Southeast Asia's response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
Countries in Southeast Asia have been considered as subdued in their response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was only on 3 March that the foreign ministers of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) issued a statement calling for a cease-fire. ASEAN member states may be far away from the fighting, but they will nevertheless be affected by rising oil and gas prices, as well as disruption to food supply chains. ASEAN’s silence may be partly due to their detachment from the conflict, however, it also serves to disguise disharmony and their inability to achieve consensus on the matter.
Russia’s ties with ASEAN member states are, by and large, not that strong. A study published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in 2020 showed that even once China and the US have been removed from the picture, Russia is only ASEAN’s fifth most ‘preferred and trusted strategic partner’. Trade relations remain weak with negative growth in total trade between 2019 and 2020.
That said, Russia, like other great powers, is seeking to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, due to the region’s market potential and strategic position. To do so, Moscow is adopting traditional strategies such as the selling of arms: Russia provided 26 percent of the region’s weapons between 2000 and 2020. It is also supplementing these traditional tactics with new and alternative ones, such as vaccine diplomacy, to better its position.
Russia is trying to improve relations with the bloc as a whole. However, when looking more closely, it becomes evident that ASEAN member states do not have the same impression of Vladimir Putin. His decision to invade Ukraine has in turn provoked diverse reactions. Myanmar publicly supports Moscow’s decision. This does not come as a surprise considering that Myanmar regularly buys arms from Russia, and Putin maintains strong relations with the junta.
The responses of other ASEAN member states have been more indecisive. Vietnam and Laos also rely heavily upon the flow of arms from Russia to strengthen their defence capabilities. This helps to explain why they were the two ASEAN member states who initially abstained from the UN’s General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion. Nonetheless, their response has been more muted than that of Myanmar.
Countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, initially voted in favour of the UN resolution and criticised the attack on Ukraine. However, since then, both Jakarta and Manila said they will not impose sanctions on Russia. The Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared on 17 March that the Philippines intends to remain neutral in the conflict.
Singapore, on the other hand, has adopted a more aggressive stance in condemning Russia’s actions. Such behaviour comes as a surprise considering the country’s preferred position of neutrality. Nevertheless, Singapore, similar to Switzerland, has broken with its policy of neutrality and unilaterally imposed sanctions on Russia. The financial hub has imposed a range of export controls and financial sanctions on Russia banks and other financial institutions.
An easy position for ASEAN to adopt, when enmeshed in its own disharmony, is one of silence and passivity. Such a position may conceal the divisions, but it does not repair them. ASEAN will sooner or later be compelled to take a more active stance. This could lead to further unravelling of ASEAN unity, which despite being at the core of the ASEAN way, has already been significantly battered by the pandemic. What’s more, internal discord over relations with Russia is not the only cause for concern, how the invasion of Ukraine will shape the bloc’s relations with China may also pose additional obstacles.