The Failing Communication System: A Snapshot of the Declining Russian Military
Earlier campaigns for Russia’s military in the invasion of Ukraine have been catastrophic. In particular, its attempt to capture Kyiv ended with a full retreat back to Belarus. Western military critics have pointed out several problems within the Russian military, including corruption, inexperienced troops, and outdated military doctrines. Among all weaknesses, the problems with military communication seem to provide a comprehensive cause of all mentioned problems. This article will explore the failures of communication in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impacts.
Military communication has always been a crucial element in operations. Prioritising communication can provide reconnaissance updates on the battlefields for higher commands. But most importantly, it allows coordinated operations across services, units, and logistics. For Russia, its lack of attention to mentioned factors has severely hindered its war effort.
Poor communications infastructure and a reliance on civilian cell phones:
First, the Russian line of transmission lacks adequate communication tools. Ukrainian intelligence has discovered that Russian radios are underdeveloped for modern force requirements. Soldiers, and even generals, were asked to communicate through cell phones. The Ukrainian government immediately ceased mobile services for Russian numbers. Out of frustration, Russian troops had to rob civilians of their phones. Their owners simply cancelled the service. The range of communication is also limited, cutting frontline troops from contacting their headquarters.
Yet, the Kremlin had anticipated this weakness. The Russian Ministry of Defence developed a highly-encrypted and advanced communication system, the R-187P1 Azart. But suffering from corruption, few were ever made or deployed. Additionally, Russian forces have destroyed signal towers in Ukrainian cities, unintentionally cutting off signals used by Russian encrypted systems. As a result, even if equipped with the Azart, its practical usage is still limited.
Lack of encryption:
Without sufficient equipment, forces could only resort to non-encrypted high-frequencies devices, exposing classified information to hostile forces. Ukrainian intelligence has tracked Russian advances, geolocating units to allow ambushes. It has proven effective for the smaller Ukrainian forces to inflict heavy losses. Civilians could also jam Russian communications. Loud music has been blasted over transmission, ranging from the Ukrainian national anthem to heavy metal. Leaked recordings also provided insights into the status of Russian troops on the ground, revealing the lack of air support, water, and supplies on the frontline. Therefore, the Ukrainian military could even have a better understanding of the situation of Russian troops than the military itself.
Overly-centralised command and control:
Furthermore, communication summarises the failing command structure in Russian leadership. Its hierarchy inherited a similar military construct as the Soviet Union. Instead of allowing independent command by officers on the field, control over military operations are highly centralised with the generals. Since most troops are inexperienced conscripts, not only are they not familiarised with military command, but also with the operation of communications tools. To avoid leaking intelligence and to issue direct orders, generals had to travel forward to the battlefront and give orders directly. In positions vulnerable to fire, it put generals at unusual risk. Hence, the Ukrainian army, aided by Western intelligence, has accurately traced key generals by tracing communication signals. Then, target them with artillery bombardments. This explains the unprecedented number of deaths of generals in any modern conflict.
Military communication as key to Russia’s ineffectivenss:
To summarise, the case of military communication, presents a snapshot cause of the declining Russian military. Corruption restricted the application of advanced transmitting devices, inexperienced conscripts failed to follow military instructions, and the over-reliance on a centralised command structure failed to operate under limited communications. It is not a problem that can be solved instantly. Only a top-down reform in the military and the government could eradicate the problems plaguing the war. As for the current Battle of Donbas, little will change for the Russian army, and Ukrainian forces should actively seek to exploit.