Strategic Crossroads: Navigating the EU's Response to Coups in Africa
Since the beginning of 2023, the African continent has been struck with three different coups d’état, accelerating a trend of military takeovers in the context of national power disputes that started in 2020.
On 15 April, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – known as Hemedti –, head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, rose up against Sudan’s de facto ruler, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, unleashing a new military conflict in the country. Three months later, on 26 July, Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown by a military junta with a strongly anti-French discourse and a belligerent stance against the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). One month after, on 30 August, a military coup outsized Gabon’s President Ali Bongo Ondimba after an election riddled with irregularities. In every uprising, corruption, economic mismanagement and the government's inability to face jihadism and armed separatism were key factors, although not the only ones. International terrorism, migration fluxes and a race for resources have brought Africa into the spotlight of the international strategic competition, which has had a major impact on the great powers’ foreign policy, including that of the European Union.
In this context, the Union’s response moves between forcefulness and caution, combining economic sanctions and strong diplomatic statements with calls for dialogue in a difficult attempt for balance. On the one hand, the Union cannot afford to give up its interests in Africa. However, an adamant position can blow up any potential diplomatic links with the new de facto rulers.
A challenging and dangerous strategic context
Sudan
Brussels faces a multifaceted dilemma in responding to these crises. Sudan’s internal conflict represents one of the most challenging cases due to the complexity of its context, including an open confrontation between the country’s two leading figures, a widespread armed conflict and a major humanitarian crisis. Since the overthrow of Sudan’s long-lasting dictator, Omar al-Bashir, in 2019, both al-Burhan and Hemedti worked closely to seize control of the country, reaching a power-sharing agreement in 2021 between the military and the democratic forces for a transition into a civil government, a process widely supported by the EU. On 15 April, however, the process collapsed with the uprising of Hemedti and his RSF against al-Burhan and the rest of the army.
As a result, the conflict, which has no prospect of ending due to the force balance between both sides, has resulted in between 4 thousand and 10 thousand causalities, over 4.1 million internally displaced and 1.1 million refugees. Thus, the conflict has destabilised the Sudanese already precarious situation and threatens to spread to a key region for the EU. Sudan borders Libya and Egypt – two of the main crossing points for migrants towards Europe – which has turned it into one of the main transit hubs for migrants from the Horn of Africa and Syria. Additionally, Sudan is among the largest refugee-producing countries and is one of the ones with the highest number of internally displaced persons. Until the outbreak of the conflict, Brussels counted Khartoum as one of its regional partners in migration control and the EU’s externalisation border measures. However, the government’s collapse along with the war could generate an uncontainable weave of migration capable of reaching Europe. In turn, this could trigger a widespread destabilisation in a region already stricken by conflicts and refugee crises, with countries such as Libya, Ethiopia or Chad.
Niger
For its part, Niger has become a severe blow to the EU’s strategic interests in the continent. Its geographical location, between the Sahel and North Africa, has made it an important piece in the struggle against terrorist groups and irregular migration. Until the coup, Niger was France’s main strategic partner in the region as it hosted Operation Barkhane’s – French military operation against terrorist groups in the Sahel – troops and numerous military and training bases from the US and EU countries such as Italy and Germany. Additionally, Niamey played an essential role in France’s uranium supply strategy for both military and civil purposes.
In contrast, when the coup against Bazoum succeeded, the military junta adopted a strong anti-French and anti-Western rhetoric – mainly linked with the country’s colonial past – turning this crisis into an open confrontation between Niamey and Paris, which the EU has been dragged into. As a result, Brussels has seen the collapse of its regional stabilisation strategy, suspending all security cooperation agreements with Niger, including three military missions, one civil mission and the European Peace Facility funds. Additionally, Niger’s military junta ended all defence agreements with France, ordering the withdrawal of Western troops from its territory.
Gabon
In Gabon, its particular internal context has instead resulted in a more practical view of the coup by Brussels. On 26 August, President Ali Bongo was re-elected for a third term under accusations of election irregularities, a situation used by the military to overthrow him, ending five decades of the Bongo family rule. The coup, in turn, has posed a dilemma in Brussels. Meanwhile, the EU and France – Gabon’s longstanding partner – have condemned the coup, a pragmatic interpretation, stating that “hours before the military coup, there was a constitutional coup”. All reflects the EU’s intention to become an active mediator and avoid losing influence in another African country.
Different strategies for different contexts
The EU’s first response to the three coups was similar, quickly issuing diplomatic statements condemning the events in which the different considerations for each case can already be seen. Thus, Brussels condemned the “ongoing fighting in Sudan”, the “coup in Niger”, and the “seizure of power by force in Gabon”, calling for “a lasting ceasefire”, “a return to constitutional order and (…) support for President Bazoum” and “a substantial and inclusive dialogue” respectively. From this point, strategies have been diversified and tailored to each case.
On 29 July, the EU suspended all development and cooperation aid to Niger in a swift move to reflect the rejection of the coup and the breakdown in all relations with the new government. So far, the measure has not been imposed to Sudan or Gabon as Brussels remains interested in maintaining relations with both governments. As regards humanitarian aid, in any case, it has been frozen, not only because of a humanitarian commitment but also because of the EU’s structural weakness towards migration. In all three cases, the suspension of humanitarian aid would put further pressure on an already impoverished population, which, together with the impossibility of coordinating with the Nigerian and Sudanese governments to control migration, would increase migration flows to Europe.
In the same line, on 31 August, barely a month after Niger’s coup, EU foreign ministers agreed on creating a legal framework for individual sanctions – including asset freezes and travel bans – against the military junta, which was finally approved on 23 October. In the case of Sudan, the legal framework for individual sanctions against both parties was only proposed on 3 October, six months after the military uprising. In this sense, the speed with which sanctions were imposed reflected Brussels’ strategic goals and concerns. In a context of clear confrontation with the Nigerian junta and alignment with the regional opposition of ECOWAS, sanctions were quickly imposed against its leaders, while in Sudan, the precarious situation along with the EU’s aim of trying to mediate between both parties have been critical factors in the delay. As for Gabon, the efforts for international mediation, the return to constitutional order, and the dangers of losing another strategic partner in the region have prevented the possibility of imposing sanctions from even being raised.
Conclusion
As the coups in Sudan, Niger, and Gabon have shown, the EU finds itself caught between the promotion of stability through democracy and the promotion of its strategic interests as the continent plunges into a new wave of militarisation of national politics.
On the one hand, Brussels continues to demand the return to a democratic order in all cases. However, the specific measures applied in the past months reflect the acknowledgement that each case is different and that it is necessary to design different approaches to each of them. In Sudan, the fierce struggle between the two generals and the lack of willingness to dialogue has led to stricter measures against both parties. In contrast, the severe humanitarian situation has led to the maintenance of the aid. In Niger, the collapse of political relations with the military junta led to the rapid swift imposition of both suspensions in cooperation and economic sanctions. Gabon, in turn, has seen a more pragmatic approach with no specific measures, as the EU still expects to be able to mediate and maintain its influence.
What these cases really reflect, however, is the impossibility of the EU to anticipate the events and be a decisive factor in preventing the destabilisation of the African continent. For the time being, it remains to be seen if its response lives up to the expectations to maintain its influence and avoid a chaotic scenario that could potentially spill over into Europe.