Arctic monopolization fears encourage a security dilemma
Britain to establish a regular Arctic presence in response to Russia increasing its control of Arctic shipping lanes
Britain’s Royal Navy is to establish a permanent presence in the Arctic, conducting regular freedom of navigation patrols in the region alongside international partners. This is a significant move by the UK to fulfil key elements of its 2018 “Beyond the ice” Arctic Strategy and role as a self-dubbed “near-Arctic state” as it highlights both the UK’s ability and willingness to project power, uphold international norms, and support regional partners in the High North.
The patrols are specifically aimed at countering Russia’s strategic advantage over the regions trade routes, especially the North-East Passage (NEP) and the integrated and shorter Northern Sea Route (NSR). These are shipping routes made viable by a melting Arctic, and that have significant advantages over traditional routes due to their shorter distances from Europe/America to Asia.
Russia’s coastline accounts for around 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean’s coastline, and these routes run along it. Additionally Russia lays claim to significant swathes of the Arctic, seeking to potentially expand its claims right up to Canada and Greenland’s exclusive economic zones, while such claims would not mean the Arctic becomes part of Russia, they would give Russia the seabed resource rights and certain rights to regulate traffic in the area, and this is the key source of concern for other Arctic-interested powers.
Russia already claims the right to regulate the NEP and NSR as it deems these within its territorial waters. Moscow argues that Article 21 and 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives it the right to regulate the NEP and NSR with the Article 21 allowing states to regulate their territorial waters, while Article 234 allows the expansion of this regulation if the state is adjacent to ice-covered waters to protect the environment.
Due to this position, Russia has successively been implementing a series of protectionist and, from a western perspective, discriminatory controls over the shipping routes since 2015 against the backdrop of escalating tensions between Russia and the “West”. For instance, in 2018 a law was passed whose expressed intent was to “limit the use of foreign tonnage on the NSR”. It did so by reserving cabotage and other shipping rights in Russian waters (i.e. most of the route) to only Russian-flagged vessels. In 2019 a further proposal was made that would see off-shore research, icebreaking and hydrocarbon transport limited to only Russian-built vessels. On top of this Russia now requires all ships to request permission to use the route, even in 2019 attempting to demand foreign warships give details of their particulars and equipment upon requesting access, and also mandating all foreign vessels pay Russia for weather and ice reports.
These measures aimed at solidifying Russian sovereignty over the routes are in the context of Russia perceiving the Arctic as vital for its economic and strategic future. Additionally Russia to provide a hard-backing to its claims of control has invested significantly in modernizing its northern fleet and expanding its defence and military projection capabilities in the Arctic, resulting in a highly militarized presence.
Other powers though are increasingly concerned about Russia’s increasing Arctic control, claims and militarization. In 2019 then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called out Russia specifically stating “We're concerned about Russia's claim over the international waters of the Northern Sea Route”, an attitude that has not changed under Biden, who last month deployed US bombers to the region to ramp up its own presence. Additionally Britain, for the first time in 20 years, led a naval task force last September into the Arctic, consisting of the US, Norway and Denmark, aiming to dissuade Russian “attempts to control freedom of access and navigation”.
The lack of clarity in UNCLOS, and its disputed nature means there is no clear right and wrong for Russian regulation over its Arctic claims. It is a matter now of diplomacy, dispute and display rather than legal wrangling.
The increasing military activity, epitomized by Britain’s new Arctic commitment, and the struggle over Arctic control zones represent a further significant leap in tensions in the region. The patrolling powers are worried about the increased militarization and control monopolization of Russia over a region that has vast economic potential and which borders them, while from a Russian perspective, the Arctic is both important economically, but also it is Moscow’s soft underbelly from a security perspective- Russia’s Northern Fleet, stationed in the region, is its main nuclear deterrent and with deteriorating relations with particularly the UK and US, Moscow primarily wishes to increase control of activity in its backyard. The actions of both sides then are contributing to a balance of power security dilemma, with no de-escalation in sight.