Perestroika Dreamin’: Evaluating the Prospects of Democracy in the post-Soviet Caucasus
On August 30 2022 the world lost one of the most influential statesmen of recent history – Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The last head of state of the USSR was repeatedly heralded as one of the most important politicians that paved the way for the end of the Cold War. During his tenure as General-Secretary of the USSR’s Politburo, Gorbachev’s foreign policy is largely remembered by the efforts to nuclear disarmament alongside his American counterpart, Ronald Reagan. In domestic affairs, Gorbachev is remembered for his attempted reforms to the Soviet socialist market economy. The most popular of those reforms were glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). The reforms gave the people of the USSR greater freedom to express themselves and their views, as well as an extended degree of economic freedom. In essence, glasnost and perestroika can be understood as a relaxation of the authoritarian nature of the Soviet Union’s government. However, instead of restructuring the Soviet Union, glasnost and perestroika have been credited as significant factors in the collapse of the USSR by Russian state media, as well as Western sources.
In most of the post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe, economic prosperity and democracy is a dream largely realised since independence from the USSR in 1991. Economically, the Former Soviet Republics (FSRs) in Europe have on the whole experienced significant economic growth. This is especially true in Czechia, Estonia, Poland, and Romania – all of which have experienced significant and sustained economic growth since 1991. In terms of GDP per capita, FSRs in Europe still lag behind the Eurozone average but are overtaking comparable countries in other regions of Europe. On the democratic front, European FSRs are facing significant backsliding stunting the region’s progress, with Poland and Hungary emerging as the significant enablers of democratic backsliding. Notwithstanding, the region has faced better progress than other regions of the former Soviet Union; the Russian Federation’s first presidential election in 1991 is among the fairest since the break-up of the USSR, and democracy in the post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia regions has had a limited role. This spotlight provides a general outline of the existing regimes of the FSRs in the South Caucasus region, and whether democratisation in the long-term is a genuine possibility.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the states which make up the post-Soviet Caucasus. The Caucasus region of Asia is situated between the Black and Caspian Seas, and acts as a natural border between Türkiye and Russia. On paper, the three countries of the post-Soviet Caucasus are semi-presidential democracies. However, on the Polity IV index, only Georgia is considered as a democracy and although Armenia is classified as an anocracy (a sort of mixed regime), it is on the fringes of being classified as a democracy. Azerbaijan is classified as a de facto dictatorship.
Although democracy has a seemingly positive outlook in Armenia and Georgia, there are still some loose ends. In the most recent Armenian general election of 2020, some members of the opposition parties claimed that Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won a fraudulent election. However, observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that, despite minor disruptions from party proxies, the election was found to be “smooth, transparent and well-organized”. Whether or not the claims of fraud can be verified remains difficult, but even if international observers’ comments are water-tight, it is worrying that Armenian politicians are willing to undermine the democratic process. Even in more established democracies like the United States, claims of fraudulent elections have had catastrophic impacts on the health of democracy. Similarly in Georgia, where democracy seems to be more robust, the 2020 elections sparked a political crisis as the election was deemed to have been fradulent. Furthermore, former prime minister Mikheil Saakashvili has been repeatedly mistreated whilst in jail following his return to Georgia after nearly a decade of exile. These infringements of democratic principles, as the Foreign Policy Research Institute warns, bodes negatively for the future of Georgian and Armenian democracy, as elites are willing to undermine democratic principles for political gain.
Despite recent episodes of infringement upon democratic principles in Armenia and Georgia, both republics are faring better than their south-eastern neighbour – Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is an effective autocracy dominated by the ruling Aliyev family, which has ruled over the country since 1993. Azerbaijan’s oil-rich economy has been at the backbone of maintaining the autocratic rule, with crude oil and related products making up the vast majority of Azeri exports. In turn, the revenues derived from oil sales are dispersed amongst “a patronage network in order to ensure the support of allies and various clientelist groups”, as explained by Farid Guliyev in a 2010 journal article. This has allowed the Aliyev family to establish a sultanist autocracy. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s ruling elites were savvy in avoiding foreign intervention during the crucial colour revolutions in post-Soviet Eurasia. Therefore, Azerbaijan has been able to largely avoid probing into its regime by foreign entities not only through internal consolidation, but also through its arms-length political relationship with Moscow.
On the other hand, Georgia has sought closer ties with the West since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Since then the European Union and the Republic of Georgia have increased cooperation and collaboration by means of multiple bilateral agreements, including the EU-Georgia Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which gives effectively Georgia preferential trade status with the EU. Similarly, Armenia has also been improving its relations with the EU; the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) came into force just last year. The CEPA is effectively a set of reforms to Armenia’s political system with the aim of increasing “democracy, transparency, and rule of law”, according to European Union External Action website. The recent collaboration between the EU and Armenia puts the latter party somewhat at odds with Russia, considering Moscow-Yerevan relations are especially friendly. Armenia’s pursual for better relations with the EU in the present conflict between Moscow and Brussels therefore puts a great question mark over the health of Armenia’s democracy. If Yerevan keeps both Russia and the West at arms-length it may avoid excessive foreign intervention, effectively insulating domestic politics from foreign interests. Equally, if Moscow feels that the EU is encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence, Armenia may struggle to maintain progressing on its democratic journey.
Another limiting factor to democratization in the region is the ongoing territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh – an ethnic Armenian-majority region within Azerbaijan’s borders. In 2020 the territorial dispute resulted in armed conflict between both states, recently escalating into further aggression just this week. This is a limiting factor to democracy because the constant fear of aggression can lead to a Thucydides’ trap where the fear of war permeates society. Consequently, the political priorities lie with armament and defence rather than democracy and reconciliation. This is crucial because, as Dan Reiter explains in an article in Politics; democracy is not necessarily a causal factor of peace, but democracy has more of a chance of blossoming in peaceful environments. Considering that Russia has been supplying both sides with armaments, both sides have significant knowledge of each other’s military capabilities. However, considering the historical and political importance of Nagorno-Karabakh to both countries, it is unlikely that the mutual knowledge of the other side’s military capabilities will be inductive to a peaceful environment conductive of democracy.
Since Mikhail Gorbachev’s calls for glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s, it seemed that, on the surface at least, one of the world’s most cruel regimes was opening the doors for a fairer more representative form of government. However, the period of economic and political instability that underpinned Mr Gorbachev’s reforms meant various parties and FSRs may have jumped the gun ever so slightly. The result has been a very mixed outcome for democracy in the FSRs; many in Eastern Europe have enjoyed significant success, however the same cannot be said for the vast majority of the FSRs.
In post-Soviet Asia, the Caucasus region has been a shaky bastion for democracy. Georgia especially has been distancing itself from Moscow since Russia’s 2008 occupation and has been seeking closer ties with the West, placing itself in an international political environment akin to that of the FSRs in Eastern Europe post-1991. It would seem then, that if Georgia can maintain its progress amongst the recent internal tensions, it may find itself as a regional champion of democracy. Armenia, closely following in Georgia’s footsteps must find a compromise between its European interests and its relations with Russia if it is to progress on its democratic journey without Russian assailment. Although democracy in Azerbaijan seems a far-out dream, Baku’s political distancing from Moscow may bode well for the South Caucasus’ democratic project. Without a regional ‘base’ in the region, there is limited scope for Russian intervention should the FSRs of the South Caucasus strengthen ties with the West.