these events are manifestations of the United States’ commitments to Taiwan and the regional security of the Asia-Pacific.