Western aircraft for the Ukrainian skies: A game changer or symbolic gesture?
Ever since the start of the grand-scale invasion of Ukraine, the question of providing fighter aircrafts to the Ukrainians has been subjected to debate. Much has been said about what would constitute a “red line” for Russia and many weapons (anti-tank systems, drones, multiple rocket launchers, or tanks) have been deemed as a “game-changer” over the year-long lasting conflict. That same debate is being applied to fighter jets.
The nature of this war, defined by some as a “naked war”, gives space to all kinds of opinions or interpretations that, sometimes, do not help clear the information space or get an objective idea of how the provided weapons are used, their requirements, maintenance, training to operate them, etc. What is clear is that weapons alone do not necessarily shape the outcome of a war, but rather an effective use of the multi-domain operations, tactics, logistics and intelligence are what help moving towards achieving objectives. In sum, the totality of the battlefield (all its working parts) is what needs to be considered to gain a better understanding. To add to this, we must not forget the human factor, as the Russo-Ukrainian war is proving to be one of heavy grinding, so the depletion of the rival's manpower pool, especially dedicated personnel or officers, is something that both sides take into serious consideration.
Before analyzing what military assistance Ukraine needs we must look at the state of the Ukrainian Air Force (PZU) before the start of the large-scale invasion. Ukraine inherited a generous amount of aircraft after the Soviet Union collapsed, with the MiG-29 forming the backbone of the PZU fighter fleet for many years primarily due to its low operational cost. This was in contrast with the theoretically more capable Sukhoi Su-27 also in service and of which Ukraine inherited several variants Su-27S (air-to-ground sorties), Su-27P (interception variant) and Su-27UB (two-seater for training). Nonetheless, both the number of MiGs and Sukhois dwindled over the years because of the dismal economic situation in the country, and several aircraft were mothballed from service or used for spare parts. Furthermore, a few MiG-29 that were modernized or used for training (MiG-29UM1 and MiG-29UB) were captured and kept by Russia during the takeover of Crimea in 2014, although the standard or poorly maintained ones were sent back to Ukraine in parts. The conflict in eastern Ukraine that raged since 2014 also took its toll, not only on fighter aircraft but also on ground-attack ones such as the Su-24 and Su-25. Modernization plans were carried out since then but, as it will be explained further on, the PZU has suffered from a clear disadvantage against the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) both in quality and quantity. By the start of 2022, Ukraine had almost 70 fixed-wing combat aircraft, with some sources saying it to be higher. For its part, the VKS deployed around 350 fixed-wing combat aircraft for the invasion.
As the invasion started, the Russian Armed Forces carried out precision strikes with several types of ballistic and cruise missiles (SRBM, ALCM and GLCM) against key installations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, especially against the PZU. These resulted in the need to recalculate and update the necessary data on the exact number of aircraft (to be supplied by third countries) and qualified pilots (trained in third countries) that would be necessary for the conflict. Ukraine's allies had taken into account the possibility of a war breaking out and the need for fighter aircraft and pilots. According to statements by an official of the Government of Ukraine collected by the media, Ukrainian pilots were present in Poland between the end of February (after the invasion) and the beginning of March ready to pick up several MiG-29 aircraft. Allegedly, the collective European Union (EU) plan for providing this aircraft collapsed after Josep Borell, High Representative of the EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, made big announcements and then backed down several hours later. There were rumors about a team in “Eastern” Europe (probably referring to Bulgaria, but surely also to Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland) that worked to provide MiG-29, Su-25 and helicopters (in parts) to Ukraine with the help of a well-established military aid hub. At the moment of writing this article, Poland and Slovakia have publicly pledged several MiG-29 for Ukraine and on this occasion the plan seems its going to be realized.
As mentioned, Russia carried out attacks and made extensive use of suppressive electronic warfare against Ukrainian military installations and radar-guided surface-to-air missile sites (SAM) during the opening days of the conflict. However, the success of these operations varied geographically. While they were rather successful in the southeastern part of the country (where Russia advanced with ease and destroyed the obsolete Ukrainian SAM sites), in the north the VKS enjoyed superiority only for a few days before it became obvious that the northern push was not going according to plan. It was also there that most of the opening air-to-air combat took place, with Ukrainian MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters engaging the more capable and better-armed Russian Su-30SM, Su-35S and Su-34. The VKS won most of the air-to-air engagements and was able to thwart some of the PZUs efforts to harass Russian troops on the ground. The situation changed in March, however, when both sides were able to effectively organise and coordinate their air defences and, in the case of Ukraine, when it was also able to deal more effectively against Russian electronic warfare. Both Russia and Ukraine established their ground-based air defence (GBAD), although the Ukrainians have relied more than the Russians on constant mobility and man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) provided by the West.
Deep attacks inside enemy lines became rare, with most aircraft trying to remain close to their own side of the frontline. As Russia failed to destroy all of Ukraine's SAMs (SA-8 'Osa', SA-15 'Tor', SA-11 'Buk', S-300PS/PT, and S-300V), VKS aircraft have been restricted from operating at high and medium altitudes, while ground attacks became even more difficult, although not impossible, because of the vast presence of MANPADS. Meanwhile, the PZU efforts were undermined by the Russian long-range (S-400 'Triumf') and radar systems (48Ya6 'Podlet-K1') present not only in Russian-held territory but also in Belarus and Crimea.
PZU aircraft are still at a disadvantage because the VKS fields more capable radars and weapons. For example, Su-35S and MiG-31BM armed with R-37, R-37M and R-77-1 missiles have the ability to lock and launch against PZU aircraft from longer distances, deep inside Russian-controlled territory and from higher altitudes, while the PZU still needs to fly low in order to avoid the Russian GBAD. The PZU lacks the so-called “fire and forget” missiles, and instead, relies on older infrared or radar guided ones, like the R-27. Despite its military advantage, the VKS has also lost some fighters (Su-30SM, SU-35S, and MiG-31BM) and several dozen support aircraft (Su-25 and Su-34), mainly due to medium air defence systems and MANPADS..
Ukraine must look to enhancing its air defence capabilities against Russian aircraft and cruise missiles, this has been done with additional mobile or static air defences such as the aforementioned MANPADS, the Gepard or the IRIS-T SLM, I-Hawk and NASAM systems. Also, the terrain and installations where aircrafts are to be stored, as well as the personnel and spare parts for its maintenance are important factors that need to be taken into account when considering the procurement of future fighter aircraft. With limited air defence capabilities, stored aircraft are at a greater risk of being destroyed during Russian missile strikes. Smaller, discrete and dispersed air bases are needed, and they must be in an environment that allows, at least, a minimum standard of mission readiness. The presence of advisors and specialists from NATO countries should also be assured, as they help Ukrainian efforts and fill the lack of expertise in several fields. Polish mine clearing teams operating in Ukraine constitute a recent example of that.
The process for providing western aircraft to Ukraine is not as simple as sending batch after batch of relative “old” fourth-generation aircraft. The Typhoon T.1 or some F-16s of various European NATO countries (most of them are F-16AM/BM Block15 variants) have been deemed some of the possible candidates. Although they have their own disparities regarding readiness and rapidly training the pilots to throw them into combat is not the best way to act. It is a process that, despite being in motion since early 2022, will still require some more time. Several experts like Michael Kofman believe that Ukraine is more in need of long-range weapons and guided munitions for attacking deep inside Russian-held territory with the help of spotter drones, just as Russia has been doing with vast fleets of Orlan-10 and Shahed-136/Geran2 used to bait Ukrainian SAMs. The provision of newer western long-range missiles traditionally relies on more modern and adapted aircraft, but this is already being done with the resources Ukraine has available. The war is proving a fertile ground for a record integration of western armaments into soviet legacy systems. The AGM-88 (HARM) missile has reportedly been carried by MiG-29 and Su-27S on operations to suppress Russian GBAD. Furthermore, the plans to integrate the JDAM-ER guided bomb into the PZU seem to be going forward too and would give Ukraine quite relevant deep strike capabilities, especially if the plans to provide them with more MiG-29 fighters succeed. It must be also considered that sending old equipment to Ukraine is also a relatively easy way for some countries to modernise their arsenal. For example, Poland will receive F-35s in exchange for the old MiG-29s sent to Ukraine.
The primary task now is to hold back Russian airpower over the frontlines, and for that Ukraine needs a constant supply of munitions, especially surface-to-air ones, which it came into possession of following the collapse of the Soviet Union the soviet legacy it still operates and for the new western systems it is receiving. Providing some aircraft in the short term (probably for Ukrainian offensives during the summer) cannot be discarded but it would require, among many things, decided political effort and sustained support from western partners. As previously said, when talking about weapons supply, we must look at the bigger picture. It became clear that the modernisation of the western war industry will require time and large amounts of effort. Some NATO members as France, and sometimes Germany, have shown their doubts about the provision of weapons to Ukraine, as Europe's stockpiles are becoming thinner and the US is trying to lead again and better position its arms industry. Paris and Berlin have had their ups and downs as some officials fear that the conflict will result in the overall weakening of the EU and legitimise a US-led Atlantic vision, as most of the Central and Eastern European countries have a stronger sympathy for the US than the Franco-German axis.
An unexpected 180-degree turn regarding diplomacy or the elites in the Kremlin seems unlikely for now. The prospect of a short war is long gone and Russia is demonstrating no signs of relenting. The West has been slowly but steadily increasing and calculating the relevance and effects of weapons provided to Ukraine. Increasing Ukrainian air capabilities is a clear challenge because part of the argument is still focused on this or that piece of hardware, and not airpower implications that should be considered first. As if that is not enough, beneath all the talk about aircraft hides the uncomfortable truth that, for now, Ukraine could more easily achieve what it wants in the battlefield with long-range missile systems, rather than aircraft. That opens the door to discussing important questions not only about offensives in Donbas, but about the future of Crimea. An impending Ukrainian offensive looms and tough decisions are going to be made. Even if Ukraine's maximalist objectives succeed and the Russians are forced to retreat to the pre-invasion or even pre-2014 borders, they would still be able to make Ukrainian economic recovery difficult either through impending normal trade in the Black Sea, sporadic attacks with missiles, raids with drones or covert actions, just to name a few. To counter some of these threats, Ukraine will still need long-term support and tools, with a capable air force being one of these. Some aircraft won't alter significantly the balance in the short-term, but with a steady supply, training and adequate maintenance, they will surely pose a threat to Russian operations in the future.