The impact of Russia’s geopolitical grail in Ukraine has reached the Arctic. Russia, being a dominant actor in Arctic politics, remains committed to utilising its regional influence in a way that is conducive to the country’s economic trajectory and foreign policy. At the same time, few scholars believe that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine freezes its Arctic ambitions. But is it so? Can Russia really turn its attention away from a region that it aims to use as its strategic resource base? It is important to demystify how far the invasion of Ukraine has been able to impact Russia’s position in the Arctic and whether it could lead to diverting Russia’s attention away from the region.

Russia’s history and the need of melting Arctic

Historically, Russia has remained confined as a continental power for long, unable to effectively use the Arctic as a proper maritime route. Therefore, it tried to expand towards the Baltic, Turkish strait and even towards Afghanistan with the aim to have access to warm waters. Even the greatest in Russia’s history, Peter the Great, was not confident in the use of the Arctic as Russia’s major maritime route. He did aim to build an Arctic city in Arkhangelsk, but, contrary to that, he knew that the frozen Arctic would not be able to help in Russia’s emergence as a maritime power. Therefore, he advised the upcoming leaders to “...approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India...” and “...penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf, advance as far as India.” This statement is interpreted by many as Peter’s guide for Russia to have access to warm waters that are integral to having access to fully functioning shipping routes. Later, this desire jolted the Eurasian chessboard as European powers tried to confine Russia’s access to warm waters and accordingly fought wars to just have access to the Mediterranean. But the tide is shifting its course as the quagmire of Russia's ability to have its own fully functioning maritime route is being answered by the melting of the Arctic.

Russia’s new Maritime Doctrine

Russia, amid the Ukraine war, has introduced its new maritime doctrine. The doctrine has further made it clear that for Moscow, the US’ and its allies' movement near Russia’s controlled Arctic is a key challenge. The pertinent point in the document is the mentioning of the change in priority. The Atlantic, which was once a priority for Russian maritime activities, has been shifted to the third priority on the list while the Arctic takes the lead. This will up the ante for increased strategic competition between the great powers, which is also observable from Biden’s new Arctic strategy to increase US presence in the Arctic. This will increase tensions as Russia has downright called for the maintenance of “strategic stability” in the region, thus intimating nuclear deterrence.

Moving forward, when Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met before the start of the Ukraine invasion, they stressed their “no-limit” relationship. However, the new naval doctrine points out Russia’s understanding of its reliance on China’s support in the Arctic, for which the new document does not mention China once. This is a stark change in position from the previous doctrine in 2015 that stated that the “development of friendly ties with China is a key component of national maritime policy in the Pacific direction.” Nonetheless, Sino-Russian relations are to continue with the same intent because of their mutual dependence on each other.

That being the case, Russia understands that its weakness in the maritime domain is linked to its lack of economic muscle to support its Arctic ambitions, and this has created a dependence on Russia for Chinese investment. Such steps echo China's role as the only viable partner for Russia’s projects in the Arctic. So, as several companies are reluctant to invest in Russian-owned projects, China remains the Kremlin’s closest economic partner. Even oil and gas projects in the Arctic by Russian energy companies are heavily dependent on Chinese investment. But as I argued in my paper, Russia’s Reimagined Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition, Russia's “dependence on East Asian markets for the sale of LNG products and Beijing’s dependence on Russia to take its expeditions in the Arctic makes it evident that both players cannot get an optimal outcome while deviating unilaterally from the game.”

Furthermore, considering the recent invasion of Ukraine, several members from the North Pole have  suspended cooperation at the Arctic Council. A clear cordon sanitaire has been established between the two sides. In such a bleak scenario, China remains the only viable partner for continuing support for Russia's economic vision of the Arctic.

So, even though Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has tilted the strategic attention towards Ukraine, Russia remains committed to its military and economic objectives in the region. Even as the war continues, Russian naval ships, along with its Arctic partner China, are flexing their muscles in the region, thus questioning the US global chant for free and open seas. For instance, Russia continues with its efforts to build Arctic infrastructure; for instance, its investments, amid the Ukraine war, in Svalbard—Russia’s gateway to the Arctic. Before that, Russia also conducted the Umka-2022 military drills in the eastern end of the NSR, therefore pointing towards Russia’s claim of the NSR’s route as its internal waters. As a result, it would be farfetched to assume that Russia might drive away from the Arctic that is integral to its great power status.

Most recently, Russia’s Arctic Ambassador, Nikolai Korchunov, has made it clear that “we will take military measures to prevent threats to navigation along the NSR.” Such exhortations point towards Russia’s maritime doctrine that categorically states that Russia will use all components in its defence for the protection of “areas of existential importance” and that the Russian controlled Arctic is part of the category.

Another reason why Russia cannot abandon the Arctic, even in the midst of the Ukraine conflict, is the increased strategic competition between Russia and Arctic NATO members, particularly the newcomers Finland and Sweden. Hereafter, once the Ukraine invasion comes to an end, Russia will formally move forward with its open resentment towards these states, therefore shaping the already tense-stability. The implications for such development will be manifold as Sweden and Finland have the capacity to affect the security dynamics of the region by utilising their aero-space related capacities.

Conclusively, stakes for strategic competition are increasing as Russia has started reopening hundreds of military sites in the region from the Soviet-era. The competition for the untapped resources of the region and the struggle for regional influence will increase in the upcoming years. On one hand, Russia will continue with its commitment to reducing maritime routes between Europe and Asia, strengthening the Russian economy, and supporting Russia’s self-image as a great power by utilising the region’s potential. On the other hand, the US stands firm in its commitment to an open and free Arctic that is conducive to maintaining security equilibrium in the Arctic. So, despite the fact that the Ukrainian conflict has raised numerous questions about Russia's future in the Arctic, Russia will prioritise Arctic dominance given its history, new maritime doctrine, and the regional gamble of great powers.