Reflections on China’s ‘Two Sessions’: Xi Jinping’s Geopolitical third term

China’s ‘Two Sessions’ and the Geopolitical Implications of Xi Jinping’s Third Term

Xi Jinping was unanimously elected the chairman of the Central Military Committee (CMC) and President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the two sessions (两会), which came to an end on Monday, 13 March. The two sessions were the first political gatherings after Xi Jinping secured a third term during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party, in which he was elected the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. After the two sessions, Xi Jinping solidified his political grip on the CCP and became the most powerful leader of the PRC. This article will discuss some key takeaways from the two sessions and analyse their geopolitical implications. 

What are the Two Sessions?

The two sessions (两会) refer to both the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and these annual meetings were held separately at the same time. The two sessions, which last for one or two weeks, announce reform plans for China and the CCP, introduce the annual economic targets, and make appointments to key positions within the government. At the end of the two sessions, the new premier of China will wrap up the event by holding a press conference. 

Li Qiang, China’s New Premier, and the Economic Slowdown

One of the highlights of the sessions this year was the appointment of Li Qiang, the new premier of China. Widely regarded as one of XI Jinping’s most trusted allies within the CCP, the former Communist Party Secretary for Shanghai is known for his close connections with Xi Jinping and his pro-business mindset. Li Qiang hailed Xi Jinpings’ zero-COVID policy during the press conference, stating that China’s radical approach to COVID ‘was completely right and delivered highly effective outcomes.’ While Li Qiang praised Xi for his enforcement of the zero-COVID policy, he admitted that China’s economy will be confronted by various challenges during Xi’s third term. During the two sessions, former premier Li Keqiang set up a new economic goal target of approximately 5% for this year, the lowest since the outbreak of the pandemic. In comparison to 5.5% of 2022 and 6% of 2021, Reuters considered the economic goal ‘modest’, as global trade is expected to return to normal this year. Indeed, various factors contributed to the last year, including the strict zero-COVID strategy, trade tensions between China and the United States, and the crumbling real estate market. Frustrated by the impacts of these unprecedented events, foreign companies such as Apple and Foxconn are beginning to shift their production capabilities out of China. To reassure foreign businesses of China’s commitment to a less hostile trade environment, Li Qiang made two promises to foreign investors during the press conference. Firstly, China will closely follow the international economic and trade regulation regime. Secondly, China will give equal treatment to foreign investment and remove government control in order to foster foreign trade and investments. While these promises sound welcoming, his ability to put his plans into practice remains unclear.  

Complete Reunification of Taiwan 

As expected, Xi reiterated his commitment to the complete reunification of Taiwan during the first session of the 14th National People’s Congress. China's complete reunification, according to Xi, ‘is a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation as well as the essence of national rejuvenation.’ His speech also encouraged China to resolutely oppose ‘foreign interference’, an implicit reference to the United States. Li Qiang, on the contrary, took a less aggressive tone. During the press conference, he regarded Taiwanese and Chinese people as ‘members of one and the same family.’ who share an ‘unbreakable bond of blood and kinship.’ Li also encouraged Taiwanese businesses to return to China and foster development in local communities. Xi and Li’s remarks on Taiwan are similar to the previous sessions. What differentiates this year’s sessions from the others is Xi’s tougher stance on the United States. 

Tougher Stance on the United States

During the two sessions in 2023, Xi Jinping surprisingly took a stance on the United States. While Xi refrained from openly criticising the United States in the previous sessions, he openly criticised the United States in front of his government advisors during a meeting on Monday: “Western countries led by the United States have contained and suppressed us in an all-round way, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our development.” Indeed, according to the founder of Eurasia Group Ian Bremmer, Xi Jinping’s remarks were the ‘strongest and most direct anti-U.S. comment from any Chinese leader in decades.’ Indeed, Xi is frustrated by the Biden administration’s decision to maintain China tariffs, the United States and the Dutch governments’ decisions to restrict tech exports to China, including DUV systems that are crucial to the production of microchips, and the ban on telecommunication equipment from Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE. 

After the Two Sessions: Geopolitical Uncertainties?

Now that Xi Jinping has tightened his political grip after the two sessions, he has more power to impose his will on the decision. Indeed, the two sessions marked not only the solidification of Xi’s power but also China’s ability to shift the geopolitical dynamics in different regions. When China announced that it brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which paved the way to restore diplomatic relations, many believed that the United States’ influence in the region is in its twilight. The deal, according to Senior Gulf Analyst Anna Jacobs at the International Crisis Group, is a ‘huge win’ for China. Indeed, the deal was considered a huge success for China as it managed to expand its sphere of influence to a region that has been dominated by the United States for decades. The United States, according to a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, ‘could not have made this agreement possible because we don’t have a relationship with Iran.’ Indeed, the deal not only benefits the three countries but also reduces the risks of military confrontations in countries such as Yemen. In addition to China’s growing influence in the Middle East, Beijing also seeks to broker a similar deal in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. 

Shortly after the International Criminal Court issued the warrant of arrest on Putin, Xi Jinping travelled to Moscow and had a bilateral meeting with Putin. During a joint press conference, Xi Jinping and Putin released a joint statement, which includes plans to construct the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, The sanctions imposed by Europe and the United States, according to the senior research fellow Maria Shagina at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘have exacerbated the already asymmetrical relationship between Russia and China. Indeed, Russia is already confronted by an Rbs2.58tn ($34bn) budget deficit in the first two months of 2023. Although the joint statement supported efforts toward peace talks and responsible dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, it didn’t mention anything related to the ceasefire or the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian soil. Indeed, the joint statement indicates that China endorses the Russian narrative of the Russo-Ukrainian War. A more subtle implication, however, lies within the asymmetric relationship between China and Russia. While the 9,000-word joint statement mentioned Russia’s endorsement of the One-China policy, it didn’t discuss China’s position on Russia’s sovereignty over Donbas. The wording of the statement implies that China has become the more powerful political entity with the ability to influence the trajectory of China-Russia relations. Indeed, since the outbreak of the war, bilateral trade has reached $190 billion and the proportion of foreign trades conducted in RMB has reached 16%. In addition, Moscow has become dependent on Beijing for resources such as microchips, military equipment, and telecommunication devices, all of which could help Russia win the ongoing war. A close connection to the Kremlin even predicted that Russia will become China’s ‘resource colony’ and dependent on China’s second-tier microchips in the foreseeable future. Xi Jinping, who has tightened his political grip after the end of the two sessions, is beginning to show his ambition to shape the geopolitical dynamics in different regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East. 

Concluding Remarks

The end of the two sessions not only deepened Xi Jinping’s control of the party and the government but also encouraged him to take a tougher stance on the United States. In response to growing hostility between the United States and the West, Xi Jinping is offering another option for the U.S.-dominated international order. It remains unclear whether China would benefit from the normalised relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran or shift away from its ambiguous position in the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, it is very likely that Xi Jinping is going to leverage China’s close ties with Russia and Saudi Arabia to shift the geopolitical dynamics in these regions and evade the U.S. ‘containment’, to put in Xi Jinping’s own words.