Ko Wen-Je: Taiwan’s ‘Grey Rhino’ President-to-be?
An Analysis of Ko’s strategy in navigating trilateral relations
Ko Wen-Je in focus
With Taiwan’s presidential election just six months away, it remains unclear who will become the island’s next president and navigate its relations with China and the US under extreme duress in the next four years. This analysis is directed at fixing the mostly inadequate and sometimes distorting attention received by Ko in Western discourses, where Ko Wen-Je is constantly conceived as a spoiler in the conventional blue-green bipartisan rivalry, which is inadvertently favourable to the DPP victory.
Poising himself as the “third way” between the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the mainland-friendly Kuomintang (KMT), former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je is by no means a fringe candidate. In June, Ko surged ahead of the DPP and KMT candidates, William Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-ih, in presidential favourability in the TVBS poll. Despite the nuances in their metrics and results, three major polling agencies, the TVBS, Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) and KW News, spelt a similar story of the evolving “three-horse race”. Ko’s command of youth voters is particularly striking, securing a 45% landslide approval among the 20-24 and 25-34 age groups, leading Lai by 7 points (36%) amongst those aged 35-44. While the youth would not be the decisive voting block for the coming presidential race, especially if we consider Lai’s overwhelming popularity across all age groups above 45, it represents an unmistakable desperation among young people to see political change, searching for an unconventional politician who could eke out a middle ground within Taiwan’s bitter bipartisan divisions.
The China Factor, be it forging closer ties with mainland China or consolidating Taiwan’s distinct identity and sovereignty, has typically cast a long shadow over most other issues in Taiwan’s presidential elections. In the face of Taiwan’s perilously strained relations with Beijing in recent years, Taiwanese voters are compelled to reexamine the cross-strait policy options very carefully. It is appropriate to point out that preserving the status quo (which means maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence but avoiding retaliation from China) is the general political consensus in Taiwan. Nonetheless, the question of ‘how best to preserve the status quo?’ remains. While domestic factors are also important, this analysis concentrates on Ko’s strategy in navigating Taiwan’s trilateral relations with Beijing and Washington. Assuming Ko can continue retaining his position no lower than second place and the presidential candidacies remain constant, this analysis seeks to explicate how Ko’s trilateral relation strategies may contribute to his seemingly improbable but traceable victory in the January presidential race.
Ko’s Beijing Policy
The former Taipei Mayor has touted himself as the most capable candidate when it comes to managing Beijing and Washington. His foreign policy vision is well encapsulated in his own words: “To position Taiwan as a bridge for communications between China and the US, not a pawn caught up in Sino-US competition.” While this might sound like a populist statement neglecting the hard reality that Taiwan faces, it does possess an undeniable allure for the moderate electorate who find the KMT too “submissive” towards Beijing, and the DPP being too “precarious” to sever all channels of communication with Beijing, thence treating Ko as a strategic alternative to avoid war. At a fireside chat with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ko further dissected his party’s approach to cross-strait relations. “Our stance is that we should prepare for war so that we will not be afraid of one, while at the same time, we shouldn’t do anything to try to provoke and seek the war.” [「備戰不畏戰，能戰不求戰」] This motto is almost identical to the mission espoused by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) under the Tsai administration, “Prepare for war but not seek it, to respond to war and not retreat from it.” [「備戰不求戰，應戰不避戰」]
Unrestrained by the burden of historical legacies, Ko has craftily differentiated himself from the traditional political parties, who inevitably inherit some stances of their progenitors in the handling of cross-strait relations. He is eager to seize the middle ground between the KMT and DDP. While the former is criticised for its outrightly conciliatory or even obsequious stance towards Beijing out of fear of invasion, and the latter is blamed for committing a chronicle of war-tempting provocations. Through crafty political communications, and operating not unlike France’s Emmanuel Macron, Ko has been able to command an aura of sensible moderateness to establish himself in the political field.
Ko’s track record of handling relations with mainland China during his mayoralty, most notably via the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum, does lend some weight to his self-assertation that he has a track record of communicating with Chinese leadership. This could mean that Beijing would be “more comfortable” communicating with him, especially compared with Hou, whose southern roots are traditionally affiliated with radical localism. Meanwhile, Vice President Lai is from the radical sect within the DPP. Most inflammatorily, Lai once proclaimed himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” [「務實的台獨工作者」]. Ko also demonstrates a sense of diplomatic intelligence when being confronted with the so-called “92 Consensus”. In a recent interview with the Voice of America, he tactfully remarked “I understand and respect your idea” without lending his support or rejection. For some pacificist voters, they may resonate with Ko’s refreshing, out-of-the-box pragmatism as a de-risking option. On the brink of a major conflict, Taiwan may now look to steady conservatism as the most attractive option.
The Ukraine parallel: Aiding Ko’s camp?
The Ukraine War has accentuated the polarisation of public perception towards asymmetrical warfare. While those in the West unitedly applaud Ukraine’s remarkable resistance, it is a divided story in Taiwan. It is understandable that upon witnessing Ukraine’s vengeance against Russia, some have felt more optimistic towards Taiwan’s capabilities to defend itself if deterrence fails. But the bloody war of attrition also arouses anxiety and fear of an imminent war with China. Unlike any previous war, the cruelty of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (which has killed roughly 42,000 civilians and 20,000 combatants) is vividly visualised to the eyes of Taiwan people through satellite broadcasting and online podcasts.
The exposed horror of modern warfare might partially explain Ko’s phenomenal popularity among the youth, who are tech-savvy enough to stay tuned on Ukraine’s developments and are most vulnerable to be enlisted should a war break out along the Taiwan Strait. Worse still, the more the populace draws parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine, the more they feel unprepared for a potential conflict with China. Ukraine had actively bolstered its military capabilities since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and constantly battled in its eastern front even before the war. Similarly, Taiwan decided to extend its mandatory military service to one year in December 2022. Yet, it will only come into force in January 2024, and there are embedded criticisms that the compulsory military training is “outdated, boring and impractical”, casting doubts on Taiwan’s ability to implement its asymmetrical defence strategy, which compels thousands of its civilian conscripts to be able to operate the “small, mobile, lethal” armaments dispersed on the island, especially in the initial phase of lone resistance awaiting possible foreign intervention.
Horizon scanning: What are the roadblocks to Ko’s success?
Ko’s presidential bid hinges on several uncertain variables. First, as local critics have pointed out, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) is essentially a “one-man party” with Ko being its only politician who can exert genuine influence on the political scene. Despite Ko’s brave proposal of a coalition government to mend this inhering deficiency of the TPP as a third party, the idea of coalition governance has never been tested at the national level. A cabinet without strong legislative support could easily become a lame duck, giving rise to concerns that Beijing might manipulate Taiwan’s weak leadership to reclaim what it sees as a renegade province.
Second, the TPP stances and strategies on national security and cross-strait relations remain largely untested and lack substance, largely due to its brief four-year foundation and complete lack of governing experience at the national level.
Third, Ko’s recent endorsement of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a Taiwan-China trade pact he vowed to retract in the 2014 Sunflower Movement, provoked accusations of his “political opportunism” and could potentially siphon young voters from his base.
Fourth, it remains highly uncertain whether Terry Gou would join the presidential race as an independent candidate. If the billionaire does join the contest, it would become a “four-horse race” to the benefit of Lai, as the remaining three contenders would have to compete for the split share of votes on the non-green side of the political spectrum.
Uncertainties still loom large across the Taiwan Strait and the January presidential election. This article points out that there is an urging demand for straddling Taiwan’s bipartisan divide. Though Ko’s strategy of maintaining equidistant relations with Beijing and Washington is yet to withstand the testament of time, it does appeal to a growing number war-wary voters. As a result, it is still too early to rule him out as the next president of Taiwan.