New German Foreign Policy: The Main Trends
On Wednesday 24 November, the Social Democrats, Greens and Free Democrats presented a new governing coalition for Germany (the first time these three parties have formed a government together), making the SPD leader Olaf Scholz the next chancellor of Germany. The coalition treaty has outlined a basis for most policy areas. This spotlight will give an overview of the most relevant foreign policy takeaways.
The Green Party co-leader, Annalena Baerbock, is likely to become the next foreign minister of Germany. However, experts state that the overall foreign policy “power balance” in Berlin is not likely to lie with the Green Party, due to the role of the chancellery (and therefore the SPD) in the formation of foreign policy. This means that we may well see a power struggle between the foreign ministry and chancellery over who formulates policy on key areas.
When it comes to the broad strokes in German foreign policy, it would not seem that there are any radical departures from the policies that Merkel conducted. The EU still plays a key role in German politics, and this coalition is not an exception. The term “EU” is mentioned well over a thousand times on the 174 page long treaty on every policy area mentioned, hinting that the new German government will continue to coordinate on a wide range of policies with its European partners. A significant focus for the coalition is building resilience and reducing dependence on other nations. As a fellow from the ECFR put it: “Protect Europe, without being protectionist.”
The new coalition government seems to want a tougher EU stance on preserving the rule of law, opening up the possibility of allowing for the use of more punitive measures against offenders. It should, however, be noted that some of the measures proposed by the coalition can (and probably will) be vetoed in the EU.
The “traffic-light” coalition, as they have been dubbed, also wants to strengthen the EU’s institutions such as the European Parliament and the EEAS without strengthening the Council of the European Union. This would appear to be part of a wider move to coordinate more of the bloc’s external engagement and be able to present a united front on more issues.
On the transatlantic partnership, the new ruling coalition does not depart radically from policies of Angela Merkel. As Olaf Scholz has been saying throughout his campaign, the transatlantic partnership is still a core pillar in German foreign policy, something the treaty also points towards: Together we want to stabilize the rule-based international order, counter authoritarian developments and work more closely together in the EU's eastern and southern neighborhood.” (Translated)
Like with the EU, the new German government seems keen on coordinating policies on a wide range of foreign policy issues with the United States, including on Russia and China. The language on China and the wider Indo-Pacific has changed from previous coalitions. China is now described as a systemic rival as a opposed to a strategic partner: “In order to be able to realize our values and interests in the systemic rivalry with China, we need a comprehensive China strategy in Germany within the framework of the common EU-China policy. We want to continue the intergovernmental consultations and make them more European.” (Translated). This also marks the first time that the Indo-Pacific region has been named specifically in a German coalition paper, hinting at broader and deeper engagement with the region, likely through the EU.
The language on Russia has similarly seen subtle changes, to a point where Germany now seeks “stable relations” with Russia as opposed to “good relations.” The treaty also points towards Russia as one of the main security threats facing Germany and the EU. What this will mean for policy towards Russia is still uncertain, but it would appear that the new German government sees good relations with its eastern partners to be more important than having a “good relationship” with Russia.
On security and defence, the treaty follows past governments and still refers to the NATO alliance as a key pillar of German security policy. In the coalition treaty, the partners pledge to hit a 3 percent of GDP spending target on defence. It should, however, be noted that this 3 percent pledge was seen in the previous government as well and does not necessarily translate into a 3 percent of GDP in defence spending exclusively. Rather, it indicates spending on defence, intelligence and international development. However, the new coalition is firmly committed to fulfilling its capability commitment to NATO.
As part of the coalition agreement, the three parties agreed to purchase new dual-use fighters to replace its aging fleet of Tornado strike aircraft, the fighters tasked with delivering US nuclear munitions. This reaffirms Germany’s commitment to NATO’s nuclear sharing policy, ending a long debate in German politics on Germany’s role in NATO nuclear policy.
The seats are yet to be assigned, and no policy has been implemented yet, but it will be interesting to see the treaty being transformed into policy.