Winter is Coming: What to expect from Winter in the Ukraine Conflict.


With the incoming winter, many questions are being raised as to what the effects of the season will bring on the war in Ukraine, both on the battlefield and throughout the world. The coming of winter has been analyzed as being a major part of Putin’s strategy as the war in Ukraine continues to rage longer than expected. Even then, the severity of winter will impact the range of its consequences and which side it hurts more. 

The war in Ukraine has entered a phase of important Ukrainian victories. Since the start of September, Ukraine has conducted major counter offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson which saw vast swathes of territory taken back from Russian forces (especially in Kharkiv). Even more recently, strategic towns in the Donbass like Lyman have been retaken by the Ukrainian military, and the slow but methodical offensive in Kherson is starting to bear fruit as Russian forces have started pulling back from indefensible positions along the Dnieper. These battlefield defeats prompted Vladimir Putin to mobilize the population in order to plug holes in Russian defensive lines with mostly untrained and poorly motivated men. 

The mobilization of hundreds of thousands of men is a costly and time-consuming process however. By most estimates, Russia has neither the equipment nor training personnel readily available to actually give these men enough support and make them at least semi-effective on the battlefield. Just the bureaucratic challenges themselves make mobilizing that many soldiers a process that will likely take several months, even if Russia does not plan on training or adequately equipping anyone. The oncoming winter is therefore likely part of the Russian battlefield calculation. The Russian MOD and Putin know that Russia will not be able to gain back an offensive initiative for the next few months at least. It is therefore likely that the Kremlin is enlisting one of its most tried and true assets in “General Winter”. Russia is likely hoping that a harsh winter will do two things, firstly the difficult terrain and conditions will help stall the Ukrainian advance, as military offensives are notoriously difficult to sustain in winter; secondly, a pause in major advances will give Russia the ability to properly mobilize its reinforcements and deploy them in Ukraine, readying them for renewed hostilities. 

While the coming winter will surely prove to be a hindrance for the side that is currently dictating the tempo (in this case Ukraine), the Russian military will also face some major difficulties in navigating such harsh conditions themselves. Mainly, the poor outfitting and training of mobilized Russian conscripts is likely to cause as many difficulties to Russian operations as Ukrainian ones. To sustain an adequate fighting force in such harsh conditions necessitates good logistics in order to supply soldiers with food and winter clothing, something that the Russian military has shown itself as unable to do. The winter may give Russian forces a respite from Ukrainian offensives, however, it is likely to not give them the ability to fix any of the major supply and training issues it has been plagued with, on top of finishing off the already abysmal morale of Russian troops. 

Another effect of winter will be its economic significance, which has been a major component of this war. Since the very start of the invasion, European countries have been planning and reacting to the threat of being without Russian energy this winter. As Europe still gets a huge portion of its energy from Russian gas, and as energy consumption rises dramatically during winter months, a real risk has been identified for years over Europe’s vulnerability to Russian economic warfare in this regard. Both Russian posturing on the matter and the recent sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines have made clear that Europe will have to endure the winter with either very little or no Russian gas at all. While Russia needs oil and gas revenue to sustain its vulnerable economy, it is likely that a calculation has been made in the Kremlin over the need to put maximum pressure on Europe this year in order to weaken the resolve of European states in their support for Ukraine’s war effort. If the winter proves to be severe, many European countries with a high percentage of their energy coming from Russia, like Germany, will have to face not only rationing of energy, but will likely be forced to shut off power to certain sectors or areas of the grid entirely so as not to overextend its reserves. While some voices claim Europe has adequately prepared and diversified its sources of energy enough to navigate the winter, the increased strain may significantly test the resolve of the European population in their support for Ukraine.


The geopolitical consequences of the next few months will be important in determining the direction of the war. If the Ukrainian counter offensives stall significantly and new Russian forces are able to coalesce around the front lines, it will prove to be complicated for Ukrainian forces to continue the rapid re-capture of occupied territories. This, coupled with the possible consequences of a rough winter, will also determine how far Europe is willing to go in its support for Ukraine. If energy prices prove to be too high and European states are shown to be unable to quell the domestic consequences of such a crisis, some countries may show an increased impatience in their support for Ukraine and may dial down their hard stances that the war should continue until a total Russian defeat. If Putin’s bid to coerce Europe fails and the West is able to navigate the season with few consequences however, then Russia will likely continue facing overwhelming pressure domestically and internationally to either find a settlement, or wait until they suffer a total military defeat. Maintaining hundreds of thousands of conscripts over months of challenging weather with defective equipment is likely to take its toll on the Kremlin as well, and if there ends up being no end in sight, Russian soldiers have traditionally (Russo-Japanese war, WW1, Soviet-Afghan war) not shied away from voicing their displeasure at their government, sometimes violently.


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