Executive Summary

• Energy security is an increasingly vital issue in Europe.

• As the EU seeks to diversify its energy supply, nuclear power is gaining relevance as a low-carbon emitting energy source and as demand for electricity increases

• France is betting on expanding its nuclear fleet to support its energy transition.

• With Russia being the world’s largest enriched uranium supplier, France’s nuclear policy pillars are still linked to its relations with Russian-owned Rosatom.

Introduction

Nuclear power has been the cornerstone of France’s strategy for energy independence, which made France the EU’s leading exponent of nuclear power. Presently, nuclear power accounts for approximately 70% of France’s electricity production thanks to its 56 operational nuclear reactors distributed among 18 nuclear plants. Furthermore, it accounts for a quarter of the total electricity production in Europe but half of the low-carbon electricity, and it has been green-labelled by the EU parliament, which can attract investors and boost the industry, especially in France. Despite its success and expertise in nuclear power, France doesn’t have domestic uranium ore and needs to import it. With Russia being one of the largest exporters of uranium ore to France, the War in Ukraine brings into question how much of France’s nuclear power, and therefore its energy security, will become affected by the straining relationships with Russia.

Overview of France’s nuclear sector

France’s nuclear development program can be traced back to the onset of WWII. By then, it was one of the leading countries in nuclear physics research thanks to the expertise of renowned scientists such as Pierre and Marie Curie. Whereas major powers such as the USA, Germany, and the Soviet Union were focused on developing the atomic bomb, France instead focused on harnessing the potential of nuclear power for energy, sourcing uranium from Belgium and heavy water from Norway. French nuclear research continued in the United Kingdom during the German occupation. With the end of WWII and the return of French nuclear scientists, General De Gaulle founded the Commission for Atomic Energy (French: Commissariat à l’énergie atomique or CEA) in 1945 to develop civilian nuclear technology in parallel with a nuclear deterrent programme. Today, it is named the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission, the leading state organisation in nuclear and renewable energy research and for its application in security and defence.

Development of the first French commercial nuclear reactor, which would become known as Chinon EDF1, was launched in 1956 as a joint project between CEA and Électricité de France, the state-owned electricity company, and became operational by 1963. The impact of the 1973 oil crisis accelerated the exploration of alternative energies to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels. Prime Minister Pierre Messmer launched France's first major civil nuclear plan in 1974 to overcome the energy crisis, aiming to build 13 nuclear power plants of 1,000 MW capacity each. The legacy of Messmer’s Plan was the construction of 58 nuclear reactors by 2000, making France the world's second-largest nuclear energy producer. However, in the last decades, many problems in the French nuclear industry have threatened this pillar of France’s energy policy. These had to do with a failed export strategy that resulted in financial losses for years, the political shift in favour of renewable power sources, and the symptoms of ageing nuclear power plants, a major safety concern spurred by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident of 2011.

Despite the promise of François Hollande’s coalition government to reduce the share of nuclear power in the electricity mix to 50% by 2025 back in 2015, this goal was continuously delayed after being deemed unrealistic because of the extent of the French economy’s dependency on nuclear power. The French nuclear industry regained momentum when, in February 2022, Emmanuel Macron announced the construction of new nuclear reactors, reaffirming nuclear energy as the cornerstone of France’s security and autonomy and instrumental towards achieving carbon neutrality in line with the European Green Deal. This framing of the role of nuclear in the energy transition was also used in the 2021 signing of a long-term agreement on strategic cooperation between Framatome (a nuclear power company subsidiary of the state-owned Électricité de France) and Rosatom, which entangled France to Russia in a nuclear relationship.

French-Russian relations on energy geopolitics

As Russia’s state corporation for nuclear energy, Rosatom allows the Kremlin to continue asserting diplomatic influence in energy geopolitics, especially in Europe, where nuclear power is playing an increasing role in the future of net-zero energy production. Along with France’s Orano Group, Rosatom is one of the four companies commercially enriching uranium. However, Russia dominates the nuclear fuel market. By 2022, it owned 40% of the uranium conversion infrastructure in the world and had the largest uranium enrichment capacity, accounting for almost half of the global capacity. Conversion and enrichment are two front-end stages of the nuclear fuel cycle needed to use uranium ore in a nuclear reactor. Furthermore, Russia provides back-end services – stages involving used fuel – such as long-term storage, reprocessing, and recycling of spent nuclear fuel.

Because it is a key player in the sector as a global supplier of nuclear reactor technology and fuel, the world nuclear industry is largely dependent on Russia, a critical reason why its nuclear sector remains untouched by international sanctions. Russia has developed a business model in which Rosatom provides a package service that covers all aspects of nuclear power plant operations, including construction, used fuel management, and financing. Turkey operates two nuclear reactors following Rosatom’s business scheme, but the ownership of the nuclear power plant is Russian because Russia manages all operations. Last August, the US banned the import of Russian-enriched uranium.

Still, the EU hasn’t followed suit because of the opposition from France and Hungary, countries heavily reliant on Russia’s nuclear services. Back in 2014, Orban’s government signed an agreement with the Kremlin in which Rosatom would manage and finance the expansion project of the Paks NPP in Hungary with the approval of France in 2023 to allow Framatome to cooperate. If the EU were to adopt sanctions against Rosatom, many state members that operate Russian designed nuclear reactors would be affected, and energy costs would spike, leading to another energy crisis. However, this could present itself as an opportunity to accelerate the diversification of energy sources that the EU is working on to strengthen security and more resilience to externalities.

French dependency on Russian nuclear supply and impact on bilateral relations

Despite its energy independence, France was not exempt from the 2022 European energy crisis because nearly 65% of its nuclear reactors were offline due to maintenance and safety upgrades, causing the lowest electricity output since 1988. However, by 2023, the electricity output had been regaining its pre-crisis levels as nuclear reactors were progressively put back online. Undeterred by the crisis, moving forward with the “nuclear renaissance” plan to build new nuclear reactors will focus the attention on the import of nuclear supply and, hence, the reliance on Russia as the largest exporter of enriched uranium, which is Greenpeace France’s argument of their report on French-Russian nuclear relations. They sustain that the French dependence on Russia is so immense that it could explain why France “continues to actively oppose the sanctions against Rosatom on the European level” and that the expansion of the French nuclear fleet will make France more dependent on imports as well as other services. Although 43% of the imported uranium ore to France in 2022 is of Kazakh and Uzbek origin, a considerable amount passes through the hands of Rosatom or its subsidiaries. 

Despite confirming that the numbers in the Greenpeace report are true, Valerie Faudon, Executive Director of the French Nuclear Society (SFEN) and Vice President of the European Nuclear Society (ENS), stated in an article that the idea of French nuclear dependency in Russia is wrong. Whereas Greenpeace France states that uranium imports to France have tripled between 2021 and 2022, Faudon defends that these imports came from contracts signed before the international sanctions were imposed, and EDF has not further pursued any more contracts with Rosatom or its subsidiaries since the invasion of Ukraine. Faudan asserts that it cannot be affirmed that France is entirely dependent on Russia because there are so many actors involved in each stage of the nuclear cycle, especially in mining the uranium ore. She also remarks that France is one of the only countries in the world capable of producing nuclear fuel on its own and is further developing back-end capabilities, mainly uranium recycling, thus reducing the dependence on Russia and the risk of an energy crisis if it were to cut its nuclear supply in the same way as with its natural gas in 2022. 

Conclusion

The weaponisation of energy by Russia revealed that dependence on energy imports is a major security risk in Europe. As a reprisal to EU sanctions due to the War in Ukraine, the supply of Russian gas and fossil fuels was severely disrupted, causing the EU to fall into an energy crisis as the electricity cost spiked. This made the diversification of the energy supply an urgent necessity. As the EU seeks energy autonomy, nuclear power can help futureproof the European electricity supply during the transition, although the safety concerns are still strong in the European nuclear debate.

France rides on the pro-nuclear wave, strengthening its centrality to the country’s energy security and position as a major power, and it will play a bigger role in its energy mix to be able to meet the electricity demand in the upcoming decades until the energy transition is completed. Developing the capability to manage all stages of the nuclear cycle is still needed, as well as resorting to alternative uranium ore providers to effectively undermine Russia’s influence in Europe. France is in a position to lead this development and take over Rosatom’s position. Together with innovation to improve nuclear safety, succeeding in this endeavour can help the EU come closer to achieving energy security, sustainability, and affordability. Yet this path needs to be cautious as the growth of this sector, which is gaining prominence in the EU as a low-carbon emission source, could reopen the doors to Russia.